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3PREFACE
This work studies the nature of nationalism in a country whose 
stability is of vital concern to Western Europe. Apart from Russia 
herself, Ukraine is the largest country to emerge from the break-up of the 
USSR, and its size, population, economic potential and military power 
mean that the stability, or even survival, of most other states in the 
region is dependent on what happens in Ukraine. Moreover, relations 
between Ukraine and Russia are the key to the politics of the whole 
region. Ukraine's attitude to Russia is complicated, however. On the one 
hand, many Ukrainian nationalists are deeply hostile to Russia as their 
traditional imperial enemy, but on the other hand they are in a minority 
within their own country. Many ethnic Russians or Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians in Eastern and Southern Ukraine would prefer to see the 
maintenance of close links with Russia. The Ukrainian nationalist 
movement has therefore historically been weak, unable to command a 
natural majority in its own country. In response to this weakness, some 
Ukrainian nationalists have in the past sought to build bridges with 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine by constructing a broad-based civic 
nationalism, whilst others have reacted in frustration and embraced an 
authoritarian ethnic nationalism of the type which has caused so much 
trouble elsewhere in Europe after the collapse of communism.
This work therefore examines the nature of the modem Ukrainian 
nationalist movement since its emergence in 1988. It demonstrates that 
the movement was unable to fully overcome its historical weaknesses, 
and that Ukrainian independence was only achieved in August 1991 
with the help of the former imperial elite in Ukraine, that is with those 
'national communists' who embraced the national cause in 1990-1. After 
independence, in 1991-2, the nationalists were able to push their agenda
on the national communists, but were unable to expand their overall 
appeal. The nationalists were therefore not in a strong position to 
prevent the national communists backsliding on their agenda, as leftist 
and regional lobbies began to grow in Eastern and Southern Ukraine 
from the summer of 1992 onwards. The work also demonstrates that, 
although most Ukrainian nationalists emphasised civic nationalism in 
1988-90, most had moved to the right by the end of 1992. Ethnic 
nationalism, only a minority concern in 1988, was growing strongly in 
popularity by the end of the period.
The work is based on original sources collected in Ukraine during a 
series of visits in 1991-2, including party press and publications, party 
archives, interviews with leading figures, and the Ukrainian press, both 
central and local. The limited range of secondary literature available was 
also consulted.
Chapter 1 uses the ideal-type distinction between ethnic and civic 
nationalism to examine the development of the Ukrainian nationalist 
movement in the twentieth century. Chapter 2 surveys the development 
of political parties in Ukraine, and then Chapters 3-7 look at the main 
nationalist parties individually. Chapter 8 then looks at the key split in 
the nationalist movement in early 1992, and at various attempts to bind 
the nationalist camp back together.
Transliteration is based on the Library of Congress system. However, 
in a common modification of the system, words beginning with 'iu' or 
'ia' begin with a 'y' (therefore 'Yurii' instead of Turn'). A soft sign is 
transliterated as an apostrophe (Nezalezhnist' ), and a Ukrainian 
apostrophe as a speech mark (Luk"ianenko ). Ukrainian and Russian 
words are in italics, except those which have passed into common usage 
such as perestroika and glasnost (no apostrophe), as excessive 
italicisation is ugly. Ukrainian place names are used throughout,
therefore 'Odesa' is used instead of 'Odessa', the 'Donbas' instead of the 
'Donbass', and so on. 'Kiev', rather than 'Kyiv' is retained as a common 
Anglicism.
I have innumerable people to thank, but the following are most 
worthy of mention. Jonathon Aves, Dominique Arel and Brendan 
O'Leary contributed invaluable comments on the text; and my secretaries 
Jenny and Marion help in practical matters. My supervisor Dominic 
Lieven provided patient and constructive guidance, and was always 
around when I needed advice. Taras Kuzio has helped me with contacts 
in Ukraine. In Ukraine itself, I would like to thank Valentyn Yakushik; 
Ihor Ostash, Yurii Petrus and all the staff at the International 
Association/School of Ukrainian Studies. I am grateful to Natalka Petrus 
for her hospitality. Above all, I would like to thank Helen Skillicom in 
London for her love and support.
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UNR Ukrainian People’s Republic
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VOST All-Ukrainian Organisation of Workers' Solidarity
WUU Writers’ Union of Ukraine
81. Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Ukraine:
Political Parties, the Intelligentsia and the State.
Introduction
The years 1987-91 witnessed the spectacular growth and ultimate success of a 
powerful movement for national revival and independence in Ukraine. The 
formal declaration of Ukrainian independence on 24 August 1991, its 
ratification by popular referendum on 1 December 1991, and the subsequent 
struggle to underpin the declaration by building a viable nation-state have had 
profound consequences for the balance of power in Eastern Europe. Ukrainian 
independence was the single most decisive factor leading to the dissolution of 
the USSR, and Ukrainian nationalism has been a key factor in regional politics 
ever since. After Russia, Ukraine is the largest state in the region, and the 
fortunes of its smaller neighbours are inextricably bound up with those of the 
new Ukrainian state. Moreover, the interplay between Ukrainian and Russian 
nationalism will be the key determinant of the prospects for regional stability 
into the next century and beyond.
Ukrainian nationalism was a relatively weak force in the pre-Soviet period, 
and even in the Gorbachev era developed late. Hence Ukraine’s declaration of 
independence caught many observers by surprise. Many were also surprised by 
the degree to which Ukrainian nationalism had apparently changed since the 
last serious attempt to gain Ukrainian independence, led in the 1940s by the 
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The OUN's uprising in 1941 
followed in the wake of the German invasion, and the OUN gained a 
reputation as a neo-fascist and ethnic nationalist organisation. However, the 
modern Ukrainian national movement has from the beginning stressed its 
commitment to dvic nationalism, thereby initially at least confounding the
9thesis that Eastern European nationalism is somehow always ’ethnic’, 
exclusivist and uncivilised, and Western European nationalism ’civic’ and 
universal. 1 However, despite the rhetoric, Ukraine’s new civic nationalism has 
yet to be tested under crisis conditions. The mainstream nationalist movement 
has pursued what is in effect an ethnic agenda, and openly ethnidst groups 
have emerged on the far right. This thesis will therefore examine whether 
Ukrainian nationalism has in fact yet fully transcended the legacy of the past, 
and the extent to which civic nationalism has put down deep roots in 
contemporary Ukraine.
Ukraine provides an excellent test-case for the study of the differences 
between the two ideal-types of ethnic and civic nationalism; both 
geographically, as ethnic nationalism is supposedly more common in Eastern 
Europe; and historically, as Ukrainian nationalists in the 1990s daim  to have 
left behind the ethnic nationalism of their counterparts in the 1930s and 1940s. 
The stability of this commitment, along with the course of events in Russia, 
will determine whether inter-ethnic relations in the region remain peaceful, or 
follow the Yugoslav route. As both Russia and Ukraine inherited nuclear 
weapons after the collapse of the USSR, inter-ethnic peace in the region is 
obviously highly desirable.
This opening chapter will firstly examine the notion of ’Eastern 
exceptionalism' propounded by Hans Kohn and others, who argued that 
Eastern Europe nationalism always tended to be of a more intolerant, ethnidst 
type. Then it will consider the extent to which the Ukrainian national 
movement before the Gorbachev era could in fact be validly described as 
ethnidst. Subsequent changes to the Ukrainian sodal and political system (in 
particular the role of the intelligentsia, the state and national communism) 
will then be examined, with a view to considering whether dvic nationalism is 
now likely to be more firmly rooted in Ukraine, or whether a reversion to 
ethnic nationalism is likely.
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Eastern and Western Europe: Ethnic versus civic nationalism
Hans Kohn first proposed the idea of a separate and distinct Eastern 
European brand of nationalism. According to Kohn, nationalism was an 
ideology imported into Eastern Europe by local intelligentsias in the nineteenth 
century but, 'while the new nationalism in Western Europe corresponded to 
changing social, economic and political realities, it spread to Central and 
Eastern Europe long before a corresponding social and economic 
transformation'^ had taken place.
According to Kohn, the classic Western European nation-states formed in 
such countries as England, France and Holland were based on dvic concepts of 
universal dtizenship for all dasses and sodal groups in the nation (although in 
all three there were in fact religious criteria for dtizenship). This idea was first 
popularised by the rising middle dasses and then gradually extended to the 
lower orders, so that by the late nineteenth century most sodal dasses were 
relatively well-integrated into the sodal order. Moreover Western European 
nationalism could be fairly secure and self-confident because the nation-state 
was more or less congruent to a well-defined territorial homeland, whose core 
ethnie had established state control over periphery areas largely in the pre­
industrial era, when peripheral communities were easier to assimilate or 
simply to dominate politically, although of course this process was in fact long 
and bloody, particularly in Britain and France.
To this analysis could be added a geographical divide based on Eastern 
Europe's relative isolation from Roman civilisation, the Reformation and 
Enlightenment, plus the 'refeudalisation' of many parts of Eastern Europe 
from the sixteenth century onwards.
In Eastern Europe therefore, in contrast to the West, 'nationalism arose not 
only later, but also generally at a more backward stage of sodal and political
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development; the frontiers of an existing state and of a rising nationality rarely 
coincided; nationalism there grew in protest against and in conflict with the 
existing state pattern - not primarily to transform it into a people's state, but to 
redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands'.^ 
The group most susceptible to nationalist ideas was the intelligentsia, but 
the Eastern European intelligentsia did not occupy the same social position as 
the Western European middle classes. If the latter were substantial property 
owners, whose social preeminence was underpinned by the control either of 
business or the professions, the Eastern European intelligentsia, according to 
Kohn, was doubly isolated, both from an imperial and cosmopolitan upper 
class, and from a parochial and illiterate peasantry. A dvic order in which all 
sodal dasses could feel they had some stake was also largely absent. Hence the 
intelligentsia tended to ground their nationalism in abstract notions of 'the 
people’, derived from Rousseau and Herder, and blood-based notions of 
genealogical descent. Even if the intelligentsia's rhetorical appeal to 'the 
people’ did not actually result in the political partidpation of the lower orders, 
it was still epistemologically necessary for defining the 'nation'.^
Local intelligentsias, having first imported the ideology of nationalism from 
the West, tended either to seek to use nationalism as a modernising ideology to 
compete with, and possibly overtake the West on its own terms, or as a form of 
prestige nationalism to prove that local traditions were equal to, or superior to 
those of the West, whose example could therefore be rejected. Either way, a 
sense of urgency and insecurity was imparted into nationalism that tended to 
mutate it in the direction of authoritarianism.
This tendency was also promoted by the practical geographical conditions of 
ethnic intermingling in Eastern Europe. Various ethnie overlapped and 
interpenetrated. They tended to be internally divided into a multitude of local 
peasant loyalties, and were all subsumed in caste-based empires. This led, at 
least among the intelligentsia, to a 'borderland consciousness',5 a sense of
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intense competition with neighbouring ethnie , and to the belief that any given 
group faced a stark choice between intensely promoted national revival or 
death. The state configuration of Eastern Europe, always involving either 
empire or states with substantial ethnic minorities, added to these fears, 
promoting intense competition between neighbouring groups over disputed 
regions.
Therefore, Kohn argued, Eastern European nationalism tended to veer 
between periods of insecurity and aggression. Eastern European nationalists felt 
that they could not afford to follow Western European civic concepts of 
voluntary or territorial citizenship, but felt compelled to make exclusive claim 
to their brethren on inalienable ethnic or blood lineage grounds.^ That is, 
nationality can be neither chosen at random nor opted out of. Rather, ideas of 
'authentidty', derived from Herder, meant that a person's true individuality 
lay in his inalienable nationality. The practical divorce of many sections of the 
population from the national idea, however, led Eastern European 
intelligentsias to advocate programmes of national revival or popular 
'mobilisation', (led of course by themselves) that would restore individuals’ 
true selves, whether they sought such a transformation or not. According to 
Kohn's thesis therefore, Eastern European nationalism was always less likely to 
be at peace with its surroundings, both because of its need for external enemies, 
and because of its restless compulsion towards a forced pace of 'nation- 
building' at home.
Kohn's analysis is useful for the two ideal-types that it contrasts, but it is 
often in practice difficult to distinguish between cases of ethnic and dvic 
nationalism. Of the paradigmatic dvic cases listed by Kohn, only the northern 
Scandinavian countries fit his model exactly, but they are ethnically 
homogeneous in any case (apart from Finland). Few other states have 
ethnically neutral dtizenship requirements, -  France f-Dr 
Even the USA and other colonial democracies, which as sodeties of largely
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voluntary immigration, have come closest to the ideals of dvic nationhood, 
have in practice discriminated against their own native and black populations. 
However, the ideal-types can be applied to the Ukrainian case as a test-case for 
the conditions that might favour one type of nationalism over the other.
In summary then, the argument of Kohn and his supporters can be broken 
down into a geographical premise (ethnic intermingling and the perception of 
territorial insecurity produce a 'borderland consciousness' and consequent 
ethnic tension), and a social premise (middle classes underpin civic 
nationalism). This opening chapter will first examine the geographical issue, 
before moving on to the sodal question.
Ukraine and its regions
Ukraine, both in 1943 and today, certainly met Kohn's first condition for the 
emergence of ethnic nationalism. Modem Ukraine is a multi-ethnic state with 
extreme patterns of regional diversity. Neither Ukraine, nor its predecessor the 
Ukrainian SSR, is a well-established state formation. Its borders were only 
established in the post-war period, when they were accorded only 
administrative significance, and Ukraine contains sizeable regions and 
minorities whose long-term loyalty to the state may well be in question. 
Modern Ukrainian nationalists have good reason to feel insecure about their 
control over Eastern and Southern Ukraine (and to a lesser extent of some of 
Ukraine's western borderlands). The following section will explain these 
differences, which will also help the reader later on in the text. Kohn's sodal 
conditions for the emergence of ethnic nationalism will be examined later in 
this chapter.
In the modem era a Ukrainian state has only existed briefly in the late 
seventeenth century and in 1917-20, but in neither period was it a secure entity, 
with firm control over all the territory in present-day Ukraine. Ethnically
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Ukrainian lands have therefore tended to be subsumed in empires, or 
dispersed amongst several states. The present-day borders of Ukraine, inherited 
from the Ukrainian SSR, fit more closely to Ukrainian ethno-linguistic 
territory than at any other time in the modem era, but the fit is still not exact, 
and significant patterns of diversity still exist within its boundaries (see Map 
1.1). Moreover, Ukraine's territory is not all integrated economically, both 
because it was a peripheral region in an imperial economic system, and because 
the inheritance of the hyper-centralised command economy has to date 
prevented the development of localised markets which would help foster 
integrative forces.
Ukraine is more accurately a bi-ethnic state (or at least a bi-lingual state), 
with substantial peripheral minorities. It has a huge ethnic Russian minority 
(11.4 million, or 22% of the total population in 1989), while the indigenous 
population has also been subject to centuries of Russification, whose impact 
has been particularly intense in the post-war period. From 1970 to 1989 alone 
the number of Ukrainians with a working knowledge of Russian increased 
from 44% to 72%7 From 1959 to 1989 the number of Ukrainians speaking 
Russian as their native tongue rose from 2 to 4.6 million, while the Ukrainian- 
speaking population of the republic fell from 73% to under 65%. By 1989, 50.6% 
of the republic's children studied in Russian language schools, and only 48.6% 
in Ukrainian.® Moreover, many Ukrainians speak the Ukrainian /Russian 
mixture known as surzhyk  . The existence of a massive Russophone 
population, heavily concentrated in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, is a key 
factor weakening the Ukrainian national movement. Ukraine also has 
problems on its western borders with substantial Moldovan/Romanian, 
Hungarian and Rusyn minorities.
This pattern of regional diversity, described in detail below, has meant that 
Ukrainian political parties find it difficult to appeal across the whole territory of 
modem Ukraine, whilst the pattern of their support can be used as a key
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indicator of their political profile and social base. Nationalist parties tend to be 
concentrated in Western Ukraine, especially in Galicia, leftist parties (in the 
traditional Western sense of the term) in urban Central and Eastern Ukraine, 
and Russophone groups in Eastern and Southern Ukraine.
For the present study Ukraine will be divided into the following eight 
regions, listed in Table 1.1, along with the present-day oblasts that they contain. 
These regions are shown in Map 1.1.
Table 1.1: Ukraine’s Regions
Region
Galicia
Volyn’-Polissia 
Other West 
Right Bank
Kiev*
Left Bank 
East
South
Oblasts
L’viv, Ternopil’, Ivano-Frankivs’k 
Rivne, Volyn’
Transcarpathia, Chemivtsi
Khmel'nyts'kyi, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr,
Cherkasy, Kivovohrad
city and oblast
Poltava, Sumy, Chemihiv
Kharkiv**, Dnipropetrovs'k, Donets’k,
Luhans'k, Zaporizhzhia
Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Crimea
* Kiev is treated separately. See below.
** There is strong historical case for considering Kharkiv as the historical 
centre of Left Bank Ukraine, but its economic, demographic and socio-linguistic 
profile is more similar to that of the other four eastern oblasts, so it is here 
considered as part of Eastern Ukraine.
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Galicia
Galicia, or to be precise Eastern Galicia, the three Ukrainian oblasts of L'viv, 
Temopil' and Ivano-Frankivs’k, has for the last century and a half been the 
foremost centre of Ukrainian nationalism.^ The area was part of the medieval 
proto-Ukrainian princedom of Kievan Rus' , whose traditions lingered longer 
in Galicia thanks to the establishment of the kingdom of Galida-Volyn’ that 
flourished after the sack of Kiev by the Mongols in 1240 until the fourteenth 
century. Galicia was then under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from 
1387 to 1772, apart from a brief period after the Cossack revolt led by Bohdan 
KhmeTnyts’kyi in 1648.
With the First Partition of Poland in 1772, Galicia came under Habsburg 
rule, where it remained until the empire's collapse in 1918. The relatively 
liberal Habsburgs allowed Ukrainian civil society to revive in the nineteenth 
century, and also encouraged the flowering of Ukrainian (then called 
'Ruthenian') national identity, and its main institutional bulwark, the Uniate 
Catholic Church, as a counterweight against the traditional Polish dominance 
of the region. This Galician national revival resulted in the formation of the 
West Ukrainian People's Republic after the collapse of the Habsburg empire in 
1918, which united with the larger Ukrainian People's Republic based in Kiev 
in 1919.
As a result of the collapse of would-be Ukrainian state and the Polish- 
Ukrainian war of 1919-20 some seven million Ukrainians fell under Polish 
control, although this was only internationally recognised in 1923 after Poland 
promised to grant Galicia autonomy. Poland however failed to deliver on such 
promises, and the Ukrainians embarked on a long struggle against Polish rule, 
in which the OUN (see above) was prominent. Galicia was seized by Stalin as a 
result of the Nazi-Soviet pact in September 1939. The OUN (now split into two 
factions) now struggled against Soviet rule and returned with the invading 
German armies in 1941, issuing a symbolic declaration of Ukrainian
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independence in L'viv on 30 June 1941. The OUN fought on against the Red 
Army until the early 1950s.
Despite the defeat of the OUN and widespread post-war purges, Galicia has 
continued to function as the main stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism. In 
fact, its population became even more solidly Ukrainian as a result of the 
wartime (and post-war) death, departure and expulsion of the local Jewish and 
Polish population. Apart from a one-off in-migration of Russian officials in the 
late 1940s, Galicia has never been subject to Russification in the same manner 
as Eastern Ukraine. According to the 1989 census the ethnic Ukrainian 
percentage of the population of the three Galician oblasts was 93%.10 Linguistic 
Russification in the area is minimal, and if anything has been in decline. In 
the 1989 Soviet census, 87% of the L’viv population gave Ukrainian as their 
native language, 97% in Temopil’, and 96% in Ivano-Frankivs'k.H Apart from 
L'viv oblast, the area contains little industry and few large urban centres. It is 
therefore the one rural area in modem Ukraine with a strong nationalist 
tradition.
Galicia likes to think of itself as the true upholder of the Ukrainian 
language, culture and traditions, and has historically sought to perform a 
proselytising role (as the ’Ukrainian Piedmont'), spreading the true national 
faith to the rest of Ukraine. However, Galicia is atypical, both because of its 
fervent commitment to nationalism, and because of its Uniate faith (the rest of 
Ukraine is Orthodox), and its nationalist messianism is not always well- 
received in the rest of Ukraine.
Volyn’-Polissia
Volyn’-Polissia, in north-western Ukraine, again has a strong nationalist 
tradition, but its different historical experience justifies its separate treatment. 
The region belonged to Kievan R us' and became one of its successor 
principalities after 1240. It was then subject to Polish-Lithuanian rule from the
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fourteenth century, and that of the Tsars after the third Partition of Poland in 
1795. The strong local Uniate tradition was then eradicated in favour of 
Orthodoxy. The region reverted to Poland in 1920, and was then incorporated 
into the Ukrainian SSR at the same time as Galicia - temporarily in 1939 and 
permanently in 1945. The northern forests of Volyn’-Polissia were however a 
stronghold of OUN resistance in the 1940s (where the nationalist guerrilla 
leader Borovets’ declared the 'Olevs’k republic’ in 1941). The region was 94% 
Ukrainian in 1989, and remained strongly rural. The Ukrainian language was 
still dominant, with 93% of the population in Rivne using it as their native 
language, and 95% in Volyn'.
Other West
1) Transcarpathia
Transcarpathia (the region separated by the Carpathian mountains from the 
rest of Ukraine) was a part of Hungary for centuries, before becoming part of the 
new Czechoslovak state (with a degree of autonomy) after the treaties of Saint- 
Germain and Trianon in 1919 and 1920. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, however, a strong local national revival took place under Oleksandr 
Dukhnovych. This national revival however was split between competing pro- 
Russian, pro-Ukrainian and pro-Rusyn tendencies until 1938 (Rusynism is the 
idea that the local population form a separate ethnie as R u s y n s ) . ! ^  Even 
Dukhnovych himself typified the split personality of the region, as he 
condemned the Rusyn dialect as not suitable for the formation of a literary 
language.
By 1938 the Ukrainiophiles seemed victorious, with the formation of the 
short-lived Carpatho-Ukrainian republic under the Uniate priest Afgustyn 
Voloshyn after Hitler's dismemberment of Czechoslovakia (although the 
republic was crushed by Hungarian invasion in 1939) and the addition of the
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area to Ukraine in 1945, but an autonomist or even separatist Rusyn 
movement has revived strongly in the early 1 9 9 0 s .  13
The local population in 1989 was officially 78% Ukrainian, 13% Hungarian 
and 9% Others, but as respondents to the census were not allowed to class 
themselves as Rusyns, the local Rusyn movement now claims that up to two 
thirds of the (977,000) local 'Ukrainians' are in fact R u s y n s .  14 Similarly, 74% of 
the oblast population was reported by the census as Ukrainianophone, but this 
would include all those speaking the Rusyn dialect. Revanchists in both 
Slovakia and Hungary have made claims against Transcarpathia, but unlike 
Chemivtsi, this has not been on an official level.
2) Chemivtsi
The territory of Northern Bukovyna, the core of what is now Chemivtsi 
oblast, was also part of Kievan Rus' , but later fell under Ottoman rule before 
passing to the Habsburgs from 1776 to 1918. The area has always had a mixed 
Ukrainian and Romanian (and German and Jewish) population, but the 
former appeared dominant in November 1918 when a local Ukrainian viche 
(people's assembly) voted to add Northern Bukovyna to the newly-formed 
Ukrainian People’s R e p u b l i c .  *5 Jh e viche1s ambitions were crushed by 
Romanian invasion however, and by the award of the area to Romania by the 
treaty of Saint-Germain in 1919 as a reward for entering the Great War on the 
side of the Entente in 1916. Romania attempted to forcibly Romanianise the 
area after 1924, but it returned to Ukraine in 1940, if now somewhat swollen by 
Stalin's addition of the traditionally Romanian Bessarabian counties of Hertsa 
and Khotyn to the Ukrainian heartland of Northern Bukovyna. The 
population of the resulting Chemivtsi oblast in 1989 therefore was 71% 
Ukrainian, 20% Romanian/ Moldovan and 10% Other. Unlike Transcarpathia 
therefore, Ukrainian ethnic domination of the region is secure (the Ukrainian 
language population was 68% in 1989), although the period of Romanian rule
21
has resulted in a lower level of national consciousness than in Galicia (local 
Ukrainian civil society was much weaker than in neighbouring Galicia, and the 
local population mainly Orthodox). Romania however continues to press its 
territorial claim to the area, and to Southern Bessarabia in what is now Odesa 
oblast.
Right Bank
The region on the Right (Western) bank of the river Dnipro contains the 
five modem oblasts of Khmel'nyts'kyi, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy, and 
Kirovohrad. The first two represent the historical Ukrainian region (and 
Tsarist guberniia ) of Podillia, and the latter three the Right Bank proper. Most 
of what is now Kiev oblast was also historically part of the Right Bank, but Kiev 
will be treated separately, for reasons explained below.
Both regions are traditional heartlands of Ukrainian culture. Originally part 
of Kievan R us ' , they fell under the dominion of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth in the fourteenth century, although they joined in 
Khmel’nyts’ky’s rebellion in 1648. The local Ukrainians were mainly peasants 
who were often parochial in outlook, but they maintained their national 
consciousness in opposition to their Polish (and Jewish) overlords. The two 
regions did not fall under Tsarist rule until the second partition of Poland in 
1793.
The area is basically still rural, although Kirovohrad oblast, the closest of the 
five to Eastern Ukraine, contains much industry. In 1989 the local population 
was 89% Ukrainian. Russian language assimilation is also at a comparatively 
low level. In Khmel'nyts’kyi the Ukrainian language population in 1989 was 
91%, in Vinnytsia 90%, in Zhytomyr 87%, in Cherkasy 89%, and in Kirovohrad 
83%.
Left Bank
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The Ukrainian territories to the East of the river Dnipro, (the three modem 
oblasts of Poltava, Sumy and Chemihiv), also part of the original Kievan Rus' , 
were incorporated into Tsarist Russia at a much earlier stage, and therefore 
have exhibited a much higher degree of Russification to this day. Chemihiv 
fell under Muscovite control in 1522, and the rest of the area was acquired by 
the Tsars as the result of the Pereiaslav agreement in 1654, along with Kiev dty 
and what is now Kharkiv oblast. The area initially received a degree of 
autonomy as 'the Hetmanate', but this was extinguished by Catherine n. The 
Russian influence has therefore been greater than on the Right Bank, although 
Kharkiv, or Sloboda Ukraine, was the first centre of the Ukrainian national 
revival in the early nineteenth century.
Kharkiv has however been placed in Eastern Ukraine, as over the last 150 
years it has experienced patterns of industrialisation and further Russian in- 
migration similar to those occurring in Eastern Ukraine. The Left Bank's 
population in 1989 was 88% Ukrainian, similar to that of the Right Bank (the 
area's traditionally dose links to Russia are offset by it s high rural population: 
villages tend to be more ethnically Ukrainian), but levels of national 
consdousness tend to be lower. The Ukrainian language population was 86% 
in Poltava oblast, 78% in Sumy and 86% in Chemihiv.
Kiev
Kiev could be included in either the Right or Left Bank. The 1654 Pereiaslav 
agreement also gave the Tsars control of the dty, but most of what is now Kiev 
oblast was part of the Right Bank. In order to avoid this dilemma, but also 
because of Kiev dty's spedal status as the capital of the republic since 1934, Kiev 
will be treated separately. The dynamics of national revival in the capital have 
had a specific character of their own in any case, because of the concentration of 
the cultural intelligentsia and mass media in the city. Kiev oblast in 1989 was 
89% Ukrainian, but Kiev d ty  only 73% (plus 21% Russians and 4% Jews). The
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Ukrainian population of Kiev has steadily increased in the post-war period 
(from 66% in 1 9 5 9 ),! 6 however, as Ukrainian peasants from Central Ukraine 
have been sucked into the capital. Although the Russian language was 
traditionally dominant in the dty, the Ukrainian-speaking population has also 
risen from 44% in 1959 to 58% in 1989 (88% in Kiev oblast).
Eastern Ukraine
Eastern Ukraine is here taken to comprise the five modern-day oblasts of 
Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovs'k, Donets'k, Luhans’k, and Zaporizhzhia. Donets’k 
and Luhans’k together form the coal-mining region of the Donbas. The reasons 
for Kharkiv's inclusion have already been discussed. Zaporizhzhia is also 
induded as part of Eastern Ukraine as it exhibits patterns of industrialisation 
and Russification similar to the other four oblasts, although its southern 
littoral has more in common with the rest of Southern Ukraine. Both Kharkiv 
and Zaporizhzhia have substantial rural hinterlands around their oblast 
capitals, and are therefore more ethnically Ukrainian than the rest of Eastern 
Ukraine.
Most of the area was part of Kievan Rus' (when it was entirely rural), 
whilst Zaporizhzhia was the site of the headquarters of the Ukrainian Cossacks 
in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Kharkiv came under the Tsars' control 
in 1654, and the rest of the area in the colonisation drive to the south and east 
from 1752 to 1775, when Catherine II destroyed the Cossack's headquarters, the 
sich . However, the character of the area was totally transformed by the 
industrialisation drive of the late nineteenth century onwards. Unlike in 
Central Ukraine, the mining and metallurgical industries of the area mainly 
attracted Russian in-migrants, especially in the pre-1930s era. By 1989, the 
Ukrainian population of Kharkiv oblast was only 63%, that of Dnipropetrovs’k 
72%, Donets'k 51%, Luhans'k 52%, and Zaporizhzhia 63%. Moreover, the 
Russian population in the area's main urban centres was always
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proportionately higher, and as up to a quarter of local Ukrainians tend to be 
sufficiently assimilated to use Russian as their native language,* ^  the 
proportion of native language Ukrainian population in the area is even lower, 
and often in fact a m inority. In Kharkiv oblast in 1989 it was only 51%, in 
Dnipropetrovs’k 61%, in Donets'k 31%, in Luhans'k 35%, and in Zaporizhzhia 
only 49%. Moreover, the area is so highly urbanised that, apart from Kharkiv, 
the Russophone urban centres dominate the region. Hence the area has always 
been among the least receptive to the Ukrainian national idea. The authority of 
the various nationalist governments of 1917-20 was always precarious in 
Eastern Ukraine, which was a centre of Bolshevik support and the site of the 
rival Donets'k-Kryvyi Rih republic.
South
1) The Black Sea Coast
Southern Ukraine is here taken to comprise the three coastal oblasts of 
Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa, plus the Crimean peninsula. The northern 
Black Sea littoral has always been characterised by a complex pattern of multi­
ethnic settlement, including penetration by Ukrainians in the Kievan Rus' 
and Cossack eras, but it fell under a long period of Ottoman and Tatar 
domination until the conquest of the area by Russia's Tsars in the eighteenth 
century. Most of the area was annexed in 1774, and the Crimea in 1783.
The Tsars’ nineteenth century immigration policy further encouraged the 
influx of a multi-ethnic settler population, including Greeks, Bulgarians and 
Gagauz (Christian Turks). Odesa in particular became famous as a 
cosmopolitan dty.*® Land hunger in Central Ukraine however meant that the 
Ukrainian peasantry spread into the southern rural hinterland at the same 
time. However, although the countryside is mainly Ukrainian, patterns of 
industrialisation and urbanisation under the Soviet regime created urban
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settlements similar in character to those in Eastern Ukraine, highly Russified 
and lacking in institutional support for Ukrainian language and culture.
In 1989 the population of Kherson was 76% Ukrainian, and that of 
Mykolaiv 76%. Odesa oblast remains more multi-ethnic. Only 55% of the 
population was Ukrainian (49.9% in the city of Odesa), 27% Russian, 6.3% 
Bulgarian, 5.5% Moldovan, 2.6% Jewish, 1.1% Gagauz, and 2.5% Other. As in 
Eastern Ukraine, however, a high percentage of local Ukrainians were 
assimilated to the Russian language. The Ukrainian speaking population in 
1989 was only 68% in Kherson, 64% in Mykolaiv and 41% in Odesa.
2) The Crimea
The Crimean peninsula has always had a multi-ethnic population. 
Although Ukraine had some links with the peninsula in the early medieval 
period, from the 1420s until Tsarist conquest in 1783 it was dominated by the 
Crimean Khanate (and by the Ottoman Turks on its southern shores). Tsarist 
rule resulted in the emigration of much of the local Tatar population, and after 
the building of a railway link in 1876, their gradual displacement by (mainly 
Russian) settlers. Although the Treaty of Brest Litovs'k awarded the Crimea to 
Ukraine, in 1921 the Crimean Autonomous SSR was established as part of the 
Russian SSR, with considerable autonomy for the Crimean Tatars. The Tatars 
were however deported en masse in May 1944 for alleged wartime 
collaboration with the Germans, and the Crimean ASSR was abolished in 1946. 
The peninsula then became an integral part of the RSFSR until it was 
transfered to Ukraine in 1954 as a gift from Khrushchev to mark the 300th 
anniversary of the Pereiaslav agreement.
Considerable further post-war in-migration resulted in a population only 
26% Ukrainian, but 67% Russian in 1989 (before the Crimean Tatars were able 
to return in large numbers). It should however be borne in mind that the 
Crimea's northern flatlands have much in common geographically and
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ethnically with Ukraine's southern Black Sea coast, and that the Ukrainian 
share of the population there is correspondingly higher. In the rest of the 
peninsula, however, particularly in the all-important southern ports, the 
almost complete absence of Ukrainian media, schools and other cultural 
infrastructure means that the local population is the most highly Russified in 
Ukraine (the local Ukrainian speaking population was a mere 14% in 1989), 
and the least receptive to the national idea.
The information concerning the ethnic population breakdown in each 
oblast and the more significant figures for the Ukrainian speaking population 
is summarised in Table 1.2 below.
Table 1.2
The Relative Dominance of Ethnic Ukrainians and the Ukrainian Language 
Population in Ukraine in 1989. by oblast.
Oblast
Galicia
L 'viv
Ternopil'
Ivano-Frankivs’k
Volyn'-Polissia
Rivne
Volyn'
Other West 
Transcarpathia 
C hemivtsi 
Right Bank 
Khmel'nyts'kyi 
Vinnytsia
Ethnic Uk Ethnic R Other
90.4
96.8
95.0
93.3 
94.6
78.4 
70.8
90.4
91.5
7.2
2.3 
4.0
4.6 
4.4
12.5
6.7
5.8
5.9
2.4
0.9
1.0
2.1
1.0
9.1
22.5
3.8
2.6
U kLg
87.0
97.0
95.0
93.0 
94.5
74.0
68.0
91.0
90.0
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Zhytmoyr 84.9 7.9 7.2 87.0
Cherkasy 90.5 8.0 1.5 89.0
Kirovohrad 85.3 11.7 3.0 83.0
Kiev
city 72.5 20.9 6.6 58.0
oblast 89.4 8.7 1.9 88.0
Left Bank
Poltava 87.9 10.2 1.9 86.0
Sumy 85.5 13.3 1.2 78.0
Chernihiv 90.5 8.0 1.5 89.0
East
Kharkiv 62.8 33.2 4.0 51.0
Dnipropetrovs'k 71.6 24.2 4.2 61.0
Donets’k 50.7 43.6 5.7 31.0
Luhans'k 51.9 44.8 3.3 ' 35.0
Zaporizhzhia 63.1 32.0 4.9 49.0
South
Kherson 75.7 20.2 4.1 68.0
Mykolaiv 75.6 19.4 5.0 64.0
Odesa 54.6 27.4 18.0 41.0
Crimea 25.6 67.0 7.3 14.0
Lastly, some idea of the relative importance of Ukraine's various regions is 
provided by Table 1.3, which lists each region's share of national territory, 
population, and contribution to national income.
Table 1.3: The Relative Importance of Ukraine's Regions19
Region % of Uk territory % of Population % of national income
Galicia 8.2 10.3 10.2
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Volyn'-Polissia 6.6 4.5 3.1
Other West 3.4 4.2 3.3
Right Bank 20.4 15.1 13.6
Kiev dty  and oblast 4.8 8.8 9.5
Left Bank 14.0 8.9 8.7
East 23.8 33.5 37.6
South 18.8 14.8 14.0
In conclusion, Ukraine has inherited considerable problems of regional 
diversity which means both that the potential appeal of the nationalist message 
is likely to be highly variegated, and that problems of 'borderland 
consciousness' exist in modem Ukraine.
Inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine are considerably complicated by the 
existence of a large Russophone Ukrainian community. On the one hand, the 
Ukrainian, Russian and Russophone communities are culturally close, and the 
existence of a substantial middle group of Russified Ukrainians prevents the 
easy polarisation of ethnic relations into 'us' and 'them'. Inter-ethnic politics 
in other states are often dominated by zero-sum conflicts between sharply 
differentiated communities, where the main party battle is within each 
community rather than across ethnic divides, as ethnic 'flanking' parties force 
more m oderate parties to the extreme.20 The fact that both the 
Ukrainianophone and ethnic Russian groups have to compete for the loyalty of 
the Russified Ukrainian group somewhat reduce this tendency in Ukraine. On 
the other hand, recent experience in Yugoslavia and elsewhere have shown 
how quickly and sharply ethnic relations can become polarised in crisis 
situations. Moreover, although it is beyond the scope of this study, it is possible 
that Russian-speaking Ukrainians may side with ethnic Russians, if they decide 
that their language of everyday use is more important to their sense of identity
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than their passport ethnicity, thus sharply curtailing the potential support base 
for Ukrainian nationalism.
The analysis of nationalist parties and movements in Chapters 3-7 will 
draw heavily on information concerning the party's regional profiles as a key 
indicator of their commitment to civic or ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalist 
groups should be more accommodating towards Ukraine's regional differences, 
and would be expected to seek support throughout Ukraine, whereas ethnic 
nationalism would probably be confined to Western Ukraine, and Galicia in 
particular.
The Ukrainian Nationalist Tradition
It must now be asked how true Kohn's caricature of Eastern European 
ethnic nationalism was of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in and before 
1943. Its subsequent development can then be better traced.
The nationalist groups that appeared in Ukraine from 1988 onwards 
represented the fourth generation of the Ukrainian national movement in the 
twentieth century. The first wave was the liberal and socialist groups that 
appeared in Tsarist and Habsburg Ukraine at the turn of the century (Ukrainian 
lands were then divided between the two empires, see below), but which failed 
to achieve a Ukrainian nation-state when both empires collapsed in 1917-21.
1900-1921
Political parties began to appear in Tsarist Ukraine from 1900 onwards, but, 
although they were able to expand their influence after the 1905 revolution, 
they could never mobilise the population in significant numbers, proved 
highly fractious in 1917-20 and were crushed by the final and decisive 
imposition of Soviet rule in 1920.21 Moreover, ethnically Ukrainian parties 
were led either by liberal populists such as Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi or by
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socialists like Volodymyr Vynnychenko. Even the former tended to share the 
general commitment to socialism almost universal amongst the intelligentsia 
of the Tsarist empire at the time, and in any case their nationalism was 
moderated by the need to compete with larger socialist and all-Russian parties, 
which at the time were dominant in most Ukrainian dties.22
In such circumstances, the Ukrainian parties were unable to adopt 
maximalist strategies. Most supported various schemes for a federal 
accommodation with Russia, and only began to push for independence after 
the Bolsheviks' seizure of power in October 1 9 1 7 .  The Ukrainian People's 
Republic (in Ukrainian, UNR) they then established was, on paper at least, a 
model democratic and dvic state,23 although it soon collapsed as Ukraine 
became the battleground for numerous armies and the site of anti-Jewish 
pogroms in 1 9 1 9 -2 0 .2 4  if, however, the period leading up to the brief attempt to 
establish Ukrainian independence in 1 9 1 7 -2 1  was certainly dominated by the 
liberal and/or sodalist Ukrainian intelligentsia, the failure of that attempt, and 
the considerable inter-ethnic violence in the wars of 1 9 1 8 -2 1  contributed to a 
sharpening of Ukrainian national identity and the radicalisation of the 
national movement in the post-war y e a s .2 5
The largest party in this period, which daimed at least 75,000 members,26 
was the Ukrainian Party of Sodalist-Revolutionaries (UPSR). It was in many 
ways the local Ukrainian equivalent of the all-Russian Sodalist Revolutionary 
party (SRs), which embraced most of the ethnic Ukrainian village and city 
intelligentsia. Its programme was a mixture of Ukrainian nationalism and 
nineteenth century Populism. The UPSR’s origins could be traced back to the 
split in the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (see below) during the 1906 
revolution, and to local defections from the SRs, but its existence as a mass 
party began with its first congress in April 1917. Its leader Mykhailo 
Hrushevs'kyi was the first President of the UNR. Although it had virtually no 
influence in the dties, one source estimates that the UPSR received over 60%
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of the votes cast in Ukraine at the November 1917 all-Russian Constituent 
Assembly elections,27 although peasant support soon fell away in 1918 as the 
party failed to deliver on the all-important question of land reform. The UPSR 
was later to be reviled by nationalists like Dmytro Dontsov for its liberalism, 
and the party proved ineffective and fractious in government, splitting in 
March 1919 when its left wing formed the national communist Borotbisti 
party. The party was totally purged from Ukrainian life by 1921.
The first major political party established in Tsarist Ukraine was the 
Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP), set up in 1900. Its major ideologist 
Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi, who wrote the party's programme Samostiina Ukratna 
('Independent U k r a i n e ' ) ,28 left the RUP in 1902 to form the first avowedly 
nationalist Ukrainian party, the Ukrainian People's Party, (his slogan was 
'Ukraine for the Ukrainians!’), but its influence remained minimal. After a 
further split in 1904, when the Ukrainian Social Democratic Union left the 
RUP to join the all-Russian Mensheviks, the RUP renamed itself the 
Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDWP) at its second congress in 
1905. The USDWP, which claimed 5,000 m e m b e r s ,29 had similar socio­
economic policies to the all-Russian Mensheviks, but during the Great War 
effectively split in two. The majority of party members supported the journal 
Ukrains'ke zhyttia ('Ukrainian life’) run by the future revolutionary leaders 
Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, and were broadly socialist in 
their sympathies. A minority of radicals supported the Union for the Liberation 
of Ukraine (one of whose leaders was Dmytro Dontsov, who was to become the 
main ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism in the 1920s), which favoured an 
independent Ukraine under German-Austrian protection. Vynnychenko and 
Petliura's branch of the USDWP was prominent in the governments of both 
the UNR (where it provided 4 out of 8 members of the first cabinet) and the 
later 'Directorate'. After 1920 its members were forced into exile in Prague.
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The second party of broadly socialist orientation was the Ukrainian 
Democratic-Radical Party (UDRP) formed in late 1905. It almost disappeared in 
the period of Stolypin’s reaction after 1906-7, but after absorbing the centrist- 
liberal Ukrainian Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Radical Party, and the 
underground Society of Ukrainian Progressives, founded in 1908, it reemerged 
in June 1917 as the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Federalists (UPSF). The UPSF 
was a prominent participant in all the Ukrainian governments of 1917-20. The 
party's leadership in exile renounced socialism in 1923 and renamed the party 
the UDRP, but by then the party's influence was minimal.
As a point of comparison, all of the major all-Russian parties were active in 
Ukraine at the time; 50,000 of the Mensheviks' national strength of 200,000 was 
concentrated in Ukraine (30,000 in the Donbas alone), 9 out of 64 of the Kadets' 
gubernii organisations were in Ukraine, one sixth of the Trudovyky's strength 
was in Ukraine, and the SRs could claim a Ukrainian membership of 300,000.30 
The Bolsheviks claimed 60,000 supporters in Ukraine in Spring 1917.31 The key 
weakness of the Ukrainian parties was their failure to cooperate with the 
imperial, more accurately all-Russian, parties, which tended to be stronger in 
the dominant urban areas. This was to be an important lesson for the 
nationalist movement in the early 1990s. A similar argument was replayed 
about whether to cooperate with 'national communists'.
1921-1950s
Political parties lasted longer in Western Ukraine (especially in Galicia and 
Volyn’-Polissia, under Polish rule from 1920), including the moderate 
nationalist Ukrainian National-Democratic Organisation (UNDO), the 
Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party and (popular in the 1920s at least) the West 
Ukrainian Communist Party. Although Ukrainianisation and the cultural 
renaissance of the 1920s in Soviet Ukraine initially attracted many Western 
Ukrainians, most Ukrainian parties in Galicia, and in exile further afield,
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swung sharply to the right in reaction to the failures of 1917-21, and any 
lingering pro-Soviet sentiment was destroyed by the Great Famine in Soviet 
Ukraine in 1932-3. Hence, the major Ukrainian political organisation of the 
period, and the one with the most durable legacy, was in fact the ultra-right 
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) set up in 1929, and which soon 
outflanked more moderate Galician parties.32
The OUN originally had a militant 'integral nationalist' ideology, based on 
the ideas of Dmytro Dontsov, (although he was never formally a member of 
the OUN).33 Dontsov's political philosophy was the result of eclectic borrowing 
from the likes of Nietzsche, Maurras, Fichte, Pareto and Sorel. Its basis was 
firstly a violent critique of the socialist 'provincialism' and inferiority complex 
of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which he deemed responsible for the failure to 
create an independent Ukrainian state in 1917-21. He advocated instead a 
militant form of elite leadership that he termed 'the nationalism of the strong' 
(Chynnyi natsionalizm ).34 A Ukrainian nation-state could only be achieved 
through the 'initiative of the minority', in other words the embodiment by a 
minority elite of a true and pure 'national idea', a clear and simple programme 
around which the popular masses could consolidate. Dontsov understood this 
'national idea' not as the product of rational thought, or the agglomeration of 
social interests, but (in his interpretation of Hegel) as an abstraction to which all 
other values should be subordinated (his favourite slogan was 'The Nation 
Above All!'). A pure and inspiring 'national idea' could only exist as the 
representation of the spirit of a homogeneous ethnic nation, free from all 
internal disunity. Dontsov was an open opponent of democratic and liberal 
values. He admired the fascist corporate state, and believed that the nationalist 
political party should provide the nucleus for the 'ruling caste' in an ethnically 
pure future 'hierarchical society'.
The OUN of the 1930s in many respects conformed to Dontsov's ideal. His 
philosophical ruminations easily translated into a simplistic programme of
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national liberation, the glory of individual struggle and sacrifice, and ethnic 
exclusion that appealed strongly to the OUN’s social base amongst radical 
youth and the Galician peasantry.35
The OUN organised a terrorist campaign first against Polish and then Soviet 
rule, and in 1943 was the main force behind the creation of the Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army (known by its Ukrainian acronym, UPA), which fought a long 
and arduous struggle in Western Ukraine against Soviet (and on occasion, 
German) troops until as late as the mid-1950s.36 Estimates as to the number of 
men it had under arms vary from 10,000 to 200,000.37 The years of the UPA 
insurrection certainly left a bitter legacy of ethnic strife, with many in Western 
Ukraine seeing little or no difference between an anti-Soviet and an anti- 
Russian war.
The OUN, however, split in two in 1940 after the death in 1938 of its 
charismatic leader, Yevhen Konovalets'. The OUN's radicals (mainly younger 
supporters of Konovalets” would-be successor, the firebrand Stepan Bandera) 
had parted company with the more moderate leadership of Andrii Mel'nyk, 
with the former calling themselves OUN-b for 'Banderite' (later OUN-r for 
revolutionary), and the latter OUN-m for 'Mel'nykite1, (later OUN-s for 
’solidarity'). Both wings of the organisation, however, soon found (like the 
Vlasovites) that they had to adopt a mutated form of social democratic 
populism as they attempted to spread their appeal to Soviet Ukraine in 1941- 
4.38 Bandera's supporters were less prepared to compromise their ideology, but 
Bandera and the OUN-b's other main leader Yaroslav Stets'ko were arrested by 
the Germans in 1941 for having the temerity to proclaim a revived Ukrainian 
republic in L'viv after the German invasion of the USSR.
By 1943 the OUN had adopted democratic nationalism as its official 
ideology. With Bandera in prison, the OUN was now under the more 
moderate leadership of Mykola Lebed' and the UPA commander Roman 
Shukhevych. Moreover, in July 1944 Shukhevych and the OUN sponsored the
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creation of an underground coalition (the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation 
Council) with less radical parties like the UNDO.
After the early 1950s, the OUN only existed in exile. Many remained loyal 
to Dontsovite authoritarianism, including Bandera himself who had never 
had to make the compromises thought necessary to spread the organisation's 
influence in central and Eastern Ukraine, and a substantial body of UPA 
veterans, radicalised by their long struggle. Their dominance lead to a further 
split between the more moderate OUN-z (for zakordonnyi , or OUN-abroad) 
and the OUN-r in 1955. The OUN-r, however, remained loyal to the political 
philosophy of Bandera and Dontsov, and was the most active organisation 
amongst the &nigr6 communities in Western Europe and North America.
Although the OUN largely disappeared from political life in the Ukrainian 
SSR after the early 1950s (some small underground groups continued the 
tradition, see Chapter 3), it left a powerful myth behind. Fifty years of Soviet 
propaganda depicting the OUN-UPA as fascists and traitorous collaborators 
with the Nazis and celebrating the alternative myth of the Red Army’s 
liberating role have left deep roots,39 particularly in Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine. On the other hand, in Western Ukraine (where the OUN-UPA's 
struggle was largely confined) the counter-myth of the UPA as an army of 
national liberation has remained equally strong. Many in contemporary 
Ukraine, however, remain ignorant of the complex history of the OUN-UPA, 
especially after 1943, and are ironically prepared to accept the myth propagated 
by both the Soviet authorities and the OUN-r that all members of the OUN- 
UPA were in fact ultra-nationalists.
Most nationalist groups in post-war Ukraine have developed independently 
with no formal connection to the OUN, but their attitude to the OUN-UPA 
myth can be used as a key criterion for the degree of their commitment to civic 
rather than ethnic nationalism (in addition to the extent to which they are able 
to expand their influence outside of Western Ukraine), both on an ideological
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level and in terms of their sensitivity to the historical differences between 
Western and Greater Ukraine.
Furthermore, the various 6migr6 branches of the OUN, particularly the 
most powerful and best-funded the OUN-r, have attempted to revive their 
influence in Ukraine from the late 1980s onwards. After a series of attempts to 
create a nationalist party in its own image, the OUN-r created a front 
organisation in 1992, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, to restore its 
presence in modem Ukrainian politics. Its role is considered in Chapter 7.
1950s-1980s
The defeat of the OUN in the 1940s and the incorporation of most ethnically 
Ukrainian lands into the Ukrainian SSR meant that modern Ukrainian 
nationalism came to be dominated by its third, or ’Soviet’ variant, which, 
while owing much to previous manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism, has 
nevertheless developed since the 1960s under profoundly different social and 
political conditions.
The new dissident national movement that emerged in Ukraine in the 
1960s (the shestydesiatnyky , or 'generation of the 1960s’) was part of the 
broader Soviet movement of legalistic dissent, which, by placing as much stress 
on individual as on national rights, laid the foundations for the development 
of the largely civic conceptions of nationalism espoused by the successor groups 
that emerged in the late 1980s as the fourth ’wave’ (the history of the 
sh e s tyd es ia tn yky  is described in more detail in Chapter 3). The 
shestydesiatnyky movement was suppressed in 1972-3, but when Mikhail 
Gorbachev's political reforms allowed opposition politics to revive throughout 
the former USSR in the late 1980s, the new nationalist parties that appeared in 
Ukraine largely returned to the agenda of the shestydesiatnyky . In many cases, 
former shestydesiatnyky provided the leadership of the new parties.
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Furthermore, this new dvic nationalism was supposedly underpinned by 
the sodal transformations of the Soviet period in Ukraine, which had resulted 
in the partial transcendence of the conditions identified by Kohn and others as 
likely to foster the growth of ethnic nationalism. In particular the period of 
Soviet rule in Ukraine had fostered the development of a new Ukrainian 
intelligentsia that, after the 1960s, provided the leadership for the new national 
movement.
The New Environment
Since Kohn published his original thesis in 1943, it could be argued that 
Eastern European sotieties have changed out of all recognition. Modernisation 
and urbanisation have worked to transcend many of the conditions identified 
by Kohn as the breeding-ground for ethnic nationalism. Modem Ukrainian 
society is better educated, and now possesses substantial 'middle strata', whom 
Kohn argued provided the bedrock for dvic nationalist movements, and which 
were largely absent in 1917. Therefore, although intolerant ethnic nationalism 
certainly revived in Ukraine in the late 1980s amongst those organisations 
whose sodal base was amongst youth, students and unskilled workers, the 
most influential organisations were dominated by the dvic nationalism of the 
new intelligentsia. Certainly, it has at least been commonplace for the 
intelligentsia leadership of Ukrainian nationalist groups in the modem period 
to argue that they have left the integral nationalism of the original OUN far 
behind.
However, this thesis will argue that this is only partially true. It could also 
be argued that Soviet rule has both effectively frozen the distinction between 
Western and Eastern European nationalism, which has reemerged with the 
collapse of communism, and has bequeathed peculiar problems of its own. 
Post-communist sodeties, although vastly different to their nineteenth century
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Eastern European counterparts, nevertheless share some of the problems of the 
latter as discussed above. Their new 'intelligentsias' are not the same as 
Western European 'middle classes’ (in the sense of property-owning and/or 
professional groups), and the new states lack a well-defined, stable social 
structure and the stable civil societies which in Kohn's view underpin dvic 
conceptions of nationalism.40 Most importantly, however, in Ukraine at least, 
the 'new intelligentsia' is still relatively small. Moreover, the 'new Soviet 
intelligentsia' consists of both a cultural elite and a technical intelligentsia. The 
latter are largely Russian-speaking, and often live in Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine. The former is thin on the ground, and is also geographically 
concentrated , living mainly in Kiev, Galicia and in the university towns of 
Central Ukraine. The cultural intelligentsia has undoubtedly provided the 
leadership for the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the 1990s, but its small 
size and limited sodal influence has been a key factor in limiting support for 
the nationalists. Lastly, it will be argued below that if a nationalist movement is 
dominated by the cultural intelligentsia, it will tend to emphasise the 
importance of language, and cultural myths and symbols, which tend to be 
ethnically spedfic.
Therefore key elements of Kohn's thesis that Eastern European national 
movements tend to be based on concepts of ethnicity and common blood 
descent, rather than broader and more indusive dvic concepts of dtizenship 
for all inhabitants of the state may still be valid under modem conditions, or in 
other words the new intelligentsia's commitment to dvic nationalism may be 
only skin-deep.
Nationalism and the intelligentsia
The predominance of the intelligentsia in many nationalist movements, 
particularly in 'renewal nationalisms’ has often been noted. Myroslav Hroch
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pointed out in his comparative study of nineteenth century nationalist 
movements, 'no class or social group had a stable place in the structure of the 
patriotic communities, sufficient to indicate that such a group had a fixed or 
necessary share in the national movement',41 (the Ukrainian revival 
movement in nineteenth century Galicia, for example, where the local 
intelligentsia was tiny, was led by Uniate priests). Nevertheless, the relative 
preponderance of the intelligentsia has been a common factor to many 
'renewal nationalisms',42 especially in Eastern Europe, where alternative elites 
have been thin on the ground.
In the nineteenth century the intelligentsia was a class that was alienated 
from the peasant masses by the simple fact of its own education, but which saw 
itself as 'a "class" held together only by the bonds of "consciousness", "critical 
thought" or moral passion',43 and therefore somehow separate from the rest of 
educated society. That is the intelligentsia was distinguished as much by its 
radicalism and culture of protest, as by its formal socio-economic position. In 
Eastern Europe the intelligentsia was able to develop its own powerful critical 
counter-culture because of the relative weakness of alternative middle strata to 
whom such an intelligentsia might have been subordinated in the West. The 
industrial bourgeoisie was always thin on the ground, and in the Orthodox 
world at least, if not in Catholic Poland or Slovakia, a strong and independent 
church was absent. Furthermore, in Ukraine, as in many other areas on the 
imperial periphery, leadership of whatever nationally-conscious elements 
existed in society fell to the intelligentsia by default, in the absence of an 
indigenous local aristocracy and state bureaucracy.
The contemporary Ukrainian intelligentsia does not of course exist in the 
same social milieu as its pre-1917 Tsarist counterpart, but some comparisons 
can nevertheless be made. The Ukrainian population in 1990 was 51.8 million, 
34.8 million of whom (67%) were urban dwellers.44 The workforce of 23.3 
million was made up, according to Soviet Ukrainian classification, of 3.5
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million collective farmers (15%), 13.7 million workers Crobitnyky ), or 59% of 
the total, and 6 .1  million employees (sluzhbovtsi ), or 2 6 %  of the w o r k f o r c e .4 5  
The latter in Soviet parlance are the ’intelligentsia'. The number of 'specialists 
with secondary or higher education', also used as a definition of the 
intelligentsia, was 7 million (30% of the workforce) in 1 9 9 0 .4 6  In other words, 
superficially at least, Soviet rule has helped to create a large intelligentsia in 
modem Ukrainian society.
In practice, however, this new intelligentsia is something of a will-o’-the- 
wisp. Modem Soviet usage of the term ’intelligentsia’ is more equivalent to 
the Western notion of white collar workers, than to the nineteenth century 
notion of a critical sub-culture. It would therefore include large numbers of 
semi-skilled employees in areas such as engineering, mechanics and medicine 
little different from the skilled working class as a whole. In Richard Pipes' 
words, 'mass education, implicit in industrialisation, has considerably blurred 
the sharp distinction which in pre-1890 Russia had separated the educated 
minority from the rest of the population, and given it its sense of cultural 
cohesion. Side by side, there has now emerged a considerable body of technical 
and administrative semi-intelligentsia dispersed through many levels of 
society .'47 The Soviet Ukrainian conception of the intelligentsia therefore is 
obviously broader than for example Anthony Smith's definition of the 
intelligentsia as those 'who possess some form of further or higher education 
and use their educational diplomas to gain a livelihood through vocational 
activity, thereby disseminating and applying the paradigms created by the
intellectuals'.48
The modem Ukrainian intelligentsia is both broader and less homogeneous 
than its Tsarist predecessor.49 For the purpose of the analysis below, it will be 
divided into two sub-groups; the cultural and the technical intelligentsia.
The cultural intelligentsia may be defined as those whose vocational 
activity involves the formation, propagation and renewal of culture. Hence it
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would include academics in the humanities, writers, actors and others in the 
arts, teachers, mass media workers in appropriate areas and in certain 
circumstances the c l e r g y .5 0  The distinguishing feature of such groups is that 
their vocation is dependent on language use (usually, but not necessarily, the 
indigenous language), or on national culture in the broader sense of a 
nationally specific myth-symbol complex. In Ukraine such group are 
concentrated in university towns and in Kiev, given its function as the capital 
city since 1934. It is they who have tended to provide the leadership for the 
modem nationalist movement, but their numbers are a small proportion of 
the 7 million quoted above. This fact should be borne in mind when later 
chapters demonstrate such low membership figures for the nationalist parties. 
Most of the nationalist parties' rank and file activists, on the other hand (except 
perhaps the DPU, see Chapter 5), are drawn from the ranks of the semi-skilled 
intelligentsia and the working class.
The technical intelligentsia, on the other hand, tends to be more prominent 
in the industrial centres and technical institutes of Left Bank and Eastern 
Ukraine. Such groups were educated in a basically Russian environment, and 
their vocations require the use of universal discourse. Particularly for the 
higher echelons of the technical intelligentsia, such as physicians, logicians and 
mathematicians, Ukrainian language and culture cannot function, at least not 
yet, as the gateway to international contacts, as Russian, or even English, has 
done in the past. Hence, members of the technical intelligentsia have not been 
prominent in the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Instead, many have 
supported Russophile groups (see Chapter 2).
There are many theories concerning the reasons for the intelligentsia's 
frequent predominance in nationalist movements. Not all of them make the 
above distinctions, but those which do tend to predict that the cultural rather 
than technical intelligentsia will occupy a leading role in such movements, by
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focusing either on modernisation theory, the group interests of the 
intelligentsia, or on their centrality in the processes of cultural communication 
that are vital to the maintenance or creation of a sense of national identity.
Modernisation Theory
The process of modernisation supposedly creates rational industrial 
societies which require a universal conceptual currency. This in turn 
presupposes a state-sponsored 'monopoly of legitimate education' in order to 
create a homogeneous and literate society, all of whose members can 
communicate with each other. Whereas traditional societies were divided 
between an elite 'high' (and anational) culture and heterogeneous and isolated 
peasant sub-cultures, the making of a 'modernised' society requires the creation 
of an indigenous intelligentsia to assist in the development of the new mass 
culture.51 The intelligentsia and the nation-state therefore become mutually 
dependent and supportive. Ironically, the modernisation of Ukrainian society 
has largely taken place under Soviet rule, which had a profoundly ambiguous 
effect. The universal conceptual currency in the USSR was not simply Russian. 
Rather, the federal structure of the state from the 1920s onwards meant that 
there were hundreds of such languages, even if open pressure towards 
Russification did become increasingly prominent.
Group Interests
An almost opposite view is that the intelligentsia’s support for nationalism 
is due to the 'over-production' of the mass education institutions of 
m o d e rn is a tio n .52 a  disappointed unem ployed or underem ployed 
intelligentsia in a modernised nation-state turns to separatist or renewal 
nationalisms as a path to employment in reformed state structures,55 or simply 
to let off steam. A sub-type of such arguments refers specifically to colonial 
societies, where the metropole trains local indigenous elites for the purpose of
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indirect administration of the localities, but then blocks their further upward 
social mobility into the heart of the metropole itself. Again this is likely to 
result in instrumental separatist movements.54
One specific form of such arguments, combining both modernisation theory 
and the group interest approach, has already been partially applied to 
Ukraine.55 On this analysis, 1917 came too early for the nascent Ukrainian 
national movement, which was fatally handicapped by its lack of a modernised 
social structure. Ukrainians were underrepresented in the crucial urban areas, 
and in all the leading strata of society, which tended to be the preserve of 
imperially minded Russians, or Jews and Poles, whilst Ukrainian society 
remained rural, parochial and largely illiterate.56
Ironically however the industrialisation and urbanisation drives of the 
Soviet regime were to transform the situation. Large numbers of Ukrainians 
were drawn off the land and into the cities, creating indigenous majorities in 
all the leading sectors in society (often as early as the late 1920s, although this 
process was then reversed by Stalin's reactive purges of Ukrainian elites in 
1929-30, 1933 and 1937-8).57 Consequently, Ukraine developed a national 
intelligentsia to refine and propagate the national message (see below), plus the 
means for them to do so (schools, modem mass communication), as well as an 
appropriate audience (concentrated and increasingly literate urban 
populations), hence making the long-term growth of nationalism an inevitable 
process.
Moreover, it has been argued that the process of mobilisation did not take 
place in a vacuum. According to Karl Deutsch, the urbanisation of traditional 
agricultural societies was first expected to lead to assimilation into the 
dominant urban culture, but even he allowed for the possibility that the rate of 
influx into urban areas might swamp the system's assimilative capacity, thus 
having the opposite effect as the newcomers captured the urban centres for 
their own (modified) culture.58
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A further reason for the failure of the new elites to assimilate, on this 
perspective, would be that urbanisation takes place within the confines of a 
'hierarchical cultural [i.e. ethnic] division of labour'.59 That is, the traditionally 
dominant urban elites, in this case Russians, maintain more than their 
proportionate share of high status positions, and the resulting social blockage 
and competition with the incomers sharpens the ethnic consciousness of the 
latter, and eventually produces a reactive nationalism. Furthermore, the 
relationship was further politicised by the central Soviet state's support for 
Russian language and culture. Although Ukrainian communist leaders were at 
times able to protect, and even promote, Ukrainian language and culture, as in 
the 1920s and in 1963-72 under CPU First Secretary Petro Shelest, at other times 
pressure towards Russification was considerable, as in the 1930s and 1940s, and 
under Shelest's successor, Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi in 1972-89. Large-scale 
Russian in-migration (there were 7.1 million Russians in the Ukrainian SSR in 
1959, and 11.4 million by 1989),60 also raised Ukrainian fears that their culture 
was being swamped.
As Paul Brass has pointed out, 'it is not inequality as such or relative 
deprivation or status discrepancies that are the critical precipitants of 
nationalism in ethnic groups, but the relative distribution of ethnic groups in 
the competition for valued resources and opportunities in the division of 
labour in societies'.^! In this broader sense, Ukrainian nationalist dissent in 
the 1960s and 1970s was arguably fuelled by grievances (real or imagined) over 
employment opportunities, access to schooling and higher education, capital 
investment and housing.62 Although the Soviet state’s extensive control over 
society gave it considerable power to suppress ethnic and national conflicts, it 
also had the effect of politicising the distribution of such resources.
Culture and the Intelligentsia
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According to Anthony Smith, ’more than a style and doctrine of politics, 
nationalism is a form of culture - an ideology, a language, mythology, 
symbolism and consciousness’. ^  Nationalism is neither specifically modem, 
nor uniquely primordial, rather it is rooted in the sense of cultural identity of a 
given ethnie , with a more or less continuous existence through both the pre­
modern and modern eras. ’Collective cultural identity refers not to a 
uniformity of elements over generations, but to a sense of continuity on the 
part of successive g e n e r a t io n s ' ,64 and this sense of continuity depends on the 
collective historical memory nurtured through the creation a national myth- 
symbol complex. 'The core of ethnicity....resides in [the] quartet of myths, 
memories, values and symbols and in the characteristic forms or styles and 
genres of certain historical configurations of p o p u l a t i o n s ’. ^
Hence it is the very nature of nationalism, its requirement to produce or 
reproduce the above-mentioned myth-symbol complex, that leads to the 
involvement of the intelligentsia, particularly of the cultural intelligentsia. 
Their job is to lead 'the process of intensifying the subjective meanings of a 
multiplicity of symbols and of striving to achieve multi-symbol congruence 
among a group of people defined initially by one or more central symbols, 
whether these symbols are ethnic attributes or loyalty to a particular state’.66 
If the imperial system fails to provide the cultural intelligentsia with such a 
role, then it has a vested occupational interest in obtaining an indigenous 
nation-state. It may rise to prominence at the head of a renewal nationalism 
challenging the existing order, or it may be called upon by state elites to help 
legitimise and solidify their power through the process of building a nation 
upon the raw material of ethnic identities (the creation of 'multi-symbol 
congruence') described above.
According to the proponents of the notion of Eastern Exceptionalism, the 
cultural intelligentsia was always comparatively prom inent in the 
paradigmatic Eastern European nationalist movement. Without a state
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bureaucracy and dvic tradition of their own (most Eastern European nations 
were ruled over by imperial states based on non-national prindples), the 
cultural intelligentsia was naturally centrally involved in the more demotic 
'vernacular mobilisation' route to nation-building common in the East. That 
is, the attempt to 'form a vertical community vising cultural resources (ethno- 
history, language, ethnic religion, customs, etc) to mobilise other strata into an 
active political " n a tio n '" .6 7  This type of vernacular mobilisation would be the 
function of the intelligentsia either when it sought power on its own in a 
renewal nationalism, or when it acted as the servant of a state which lacked the 
resources to copy the alternative Western model of nation-building, namely 
'bureaucratic incorporation'.
Any of the above analyses could be used to predict that in post-communist 
sodeties the intelligentsia is again likely to take the leading role in national 
movements. Moreover, an additional factor encouraging the predominance of 
the cultural intelligentsia in the nationalist movements of the perestroika era, 
not present in the nineteenth century, was the bifurcation of the Soviet state, 
highly centralised in political affairs, but more genuinely federal in the cultural 
s p h e r e .6 8  in other words, each of the Republics of the USSR was
blessed with its own significant cultural institutions, such as Writers' Unions 
and Academies of Sdences, which not surprisingly often provided the leading 
figures for the nationalist movements of the late 1980s. The Soviet expectation 
that cultural diversity would ultimately be absorbed into the homogeneous 
political sphere proved a serious underestimation of the importance of 
autonomous centres of culture formation in leading the development of 
national assertiveness. It was the republican cultural intelligentsias who 
therefore everywhere took the lead in forming nationalist opposition 
movements, and repeating the process of 'vernacular mobilisation’ begun in 
the nineteenth century.
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Ethnic or Civic Nationalism?
Ernest Gellner’s brand of modernisation theory would predict the 
likelihood of dvic nationalism, as modem states wish to draw the whole of 
their populations into the ambit of their 'universal conceptual currency1. 
Although Gellner predicts that this process can be sabotaged if sharp 'boundary 
markers' mark off one ethnic group within a given state from another,69 such 
boundary markers are not particularly sharp between Ukrainians and Russians, 
given their dose histories, languages and cultures, although the potential for 
them to become more salient in crisis situations must always be considered.
On Smith's analysis, however, it could be predicted that a modem 
intelligentsia-led nationalist movement would be as committed to some form 
of ethnic nationalism as its nineteenth-century counterpart, unless it could 
devise national myths and symbols that were spedfically dvic in character, 
although the specific circumstances of each nation's history and the nature of 
its own myths and symbols would also have to be taken into account. In 
Ukraine's case, both inclusive 'dvic' myths (such as the idea of the multi­
national, freedom-loving Cossacks), and exdusive 'ethnic' myths (such as that 
of the OUN-UPA) are available. It is therefore of profound significance that the 
Ukrainian intelligentsia, whilst on paper committed to dvic nationalism, is so 
fearful for the very survival of Ukrainian language and culture after centuries 
of Russification, that it has chosen to promote specifically Ukrainian myths and 
symbols.
It would also be expected that the intelligentsia would be inclined towards 
ethnic nationalism if their primary motivation was to overcome a 'cultural [i.e. 
ethnic] division of labour'. The politidsation of ethnic differences would be the 
best way to displace members of a rival ethnic group from desired positions.
The State
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The above analysis will not be complete without considering the other 
main group in modem Ukrainian society, namely national communists or 
former apparatchiki . If the social and political influence of the Ukrainian 
cultural intelligentsia is limited, this is because most of Ukrainian society 
continues to be dominated by the servants of the ancien regime . In order to 
understand the clear constraints to the appeal of nationalism in Ukraine it is 
necessary to examine the role of this group.
As argued at the start of this section, 'on their own...opposition [i.e. here 
intelligentsia] elites were largely powerless: they lacked concrete resources and 
their demands, mostly regarding language, culture and the environment, 
would have remained only symbolic without the active backing of resource- 
endowed actors' (i.e. state elites).^0 Moreover, the communist (and even post­
communist) state was vastly more powerful than its nineteenth century 
counterpart, and much less tolerant of rival centres of power, making anti-state 
collective action extremely difficult.^!
One key component of the thesis of 'Eastern exceptionalism' was the idea 
that in Western Europe nations tended to form the state from below, whereas 
in Eastern Europe the reverse situation, with the state (in the post-imperial 
phase) forming the nation from above, tended to be more prevalent. This is of 
course only an ideal-type distinction. It was the French Third Republican state 
which turned 'peasants into Frenchmen'. According to Kohn, this was the 
result of the relative social vacuum in Eastern Europe, and the lack of strong 
intermediary groups between the individual and the state. In this respect, little 
has changed in post-communist Eastern Europe, which is once again 
characterised by comparatively weak civil societies.^ Moreover, in Ukraine, 
inherited regional differences make the formation of a nationalist movement 
from below highly problematical. In August 1992, for example, the leading 
Ukrainian nationalist leader Mykhailo Horyn’ could admit the existence of 'a
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paradoxical situation in Ukraine, when it is not the nation that is building the 
state, but the state which, having been established on ethnic territory during 
the time of the nation's emergence, is [now] assisting her c o n s o l i d a t i o n ’. ^  
Therefore, the intelligentsia may be perfectly conscious of its weakness, and 
explicit about seeking an alliance with state elites. Moreover, many Ukrainian 
nationalists are anxious to avoid repeating the errors of 1917-20 when no 
attempt was made to win over local imperial elites to the national cause. In 
August 1992, another leading nationalist, Larysa Skoryk, quoted the leading 
Ukrainian conservative philosopher, V'iacheslav Lypyns’kyi, to assert that 
Ukrainian independence could only be achieved by 'the creation of a new 
unified Ukrainian ruling elite composed of...the separatist part of the old local 
ruling elite [i.e. national communists]...and the new active leaders who 
emerged from the popular mass’ [i.e. the cultural i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ] . ^
One crucial difference between the late 1980s and 1917, however, was that 
the modem Ukrainian intelligentsia now had a potential ally in the state elites 
of the Ukrainian SSR (Ukrainian state institutions had simply not existed in 
1917, and the dominant social elites, as argued above, were imperially-minded). 
Therefore, the Ukrainian nationalist movement began in 1987-90 as a typical 
'renewal nationalism'. Such movements 'usually start outside the main 
centres of power, and if allied to social discontent, are directed against the 
incumbent ruler or r e g i m e ' ,75 because their 'policies of concessions and 
privileges for foreigners have brought a paralysis of the collective will and a 
loss of communal purpose and integrity.'...that 'can only be remedied by the 
infusion of a new spirit and moral purpose into the "body politic” and the 
society, involving its modernisation and reintegration through sweeping 
c h a n g e s . '76 The nationalist movement was then able to expand its influence 
significantly in 1990-91 as the result of an alliance with Ukrainian state elites.
Fortunately for Ukrainian nationalists, the Soviet federal state had a built-in 
tendency towards generating nationalism amongst such elites. In the USSR
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before perestroika, the central state always found it difficult to exercise control 
over peripheral regions, to which it would periodically have to grant more 
autonomy (as in the 1920s, or under Khrushchev). Although such a devolution 
of power was never permanent (once local communist elites or opposition 
dissidents in the periphery overplayed their hand, the centre would complete 
the cycle by reasserting control), the fact that it was a recurrent phenomenon 
indicated that it was a long-term effect of the manner in which the Soviet state 
was constructed (see below) and the practical difficulties of exercising highly 
centralised control in such a vast empire.
The crucial aspect of the perestroika period therefore was the extent to 
which Gorbachev's reforms and his struggle to assert his own power, the 
decline of the communist party, and economic collapse had weakened the 
centre so that the normal recentralisation phase was no longer possible when it 
was attempted in August 1991. It was the effective implosion of central 
imperial authority in 1990-91, a process ironically completed by the failure of 
the attempted coup, that allowed effective nationalist movements to organise 
in the periphery, and ultimately to triumph in late 1991 by allowing (or even 
compelling) local state elites to make common cause with them.
National Communism
As well as having the power to block or facilitate the emergence of 
nationalist opposition movements then, the Soviet state also tended to foster a 
kind of nationalism w ithin official federal structures. Moreover, in many 
republics, especially Ukraine, the alliance between ’national communists' in 
the state and opposition groups was the crucial factor in the eventual triumph 
of the national movement.
The origins of the term 'national communism’ lie in the Austro-Marxism 
of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, whose arguments were first utilised by
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Ukrainian communist leaders of the 1920s, such as Mykola Skrypnyk and 
Mykola Khvyl'ovyi.77 They argued that it was not only possible, but desirable 
to build communism within a national framework. For them a future 
communist utopia would not be premised on the 'withering away' of national 
differences as in official Soviet doctrine, but rather would be enriched by 
diverse national cultures and peculiarities. National communism for them 
also meant the Ukrainianisation (korenisatsiia )?$ of the Ukrainian SSR, and 
their empowerment as a specifically national communist elite.
As belief in the 'higher stage of communism’ has itself long since withered 
away, the term 'national communism' is here used to denote members of the 
communist party who primarily seek to achieve their goals, whatever they may 
be, within the confines of a given nation-state. 'National' is here adjectival: 
such men may or may not be nationalists, in the sense of their primary political 
value being that of the nation and its interests. However, a nation-state has to 
exist, be defended, or created for them to pursue their goals. That is, in the 
nation-building period they objectively function as nationalists as they must 
support the creation of state structures as the vehicle for their ambitions. This 
required that, in addition to the disappearance of communism as an ideology, 
that the myths and symbols of the imperial state also should lose their 
attraction. Once Gorbachev had completed this process by 1990-91, national 
communism was in many ways the only option for local elites.
The federal structure of the Soviet state certainly promoted the 
Ukrainianisation of the state elite in Ukraine, dramatically transforming the 
situation in 1917, when the Ukrainian national movement had had few leaders 
and virtually no influence in Ukrainian urban centres or in the local imperial 
administration. The process was begun first in the 1920s, and then, after the 
wholesale purges under Stalin, renewed after the first post-Stalin (the 18th) 
Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU)^9 in 1954. After the 
appointment of Oleksii Kyrychenko as First Secretary of the CPU in June 1953,
52
the First Secretary would always be a Ukrainian, as would a majority of leading 
figures in the party and the state apparatus (the Second Secretary of the CPU, 
responsible for cadre appointments, was also an ethnic Ukrainian until 1976, 
unlike many other republics, where this sensitive post was always reserved for 
Russians). The percentage of Ukrainians in the CPU, only 23% in 1922, rose and 
stabilised to around two thirds by the 1960s (although still less than the 
Ukrainian share of the population of the republic, - 73% in 1989), as shown in 
Table 1.3 below.
Table 1.3: Percentage of Ukrainians in the CPU.&Q
1920 23%
1922 23%
1927 52%
1933 60%
1937 57%
1940 63%
1950 59%
1960 62%
1971 65%
1980 66%
1988 67%
1990 67%
Table 1.4 shows the rate of growth of the Ukrainian party over the same 
period. In the 1920s and in the post-Stalin period, this was faster than that of 
the CPSU as a whole, reflecting the same desire to attract Ukrainians into the 
party.
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Table 1.4: Growth of the CPUffi
1918 4,301
1922 73,804
1933 555,433
1936 241,330
1940 505,706
1945 164,743
1954 795,559
1959 1,159,207
1966 1,961,408
1971 2.378,789
1976 2,625,808
1981 2,933,564
1986 3,188,854
1989 3,302,221
1990 3,294,038
1991 2,500,000s2
According to Bohdan Krawchenko; 'The [1954] congress marked a turning 
point in the history of Ukraine. It saw the emergence of a new Ukrainian 
political elite.'ss The national communism of the early 1990s therefore did not 
appear from nowhere. It was the product of a long incubation period during 
which the post-1917 modernisation of the Ukrainian social structure had 
resulted in the local state structures being captured for national communism 
from within.
Whereas Krawchenko argues that the emergence of national communism 
was the product of socio-economic change, the Director of the Soviet Institute
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of Ethnography, Valerii Tishkov, argues that it was the result of the 
institutional structure of the Soviet state. The fatal flaw in the Soviet state was 
the system of federal institutions established in the 1920s, which gave free rein 
to the ambitions of such Union-Republican elites, and, by promoting their 
national communism, proved to be the key factor leading to the dissolution of 
the USSR.84 Tishkov interprets nationalism entirely subjectively as an alien 
doctrine imported from Western Europe, and then manipulated by local elites 
to secure their path to power, quoting Ernest Gellner in support of the notion 
that all nations are more or less 'invented', and that all nationalisms therefore 
subjectively politicise otherwise neutral social relations.®^
However, although it is possible to accept Tishkov's point that the Soviet 
federal state was a natural breeding ground for national communism,86 short- 
tem  political and economic factors must also be considered. National 
communism was as much a product of the crisis of the late 1980s as it was of 
political institutions or of long term socio-economic change. The circumstances 
of the late 1980s were radically different from previous national communist 
eras. The federal system in itself was not enough to produce secessionist 
sentiment amongst local elites. That also required the unique circumstances of 
the Gorbachev period, and the way in which imperial myths and symbols were 
so totally discredited.
The leaders of the Soviet Union's constituent republics were in the same 
invidious position as all satrap elites in an empire. Required to administer the 
locality on behalf of the centre, they were nevertheless trapped in an 
ambiguous role, as a two-way channel for the influence of the centre on the 
locality and vice-versa. Hence, all too frequently, the original design of the state 
is often reversed, and the proconsuls come to represent the interests of the 
periphery against the centre rather than the opposite.®?
The Soviet federal system established in the 1920s attempted to overcome 
this traditional problem with local elites through the highly centralised nature
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of the state structure as a whole and the communist party that inhabited it at 
every level, and by attempting to construct a viable imperial ideology.®® Some 
analysts have stressed the near-total powerlessness of republican elites in such 
a s itu a tio n .® ^  They would point out that although in theory the federal system 
ceded impressive powers to the localities, in practice sovereignty was not 
granted to the nationalities themselves, but to the 'national working classes' 
whose unitary interests were represented by the highly centralised communist 
party, thus preventing the exercise of republican autonomy in any manner 
which conflicted with the interests of the centre. Moreover the imperial 
centre's apparent monopoly control over the distribution of material and 
political resources, ensured that republican elites simply lacked the capacity for 
independent political action.
However, except under the high Stalinist period, republican leaderships 
were never simply 'transmission belts’ for the passive implementation of the 
diktat of a totalitarian centre. They possessed substantial political resources of 
their own in terms of their control over local populations. As a mobilisational 
state, the Soviet Union needed assistance in mobilisation.90 Despite the state's 
totalitarian reputation, its capacity to reach into every nook and cranny of social 
life ('penetration') and to secure the active rather than passive support of the 
population ('participation’) was always limited, if admittedly extensive in 
comparison with other states. 91
Republican elites were key intermediaries in both these respects. Hence they 
were never pure vassals, but political actors with significant control over 
resources. If anything, such control was strengthened by Brezhnev’s policy of 
maintaining 'stability of cadres’, which led to significant economic and political 
fiefdoms slipping out of the centre’s control, and the creation of dense local 
networks for corruption and the exchange of favours. Moreover, the federal 
system and the korenisatsiia principle tended to over-represent Union- 
Republican elites at the expense of other local m in o r i t i e s .9 2
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The Gorbachev reforms, and the declining powers of the imperial centre in 
the late 1980s both increased the resources at the disposal of local elites and 
tilted the balance towards deploying such resources with the interests of the 
locality rather than the centre in mind. The early perestroika period (1985-89), 
adm ittedly, had much in common with earlier periods of partial 
decentralisation. The balance of costs and benefits facing republican leaders in 
1985-9 still inclined them towards loyalty to the centre. It was still conceivable 
that Moscow would recentralise at any moment, as it had done in the past.
However, in 1990-91 local elites were more or less compelled to cut loose in 
the direction of national communism by the surprising, but nevertheless total, 
failure of the centre in all areas where local elites might be expected to feel the 
tug of attraction towards the imperial state (see Chapter 2). Most important of 
all in this respect, was Moscow’s repeated failure to deliver either significant 
economic improvement or reform. The combination of this implosion of the 
imperial centre with the republican elections of March 1990, which forced local 
elites to pay more attention to cultivating their links with their local 
constituencies than with the centre, strongly encouraged the development of 
national communism.
Satrap elites, however, cannot 'invent' local nationalisms. They must have 
some prior material on which to build. In other words, national communists 
are dependent on national intelligentsias to furnish the cultural foundation on 
which their state-building project might rest. Therefore, when national 
communists began to break away from Moscow in 1990-91, they were more or 
less forced to make common cause with their local cultural intelligentsia, and 
its nationalist agenda.
In Ukraine, once the national communists joined forces with the 
intelligentsia-led opposition in mid-1991, the situation was transformed. The 
national communists controlled vast areas of Ukrainian economic and social 
life that the opposition was unable to reach, particularly in small towns and in
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the countryside. Together with a mass media blitz in favour of Ukrainian 
independence, the national communists secured a level of support in the 1 
December 1991 referendum that the former opposition alone could never have 
achieved. The March 1990 elections, and the March 1991 referendum on the 
future of the USSR, when the opposition called for a vote against Gorbachev’s 
question (see Chapter 2) had shown that the opposition was unable to increase 
its support from around the level of 25-33% of the electorate.93 Once the 
national communists also began to promote the national message, however, 
opinion polls in Autumn 1991 showed a steadily rising response to the 
authorities' propaganda campaign,94 before a final 'Yes’ vote to Ukrainian 
independence of 90.3% on 1 December.
As the leader of the main nationalist party, the Ukrainian Republican Party, 
Levko Luk”ianenko, was prepared to admit at the party’s third Congress in May 
1992, 'the glittering victory of 92% [sic] of the votes [in the December 1991 
referendum] became possible only because both nationalists and communists
agitated for independence'.^
The most important conclusion of the above analysis, however, is that the 
national communists committed themselves to the nationalist cause for their 
own reasons. They remained former satraps. If any of the past attractions of the 
imperial centre were to be revived, then their support for local nationalism 
would start to waver. Unlike the Baltic states or Transcaucasia, the Ukrainian 
nationalists were too weak to take power on their own, and would not 
therefore be well-placed to prevent the national communists backsliding.
Conclusion
Once they were securely in power in Ukraine after August 1991, the national 
communists had an agenda, but not an ideology of their own. They wished to 
take power over their own society, but had to clothe such self-interest in the
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language of nationalism. Hence although the nationalist political parties were 
not yet formally in power, the national communists were parasitic on their 
ideology and their programme. This was increasingly true as President Leonid 
Kravchuk and his government began to take aggressive state-building 
measures from September 1991 o n w a rd s .9 6  The nationalist parties tended both 
to prepare the programmes for such measures, and then to maintain pressure 
on the authorities to ensure their implementation. Moreover, although the 
national communists to a certain extent enjoyed the benefits of submerging 
themselves in an amorphous and anonymous 'party of power', it became 
increasingly clear that they had a vested interest in supporting the nationalist 
parties as a potential future power base.
In 1991-92 then, Ukrainian politics was dominated by the tactical alliance 
between the nationalists proper and the national communists. Superficially, 
both remained committed to civic nationalism, which helped to maintain 
internal stability and external peace. The nationalists were not yet in power 
themselves. Ukraine remained a bi-ethnic state, and Ukraine's national 
communist leaders remained cautious about committing themselves 
wholeheartedly to the nationalist cause, fearing that this could jeopardise inter­
ethnic harmony.
However, the logic of the state-building process means that national 
communists tend to be parasitic on the ideology of 'renewal nationalism', and 
there is nothing to stop them making demagogic appeals to their ethnic 
brethren if they come to think that this would provide them with a stronger 
basis of support. In other words, as with the intelligentsia, the dvic nationalism 
of Ukraine's national communists has yet to be tested in crisis conditions.
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The rest of this work will seek to develop further the main issues raised in 
this introductory Chapter, in particular the nature of modem Ukrainian 
nationalism, and the manner of its influence on the state (this is not a work 
about national communism). Chapter 2 will trace the development of 
Ukrainian political parties in the period 1987-92, and examine their general 
characteristics, before later chapters move on to a discussion of the nationalist 
parties.
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY POLITICS IN
UKRAINE, 1988-92
Introduction
Although Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the beginnings of 
independent political activity in Ukraine were delayed until 1987-88, as 
the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) since 1972, 
Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi, largely succeeded in m aintaining a 
Brezhnevite autocracy until his departure in September 1989. Thereafter, 
although the CPU progressively ceded ground, it always enjoyed a 
comparative advantage over any potential rivals because of its control of 
material and institutional resources. A period of more open party 
competition was ushered in by the banning of the CPU in the aftermath 
of the failure of the August 1991 coup (on 30 August), but it would be a 
mistake to assume that a fully fledged civil society was also created in 
this period. Rather, Ukrainian political parties remained in many 
respects underdeveloped and loosely organised.
Therefore, the five years from 1987-92 will be divided into the 
following four periods (all of which overlap to a degree);
1) Communist party monopoly, 1987-89. The communist party largely 
retained its monopoly over public political activity. As in the 1960s, 
opposition activists were able to form discussion circles and propaganda 
groups, but not political parties.
2) Dominant or 'Hegemonic' party system, late 1989 -August 1991. 
The CPU surrendered its constitutional monopoly; opposition groups 
were allowed to contest the March 1990 republican elections under clear 
constraints and subsequently gain a foothold in state political 
institutions; and from summer 1990 onwards it was finally possible to
form non-communist parties. However, the CPU remained 'first among 
equals'.
3) Atomised pluralism, 1991-2. It was dear even before the attempted 
coup in August 1991 that party formation in Ukraine was hindered by 
the underdevelopment of civil sodety and the difficulty of building 
national parties to bridge the gap between Ukraine's diverse regions. The 
parties' weaknesses were then given sharper focus in the vacuum 
following the banning of the CPU, as the new political parties struggled 
to influence the political process.
4) Political realignment and polarised pluralism, 1992. Party blocks 
were created, giving dearer focus to the party struggle, and enmeshing 
the parties more dosely into the political system. Rukh itself sought to 
turn itself into a political party in December 1992.
Communist party monopoly, 1987-89
The Soviet Union up to 1989 has often been described as a 'one party 
system'. However, as Sartori points out, a 'party' is normally also some 
part, and only a part, of a broader whole, whereas in a 'one party system’ 
the 'single party can be said to be a duplication of the state'.1 Although 
the duplication is never exact, the 'party' is no longer only a part of the 
system, but displays characteristics of 'wholism', that is it seeks to 
substitute itself for the system as a whole. What results is not so much a 
ruling party as the 'party-as-a-system' or a ruling 'party-state nexus'.^
In such circumstances, the party-state's relations with other would-be 
parties can be of two types. Firstly, they can be 'destructive', that is the 
party-state uses maximum levels of coercion to prevent groups 
assodating together even at the very margins of political life. This 
Sartori (rather strangely reintroducing the term 'party') classifies as
'totalitarian unipartism'. Secondly, the party-state may be 'exclusionary', 
that is small groups may be allowed to form at the margin, but the party- 
state vigorously polices a sharply delineated boundary totally excluding 
such groups from participation in public political life. For Sartori, this is 
'authoritarian unipartism.^ In practice, it is possible for the party-state to 
swing from one mode to the other.
The post-war Ukrainian party-state was a clear example of totalitarian 
unipartism. That is, the CPU's attitude towards actual and potential 
rivals was nearly always 'destructive' rather than 'exclusionary'.^
Nevertheless, underground or semi-public groups, even if they all 
met the same fate, were a recurrent feature of the post-war period. In the 
late 1940s and early 1950s the CPU had to face a long drawn-out struggle 
to suppress the insurrection of the nationalist OUN-UPA in Western 
Ukraine (see Chapter 1). After a lull in the mid-1950s, smaller dissident 
groups began to reappear. Some, such as the Ukrainian National Front 
(UNF) in the 1960s were consciously descended from the UP A, others 
such as the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants’ Union (UWPU), led by 
Levko Luk"ianenko and Ivan Kandyba, active in Galicia in 1958-61, were 
committed to constitutional and peaceful methods of activity (all of the 
groups mentioned here are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3).5 
Although both the UNF and UWPU were suppressed, the 1960s also 
produced a new generation of dissidents, known as the shestydesiatnyky 
(’generation of the 60s'). Although never an organised movement as 
such, they represented a much broader climate of opinion than the 
activists of the UNF and UWPU. Most of the Ukrainian cultural 
intelligentsia sympathised with the movement to promote national 
cultural and linguistic revival, more or less tolerated by the CPU leader 
from 1963 to 1972, Petro Shelest, but the movement petered out after 
Shelest's replacement by Shcherbyts'kyi and the mass arrests of 1972-3.6
The most important dissident group of the pre-perestroika era was 
the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (UHG), established in November 1976 
(see Chapter 3). Like the other Helsinki watch groups elsewhere in the 
USSR it acted openly, although more as an organisation to publicise the 
regime's violations of the rule of law than as a political party.
Despite a period of relative tolerance under Shelest, however, the 
party-state remained committed to the defence of 'totalitarian 
unipartism'. All the above groups were coerced out of existence. The 
UWPlFs leaders were arrested in 1961, the UNF's in the late 1960s. The 
shestydesiatnyky were eventually silenced by two arrest waves in 1965-6 
and a much larger round-up in 1972-3. The UHG was effectively out of 
action by 1980-1 (23 of its 37 declared members were eventually 
imprisoned, and 6 forced into exile. See Chapter 3). In other words, the 
party-state not only zealously defended its monopoly of public political 
life, but was prepared to use sufficient levels of coercion to prevent the 
formation of groups capable of collective action against the state, or at 
least to quickly strangle them at birth.?
In many respects the 1987-9 period had much in common with the 
1960s. After the lull of the early 1980s, the first signs of dissent began to 
reemerge in Ukraine towards the end of 1987 (rather later than in the 
rest of the Soviet Union given the extreme conservatism of 
Shcherbyts'kyi's period in office). The first opposition organisation 
proper to be formed was the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), a 
conscious revival of the UHG, in spring 1988. Although the UHU's 
members were continually harassed and prevented from assembling (see 
Chapter 3), the CPU, mainly in deference to the new climate in Moscow, 
had moved from 'totalitarian unipartism' to 'authoritarian unipartism’, 
as it now sought only to 'exclude' groups such as the UHU, that is
prevent them from engaging in open political activity, rather than to 
destroy them, so long as they avoided labelling themselves as political 
parties and did not challenge the party-state's constitutional monopoly 
right to rule. However, the UHU always de facto saw itself as a political 
party in embryo, and constantly strove to escape from the limitations 
placed on it by the CPU. Moreover, as the proponents of perestroika (in 
Moscow at least) began to place more emphasis on developing a rule of 
law, it became progressively more difficult for the CPU to coerce the 
UHU and similar groups, and the UHU gradually evolved into a proto­
party.
Other similar, but more radical groups, such as the Ukrainian 
People’s Democratic League, set up in Kiev in June 1989, the Ukrainian 
Christian Democratic Front established in November 1988, and the 
underground Ukrainian National Party that held its first congress in 
secret in L'viv in October 1989, were also in practice functioning as 
opposition parties by 1989 (see Chapter 6 for the UPDL and UNP, and 
Chapter 7 for the UCDF).
A second type of proto-party that appeared in this period were the 
many 'informal' groups that were established in 1987-8. They could 
function as safe havens for the opposition-minded so long as they 
followed self-limiting precepts confining them to 'apolitical' areas. 
Examples included cultural 'discussion groups' such as the Ukrainian 
Culturological (or Culture and Ecology) Club set up in Kiev in August 
1987,8 and the Tovarystvo leva ('The Lion society', after the city’s 
symbol) in L’viv in October 1987.9 A Ukrainian Association of 
Independent Creative Intelligentsia, including V”iacheslav Chomovil 
and Mykola Rudenko of the UHG, was formed in October 1987.10 A 
student group Hromada (named after the nineteenth century Ukrainian 
patriotic groups) appeared in Kiev in the spring of 1988.11 A Committee
in Defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church emerged in Galicia in early 
1988 under Ivan Her, whose roots went back to a similar group set up in 
1982.12 All such groups had miniscule memberships, but they served to 
incubate a new generation of opposition activists, alongside the elder 
generation which reemerged from the camps in 1987-8.
A third form of proto-party that began to emerge generally at a later 
stage in 1987-9 were much larger ’front’ organisations, which tended to 
be hybrid organisations uneasily straddling the official and growing 
unofficial worlds, although they tended increasingly to adopt the latter's 
values, as the authorities' ability to direct their activities slowly 
weakened. Their initial leadership tended to come from the 
establishment intelligentsia, which was for the authorities a more 
acceptable alternative to the ex-political prisoners prominent in the 
UHU, but, as even the official intelligentsia was beginning to feel the 
pull of nationalism from late 1988 onwards, the 'fronts' soon became 
bulwarks of nationalism.
The first such 'front' was the Zelenyi svit (Green World) ecological 
association, set up under the auspices of the CPU controlled Ukrainian 
Peace Committee in December 1987, but soon slipping out of its 
control. 13 In January 1988 the radical writer Serhii Plachynda (later the 
leader of the Ukrainian Peasants' Democratic Party - see Chapter 7) was 
elected the first President of Zelenyi svit , and the association held its 
first conference in March 1988 in Kiev. Another writer Yurii Shcherbak 
had replaced Plachynda by the time of Zelenyi svit's first national 
conference in October 1989. By then the association had grown rapidly, 
mainly because the 1985 Chomobyl' disaster had sparked off a genuinely 
popular mass movement of ecological protest that the authorities could 
not contain, but also because Zelenyi svit functioned as a flag of 
convenience, providing an unnatural political home for activists such as
Anatolii Lupynis, later a member of the ultra-nationalist Ukrainian 
National Assembly.
The second main ’front' organisation in this period was the Taras 
Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society (ULS), allowed to hold its first 
congress more or less with official blessing in February 1989. The ULS 
had grown out of the unofficial Ridna mova (native language) society 
that had grown up in Galicia in 1988-9,14 but its inaugural congress was 
also supported by the Institutes of Philology and L i t e r a t u r e .  15 its first 
head was therefore the poet Dmytro Pavlychko, at the time still an 
establishment CPU figure capable of commanding the confidence of the 
authorities. However, the ULS's rank-and-file membership, estimated at 
70,000 in mid-1989,16 was more radical and would form the activist core 
for later organisations such as Rukh and the Republican and Democratic 
parties.^
Finally there was also the Ukrainian branch of the all-Union 
Memorial society set up in March 1989. It gained official support from 
the Ukrainian Cultural Fund as part of the official campaign to uncover 
the 'blank spots' in Ukrainian history, but its main sponsors were the 
Kiev cu ltu ra l in te lligen tsia , includ ing  groups from  the 
Cinematographers', Theatre Workers’, and Architects' Unions. 1® The 
head of the Theatre Workers' Union and future people's deputy, Les' 
Taniuk, became the first leader of the Ukrainian Memorial.
The CPU however prevented the above groups from combining their 
forces. It was as yet impossible to form a 'Popular Front’ similar to those 
in existence by the summer of 1988 in the Baltic Republics. A campaign 
of mass meetings reportedly attended by 20,000 to 50,000 people in L’viv 
in June and July 1988 attempted to force the authorities to concede the 
creation of a Popular Front, while a similar demonstration in Kiev 
attracted some 500 p eo p led  However, the authorities, although initially
hesitant in L'viv, cracked down with the OMON militia and 
demonstrations largely ceased with the onset of winter.
Hence, although at the beginning of the 1987-9 period, the CPU was 
capable of 'destroying' its political opponents, it increasingly had to be 
content with only 'exclusion' as its powers began to wane, and as the 
unfolding perestroika programme narrowed the limits of permissible 
coercion (little is yet known about the relationship between CPSU and 
CPU elites in this period). At the end of the period, although fully 
fledged political parties had not yet developed, the CPU was attempting 
to defend its monopoly control of the public political arena against 
increasingly assertive opposition groups growing in both size and 
number. 'Exclusion' was becoming more and more difficult. The next 
period would be marked by both the transformation of opposition proto­
parties into political parties proper, and by their break-put from the 
artificial 'apolitical' area in which the CPU had attempted to confine 
them.
Hegemonic party system, late 1989 -August 1991
The period from late 1989 until the failed coup attempt in Moscow in 
August 1991 can best be described as a 'hegemonic party system'. The 
CPU was no longer capable of maintaining either 'totalitarian 
unipartism' or 'authoritarian unipartism’. However it remained first 
among equals. To return to Sartori's typology, a 'hegemonic party 
system’ is a two-tier system, where there is one set of rules for the 
governing party and another for those in opposition.20 The governing 
party still enjoyed a comparative political advantage because of its 
control over the economic, coercive and communicative resources of the
state, whereas its potential competitor parties remained starved of 
resources. Moreover, although Ukraine rapidly developed a formal 
multi-party system from spring 1990 onwards, opposition political 
parties remained in many respects underdeveloped, and not only 
because of their lack of material and communicative resources. Parties 
were weakly ’institutionalised’, in terms of factors such as the degree of 
development of the parties' bureaucratic structures, the degree of 
cohesion within and amongst the various branches of the party, and so
on .21
This period begins with the first congress of the Ukrainian Popular 
M ovement (originally, the Ukrainian Popular M ovement for 
Perestroika ) or just Rukh (the Ukrainian for 'movement') in 
September 1989, and the CPU’s surrender of its constitutional monopoly 
to rule (although the Ukrainian 'Article 6' was not formally removed 
from the Soviet Ukrainian constitution until October 1990, after the 
March 1990 elections). Although Rukh and other political associations 
were able to work behind the scenes in the campaign, they were not able 
to participate directly (although Rukh was the main force behind the 
Democratic Bloc set up to contest the elections in November 1989). The 
process of party formation did not therefore receive the boost that could 
have been expected from participation in a fully free and open election 
campaign, and this also reduced the influence that the new parties could 
exercise in the Ukrainian Parliament (the Supreme Council, or 
Verkhovna rada ) .
The history of Rukh is described in Chapter 4. Originally it was 
deliberately conceived as a non-party organisation, an umbrella 
movement that would unite three main groups; communist reformers, 
'general democrats' and nationalists. In its formative period, in the run­
up to its first congress in September 1989, Rukh remained subject to a 
strong element of control from above and many of its members came 
from the CPU. In this period, Rukh saw its role as a ginger group to 
maintain the pressure for reform, but increasingly it assumed the role of 
a counterweight to the CPU in the absence of genuine political 
pluralism. Rukh was therefore the main organising force behind the 
Democratic Bloc that opposed the CPU at the March 1990 republican 
elections in Ukraine, winning approximately 25% of the 450 seats. This 
Bloc in turn then became the basis of the opposition faction in the 
Ukrainian parliament, the Narodna rada (People's Council) that, 
including the old Democratic Platform of the CPU, claimed the support 
of 125 people's deputies by June 1990.22
Between September 1989 and the movement’s second congress in 
October 1990, however, Rukh increasingly fell under the control of the 
third, that is nationalist, element. Hence Rukh found it increasingly 
difficult to perform its new role as a coordinating body for the new 
political parties that had emerged in the inter-congress period. Non­
nationalist parties shunned it, and even with the nationalist parties the 
putative relationship was reversed. Instead of Rukh directing the 
nationalist parties, the parties came to impose their priorities and their 
squabbles on Rukh , resulting in a debilitating factionalism.
While Rukh sought to act as an umbrella movement, political 
parties proper also began to develop from mid-1990 onw ards.23 This, 
again, was relatively late, as the CPU had continued to obstruct the 
process of formal party formation before the March 1990 republican 
elections. Despite a promise made by the then Ideology Secretary of the 
CPU Leonid Kravchuk to the first congress of Rukh in September 1989, 
Rukh and other organisations such as Zelenyi svit were prevented
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from putting forward candidates to the elections.^ Hence it was only 
once the elections were over that the process of party formation began in 
earnest, once the CPU could no longer hold back the tide. The 
simultaneous moves emanating from Moscow to abandon Article 6 of 
the USSR constitution (which enshrined the communist party's formal 
monopoly on power) only gave formal recognition to this process.
In other words, the CPU remained a hegemonic party. It conceded an 
arena to Ukraine's many proto-parties to formally organise themselves, 
but it continued to try to exclude them from the centre of political life. 
The party-state continued to obstruct the process of party formation by 
insisting until September 1991, in the aftermath of the failed coup, that a 
would-be party required 3,000 members spread throughout a majority of 
Ukraine's 25 oblasts in order to receive official registration (in September 
the requirement was lowered to 300, by which time only five parties had 
met the targets). Although coercion was now used more sparingly 
against the CPU's opponents (though they were still harassed where 
necessary, see the arrest of Stepan Khmara in Chapter 3, and that of UIA 
activists in Chapter 6), the CPU continued to enjoy monopoly access to 
the means of communication and the economic resources of the party- 
state.
The party spectrum - right and centre parties
Nevertheless, most of Ukraine's proto-parties formalised their 
existence as political parties proper in this period. It is of course difficult 
to classify post-communist political parties along a traditional left-right 
spectrum, as 'rightists' may well be radical reformers, and 'leftists' 
conservatives, nostalgics or even reactionaries. With such a proviso,
however, nationalists will regarded as being on the right, and neo­
communists on the left.
The Right
The main new parties were, on the nationalist right, the Ukrainian 
Republican Party (URP), which was formed on the basis of the UHU at 
an inaugural congress in April 1990 (see Chapter 3). The URP was led by 
many of Ukraine's numerous ex-political prisoners, and throughout the 
period of study remained the best organised and best resourced 
nationalist party.
The other main nationalist party was the Democratic Party of Ukraine 
(DPU), which held its founding congress in December 1990 (see Chapter
5). This was the party of the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia. Initially it 
posed as a party of the centre, but by the time the party held its inaugural 
congress the centre-ground was already crowded, and the DPU soon 
found its natural home on the right. By 1992, it was contemplating 
merger with the URP. Both the URP and DPU drew their main strength 
from Western Ukraine, but also had strong centres of support in the 
urban centres of Central (Right and Left Bank) Ukraine (for Ukraine's 
regions, see Chapter 1). The URP has 11 deputies in the Supreme 
Council, and the DPU 23 (plus 17 ’supporters’).
The URP and DPU had many satellite parties with similar political 
programmes. Two nationalist parties that failed to live up to their early 
promise were the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) formed 
on the basis of the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front in April 1990, 
and the Ukrainian Peasants' Democratic Party (UPDP) established in 
June 1990 to campaign for the rebirth of the Ukrainian village. Both are 
discussed, along with a splinter group from the URP, the Ukrainian 
Conservative Republican Party (UCRP) set up by Stepan Khmara in June
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1992, in Chapter 7. The UPDP has one deputy (Dmytro Chobit), and the 
UCRP one (Khmara).
Although the DPU and URP remained the two strongest nationalist 
parties throughout this period, they were always challenged by a variety 
of extreme nationalist parties to their right. Ukraine's many ultra-right 
groups tended to be quarrelsome and fissiparous, but helped to pull the 
URP and DPU (and the political system in general) to the right as the 
orthodox nationalist parties could not risk being outflanked on the right. 
The main characteristic of the Ukrainian ultra-right before August 1991 
was their refusal to accept the institutions of the Ukrainian SSR as 
legitimate, and their consequent advocacy of boycott tactics. After August 
1991, they swung to the other extreme, and advocated the building of a 
strong corporate state and/or a more ethnically exclusive nationalism. 
The main such group was the Ukrainian Inter-party Assembly (UIA), 
formed in June 1990 as a coalition of radical groups, and transformed in 
September 1991 into the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) - see 
Chapter 6. The UNA's goal was the building of a mighty nation-state, in 
alliance with national communists if necessary, whereas the other main 
far right group, the Union for Ukrainian Statehood and Independence 
(in Ukrainian DSU), based itself on the traditional ethnic nationalism 
and anti-communism of the OUN. It is discussed in Chapter 7, along 
with some smaller right wing groups and the main Emigre nationalist 
group, the OUN-r, which has operated in Ukraine through the Congress 
of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) since March 1992. The UNA has no 
deputies, as it was only formed in 1991, but the DSU has one (its leader 
after December 1992, Volodymyr Shlemko).
The Centre
Although non-nationalist groups lie outside of this study, a short 
explanation of their history is necessary in order to fully understand the 
limitations on the influence of the nationalist camp.
The political centre in Ukraine is occupied by the Green Party of 
Ukraine (GPU) founded by members of Zelenyi svit in September 
1990;25 two Social Democratic parties, the Social Democratic Party of 
Ukraine (SDPU) and the United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine 
(USDPU), formed as a result of a split at the social democrats' founding 
congress in May 1990;26 and by the Party of Democratic Revival of the 
Ukraine (PDRU). A Liberal Party of Ukraine, claiming to represent the 
new business class, was formed in August 1991.27
The early history of Zelenyi svit was described above. The GPU has 
no deputies of its own in the Supreme Council (as it was prevented from 
putting forward candidates in March 1990), although the second congress 
of Zelenyi svit in March 1991 was attended by three sympathetic 
deputies; - Mykhailo Holubets’ from Ivano-Frankivs’k, Taras Nahulko 
from Khmel'nyts'kyi and Yurii Kostenko from Kiev2® (Kostenko, 
supported by the GPU and Rukh , became Minister for the Environment 
in October 1992). Thanks to its Chomobyl' campaigns, however, it has 
consistently enjoyed high levels of public support. As a party, however, 
it has suffered from its decentralised structure, and there were signs that 
it was slipping out of public view in 1992.
The two social democratic parties are small. Their membership 
consists mainly of centrist and leftist intellectuals, while their links with 
organised labour are undeveloped. The SDPU is more centrist. It bases 
its  conception of social democracy on the ideas of social partnership 
developed by the post-Bad Godesberg German SPD, and the party 
supports the idea of a Ukrainian nation-state. The leftist USDPU on the
other hand took its brand of social democracy from the Second 
International, and sees itself as more 'int ernationalist’. It is 
consequently less willing to repudiate all aspects of the Soviet past. The 
USDPU has one deputy, Volodymyr Moskovska from Kharkiv, and the 
SDPU two, Yurii Zbitnev from Kiev and Oleksandr Suhoniako from 
Zhytomyr. The SDPU proposed reunification to the USDPU, after 
Zbitnev replaced Suhoniako as leader in mid-1992.
The most important centrist party, however, was the PDRU, formed 
in December 1990 on the basis of the old Democratic Platform of the CPU. 
The PDRU was supported by both the Ukrainian liberal intelligentsia 
and the Eastern Ukrainian Russophone technical intelligentsia. In 1990- 
92 the PDRU was the only party with a mass base in the urban centres of 
Eastern Ukraine, where it was better able to represent generalised urban 
discontent, than Rukh or the nationalist parties.29 in 1992, however, 
other parties began to emerge in Donets'k (see below), and the PDRU's 
main power base is now in Kharkiv, which has a more modem 
industrial base than the Donbas, which is dominated by heavy industry 
and a cruder form of left wing populism.30
The PDRU tends to take a radical line on questions of 
decommunisation or economic reform, but is also a strong supporter of 
the rights of Ukraine’s Russophone population. The PDRU controls a 
faction of 36 in the Supreme Council, including 20 members of the party 
and sixteen supporters, (18 of the 36 were from Eastern U kraine),31 and 
is a party of considerable intellectual and organisational potential. If the 
DPU tended to monopolise the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia, the 
PDRU has attracted logicians, scientists and engineers, such as the 
philosopher Myroslav Popovych and the Russian Deputy Chairman of 
the Supreme Council, Vladimir G r in io v .3 2
The Liberal Party of Ukraine, led by local businessman Ihor 
Markulov, emerged from Donets'k, and has strong links with the 
business structures set up by former CPU and Komsomol members.
The party spectrum - left wing and regional parties
The second phase in party formation in Ukraine took place after the 
banning of the CPU and achievement of Ukrainian independence in 
August 1991. On the left, successor parties to the CPU emerged; slowly at 
first, then with the pace quickening after the autumn of 1992. Regional 
groups also began to develop as Ukraine's ethnic minorities began to 
digest the full implications of Ukrainian independence for their future.
The Left
Apart from small anarchist groups who are difficult to classify in any 
case, only the CPU was to the left of the USDPU before August 1991. 
However, after the CPU was banned by the Presidium of the Ukrainian 
Supreme Soviet on 30 August 1991, two successor parties, the Socialist 
Party of Ukraine (SPU) led by Oleksandr Moroz, and the Peasants' Party 
of Ukraine (PPU) led by Serhii Dovhan were founded in October 1991 
and January 1992 respectively.33 Both were partial successors to the 
banned CPU, but in the climate of the times were careful to maintain 
their distance from the discredited ruling party. Both parties hoped to 
emulate the success of Polish or Lithuanian communists by renaming 
themselves and adopting a strongly populist programme to take 
advantage of growing opposition to economic reform. In Ukraine, 
however, unlike Poland or Lithuania, the party could also afford to be 
strongly anti-nationalist and hope to gather support in Eastern and 
Southern Ukraine.
The SPU claimed the support of 60,000 members, and 38 deputies in 
the Supreme Council, although the latter were not strictly organised as a 
faction.34 The PPU drew considerable support from the ’agrarian faction’ 
in the Supreme Council. The latter has claimed the support of 103 
deputies,’35 but a more realistic figure would be the 44 collective farm 
chairmen and heads of agro-industry elected in March 1990.36 The PPU 
claimed a membership of 1.6 million in 1992,37 which in fact represented 
the fact that the PPU was simply the old Soviet era Peasants' Union in 
different guise.
Eastern Ukraine
From 1991 to mid 1992 the nationalist parties from Western and 
Central Ukraine dominated the political agenda in Ukraine, particularly 
after the ban on the CPU left Eastern Ukrainian elites disorientated. 
However, despite a period of relative quiescence in 1991-92, Eastern and 
Southern Ukrainians began to find their feet again in the summer of 
1992, as economic collapse accelerated, traditional links with the rest of 
the USSR were ruptured and ethnic nationalism began to gather support 
in Western Ukraine.
First of all Eastern Ukraine, in particular Donets’k, was the centre for 
the appearance of a variety of other leftist parties in 1992-93, with the rate 
of their formation quickening significantly after the decision by the 
Russian Supreme Court to partly annul the ban on the CPSU in 
November 1992. An 'Initiative Committee for the Annulment of the 
Anti-Constitutional Decision to Ban the CPU',33 largely the work of the 
SPU, was established in Ukraine in June 1992. After 243 deputies signed a 
motion to reconsider the Ukrainian ban in January 1993,39 the 
Presidium of the Ukrainian parliament issued a decree in May 1993 
allowing Ukrainian citizens to form communist organisations.
77
If the SPU’s brand of socialism was analogous to that of Brazuaskas in 
Lithuania or Roy Medvedev's reform communists in Russia, many of 
the new Ukrainian groups were more openly reactionary, as with Nina 
Andreeva's group in Russia. These included the League of Crimean 
Communists, which claimed 10,000 members in August 1992;^0 the Party 
of Workers and Industrialists of Ukraine, formed in Odesa in June 
1992;41 the Congress of Working People of Ukraine, founded in 
Dnipropetrovs’k in August 1 9 9 2 ; ^  the Ukrainian Party of Justice, set up 
in December 1992 with support from the (ex-communist) Federation of 
Trade Unions of Ukraine;^^ the Union of Communists of Ukraine 
established in January 1993;44 and the Party of Communists-Bolsheviks, 
established in Donets'k in February 1993.^5 a  Ukrainian branch of the 
all-Union (i.e. all USSR) Party of Communists met in Luhans'k in June 
1992.46 xhe largest new leftist party, however, was the Labour Party of 
Ukraine, based in the Donbas, which held its first congress on 25 
December 199Z It was backed by conservative industrialists/ ^  earning it 
the nickname of 'the party of red directors'.
The sheer length of the above list deserves comment. Clearly there 
was a growing constituency for such groups, especially in Eastern 
Ukraine, as the economic situation in Ukraine deteriorated sharply from 
early 1992 onwards. There were divisions within the left wing camp, 
however. The smaller leftist groups only tended to represent a small 
number of war veterans and nostalgics. The SPU was formed as a party 
of leftist economic populism, but, as demonstrated by the speed of its 
formation after August 1991, the party's leaders were on the whole 
prepared to work within the new regime. On the other hand, those who 
openly regretted the passing of the old order were hostile to Moroz, 
whom they viewed as an arriviste . They preferred such figures as Borys 
Oliinyk who was elected to the Supreme Council in a by-election in
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November 1992, (Stanislav Hurenko, the last First Secretary of the CPU, 
announced his intention to retire from the 'nationalist' Supreme 
Council in January 1993).48 If Moroz was reconciled to the fact of 
Ukrainian independence, many of the rival groups on the left were 
openly nostalgic for the CPU and the USSR. Open moves to restore the 
CPU were beginning in early 1993, but lie outside the scope of this study 
(an 'all-Ukrainian Conference of Communists' was held in Makiivka in 
Donets'k in March 1993, and was attended by 300 delegates, including 
eight people’s deputies, who discussed the possibility of formally 
reviving the CPU.^9 The Ukrainian Komsomol meanwhile held a 
revivalist (28th) congress in Donets'k in January 1993).50
Regional and/or Ethnic Parties
A conventional left-right spectrum far from exhausts the range of 
political parties to appear in Ukraine in the early 1990s. Because of 
Ukraine's ethnic and regional diversity, a number of ethnic and /or 
regional parties also appeared in the 1990s, especially in periphery 
regions and above all in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, where regional 
groups were closely tied to the new left wing parties. In other words, 
parties are as likely to form in Ukraine along regional and/or ethno- 
linguistic cleavages, as along socio-economic cleavages, especially as the 
latter are comparatively underdeveloped.^! In particular, it is impossible 
to understand the situation in Eastern Ukraine, without analysing the 
mix of welfare populism and Russophone sentiment which unites both 
the neo-communist and regional organisations of the area.
a) Periphery regions
In Transcarpathia, a Hungarian Cultural Association of Subcarpathia 
was established in February 1989, which was in turn the foundation for 
the more overtly political Hungarian Democratic Alliance set up in
October 1991.52 The local Ruthenians formed the Society of Carpathian 
Ruthenians in January 1989, and the Subcarpathian [Pidkarpats'ka ] 
Republican Party in Mukachev in March 1992, led by Vasyl’ Zaiets',53 a  
Congress of Romanians in Bukovyna (Chemivtsi) was held in June
1992.54
The Crimean Tatars also have their own organisations, the most 
significant of which is the Organisation of the Crimean Tatar National 
Movement (OCNM), led by Mustafa Jemilev, which elected a Majlis , or 
Supreme Tatar Assembly, at its first congress in June 1991, which 
declared that ’Crimea is the national territory of the Crimean Tatar 
people, on which they alone possess the right to self-determ ination’.55 
In July 1992 the OCNM announced its intention of forming a political 
party to represent the interests of the Crimean Tatars, around 155,000 of 
whom were estimated to have returned to the Crimea by mid-1992 (they 
were deported en masse by Stalin in 1944 for alleged collaboration with 
the G e rm a n s )  .56 Jews and Germans in Ukraine also have their own 
organisations.57
b) Russophone Groups
Most important, however, were the numerous organisations that 
emerged in 1991-3 to defend the interests of the Russophone population 
in the Crimea and Eastern (and Southern) Ukraine. The main Crimean 
organisation, which has openly pro-Russian sympathies, is the 
Republican Movement of the Crimea, led by local deputy Yurii 
Meshkov. At its third conference in September 1992, it created the 
Republican Party of the Crimea /  Party of the Republican Movement of 
Crimea, also led by M eshkov.58 a  Party of the Economic Revival of 
Crimea was set up in November 1992 to represent Crimean business 
interests, which remain strongly opposed to Ukrainian independence.59
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In Southern and Eastern Ukraine, a variety of organisations 
defending the interests of the Russophone population have sprung up 
since the Declaration on Ukrainian Independence on 24 August 1991. 
The main Southern organisation is the Congress of Democratic Forces of 
the Odesa Region, which held its first congress in March 1993.60 ft is 
backed by former local leaders of the CPU, and some of its members have 
openly declared that Southern Ukraine is no more than Novorossiia 
(that is, an addition to Russia as a result of Catherine II's defeat of the 
Ottoman Turks and Tatars in the late eighteenth century, rather than an 
integral part of Ukrainian territory).
Eastern Ukraine is more populous, strategically important, and its 
Russophone population more dominant, however. The main two 
Russophone organisations are the Democratic Movement of the Donbas, 
formed in October 1991 in Luhans'k; and the Public Congress of 
Democratic Forces of Ukraine formed at two congresses in Donets'k in 
June and October 1992.61 The Public Congress' title deliberately echoes 
that of the Russian Grazhdanskii soiuz , with which the organisation has 
close links. Both Ukrainian organisations make similar demands; - for a 
federalised Ukraine with Russian as the local state language in Eastern 
Ukraine, strengthened ties with the CIS, and dual citizenship of Ukraine 
and Russia.
The growing strength of such regional groups from the summer of 
1992 onwards is the flip-side of the limitations of the nationalist 
movement. The nationalist movement has little political appeal in 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine. The nationalist camp was able to 
dominate the political agenda in 1991-2 because nationalist parties were 
organised relatively soon (in 1990-91), and because the tide was flowing 
in their direction with the winning of independence in August 1991, but 
their victory was always illusory. Eastern and Southern Ukraine are not
natural nationalist territory. Although both regions supported 
Ukrainian independence in the December 1991 referendum, they did so 
largely for pragmatic economic reasons, soon to be disappointed (that is 
they accepted state and nationalist propaganda that the standard of living 
would be higher in an independent Ukraine). Once both regions began to 
create their own parties from the summer of 1992 on, the nationalist 
lobby found its influence waning, as national communists such as 
President Kravchuk now had to balance two roughly equal political 
forces, the nationalist and the Russophone.
The list of the main all-Ukrainian political parties to emerge in the 
early 1990s is summarised in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1. Main Ukrainian Political Parties at the end of 1992.
Ultra-right
Inter-party Assembly (ULA) /  Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) 
Union for Ukrainian Statehood and Independence (DSU)
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN)
Right
Ukrainian Peasants' Democratic Party (UPDP)
Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)
Ukrainian Republican Party (URP)
Democratic Party of Ukraine (DPU)
Centre-left
Green Party of Ukraine (GPU)
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU)
Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine (PDRU)
United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (USDPU)
82
Liberal Party of Ukraine (LPU)
Left
Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU)
Peasants' Party of Ukraine (PPU)
Labour Party of Ukraine (LPU)
Regional
Subcarpathian Republican Party (SCR)
Republican Movement of Crimea (RMC)
Tatar Majlis
Public Congress (Donbas)
This study will focus on the nationalist parties: - the DPU, URP, UIA, 
DSU and smaller parties of the right, along with the Ukrainian Popular 
Front (Rukh ). A nationalist party is here defined as one for whom the 
primary political value is the n a t io n .6 2  This excludes the parties of the 
Centre-left, even though by November 1991 many were in favour of 
Ukrainian independence. The left wing parties such as the SPU, PPU and 
USDPU are primarily economic populists whose long term commitment 
to Ukrainian independence is largely tactical; the PDRU and SDPU are 
more interested in economic reform, individual rights and a rule of law; 
and the GPU in ecology.63
The length of the above list demonstrates that the nationalist parties 
face plenty of competition in Ukraine, as predicted by the analysis of the 
historical weaknesses of the Ukrainian national movement in Chapter 1.
The CPU Splits
No description of the Ukrainian party system can be complete 
without examining the reasons for the demise of the CPU and its legacy.
By spring 1991 Ukraine had at least the appearance of a multi-party 
system, but free and equal competition remained impossible, so long as 
the CPU remained more of a party-state than a normal political party. 
Spring 1991, however, also marked the emergence of serious divisions 
within the CPU, as the attractions of national communism finally began 
to make themselves felt (although at this stage the national communists 
were still a minority within the CPU), and national communist leaders 
such as Leonid Kravchuk began to build bridges with the opposition.
The perestroika reforms, if inadvertently, were shifting control over 
political resources and the locus of political legitimacy from the centre to 
the periphery, causing local communist parties to split in two. The 1990 
elections in the republics forced local communists in the state and the 
Soviets to adapt themselves to the exigencies of electoral politics by 
reorientating their policies towards the defence of their constituents’ 
interests, and by adopting the myths and symbols of nationalism as the 
best, in many ways the only, means of relegitimating their rule (it is 
im portant here that the 1989 all-Union elections were much less 
democratic). As mentioned above, the opposition 'Democratic Bloc' had 
won approximately 25% of the seats in the March 1990 Ukrainian 
elections, and the CPU therefore 75% (84% of deputies were originally 
members of the CPU, but many defected in the aftermath of the 
elections) .64 Despite considerable electoral malpractice, this was broadly a 
fair reflection of patterns of support at the time.65 Much of Ukraine was 
still politically inert. However, even at this stage the CPU had been 
compelled to steal the opposition's clothes by adopting a programme 
defending republican rights,66 in which the CPU called for 'the 
affirmation of sovereign Ukrainian statehood’.67
However, although the March 1990 Ukrainian elections had forced at 
least the CPU’s parliamentary wing into a limited accommodation with
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public opinion, the party apparat was still rigidly pro-Moscow. Its 
influence ensured that the CPU could never turn itself into a normal 
electoral party. The CPU’s 1990 programme also restated its commitment 
'to defend the ideas of the October revolution and of socialism', and 
stressed that the party continued 'to organise itself on the principle of 
democratic cen tralism '.^  Moreover the commitment to defend the 
rights of the republic was qualified by the statement that 'the CPU, 
considering historical experience, does not consider that all [problems] 
can be solved on the basis of the state sovereignty of Ukraine' and aims 
for 'a new Union....of equal, sovereign, socialist states, united on the 
basis of common values and interests’.*^ The CPU apparat from July
1990 was controlled by the rigidly orthodox Stanislav H u ren k o /0  and he 
and his fellow conservatives continued to coordinate their activity with 
that of Moscow hardliners, supporting the January 1991 Baltic measures 
and finally discrediting themselves through their role in the August
1991 attempted coup.
However, the ground was being cut from under the conservatives' 
feet by the extraordinary process of the imperial centre's collapse, 
undermining all the traditional reasons for loyalty to the centre one by 
one, so that even those who were relatively reluctant to cut ties with the 
centre were forced to strike out on their own.
First and foremost, economic dependency was traditionally a vital 
centripetal factor, given that as late as 1990, 96% of (official) economic 
activity in Ukraine was still controlled by Moscow ministries. As 
Ukraine was but one part of a highly centralised and integrated 
command economy, few if any branches of its 'national economy' were 
truly self-suffident.71 However, Gorbachev's repeated failure to address 
the question of economic reform, allied to the spiralling collapse in 
production from 1990, the enfeeblement of the central economic
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ministries and the desire of the republics to isolate themselves from 
Moscow's inflationary monetary policy, all loosened the centre's control 
over the periphery. The Soviet political economy was transformed from 
a centralised dependency system to a zero-sum war of all against all for a 
diminishing quantity of economic resources and political legitimacy. The 
centre could no longer provide for the periphery in the way it had done 
in the past. In such circumstances the optimal policy for republican elites 
was to try and recentralise control at their own local level, and the 
necessary means to establishing such a local hegemony was the national 
communist strategy of using nationalism to mobilise local populations.
Other traditional factors mitigating against the appearance of national 
communism also declined or disappeared in 1990-91. Many Ukrainians 
had traditionally benefited from all-Union career paths, like Scots in the 
British Empire, often becoming more Catholic than the Pope as they 
served alongside Russians as fellow East Slavs in the wider empire. For 
example, Shcherbyts'kyi's successor as First Secretary, Volodymyr 
Ivashko, notoriously showed his contempt for the republic by accepting 
the post of Second Secretary to Gorbachev in the all-Union CPSU in July 
1990, turning his back on a position he had only held since September 
1989.72 This had the vital effect of exposing the CPU's centrist loyalties, 
and leading to the division of the top CPU and state posts, previously 
combined by both Shcherbyts'kyi and Ivashko, between Stanislav 
Hurenko and Leonid Kravchuk. This created the fault-line around 
which the CPU was eventually to split.
In Ukraine the rising tide of national communism reached a critical 
mass in spring 1991, when it became increasingly clear that the 
conservative counter-attack launched in Moscow the previous autumn 
(and supported by Hurenko in Kiev) had no real chance of success. In 
the Supreme Council, the national communists began to vote with the
opposition. The stand-off between the CPU majority and the opposition 
was therefore replaced by a new majority consisting of the national 
communists and the former opposition, if not the national communists 
on their own.73 Most of the former opposition in turn were happy to 
escape from their own former minority status by cooperating with the 
national communists. The centre parties were mainly in favour 
(although some distrusted the communists), as were the DPU, although 
the far right continued to refuse to 'collaborate' with any institutions or 
representatives of the Ukrainian SSR. The URP was split, with the party 
leadership seeking to cooperate with the national communists, but with 
a substantial body of the party's rank-and-file sympathising with the far 
right.
In the spring and summer of 1991 this new alliance began to bear 
fruit, as Ukraine passed a series of measures to give effect to its July 1990 
Declaration of Sovereignty, and opted out of the Union Treaty 
negotiations until September 1991. It is important therefore to bear in 
mind that the process of national communist cooperation with the 
former opposition began long before August 1991, and that nationalism 
had already deeply penetrated the CPU even before the Declaration of 
Independence on 24 August 1991. Although during the August coup 
attempt, it appeared for a time that many in the CPU were prepared to 
revert to type, especially those in the CPU apparat , and in local 
administration, Kravchuk was only criticised for wavering; -things had 
gone too far for any of the national communists to actually back the 
plotters, until it was clear that they would be forced to do so7*
Thereafter almost the entire CPU sought to save themselves by 
joining the national communist camp after the party was banned by the 
Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Council on 30 August, although a 
minority joined the revivalist Socialist Party of Ukraine set up by the
former leader of the CPU majority in the Supreme Council Oleksandr 
Moroz in Kiev on 26 October 1991.^ 5
The party-state did not disappear, however. Most members of the 
former CPU were now reluctant to associate themselves with any 
political party, but it it is impossible to explain the operation of the 
formal party system without reference to the informal ’party of power'. 
The fact that most of the levers of political power are still controlled by 
national communists is a key reason for the relative weakness of the 
(rest of) the party system.
Atomised pluralism, 1991-2
The banning of the CPU on 30 August 1991 only served to indicate 
how weak most of Ukraine’s fledgling political parties actually were. 
Although the CPU had formally departed from the scene, most of the 
resources of the party-state were now inherited by the national 
communists. Hence the legacy of the 'two-tier system’ of 1990-1 persisted, 
although the strongest element in the political system was no longer a 
party as such (the party-state simply became the state), and the new 
political parties struggled to make their impact felt.
A first glance at the Ukrainian party system after August 1991 
confirms the impression of an 'atomised party system', seemingly 
characteristic of all post-communist states.^6 If anything in fact, 
Ukrainian party politics had weaker foundations than in other post­
communist states. In Poland by contrast, Solidarity had already put down 
deep roots as an anti-communist front at the time of political 
liberalisation in 1989. Hungary had had a long tradition of semi-official 
tolerance of opposition groups since the 1960s, while the Baltic
opposition movements reached the stage of mass mobilisation almost 
two years before Ukraine.
In late 1991 there were already more than twenty parties in Ukraine 
(the proliferation of political parties was facilitated after September 1991, 
when the number of members required for official registration was 
lowered from 3,000 to 300. At that time, only five parties had met the 
target). Party membership figures were low, even for the best organised 
parties. The largest nationalist party, the Ukrainian Republican Party 
(URP), had only 12,000 members in 1992 for example and the Socialist 
Party of Ukraine (SPU) probably only around 10,000 (it claims 30,000 but 
has yet to formally register its members). Moreover, for most parties 
membership after the initial enthusiasm of 1990-1 was either stagnant or 
falling. The disappearance of the CPU as the opposition’s main 
opponent, poor economic performance, and for many nationalists, the 
achievement of their main goal, an independent nation-state, led to 
disorientation and growing apathy amongst many former activists. 
Many Ukrainians are in any case suspicious of any political party.
Even amongst those parties claiming to have an all-Ukrainian 
structure, membership tended to remain regionally concentrated. Of the 
two main nationalist parties, 55% of the URP's membership in 1992, and 
34% of the DPU’s was from the radical but unrepresentative Galician 
region.77 Almost a third of the Green Party's membership was in one 
oblast - Ternopir.78 Qn the other hand, the membership of centre-left 
parties such as the Social Democrats or the PDRU was concentrated in 
urban Eastern and Central Ukraine (The PDRU had 320 members in 
Luhans'k oblast, 250 in Kharkiv, 250 in Donets'k out of a total of 3,500 in 
spring 1 9 9 2 ).79 Party organisations moreover rarely existed outside of the 
local oblast centres, except in Galicia.
Parties were also handicapped by minimal resource bases and limited 
access to the mass media. In 1992, only the URP, DPU and the ultra- 
radical UNA had proper offices in Kiev. All had miniscule budgets. In 
autumn 1992 the DPU had only 10,000 coupons (then $30) in the kitty. 
Parties such as the URP, which received up to 65% of its budget from 
supporters abroad, were only slightly better off.88 Unlike the Russian 
Federation Parliament, the Ukrainian Supreme Council did not 
materially support party factions. It did not even provide them with 
offices. Only the URP, DSU, and UNA had a regular party press, but its 
quality was poor.8* The mass media remained the preserve of the 
supporters of President Kravchuk, although this now included some 
elements of the former opposition (see below). An appeal for the 
creation of a new independent TV channel was therefore launched by 
disgruntled members of the former opposition in July 1992, but with 
little immediate chance of success.8^
The interconnections between political parties and other elements of 
the social and political system remained weak and ill-formed. The 
parties' ability to mobilise collective action amongst the public declined 
spectacularly after the great wave of strikes and public demonstrations 
that culminated in the student hunger strikes of October 1990. The 
predominant public mood was by 1992 either hostile or indifferent to 
political parties. Rukh for example had a minus 32% rating (17% in 
favour, 49% hostile) in May-June 1992, and the rival centrist coalition 
New Ukraine (see below) minus 19% (12% support, 31% against).88 The 
number of individuals in Kiev classifying themselves as non-party or 
anti-party rose from 17% to 42% from mid-1990 to May 1992.84
No party could daim more than 10% in opinion polls. A typical poll 
in April 1992 gave the URP 7.7%, the GPU 5.4%, the DPU 4.3%, the 
PDRU 2.6%, the SPU 2.2%, the UPDP 1.2%, and the UCDP 1.1%.85
In many cases, Ukrainian public opinion was simply ignorant of the 
activities of political parties, given their limited means of publicising 
themselves. In September 1991, only 18% of Ukrainians considered 
themselves 'well-informed' about the activities of the DPU; 17% well- 
informed about the URP, and 7% about the PDRU.®^ One indication of 
declining public support for political parties was the repeated failure for 
by-elections to elect a candidate with the required 50% participation of 
the local electorate. Consequently, in September 1992, thirty seats in the 
Supreme Council lay vacant.®^
Party factions in parliament remained small and ill-disciplined. 
Central party leaderships lacked the means to enforce a party programme 
on their deputies' group. Even when the latter had some collective 
identity as a caucus, there was no whipping system. Caucus decisions 
only had recommendatory character. In a survey of Supreme Council 
deputies in September 1992 only 38 (out of 421) were prepared to confess 
a party affiliation.®® As in the eighteenth century British parliament, 
personalities and informal ties (as well as 'the king's men', or in the 
modem Ukrainian context, the amorphous national communist 'party 
of power') were usually more important than party.
Analysis of voting patterns in the Supreme Council throws up 
abundant evidence of the lack of party discipline. On 7 July 1992 for 
example various opposition groups tabled a motion for the resignation 
of the government of Vitol’d Fokin. The URP’s leader Mykhailo Horyn’ 
abstained, but four of his colleagues voted in favour of resignation. Ten 
members of the DPU voted for, but the leader of the party’s 
parliamentary faction Dmytro Pavlychko abstained. Thirty of the New 
Ukraine faction (see below) voted for, six against, and six abstained.® 9 
However, parties often issue public declarations on particular issues, and 
are increasingly responsible for concrete legislative initiatives.
Moreover, the parties failed to show much discipline during the 
autumn 1991 Presidential election campaigns (see Chapter 4). The PDRU 
had two rival candidates (Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi and Vladimir Griniov), 
and the DPU supported the non-party Volodymyr Pylypchuk instead of 
their own Volodymyr Yavorivs'kyi. Even the URP, despite its reputation 
for internal party discipline, had problems with its maverick Deputy 
Leader Stepan Khmara supporting Leopol'd Taburians'kyi instead of the 
URP's then leader Levko LukHianenko.
Lastly, Ukrainian parties (and movements) have suffered from 
frequent splits, such as those at the congress of Rukh in February-March 
1992, and the URP in May 1992, testifying to the failure to create 'broad 
church’ parties, or parties united by a common commitment to a clear 
platform. The Ukrainian Christian Democrats split into three factions in 
1992; whilst the Social Democrats managed to split at their founding 
congress in 1990, and again after attempts to reunify the party in the 
summer of 1992. The radicals who split from the URP to form the 
Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (UCRP) themselves split at 
their founding conference in June 1992. On the other hand those parties 
who have a loose and open structure, such as the GPU, have been 
debilitated by internal anarchy.90
Three possible theoretical perspectives could be applied to examine 
the reasons for the weakness of Ukrainian political parties.
From a structuralist perspective, where primary causality is attributed 
to socio-economic forces, and political parties are only dependent 
variables, the patterning of any party system supposedly reflects the 
pattern of strategic 'structural cleavages’ in society.91 The UK's 
traditional two-party system for example could be interpreted as 
reflecting the still all-important (if declining) central class cleavage in
society, the four main camps in Belgian politics the crosscutting socio­
economic and linguistic cleavages, and so on.
As throughout the former Soviet Union, however, a post­
communist society with well-defined 'structural cleavages' has yet to 
crystallise in Ukraine. Ethnic and regional cleavages also exist, but are 
also ill-defined until politicised by elites. The Soviet state prevented 
social groups from organising themselves, or even from communicating 
with one another and developing a sense of identity. Consequently, it is 
common to argue that the only significant social division in 
contemporary Ukraine is between a priviligentsia apparat and an 
amorphous 'society as a w h o le ' .92 Although parties may claim to speak 
for the interests of given social groups, as yet they represent only activist 
networks or circles of friends (Max Weber's 'political clubs'). Hence there 
is as yet no real pressure from social self-organisation welling up from 
below to channel the creation of political parties into more well-defined 
blocs.
Parties therefore remain weakly connected to social groups as a 
whole. They function horizontally by providing systems of 
communication and mutual support for groups of activists, but do not 
provide vertical linkage between social groups and the state.93 Instead, 
parties' projected social bases are determined ideologically. It is 
unfashionable to directly invoke narrow working dass interests, and few 
are prepared to openly speak out for the interests of the nomenklatura 
upper strata. Hence nearly all parties are either forced into the crowded 
middle ranks of sodety, speaking for a farmer or entrepreneurial dass 
that has yet to come into existence, or resort to a vague and general 
populism.
In addition to the bottom-up structuralist perspective, a top-down 
analysis stressing the importance of political institutions and the relative
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autonomy of political parties as organisations can also be invoked to 
explain the relative weakness of Ukrainian political par ties.94 Here the 
key institution is the Ukrainian Supreme Council, and its key feature is 
the fact that political parties were largely created after the elections held 
in March 1990. As stated above, the CPU used its then near monopoly on 
public political activity to prevent many of the various ’fronts’ and 
opposition movements of the time from putting forward candidates and 
establishing a presence in parliament. Hence Ukrainian deputies were 
not elected on a party label. Although factions were organised 
subsequently in the Supreme Council, Ukrainian deputies do not owe 
their careers to a party machine. Moreover, although the CPU was not 
allocated the reserved places it had enjoyed in the all-Union elections of 
1989, many candidates were selected through the old Soviet system of 
workplace nomination, rather than through a Western European-style 
system of open nomination in which all social groups can participate.
Since March 1990 the Supreme Council has done little to stimulate 
the formation and consolidation of political parties from above. As 
stated earlier, factions have little organisational or ideological cohesion. 
Deputies may in fact belong to two factions. (That said, two seemingly 
more purposeful factions were created in September 1992, a Rukh 
faction of 49, and the 42 belonging to the Congress of National 
Democratic Forces. New Ukraine had a faction of 52 in the summer of 
1992.95 For an explanation of these groupings, see below).
Election campaigns have yet to play their traditional role in 
stimulating party formation. The 1989 and 1990 elections came too early, 
whereas the referenda and Presidential campaigns of March and 
December 1991 had a mixed effect. The independence referendum of 1 
December 1991 did little to sharpen individual party identities, as every 
significant political force campaigned for independence, whereas the
Union Treaty referendum of 17 March 1991 and the Presidential vote on 
1 December 1991 produced as many divisions within as between the 
political parties. The URP was admittedly perhaps an exception, as it 
strengthened its organisation and public profile in the Presidential 
campaign (and also earned the enmity of its rivals for splitting the 
opposition vote). New parliamentary elections, due in 1995, but probable 
in 1994 would of course be different.
A third theoretical perspective might focus on Ukrainian political 
culture, or rather the lack of it. Post-communist Ukraine is in effect 
attempting to create a political culture from scratch. Unlike the Baltic or 
Eastern European states with their, albeit limited, memories of 
independent political parties and civil society in the inter-war period, 
Ukraine cannot draw on a rich historical political tradition. The 
fundamentals of a civil society did develop in Galicia under Habsburg 
rule before 1918 and Polish rule until 1939, but Galicia only contains 10% 
of the contemporary Ukrainian population.
The political parties of 1917-20 that were described in Chapter 1 were 
always weak and fractious, and failed to leave much of a historical 
tradition behind them. The OUN left a more durable legacy, but, as a 
terrorist group with, in the 1930s at least, a militant ethnically-exclusive 
ideology, did not display many of the virtues of a civic culture. The only 
other domestic political traditions available as opposition activity began 
to flourish in the glasnost' era, were those of the tiny dissident circles of 
the 1960s and 1970s. Such groups had left the militant ideology of the 
original OUN behind, but by definition had no experience in forming 
mass political parties.
Nor in general have Ukrainian parties been able to organise around 
ready-made indigenous ideologies bequeathed from the past. Liberals 
may quote Mykhailo Drahom anov (1841-95),96 the URP the
conservative philosopher V'iacheslav Lypyns'kyi (1 8 8 2 -1 9 3 1 ),97 and the 
ultra-right Dmytro Dontsov (1 8 8 3 -1 9 7 3 ),98 but their works are not well- 
known. Even amongst the highly ideologised ultra-right, which tends to 
revere Dontsov, its more important groups, such as the Ukrainian 
National Assembly, are clear that they would prefer to formulate their 
own ideology more in tune with contemporary political c o n d i t i o n s .99 
Poets tend to get more space in party publications.
Post-Soviet political culture in general is not free of its birth-marks 
under the ancien rigime . The Soviet regime did little to foster the 
principles of open dialogue, tolerance, and acceptance of mutual 
dependence and compromise on which the creation of broad-based 
political parties depends. Most Ukrainian parties have extremely low 
tolerance levels for internal dissent, and tend to be characterised instead 
by crude slander and bullying tactics. Mykhailo Horyn1, leader of the 
URP, has for example complained of 'extreme Bolshevik intolerance 
towards our political opponents, especially when we are trying to work 
out a common s t r a t e g y ’. 100 However, the URP itself has been one of the 
most ruthless parties when it comes to purging internal dissent (see 
Chapter 3). Open political activity has only been possible in Ukraine 
since 1990. It will take many years to develop the habits of collective 
action, accommodation and compromise that are the cement of an 
effective party system.
Despite the impressive list of weaknesses above, parties have 
nevertheless had a major impact on the political system. As argued in 
Chapter 1, the national communists who still dominate the Ukrainian 
political system, do not have a real ideology, unlike their predecessors in 
the 1920s. They are parasitic on other political parties. Ukrainian parties 
may be weak in structural terms, but their ideological impact on the state
has been great. In 1991-2 the national communists were particularly 
subject to nationalist pressure, as they had committed themselves to the 
goal of building a Ukrainian nation-state, there was a political vacuum 
on the left where the CPU used to be, and regional counter-lobbies had 
yet to organise themselves. A clear pattern emerged in 1991-2 whereby a 
given issue, such as the retention of Ukrainian nuclear weapons, or the 
protection of Ukrainians living in the Russian Federation would first be 
raised by the far right, and then be taken up by the conservative right, 
before finally emerging in government circles some several months 
hence.
After the summer of 1992, however, the national communists were 
also subject to pressure from the new left-wing and Russophone groups. 
The 'party of power' now had to conduct a more delicate balancing act 
between two roughly equal political forces, largely resulting in political 
stalemate. If anything this was the more natural situation. As was 
described in Chapter 1, the Ukrainian national movement does not has a 
natural majority within the current boundaries of the Ukrainian state. It 
could exercise enormous influence in 1991-2 after the startling collapse of 
pro-Moscow and leftist forces, and with Eastern Ukraine quiescent, as in 
1917, but there were strong signs that all three of the latter were 
beginning to revive in late 1992.
Political realignment and polarised pluralism, 1991-3
Because of the weaknesses in the party system as listed above, and 
because of the desire to convert parties of opposition into parties of 
government, Ukraine's political parties have since early 1992 attempted 
to consolidate their position through the formation of political blocs or 
coalitions, five of which are likely to contest parliamentary elections in
1994 or 1995, alongside whatever regional groupings may emerge. These 
may be classified as follows:
- Ultra-nationalist;
- Nationalist;
- Centrist;
- State-bureaucratic;
- Socialist;
- Regional;
The Ultra-nationalist camp is represented by the UNA, DSU, KUN, 
and UCRP, plus radical youth groups such as the Union of Independent 
Ukrainian Youth (see Chapter 6), and some smaller fringe groups (see 
Chapter 7). The UCDP and UPDP are difficult to classify, with a foot in 
both the ultra-nationalist and national-democratic camps (see Chapter 7).
The ultra-right's influence is considerable, but the likelihood of its 
achieving unity is poor. The most prominent individual on the ultra- 
right is the maverick people's deputy and ex-Deputy Leader of the URP 
Stepan Khmara, but his party, the UCRP is weak. On the other hand, the 
best organised party of the ultra-right, the UNA, lacks charismatic 
leaders. Khmara and the UNA are not close, because the latter do not 
share Khmara's strident anti-communism. The prospects for unifying 
the ultra-right under the banner of the well-funded emigr£ OUN-r and 
its front organisation the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists are also 
poor, as the OUN-r has consistently alienated indigenous Ukrainian 
parties by its manipulative tactics.
The ultra-right should not be dismissed as mere rabble-rousers, 
however. The UNA and its paramilitary wing, the Ukrainian National 
Self-Defence Forces, have gained notoriety for participating in the
fighting in the breakaway 'Dnister republic’ and other controversial acts, 
such as issuing a notorious condemnation of separatism in the Crimea, 
namely that it should be ’either Ukrainian or depopulated'.* 01 
However, often in ethnic politics competition tends to be between the 
competing claims of extreme and moderate nationalists to best defend 
the ethnic constituency, rather than between moderate nationalists and 
moderate centrists. Hence the ultra right has good prospects for a 
significant political breakthrough if the economic an d /o r security 
situation in Ukraine continues to worsen, and support within the core 
nationalist camp shifts to the right. In such circumstances, poorly 
qualified Ukrainian white-collar workers and sections of the Ukrainian 
working class threatened by unemployment could easily be attracted by 
their populist, neo-socialist economic rhetoric,* 02 and their clear 
identification of the national 'enemy'.
Until such a time, the main nationalist parties (Rukh , the URP, DPU 
and smaller satellite parties) are likely to inherit most of the 25-33% of 
the national vote that Rukh could command at the peak of its 
popularity in 1990-91 (see Chapter 4), with probably less than 10% of that 
vote going to the ultra-right However, sharp disagreements exist 
between the URP and the remnants of Rukh , now led by V ’iacheslav 
Chomovil. Since 1991 the URP has tried to transform itself into a 'party 
of respectable conservatism1,* 03 becoming an ardent supporter of the 
new state and its national communist leaders, and has even talked of 
becoming 'the natural party of government'.*04 Consequently the URP 
has actively supported the strengthening of Presidential rule since 
August 1991, and has sought to 'participate in, rather than to criticise* 
government (see Chapter 3).
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At the other extreme is Chomovil's Rukh , which is less attracted by 
the nationalist principle of ’my country, right or wrong', and still sees 
itself as a party of opposition. Chomovil's anti-communist populism, in 
many ways reminiscent of Lech Walesa's in Poland, strikes a strong 
chord with Rukh's remaining rank and file, especially while other 
leaders of the former opposition are receiving cosy government jobs 
from President Kravchuk.
Opinion polls indicate that the nationalists could expect up to 25-30% 
in new elections, but the animosities between Chomovil and the pro- 
Kravchuk wing make it extremely unlikely that a cohesive pre-election 
bloc could be formed,*05 although in an atmosphere of national crisis 
the two camps are more likely to close ranks, as in January 1993, when 
the short-lived Anti-Communist Anti-Imperial Front was formed (see 
Chapter 8).
In summer 1992 the nationalists created two rival blocs. On 31 July 
Chomovil formed the Congress of Democratic Forces on the basis of 
'struggle with the authoritarian tendencies of the pro-communist 
structures of p o w e r ’,  ^06 along with the committee 'A New Parliament 
for a New Ukraine’ to campaign for the collection of the three million 
signatures necessary to force early parliamentary elections (see Chapter 
8). At Rukh's fourth congress in December 1992, Chomovil formally 
transformed Rukh into a political party.
Chomovil’s Rukh hopes to emulate the anti-communist success of 
the Civic Forum movement in Czechoslovakia or Lech Walesa's 
Presidential campaign in Poland, if necessary through cooperation with 
the liberal centrists, whom the URP abhors. Ukraine is, however, much 
less of a homogeneous nation-state than Poland or even the Czech 
republic, and commitment to many aspects of Soviet egalitarianism and 
welfarism goes much deeper in Ukraine, particularly in the East. It is
therefore unlikely that an anti-communist tide that Chomovil seeks to 
ride to power will sweep across the whole country, as it did for Walesa. 
Moreover, Chomovil's Rukh is not the organisation it was in 1990, 
having been weakened by a series of splits in 1992, and the time for an 
anti-communist crusade may well have past. Personal popularity often 
counts for much in Ukrainian politics, however, and Chomovil's is 
second only to Kravchuk's. 10^
The most serious of these splits led to the 'Presidential', or more 
nationalist wing of Rukh , forming the rival Congress of National 
Democratic Forces (CNDF) on 2 August 1992 along with the URP, DFU, 
Union of Ukrainian Students and other smaller organisations. The 
CNDF stood for 'unitary statehood, departure from the CIS, support for 
national industry and the building of [strong] Armed Forces'.*08 The 
CNDFs priority, in other words, was the building of a Ukrainian nation 
rather than a civic state. In Chomovil's words, they favoured building 
'statehood first and then democracy', whereas he viewed the two 
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All the nationalist parties, like their counterparts in Western Europe, 
are on the political right and claim to support free enterprise (and 
therefore low taxes), and court the emergent new business class as their 
future bedrock of s u p p o r t . H 0  At the same time they support strong 
national defence, and even 'social protection of the population’. The 
social dynamics of post-communist societies are completely different to 
those of relatively stable Western European states, however, and it will 
be difficult for Ukraine's national-democrats to achieve all of the above 
aims at once. The nationalists' commitment to free enterprise is largely 
the legacy of their past anti-communism, and the idea popular in the 
1980s that a free enterprise economy was the best foundation for a strong 
state. In the harsh economic climate of the 1990s, a majority of the
Ukrainian working population will be short-term losers from the 
processes of economic adjustment, and the new middle classes are likely 
to remain thin on the ground. The nationalists therefore are more likely 
to be attracted by policies of state support for industry and economic 
populism. Such policies, after all, also have a strong pedigree for 
conservatives.
As regards government, the CNDF has cultivated good links mainly 
with security ministers, especially the head of the Security Service of 
Ukraine, Yevhen Marchuk and Defence Minister Konstantin Morozov. 
Rukh , on the other hand, having been violently opposed to the 1990-92 
government of Vitol’d Fokin, was prepared to cooperate with his 
successor, Leonid Kuchma, appointed in October 1992, and several of its 
members joined the new Cabinet of Ministers. These included the First 
Deputy Prime Minister until March 1993 (when he was forced out of 
office by left-wing criticism) Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi, the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for Economic Reform Viktor Pynzenyk, the 
Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for Humanitarian Issues 
Mykola Zhulyns'kyi (a Rukh sympathiser), the Minister for the 
Environment Yurii Kostenko, and the Minister for Foreign Economic 
Relations, Ivan Herts.
The Centrist bloc is represented primarily by the Nova Ukraina (New 
Ukraine) organisation, formed in January 1992,m  but whose origins can 
be dated back to the formation by the PDRU of a coalition for 'Democratic 
Reform in Ukraine', in the aftermath of the failed August 1991 c o u p .* *2
New Ukraine is a union of centrist political parties, such as the 
PDRU, SDPU, USDPU, and some sections of the Green Party; and those 
business lobbies which favour economic reform, such as the Ukrainian 
League of Businesses with Foreign Capital, the Confederation of
Industrialists of Ukraine (later the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and 
Managers, or UUIM) and the Union of Cooperative Workers (the 
original name intended for New Ukraine was in fact the ’Union of 
Politicians and Industrialists'). In summer 1992 New Ukraine controlled 
a Parliamentary faction of 58 deputies.* *3
The main aim of New Ukraine is 'the creation of [both] appropriate 
social conditions, and a coalition between politicians, state bureaucrats, 
businessmen and skilled workers [to support] the introduction of radical 
reforms and the building of a socially-oriented market economy and a 
well-developed civil society in Ukraine1. **4 At its founding congress in 
June 1992, it declared itself in favour of 'capitalism with a human 
face'.**5 Unlike the URP, Rukh , and the other national-democrats, New 
Ukraine does not call for Ukraine's departure from the CIS, and 
pragmatically supports the maintenance of good neighbourly relations 
with Russia. Although New Ukraine supports the Ukrainian nation­
state, it is not a nationalist party.
Arguments within the PDRU between supporters of liberal and social 
democracy, between more or less fervent supporters of President 
Kravchuk, and between the Kiev liberal intelligentsia and the 
Russophone technical intelligentsia in Kharkiv have however carried 
over into New Ukraine.* *6 New Ukraine's second congress in March 
1993 seemed to mark the ascendency of the Russophone element, when 
Vladimir Griniov replaced Volydymyr Filenko as Chairman.* *^
Moreover, New Ukraine only represents a minority of industrial 
managers, most of whom are lukewarm about market-oriented reforms 
at best. The UUIM is not the only industrial lobby, as Ukrainian 
industrialists have proved just as fractious as the leaders of Ukraine's 
political parties. The UUIM, led by New Ukraine stalwart and from 
October 1992 Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Vasyl' Yevtukhov,**®
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supports market reforms in principle, but Yevtukhov has used his 
influence in government to change the privatisation laws to give more 
rights to enterprise managers. The UUIM is analogous to, and has close 
links w ith, Arkadi Volsky's managers' group in Russia, and 
Yevtukhov’s group represents those managers who favour the 
restoration of close economic links with Russia.
Managers in Eastern Ukraine are much more conservative. They set 
up the Interregional Association of Industrialists in November 1992,1*9 
which supports Russophone and left of centre groups in Eastern 
Ukraine, such as the Public Congress and the Labour Party of Ukraine.
The Union of Independent Industrialists, set up in February 1993, on 
the other hand, is more national-protectionist. Its first chairman was 
Oleksandr Yemel’ianov, President Kravchuk’s conservative economics
adviser.120
A final business group is the National Association of Businessmen of 
Ukraine, which was set up on 29 March 1993 in response to alleged 
'backsliding' by the Kuchma government on economic reform. It has 
strong links with the Congress of Business Circles of Ukraine and the 
Ukrainian Financial G r o u p .  121
The centre ground in Ukraine is very precarious. New Ukraine has 
found itself squeezed between the national-democrats and the national 
communists, attacked for its anti-patriotic 'pro-Russian' stance and for 
its forthright opposition to the government for its foot-dragging on 
questions on economic reform. Its main standard-bearer in government, 
the pro-Western Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Privatisation 
and Economic Reform, Volodymyr Lanovyi, was unceremoniously 
sacked by Kravchuk in July 1992.122 Several ministers in the new 
Kuchma government had good links with New Ukraine, however, 
including Yevtukhov, Viktor Pynzenyk and Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi.
104
Early opinion polls suggested that New Ukraine was supported by 20- 
24% of the electorate. More people had a negative opinion of Rukh 
(49%) than of New Ukraine (31%), reflecting the unpopularity of Rukh's 
nationalism in the industrial regions of Eastern and Southern Ukraine, 
and New Ukraine's relative n o v e l t y .*23 More electors were indifferent 
or as yet undecided towards New Ukraine (57% compared to Rukh's 
34%), indicating some potential for growth. New Ukraine's key 
weakness, however, is that it looks to long-term processes of 
privatisation and demonopolisation to create appropriate social bases of 
support. Moreover, as a centrist bloc it would be squeezed if the situation 
in Ukraine polarised. Already in late 1992 it was loosing support to its 
left, and the formation of new parties in Donets'k meant that its 
influence in Eastern Ukraine was increasingly confined to the Kharkiv 
area.
The prospects of the state-bureaucratic bloc are the most difficult to 
analyse. The so-called 'party of power’, the national communists led by 
President Kravchuk into support of the national cause, has no real 
formal party structure. This is natural enough, as it is not in the interests 
of either the President, the leaders of the military-industrial complex, the 
heads of the collective farms, or those who work in the government 
executive to associate themselves with any party. The banning of the 
CPU has given them a useful anonymity with which to deflect public 
criticism, compared with both the opposition parties and with their 
communist past. Interestingly, the rating of President Kravchuk, 
compared with that of the government (down 18%) and that of the 
Supreme Council (down 32%), rose by 10% from January - June 1992 to 
stand at +14%. A relatively high 44% of the population supported his 
policies, in the expectation of social peace and relative stability of life,
and because public opinion places more faith in leading individuals such 
as Kravchuk and Chornovil, than in unfamiliar or discredited 
institutions, such as parties or parliament.
Kravchuk at least still commands considerable support amongst a 
public worried that an 'atomised party system' is too reminiscent of 
Russia in 1917, Germany in 1933 or Georgia in 1991. The notion of a 
strong 'apolitical' President has strong appeal to at least half of the 
population. However, Kravchuk's increasing inability to act decisively 
after the summer of 1992 was bound to cost him some support.
At a local level, former members of the nomenklatura , as in other 
ex-communist countries, are likely to pose as 'non-party' candidates, 
whilst using their control over local economic resources and mass media 
to secure e l e c t i o n . !  24 Therefore i t  is unlikely that the 'party of power', 
will seek to fully institutionalise itself, although the proposed election 
law (see below) may force them either to cooperate with existing party 
structures, or even to form new parties of their own.
The socialist bloc is represented by the Socialist Party of Ukraine and 
its rural counterpart, the Peasants' Party of Ukraine, plus numerous 
small neo-communist groups. Both the SPU and PPU stand accused of 
'social demagogy’, and are treated as pariahs by the rest of the political 
spectrum. However, the two parties' simple slogans against price 
liberalisation, in favour of restored state control, and for 'socially just 
privatisation' strike a chord amongst those elements of the population 
who see market reforms wholly in terms of higher prices. The socialist 
bloc might expect 10-15% at the forthcoming elections (as in the 1991 
elections to the Polish Sejm ) but its prospects should not be exaggerated. 
The majority of the former party-economic nomenklatura have not 
joined its ranks, but have found it more convenient to remain in the
non-party ’party of power'. Moreover, there are internal divisions 
within the left wing camp between the SPU and those who would like to 
revive the CPU.125
In Eastern Ukraine, however, it is likely that the SPU and other leftist 
groups may make common cause with Russophone groups to create a 
pow erful r e g iona l lobby. Although the formation of regional 
organisations lagged behind that of mainstream political parties, the 
events of January 1993, when 150 Eastern Ukrainian people's deputies 
attempted (unsuccessfully) to force the Supreme Council to open in 
emergency session to consider their demands that economic reform be 
slowed, the ban on the CPU reconsidered and the CIS Statute signed by 
Ukraine, vividly demonstrated the potential strength of such a bloc (see 
Chapter 8).
Ukraine’s 'atomised party system’ is developing towards the pattern 
of party configuration described by Sartori as 'polarised pluralism', as in 
the French Fourth Republic of 1946-58 (although the respective geo­
political, ethnic and economic situations are completely different, as are 
the histories of the political parties themselves).*2** That is, a party 
system with five main blocs has a 'destructive opposition’ on both the 
extreme left and extreme right (the socialists and the ultra-right, as with 
the PCF and the Gaullists under the Fourth Republic), with the national- 
democrats, liberal-democrats and the 'party of power' in the centre. The 
prospects for political stability will therefore depend on the stability of 
coalitions in the centre. This in turn will depend on how much of the 
centre is prepared to work together, and on the centre's power to resist 
encroachment from the flanks.
Of most relevance to this work, however, is the fact that the two 
nationalists blocs do not represent a political majority. Although 
Ukraine was basically governed from 1991-92 through an alliance of the 
nationalist and national communist camps, it remained possible that an 
alternative majority could be constructed if the national communists 
were to construct a new alliance with the fast-growing leftist-regional 
bloc.
A leg-up for the parties?
The Ukrainian Supreme Council has passed certain measures to try 
to strengthen the party system. The first, in June 1992, was a Law on 
citizens’ associations (Obiednannia hromadian ) X ^  The Law divided 
such associations into two categories; political parties which will have 
the right to directly nominate candidates in Parliamentary elections and 
the right of legislative initiative, but will not be allowed to participate in 
commercial economic activities; and dvil organisations (Hromads'ki 
orhanizatsi'i ) such as unions, movements and societies (Tovarystva ), 
which, on the contrary, will be able to engage in commercial activity, but 
not to directly nominate candidates for election.
Secondly, the draft law on parliamentary elections envisaged a mixed, 
majoritarian-proportional electoral s y s t e m .  128 One part of the deputy 
corpus will be elected from single mandate electoral districts, and the rest 
from party lists, where electors will not vote for concrete individuals, but 
for a party or coalition of parties (parties may add non-party candidates to 
their lists). The number of mandates received would then be 
proportional to the number of votes received on the lists (as in 
Germany).
Given the small size and lack of influence of existing parties, it is 
envisaged that parties or coalitions must not only be registered, but also 
must collect 100,000 signatures of support before they can be added to the 
general list. This is likely to be an extremely tough obstacle. A similar 
provision existed for the 1 December 19 9 1  Presidential elections in 
Ukraine, when only the six candidates backed by the strongest 
organisations managed to collect the necessary 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  signatures. The 
apparat successfully collected for Kravchuk, Rukh for Chomovil, the 
URP for Lukianenko, the PDRU for Yukhnovs’kyi and Griniov, and 
the (obscure) Peoples’ Party for Taburians’kyi. The candidates of the 
Greens, the UNA and the DPU all fell s h o r t . ^ ^ 9  Candidates for 
individual districts will require the signatures of 5 0 0  electors.
Moreover only those parties receiving more than 3% of effective 
votes will be allowed representation. Lastly, the requirement that 50% of 
electors participate in any given election for it to be effective will be 
abolished.
Taken together, these measures will clearly favour the larger parties, 
and may go some way towards assisting the emergence of a stronger 
party system with more cohesive Parliamentary factions, loyal to the 
party platform. However, it is far from certain that all the above 
measures will be passed. They are of course in the interests of the parties 
themselves, but, as demonstrated above, their influence in the Supreme 
Soviet is limited. Moreover, the majority of deputies from the state- 
bureaucratic bloc would prefer to be elected as non-party individuals. 
Their chances of future success are considerable if they are able to 
manipulate their local influence, whereas few would be prepared to 
gamble on association with the SPU or other neo-communist groups (as 
shown by the fact that only 38 deputies of the former hardline CPU
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’group of 239’ have joined the SPU). They therefore have little incentive 
to support the proposed measures.
Conclusion
After a long and difficult birth, Ukraine's political party system was 
entering a consolidation phase in 1992-3. This Chapter has made clear 
the manifold difficulties facing political parties in Ukraine, as in many 
other post-communist societies. Politics remains highly individualised 
and volatile. But in a situation where all political structures are as yet 
weakly institutionalised, the influence of political parties is a key 
element in the political process.
The nationalist and ultra-right blocs represent only two out of a total 
of six significant political groupings in Ukraine, but, as predicted in 
Chapter 1, the nationalist parties were able to exercise considerable 
influence in 1991-92 through their alliance w ith the national 
communists. This alliance was not necessarily permanent, however, as 
the national communists had other possible allies.
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3. THE PRISONERS* PARTY:
FROM THE UKRAINIAN HELSINKI UNION,
1988-90, TO THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLICAN 
PARTY, 1990-2
Introduction
The Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), which became the Ukrainian 
Republican Party (URP) in April 1990, was the best organised, and often 
the most influential, nationalist party throughout the period of study. It 
came closer than any other nationalist group to functioning as an 
effective political party. As argued in Chapter 1, however, the social and 
geographical base for a mass nationalist party in Ukraine remained 
inherently limited. Moreover, the new Ukrainian intelligentsia initially 
kept their distance from radical nationalism by forming their own party, 
the Democratic Party of Ukraine (see Chapter 5). Therefore the UHU- 
URP's rank-and-file membership largely consisted of working class or 
unskilled white collar workers, while its leadership was provided by 
former political prisoners. The leader of the UHU-URP from 1988 until 
May 1992, Levko LukMianenko, spent a total of 27 years in the camps, and 
his successor, Mykhailo Horyn', twelve.*
The ideological background of such former prisoners was in the dvic 
ideals of the dissident movements of the 1960s and 1970s. However, in 
practice, given the semi-underground conditions in which the party had 
to operate before it became (as the URP) the first non-communist party to 
be offidally registered in Ukraine in November 1990, the URP evolved 
into a highly disdplined party, whose style and structure was in many 
ways reminiscent of its communist opponents, and whose ideology was 
distinctly ethnicist. This trend was also encouraged by the
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unsophisticated nature of the party's mass membership, and the cult of 
deference within the party towards Luk"ianenko as the patriarch of the 
national movement.
The party had no enemies on its right until 1990 when small ultra­
nationalist groups began to form, and even in 1990-91 it remained 
distinctly radical. Whilst more moderate groups were firmly committed 
to civic nationalism, parliamentary politics and cooperation with 
national communists, the URP continued to flirt with ethnic 
nationalism and the extra-parliamentary tactics of the far right.
As fervent nationalists, however, the URP swung from one extreme 
to the other after the Declaration of Ukrainian independence in August 
1991. If before August 1991, the URP had remained deeply suspicious of 
the institutions of the 'colonial' Ukrainian SSR and its communist 
leaders, the party now considered that the situation had changed utterly. 
A truly Ukrainian state worth defending had now come into being, and 
the URP became a strong supporter of the the national communists who 
had played the key role in securing independence. The party now sought 
to actively participate in 'nation-building', and sought to transform itself 
into a 'party of respectable conservatism' and 'a school for the 
preparation of state cadres', by becoming a party of the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia, and the pre-eminent defender of national statehood.^
This chapter will firstly examine the party’s roots in the nationalist 
groups of the 1960s and 1970s, and then provide a basic chronological 
survey of the party's history, before looking at key themes such as the 
party's structure, ideology and tactics.
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The OUN and UWPU
The roots of the UHU-URP go back to January 1961, when Levko 
Luk"ianenko,3 the party's elder statesman, was first arrested for his part 
in the formation of a underground nationalist party, the Ukrainian 
Workers’-Peasants' Union (UWPU), whose dozen or so members had 
held various secret meetings in L'viv oblast in 1958-61.
As described in Chapter 1, from 1941 until 1953 Ukrainian 
nationalism had been dominated by the OUN-UPA. After the early 
1950s, however, it only survived in exile, and new nationalist 
organisations began to take its place in Ukraine. The most prominent of 
these was the UWPU, which, according to Luk"ianenko, represented a 
crucial transitional phase in the Ukrainian nationalist movement. The 
UWPU’s radical call for outright independence echoed the OUN, but 
Luk"ianenko's group also foreshadowed the legalistic themes of 1960s 
and 1970s dissidents by basing this demand on Article 17 of the then 
USSR constitution, which formally guarantied all Soviet republics the 
right of succession. Moreover, the UWPU proposed that such secession 
would only be possible after a referendum,4 and specifically renounced 
the use of forced It soft-pedalled on the OUN’s traditional anti­
communism, and called for 'an independent Ukraine with a highly 
developed socialist political system'.** Its membership was also more 
typical of the 1960s than the 1940s. The UWPU itself was 'a group of 
intelligentsia, three lawyers [one being Luk"ianenko himself], an 
agronomist, a militiaman, party workers....until then the national 
liberation movement had a military character and was made up of 
simple peasants'.^
Nevertheless, the UWPU’s leading members were all arrested in 
1961. Luk,fianenko was initially sentenced to death, but this was later 
commuted to 15 years' in the camps. Also arrested with Luk"ianenko 
was Ivan Kandyba, who founded his own nationalist organisation, the 
DSU, in 1989 (see Chapter 7).
The UWPU was, however, somewhat ahead of its time. The majority 
of other arrests in the early 1960s were still of conspiratorial Galician 
groups committed to the goals of the OUN, and often rim by OUN 
veterans. Examples of such groups were the conspirators arrested in 
Ivano-Frankivs’k in 1958, the Ob"ednannia ('Union') group uncovered 
in 1960, the Khodorovs'ka group arrested in 1962, and the 20 members of 
the 'Ukrainian National Committee' imprisoned in L’viv in 1962.®
Most of the Ukrainian prisoners, including Luk''ianenko and the rest 
of the UWPU, were sent to the Mordovian prison camps, where, 
ironically, a whole generation of Ukrainian political leaders was formed, 
later to be released en masse in 1987-8. In the early 1960s the camps were 
still dominated by OUN veterans,9 who formed a radical Galician clique. 
They cooperated easily with other non-Russian prisoners, but found 
even the professed democrats among the Russians to be profound 
chauvinists. Moreover, they felt a considerable distance from Ukrainian 
prisoners from Central and Eastern Ukraine, who seemed less fervent in 
their commitment to the national idea. 10 Older prisoners such as 
Luk"ianenko and Kandyba still had much in common with the OUN 
generation, but after 1966 the Banderites' domination of the camps' 
intellectual life, such as it was, began to decline with the influx of a new 
generation of political prisoners from Central and Eastern Ukraine after 
the mass arrests of 1965-6. In other words, even those in the camps were 
to absorb many of the changes of the 1960s.
The shestydesiatnyky
The new prisoners came from the shestydesiatnyky , (generation of 
the 1960s), whose roots lay in the Khrushchev thaw rather than in the 
wartime struggles of the OUN. Once Khrushchev loosened the political 
reins after 1956, a new generation of dissenters began to appear 
throughout the USSR. The Ukrainian shestydesiatnyky were mainly 
intelligenty , who worked in 'the linguistic-cultural sphere', and 'limited 
their demands to national enlightenment'*! [prosvitianstvo ], rather 
than seeking outright national independence, at least in public. The first 
secretary of the CPU from 1963 to 1972, Petro Shelest, was relatively 
tolerant of their activity, allowing the shestydesiatnyky to produce a 
national literary and poetic revival, and campaign for the rehabilitation 
of national myths and symbols. Such dissidents also strongly criticised 
the pressure to Russify Ukrainian schools and culture that had become 
more intense after Khrushchev's education reforms of 1959. Like other 
dissidents elsewhere in the USSR at this time, however, the 
shestydesiatnyky emphasised individual rights and a rule of law as 
much as national rights. Unlike the UWPU, which, although legalistic 
and peaceful, had operated underground, they consciously sought to 
work openly and within the Soviet constitution, in the attempt to force 
the authorities to live up to their own formal standards.
The most famous dissident publication of the period was Ivan 
Dziuba's Internationalism or Russification? published in samizdat in 
1966.12 Dziuba was far from being a radical. His book called for a return 
to 'Leninist nationalities policy’ (that is, removing the 'distortions' of 
the Stalin and Khrushchev eras, and restoring the respect for national 
rights supposedly prevalent in the early 1920s).
The main dissident organ of the period was the Ukrains'kyi visnyk 
(Ukrainian Herald),* 3 edited by the journalist V'iacheslav Chomovil. 
Six issues were circulated in Ukraine in 1970-2. Issue 7-8 appeared in 
Spring 1974, having been edited by Stepan Khmara^^ after Chomovil’s 
arrest in 1972. Chomovil maintained a dry legalistic tone, reporting 
human rights violations w ithout editorial comment in a style 
reminiscent of the Chronicle of Current Events in Russia, but Khmara's 
issue, which referred to the 1972 wave of arrests in Ukraine as a 
'pogrom', was noticeably more radical - a foretaste of future arguments 
between the two.
Chomovil was more typical of the new generation of Ukrainian 
dissidents, however. He believed that the tactics of underground struggle 
appropriate to the 1930s and 1940s had now outlived their usefulness. 
Each successive conspiratorial group failed to learn from the mistakes of 
its predecessor and soon fell into the hands of the police, and once in the 
camps could only 'fantasise about a future struggle for Ukraine's 
f r e e d o m ' .  xhe shestydesiatnyky therefore sought to work within the 
framework of the USSR’s constitution and within international law. 
Such tactics did not guarantee them immunity from arrest, but they 
helped to attract a larger circle of sympathisers, whom it was more 
difficult for the authorities, fitfully mindful to a degree of international 
opinion, to arrest en masse.
This semi-tolerance ended with Shelest’s removal in in 1972 and the 
mass arrests that followed (smaller numbers had been arrested in 1966). 
Under Shelest, the cultural intelligentsia's agenda had overlapped at 
least partially with that of local national communists who sought to 
defend Ukrainian language schooling and capital investment for 
Ukrainian industry. However, his successor Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi
(1972-89) collaborated enthusiastically with Moscow. After Shelest's 
removal, not only dissidents, but also national communists in the CPU, 
were purged. Party leaders with a background in cultural work and from 
nationally conscious areas in Central and Western Ukraine were 
replaced by CPU generalists, ideologists and 'administrative cadres', and 
above all politically safe careerists from Russified Eastern Ukraine.
The arrest of many of the shestydesiatnyky , however, had the 
paradoxical effect of introducing new political ideas into the camps. 
Although traditional OUN-style radicals were still arrested, such as the 
Ukrainian National Front group in 1967,18 intellectual discussion in the 
camps 'was turned upside-down' by the arrival of the new g e n e r a t io n . 19 
Therefore, the former prisoners who emerged from the camps in the late 
1980s to lead the UHU were transitional figures. They were more radical 
than those shestydesiatnyky who had escaped arrest. Many prisoners, 
such as Stepan Khmara, were embittered by their experience, and all had 
more contact in the camps with the traditions of the OUN than the 
population at large. Nevertheless, even in the camps the prisoners felt 
the effects of generational change and adapted to the new political ideas 
produced by the demands of post-war reality. They thus stood half-way 
between the radical ethnic nationalism of the OUN and the civic 
nationalism that supposedly replaced it in the late 1980s.
The Ukrainian Helsinki Group
The most prominent group to espouse the new 'civic' dissent in 
Ukraine was the Ukrainian Group for the Promotion of the 
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, or Ukrainian Helsinki Group 
(UHG) for short, active from November 1976 to 1981 (although it never
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formally disbanded). Like the Helsinki Groups elsewhere in the USSR, 
the UHG was not an overtly nationalist group, even though leading 
figures, such as Lukianenko (who had resumed political activity after 
his release in 1976 and become one of the leaders of the UHG), and the 
UHG's first leader Mykola Rudenko were professed nationalists.^® 
According to Lukianenko, ’in the first year of its existence, the group 
occupied itself 70% in the defence of individual rights, and only 30% - in 
the defence of national r ig h ts 'l l  The UHG’s main demand in its 
founding Declaration was that the Helsinki Accords 'became the basis of 
relations between the individual and the state'. Its only mention of 
specifically national demands was that 'Ukraine, as a sovereign 
European state and member of the UN, should be represented by its own 
delegation at all international conferences at which the implementation 
of the Helsinki Accords will be discussed’.22 In fact, the UHG would later 
be strongly attacked by radical nationalists for their alleged 'neglect' of 
the national issue.23 The documents of the UHG, like the Ukrainian 
Herald when edited by V'iacheslav Chomovil, concentrated instead on 
cultural and linguistic issues.
The UHG worked to publicise abuses of the Helsinki Accords, 
producing a dozen statements and twice as many bulletins, many of 
which reached the West. It only ever had 37 declared members, 
however, (plus an outer circle of sympathisers of unknown size), and its 
ranks were soon decimated by arrest. Twenty three were imprisoned and 
6 forced to emigrate to the W e s t .2 4  Four members; Oleksa Tykhyi, Vasyl' 
Stus, Valerii Marchenko and Yurii Lytvyn; died in the camps, and were 
later to be mythologised by reburial in Kiev in November 1989.25 
Lukianenko later claimed that, given the high risks associated with 
dissent at the time 'we did not attempt to expand our circle of association
and did not demonstrate the associations we had so as not to bring 
misfortune on innocent p e o p le \ 2 6
The UHG drew its membership mainly from the cultural 
intelligentsia. They were ’predominantly the literati': 52% of its 
members came from the arts and humanities, 22% from the scientific 
intelligentsia (the reverse of the proportions in the Moscow group, 
indicating the centrality of cultural concerns), and 15% from other
professions.27
Krawchenko and Carter's broader study of 9 4 2  Ukrainian dissidents 
active in 1 9 6 0 -7 2  draws similar conclusions. Eighty nine percent were 
urban dwellers, and 86% 'white collar staff (including, out of a sample of 
6 5 9 , 2 2 7  creative intelligentsia, 151 scientific and technical intelligentsia, 
9 8  teachers and 6 6  students). Dissent was no longer confined to Galicia. 
Thirty eight percent of dissidents now came from the city of Kiev, and 
25%  from L 'v iv .2 8  in  other words, as argued in Chapter 1 , the new 
Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia provided most of the activists for the 
new movement, but it was unable to provide them in any great 
numbers.
The UHG did not survive long under Shcherbyts’kyi's regime, and 
repression easily isolated it from the general population. However, 
when the Ukrainian national movement reemerged in 1987-8, the prior 
existence of the UHG as a organisational and moral example proved 
invaluable, even if at the time they appeared to be fighting a losing 
battle.
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The release of prisoners and the establishment of 
the Ukrainian Helsinki Union
The issues raised by the UHG were returned to in 1987-8, when 
limited dissent again became possible. By then the additional damage 
that Ukrainian language and culture was perceived to have suffered in 
the intervening period added extra urgency to the cause.
Dissent had in fact never entirely disappeared in the early 1980s, 
although its level was certainly sharply reduced. In 1982, for example, 
Yosyf Terelia had established the Initiative Committee for the Defence of 
the Rights of Believers of the Church [in Ukraine], which sought to 
relegalise the Uniate Church. However, dissent only really began to 
return to the levels of the early 1970s with the mass release of political 
prisoners and their return to Ukraine in 1987 (those released included 
V'iacheslav Chomovil, Mykhailo Horyn', Oles' S h e v c h e n k o ^  and 
Stepan Khmara. The older prisoners, whom the authorities feared more, 
were only released in 1988. Luk"ianenko only returned to Ukraine in 
January 1989). At this time the penalties for public dissent were severe 
enough to deter all but former prisoners, who felt that they had nothing 
to loose. The establishment cultural intelligentsia was still quiescent, and 
therefore leadership of the dissident movement fell to the UHU by 
default (until rumblings of disquiet in the cultural establishment began 
to be heard in late 1988).
The first dissident publications of the new era were Chomovil's 
'Open letter to Gorbachev' in August 1987, and the simultaneous appeal 
by 206 Uniates to Pope John Paul n.30 Chomovil's letter announced the 
relaunch of the Ukrainian Herald, starting with issue 7, that is, ignoring
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Khmara's number. Chomovil declared, in the fashion of the time (if 
only for tactical reasons), that ’this journal conforms to the spirit of 
g lasnost',31  and by appealing to Gorbachev to restore 'Leninist 
orthodoxy' in nationalities policy, effectively took Ukrainian dissent 
back to the positions set out by Ivan Dziuba's Internationalism or 
Russification? in 1966. Ukrainian dissent mainly took the form of 'loyal 
appeals' to Gorbachev until 1989-90, when separatist sentiment could be 
openly expressed for the first time.
Issue 7 announced that the Herald would be an independent organ, 
but in March 1988 it effectively became the house journal of the revived 
UHG (later the Ukrainian Helsinki Union). A press release issued on 18 
March was signed by the 13 founder members of the revived UHG, plus 
the six coopted editors of the H e r a ld .3 2  As the only available channel for 
opposition activity, 'the Ukrainian Herald in L'viv [and the Ukrainian 
Culturological Club in Kiev] became centres to unite [all] the active 
national-cultural and social-political forces in U k r a i n e ’.33 A steering 
committee for reviving the UHG was established, consisting of 
Chornovil, Mykhailo Horyn', Mykola Horbal', Yevhen Proniuk, 
Khmara and, nominally, Levko Luk"ianenko (Luk"ianenko had been 
asked by Chornovil to assume leadership of the group while 
Luk"ianenko was still in exile in March 1 9 8 8) .34
A Declaration of Principles for a Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), 
written by Chomovil, Mykhailo and Bohdan H o ry n ',35 was issued on 7 
July 1988, and circulated in samizdat . After heated discussion, however, 
the Declaration failed to demand outright Ukrainian independence, and 
called instead for a confederal USSR, although individual members were 
allowed to campaign for independence. The Declaration stated that 'we 
imagine the possible future coexistence of the peoples of the USSR in a
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confederation of independent states'. ’The new... constitution of the 
union must only guarantee....general principles of federal ties between 
the republics, but without unifying and regulating the organisation of 
economic, political and cultural life in the republic’®** (the use in the 
same breath of the terms 'confederal' and 'federal' indicates a confusion 
typical of the times, and also the degree of the UHU's dissimulation).
Moreover, the rest of the Declaration confined itself to general 
demands that would command maximum support. It called for 
Ukrainian citizenship and state status for the Ukrainian language. It 
supported state provision of 'minimal material welfare' but did 'not see 
the revival of social justice in egalitarianism'. The 'threat of ecological 
genocide' was also condemned. The Declaration also called for a rule of 
law, general civil rights, freedom of religious worship and individual 
movement, and the dismantling of the old repressive criminal code. 
Lastly, 'military service should take place on the territory of the republic 
in republican military fo r m a t io n s ' .® ?
These compromises were not without cost, as the UHU began to lose 
some of its more radical members. By 1989, the UHU would also lose its 
monopoly status as the only opposition group, as leading radicals such as 
Vasyl' Sichko and Luk''ianenko's colleague from the UWPU, Ivan 
Kandyba, left to form their own organisations (see Chapter 7).®®
In December 1988 and January 1989 Luk”ianenko wrote a 
programmatical essay Shcho dali? (What Next?)®  ^ in order to further 
explain the UHU's p o s i t io n .^ ®  it still expressed faith in the progressive 
nature of Gorbachev's reforms, but was more open in its forthright 
condemnation of Bolshevism and Russian imperialism. 'At the heart of 
the Russian national spirit is the conception of Russia as a country 
whose core is known, but whose periphery has no permanent limits', he
argued. T he tem peram ent of an individual is a subjective 
phenomenon, whereas the temperament of a large number of people 
becomes an objective force', and this ’objective force' consists of 'the 
traditional stability of the vast Russian masses' imperialist attitudes'.^!
Luk"ianenko's references to the 'exploited masses', his deterministic 
belief that 'the progress of national maturation is irresistible'^^ and his 
statement that 'to be a leading organisation, the UHU must be in the 
forefront of other Ukrainian patriotic currents just enough, so as not to 
break the sense of common, strategic direction of those who are with 
us’43 showed how much he remained under the influence of Bolshevik 
ideology and political tactics. He argued explicitly that the UHU should 
function as a vanguard party. The popular masses were still 'not guided 
by aspirations for justice, but by an aspiration to avoid p r i s o n ’,44 and the 
cultural intelligentsia, 'the writers and other patriotic persons of the 
official system' were still conformist, although Lukianenko concluded 
his work with a call to them to struggle alongside the UHU.45 Therefore 
only former prisoners could provide the necessary leadership to the 
national movement.
In order to function as a vanguard party, however, the UHU needed 
to influence mass public opinion. In 1988-90 this remained very difficult. 
The L’viv UHU began to publish two samizdat information bulletins; 
Informator from late 1988, and L'vivs'ki novyny (L’viv news) in 
January 1989, and the Kiev UHU published the journal Holos 
vidrodzhennia (Voice of Rebirth) from March 1989, but their circulation 
remained limited. Holos vidrodzhennia , for example, only had a print- 
run of 10,000-15,000 which had to be organised in the Baltic r e p u b l ic s .4 6  
However, in late 1988 the UHU established two press centres, one in 
Moscow and one in L’viv under Chomovil, which made skilful use of
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foreign contacts to spread information about the organisation and its 
aims more widely (Radio Liberty in Munich and others could be relied 
on to relay such information back into Ukraine).
The UHU also sought to organise mass collective action. First and 
foremost it returned to its traditional tasks of campaigning against 
human rights abuses. To this end, an Initiative Group for the Freeing of 
Ukrainian Political Prisoners had been set up by Mykhailo Horyn' as 
early as October 1 9 8 7 . When one of the group's members, Ivan Makar 
(later to become a Ukrainian deputy), was arrested in summer 1 9 8 8  the 
successful campaign for his release became 'the foundation, on which 
the structural edifice of the L'viv oblast organisation of the UHU began 
to a r is e ' .4 7  The UHU organised petitions, leafleting and publicity in the 
West for the persecuted. In autumn 1 9 8 8 , the L’viv UHU set up a social 
committee for the families of the persecuted, and in October was strong 
enough to organise a strike committee under Stepan Khmara to protest 
against the violent dispersal of demonstrators in L'viv on 1 October. 
Forty factories in L'viv struck for two hours on 3 October, as a result of 
which Colonel Martynov of the local OMON, and General Popov of the 
local militia were replaced for failing to contain the protest.^®
In June and July 1988 a series of public demonstrations numbering 
some 1,000 to 7,000 people were held in L'viv to demand the formation 
of a 'Democratic Front in Support of Perestroika', in imitation of similar 
moves in the Baltic republics. The failure of the 19th CPSU Party 
conference in Moscow to condemn the Baltic Popular Fronts 
emboldened the Ukrainians and encouraged them to believe that a 
similar organisation could be formed in Ukraine. However, they came 
too early to be effectively led by the UHU, and the authorities had little 
compunction in quickly crushing them.49 Despite formulating their
demands in terms of a loyal petition to Gorbachev, the demonstrations 
were soon broken up by the OMON, as was a further meeting on 1 
October. The UHU continued to organise meetings, however, although 
people were less willing to demonstrate in the winter. On international 
Human Rights Day, 10 December 1988. a few hundred gathered in L'viv, 
but no demonstration was possible in Kiev. The same pattern was 
repeated on 22 January 1989, when a large demonstration was held 
outside Sts. Yuriis' Church in L'viv to commemorate the 1919 reunion 
of Western and Central-Eastern Ukraine, but a demonstration planned 
for St. Sophia square in Kiev had to be held in a private apartment.^10 
The tempo of demonstrations would, however, begin to rise again in 
mid-1989, as the Ukrainian cultural establishment began to join the 
protests.
The UHU organises itself
The set-backs of summer 1988 convinced the UHU that it must 
quickly organise itself more effectively. The UHU also benefited from the 
growing radicalisation of public opinion in Galicia and in Kiev in 
reaction to the failure of the Ukrainian authorities to live up to the 
promises of perestroika (the political atmosphere in Ukraine was always 
distinctly more conservative than that in Moscow until Shcherbyts'kyi's 
removal in September 1989). A founding ’congress' for the UHU was 
held in secret in a private apartment in L'viv on 29 October 1988, 
attended by 60 p eop led  Oblast branches were formed in early 1989.52 By 
the beginning of 1990 the UHU was active in every Ukrainian oblast save 
Kirovohrad and Cherkasy.
The first URP congress
An all-Ukrainian conference of the UHU attended by 134 delegates on 
17-18 March 1990 finally decided to call the Union's first national 
congress, and also endorsed Lukianenko's desire to turn the UHU 
formally into a political party, and de facto to create the first mass 
opposition party in U k r a i n e ^  (the UHU's campaign in the March 1990 
Ukrainian elections is described below). The decision was made possible 
by Gorbachev's decision in February 1990 to abolish Article 6 of the USSR 
constitution that had guaranteed the communist party's legal monopoly 
on public political activity.
The congress met in Kiev on 29-30 April 1990,54 and was attended by 
495 delegates, representing the UHU's 2,300 members (the UHU now had 
organisations in all of Ukraine's oblasts, and even branches in Moscow 
and Lithuania). The name 'Ukrainian Republican Party' was chosen by 
251 of the delegates, although 39 voted for Ukrainian Democratic Party’, 
14 for 'Ukrainian Christian-democratic Party’, 11 for 'Ukrainian 
National-democratic Party’, and two for 'Party of Ukrainian 
Independence' .55
The delegates' speeches showed that the UHU, despite the departure 
of many radicals in 1989, remained a broad church, embracing both 
moderates such as V'iacheslav Chomovil, and radicals such as Roman 
Koval' and Dmytro Korchyns'kyi who were later to provide the 
leadership for parties of the far right. Chomovil attacked both the 
excessive radicalism of the proposed programme and the party's 
authoritarian structure and, together with 11 other delegates, signed a 
declaration disassociating himself from the new p a r t y .5 6  The exiled 1970s
dissident Leonid Pliushch also complained that the new party was too 
preoccupied with the national question, and had failed to pay sufficient 
attention to socio-economic questions, which would limit its appeal in 
Eastern Ukraine.57
The UHU's radicals, mainly somewhat younger, also had their say. 
Volodymyr Yavors'kyi, Oles' Serhiienko, Dmytro Korchynslcyi and 
Roman Koval' (all of whom would ultimately depart the URP for parties 
further to the right) called for the URP to be a tightly disciplined, 
vanguard party, with limited tolerance for internal dissent and with 
radical nationalism as its ideology.58 Koval’, one of the URP’s seven 
leadership Secretaries, even proposed a radical alternative programme 
for the party, which asserted that 'the rebirth of Ukrainian statehood is 
impossible without the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation', and demanded 
that 'the government of a Ukrainian republic should carry out a 
protectionist national policy which will secure the fundamental rights of 
the indigenous nation' as opposed to the 'denationalised' and the 
'millions of Russians whose numbers in Ukraine are steadily growing'. 
Koval' also called for the CPU to be banned, and for all 'armed [forces] on 
Ukrainian territory, including nuclear, to be nationalised. This will be 
the guarantee of our i n d e p e n d e n c e ' ^ ^  (it is significant that leading 
radicals such as Koval’ were prepared to contemplate a nuclear-armed 
Ukraine as early as 1990).
KovaT's proposals received little support, however, not least because 
they openly challenged Luk”ianenko’s leadership. However, the final 
party programme that was thrashed out in a committee dominated by 
Luk''ianenko's supporters owed more to Koval"s radical nationalist 
ideas than to Chornovil’s civic liberalism.60 The programme was short 
on specifics, but strongly emphasised the party’s central goals of
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independence and the rehabilitation of ethnic myths and symbols. The 
economic section was particularly sparse.
Moreover, the new leadership elected at the congress contained 
several ultra-radical supporters of ethnic nationalism, and Luk"ianenko 
had to fight a long-running battle throughout 1990-92 to prevent their 
influence from growing. Luk"ianenko was elected by acclaim, and 
proposed as his Deputies Stepan Khmara from L'viv and Hryhorii 
Hrebeniuk from Donets'k in a misguided attempt to balance Western 
and Eastern Ukraine. Both, however, were ultra-radicals, who along 
with three other members of the URP leadership; Roman Koval' (now 
head of the party's Ideological Department, and editor of the URP's 
samizdat paper Prapor antykomunizmu ,61 which in February 1991 was 
renamed Vyzvolennia '91 ), Serhii Zhyzhko and Oles' Serhiienko^ 2 
formed a powerful radical faction pushing the party to the right. They 
dominated the party Secretariat because many of the URP's leading 
moderates had just been elected to the Ukrainian parliament, where 
their activities were now concentrated (see below).
Internal arguments, 1990-91
Throughout 1990-1, the party was divided on three key issues that 
also split other nationalist parties; whether to recognise the political 
institutions of the Ukrainian SSR as legitimate and participate in 
parliamentary politics, whether to embrace ethnic 'integral' nationalism 
as the party's official ideology, and whether to cooperate with national 
communists in the CPU. These arguments will be considered 
thematically in greater detail below. Here it will only be remarked that 
the URP's leadership found it increasingly difficult to hold the line as
128
the party’s younger members grew increasingly frustrated with the slow 
pace of political change and with the leadership's conservative 
accommodation of non-nationalist opinion in Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine. As a result, there was considerable cooperation between the 
URP's radicals and other ultra-right groups (see Chapters 6 and 7), 
especially at a local level. The Cherkasy branch of the URP defected en 
masse to the Ukrainian National Party in late 1990.63 Roman Koval' 
went so far as to called for formal merger with other ultra-right groups 
in March 1991,64 and the URP leadership felt compelled to ban joint 
membership of the URP and the main ultra-right group the UIA (see 
Chapter 6) in April 1991.65 An 'Initiative Committee for the Formation 
of a Radical Group in the URP' appeared in L'viv in December 1990, 
which criticised Lukianenko and other leaders of the URP and Rukh 
for their 'irresolution', lack 'of preparedness for active struggle’, and 
fascination with the parliamentary game. The Group argued that 
'having grown in numbers, the party has decisively weakened in terms 
of quality', for which the only remedy was 'the study of the experience of 
the ideological-political struggle of the OUN\66
The desire by the party's radicals such as Roman Koval’ and Stepan 
Khmara for a policy of sharp confrontation with the authorities gathered 
support in the winter of 1 9 9 0 -9 1  as Gorbachev's reforms began to falter 
and conservative communists counter-attacked throughout the USSR. 
In Ukraine, Stepan Khmara was entrapped by KGB provocateurs on 7  
November 1 9 9 0  (he was accused of an assault). Two hundred and forty 
deputies from the CPU majority voted to strip him of his parliamentary 
immunity on 1 7  November and he was promptly arrested in the 
Supreme Council building i t s e l f .6 7  when the URP's Grand Council met
on 17-18 November, the atmosphere was near-hysterical.®® Roman 
Koval* called for the URP to form secret underground structures and 
prepare for an all-Ukrainian strike in protest at Khmara’s arrest and the 
general communist revanche , and received widespread support®^ until 
he was put in his place by Luk'lanenko, who asserted that 'the situation 
is not that extreme. The worsening of the situation is natural, and we 
expected it*. 'Our strength lies in open struggle' and semi-public 
discussion of the party going underground was absurd in any case.?® 
Arguments over strategy continued to split the party right up to the 
very top, however. Koval’, for example, attacked moderate deputies 
such as Oles' Shevchenko for compromising with the imperial enemy, 
while Shevchenko replied by accusing Koval' of 'carrying out the work 
of the KGB’ by splitting the party from w i t h i n . T h e  radicals’ personal 
feud with leading figures in the URP led to a widespread purge in the 
run-up to the URP's second congress in June 1991. The first to go was 
Volodymyr Yavors’kyi, thrown out of the L’viv URP in December 1990 
(he went on to edit the radical nationalist L'viv journal Napriam , and 
joined Ivan Kandyba's ultra-nationalist splinter group, the DSU, in 1992 
- see Chapter 7). After long discussion, Koval' was suspended from his 
work as a URP Secretary in April 1991.^2 Koval', along with most of the 
others purged before the congress (Zhyzkho, Anatolii Shcherbatiuk) also 
ended up in the DSU (the parties of the far right were often led by those 
expelled from the UHU-URP, - see Chapters 6 and 7). The URP's deputy 
leader, Hrebeniuk, would also be removed at the congress. The radicals 
therefore were largely decapitated of leadership.
Khmara, however, because of his spell in prison, was too much of a 
popular hero for the leadership to touch. The Ukrainian authorities in 
fact deliberately released him in time to make mischief at the party's 
second congress. Moreover, many of the party’s younger and more
nationalist members continued to support the radicals' programme, and 
there was much resentment against the party being run by a clique of 
former political prisoners at the top (Luk"ianenko, Shevchenko and the
Horyn' brothers).^
Khmara and the second congress
The second URP congress was held on 1-2 June 1991.^4 The party now 
claimed 8,881 members (1,653 of whom were probationary 'candidate 
members’), as opposed to 2,300 a year earlier.
Khmara now carried the standard for the party's radicals. He had 
already gained notoriety for his extreme anti-Russian and anti­
communist views, and had been further embittered by what he saw as 
lack of support from other opposition deputies while he was in prison, 
and frustrated at their general lack of activity.^ From prison, Khmara 
had even drawn up a draft constitution for a 'Sovereign Hetmanate 
Republic', in other words a Ukraine purged of all communist influence 
and Soviet institutions.^^ Khmara therefore was always arguing with 
Luk"ianenko, Shevchenko and the Horyn' brothers. For them, national 
independence was the primary political goal, to be achieved through 
cooperation with national communists if necessary.
In his speech to the congress, Khmara declared that 'Marxism is the 
embodiment of Satanism', and that 'in the whole of world experience 
there is not a single example where cooperation between democrats and 
communists has had positive consequences'. He dismissed talk of a split 
between orthodox and national communists in the CPU as 'demagogic 
and perfidious propaganda, designed to maintain the people's 
delusions'. In fact 'the Supreme Soviet under the leadership of 
Kravchuk has turned itself into [little more than] a branch of the Central
Committee of the CPU1, which was full of 'wafflers' unwilling or 
incapable of taking practical steps to defend Ukraine's sovereignty.^? He 
therefore repeated his call for the URP to remain a purist and elite 
vanguard party, with a more openly nationalist ideology, based on the 
principle that 'abstract love for Ukraine without hatred for those who 
crucify her, that is for her enemies [a reference to Luk"ianenko's normal 
position that nationalism meant love for one's own, rather than hatred 
of others], will render the defence of our people impossible; nor with 
such an (amoral) approach will an independent Ukraine ever be built'. 
The URP, according to Khmara, should seek to come to power only with 
the aid of similarly pure political forces. Far from cooperating with the 
CPU, the URP should exclude even ordinary former communists from 
its ranks for a period of five years after their departure from the CPSU- 
CPU.
Khmara's platform was clearly popular with many of die delegates, 
but his support was never openly tested as he withdrew his candidacy for 
the leadership in exchange for the position of deputy le a d e r ? ^  (a proxy 
candidate, an obscure local party member Ivan Temovyi, received 33 
votes against Luk”ianenko's 368 in the ballot for the leadership).®9 
Luk"ianenko (rather a biased source) estimated Khmara's support at no 
more than 5-10% of the party, and only 5 delegates (from Rivne) actually 
quit the party at the congress,®* but events at the party’s third congress in 
1992 indicated much higher levels of support for ultra-radical positions 
(25-33% of the party, see below), which only Luk"ianenko's personal 
prestige managed to stifle in 1991.
Luk"ianenko's speech on the other hand directly attacked the 'ultra- 
radicals', arguing that the URP's participation in the Supreme Council 
had produced clear and positive results. By raising the issue of 
independence before a mass audience, it had helped to expand the limits
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of the popular political imagination, whilst pressure on the national 
communists had produced the July 1990 Declaration of Ukrainian 
Sovereignty and the legalisation of opposition political activity. 
Luk"ianenko also claimed credit for devising the wording of the second 
ballot in the March 1991 referendum, taken up with enthusiasm by 
Kravchuk. Moreover, the ultra-radicals were unrealistic to think that 
independence could be achieved without the cooperation of the 
hundreds of thousands of bureaucrats and enterprise managers in the 
CPU. Ukrainian society, dominated by parochial self-sufficient peasant 
economies in 1917, was now a complex industrial organism, whose 
disentanglement from imperial structures would be a long and complex 
process. Luk"ianenko again stressed his personal opposition to narrow 
ethnic nationalism, and argued that the self-limiting radicalism of more 
extreme groups to the party’s right was not for the URP. The URP had to 
accept that for the first time since the formation of the UHG in 1976, it 
now had more radical rivals to its right, but experience had shown that 
such groups would remain tiny, and their influence confined to
Galida.82
That said, Luk”ianenko clearly had to make concessions to the party's 
right wing to prevent Khmara splitting the party. Despite Oles’ 
Shevchenko's stated desire to provoke a showdown with Khmara’s 
supporters, Luk”ianenko preferred to avoid a split at all costs. The party’s 
amended programme once again committed the party to the defence of 
individual rights, but also declared that 'the development of Ukraine 
should be based on the union of the [ethnic] nation and statehood, 
without which the decisive material and spiritual progress of Ukrainian 
society is impossible', and that the CPU was a 'criminal' organisation, 
whose 'property must be returned to the people of U kraine'.^ The party 
would maintain its 'twin-track' strategy of simultaneous parliamentary
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and extra-parliamentary action until Ukrainian independence was 
unexpectedly achieved in August/December 1991. The URP was not 
finally rid of Khmara and his supporters until the party's next congress 
in May 1992.
The August coup, independence and Presidential elections
During the attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991, the URP was 
prepared to resume its underground existence.*** The party immediately 
condemned the coup as 'an attempt to smash the national-democratic 
movement [in Ukraine] and start a civil war in the republic’, and called 
on 'all party organisations to organise open party meetings in the streets, 
squares and factories’, ^  and prepare for mass civil disobedience and an 
all-Ukrainian strike if necessary. Lukianenko meanwhile joined other 
representatives of the political parties in attempting to persuade 
Kravchuk to take a firm stand against the plotters (see Chapter 8).**^  The 
URP's deputies were also prominent at the meeting of the Narodna rada 
on 23 August that decided, after the collapse of both the coup attempt 
and Moscow's authority, to press the demand for independence at the 
special session of the Supreme Council due to open the next day. The 
party's deputies also successfully argued that the demand for Ukrainian 
independence should come before any witch-hunt against the CPU.
Events on the 24th (Lukianenko's birthday) duly unfolded in this 
fashion. The achievement of independence then had a profound effect 
on the whole psychology and politics of the URP. Khmara's continued 
anti-communist obsession was no longer shared by the majority of the 
party's leaders, who instead swung to the other extreme and embraced 
the national communists for having delivered the party's main political 
goal. Lukianenko and Mykhailo Horyn' now sought to transform the
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URP from a semi-underground party into the main defenders of 
Ukraine's newly-acquired statehood. Khmara meanwhile began to 
alienate other nationalists by arguing against 'premature' Presidential 
elections, and even against the referendum on Ukrainian independence 
as a majority then seemed far from certain.®^
The party of course campaigned strongly for a 'yes' vote in the 
referendum, and also put forward Luk"ianenko as the party's candidate 
for President (see below). Luk"ianenko tacitly supported Kravchuk, but 
opposed Rukh's official candidate, the 'excessively liberal’ Chomovil.
The URP changes to a 'party of government'
The URP's campaign caused much bad blood, especially as it had split 
the opposition vote; and was the key factor leading to Chomovil's 'anti- 
party' campaign within Rukh (see Chapter 4). The URP nevertheless 
considered itself vindicated. It called on 'all Ukrainian citizens and all 
civic and political organisations to unite around President Kravchuk in 
the defence of Ukrainian independence, and as one set about the 
building of our state, confirmation of our rights and freedoms, spiritual 
revival of the Ukrainian people and all peoples and ethnic groups for 
whom Ukraine has become their one single homeland*. The URP now 
declared itself to be in 'constructive opposition' to Kravchuk, that is they 
would support him in so far as he lived up to the tasks outlined above.®®
The fact should be borne in mind, as the URP was accused 
throughout 1992-3 of excessively slavish support for the authorities. In 
fact, the party was only prepared to back them in so far as they were 
implementing the party's nationalist programme. The URP called for 
the resignation of Premier Vitol’d Fokin’s government as early as 
December 1991.®  ^ The URP's position, as clarified in August 1992, 'is,
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and has always been [to support the process of ] state-building. In 
Ukraine, as in the rest of the world, the institution of the Presidency is 
the source of stability. Given this, the URP does not orient itself towards 
the actual individuals who occupy the post of President, but towards 
Presidential power itself as the guarantee of stability in the state and in 
society'.90 Kravchuk, meanwhile, was happy to accept the URP's 
support. He needed to broaden his power-base, whilst the URP's 
emphasis on state-building and relative lack of interest in economic 
reform did not threaten his policy of domestic 'stability'.
The ground for these changes was first of all prepared at a theoretical 
conference held in Kiev in Khmara's absence on 25-6 January 1992,91 
which endorsed the new party line. The party leadership also moved 
quickly to isolate the supporters of Khmara. In the manner of the 
communist party of old, the URP leaders circulated a 'closed letter' 
condemning Khmara to its oblast organisations, which not surprisingly 
surfaced in Vechirnii Kyiv on 28 April. This listed his increasingly 
idiosyncratic behaviour, and concluded that 'it is obvious that the 
quicker the personality and image of Mr. Khmara ceases to be associated 
with the URP, then the quicker we will attract engineers, scientists' and 
the like into the party.92 Khmara had alienated many of his supporters 
since 1991. The URP leadership was no longer so afraid of his public 
popularity, and prepared the ground for his expulsion well.
The URP campaign to build bridges with Kravchuk suffered a setback 
in March 1992. The party had tried to push Rukh into open support for 
Kravchuk, but at the movement's third congress V'iacheslav Chomovil 
and his supporters, who wished to emphasise anti-communism as much 
as nationalism and remain in opposition to Kravchuk, were victorious 
(see Chapter 4). Ironically, however, this left pro-Kravchuk elements in 
Rukh even more dependent on the URP, as the only political force
capable of creating a 'national democratic' coalition that would support 
the national communists (see Chapter 8). The proposal to create such a 
movement was also supported by the Democratic Party of Ukraine, the 
Union of Ukrainian Students, and the Prosvita Ukrainian Language 
Society. The pro-Kravchuk elements in Rukh therefore began to come 
over to the URP, which withdrew formally from Rukh  once 
Chomovil’s victory became irreversible. Forty deputies in the Supreme 
Council (mainly URP and DPU), formerly members of the opposition, 
but now keen supporters of Kravchuk, who had first organised 
themselves as a 'national democrat' Rukh faction in February 1992, 
under Mykhailo Horyn' (see Chapter 4), now disassociated themselves 
from Chomovil and formed a pro-Kravchuk 'Independence and 
Democracy' faction, also led by H o r y n ' .93 More formal steps towards 
union within what the URP termed the 'national democratic' camp 
were clearly possible once the URP had forced Khmara out of the party.
The URP's third congress
The URP's third congress met on 1-2 May 1992.94 Since the second 
congress in June 1991, membership had grown from 8,881 to around 
12,000 members (6,033 or 50.3% were from G a l ic ia ) ,95 maintaining the 
URP’s status as the largest (in terms of membership) and best organised 
Ukrainian party, the Socialists excepted. The URP’s Council had denied 
Khmara the right to speak the previous day, and an attempt by his 
supporters to overturn this received only 142 votes. Khmara also failed 
to be elected to the Congress Presidium, receiving only 216 votes (after a 
stormy r e c o u n t ) .96 Khmara's daim to represent the voice of radicalism 
within the. party was finally squashed by Luk’lanenko forcing through a 
reaffirmation of the party's ban on factions, which received 296 votes.
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Khmara promptly announced his departure from the party, initially 
taking 11 delegates with him to form a rival 'Party of Radical Action', 
although ultimately perhaps 5-10% of the URP's membership was to 
join the rival Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party founded by 
Khmara in June 1992 (see Chapter 7) .97 The URP leadership conducted a 
post-congress purge of Khmara's supporters in any case, just to make 
sure that they were rid of his i n f l u e n c e . ^
Thereafter the leadership prevailed. The statute was liberalised to 
attract more members of the intelligentsia. Luk''ianenko, who had 
agreed to become Ukrainian ambassador to Canada, became honorary 
chairman of the party, and Mykhailo Horyn’ replaced him as the party’s 
new leader, receiving 389 votes with 9 against. The Congress then 
confirmed Horyn"s proposals of Oleh Pavlyshyn as deputy leader in 
charge of party organisation, and Levko Horokhivs'kyi as deputy leader 
in charge of the parliamentary party.
The Congress's resolutions and amendments to the party programme 
confirmed the supremacy of the 'national democrats', urging support for 
Kravchuk from a position of pushing him into ever more radical 
policies. The Congress demanded complete and immediate withdrawal 
from the CIS; protection of national enterprises against 'unfair foreign 
competition'; strengthened national defence and retention of remaining 
nuclear weapons should Russia keep a nuclear capacity; tough action 
against 'separatist fifth columns' within Ukraine; and support for 
Ukrainians living in the other states of the former Soviet U n i o n .9 9  As 
regards the last point, even Luk"ianenko, a relative moderate, called for 
the disintegration of the Russian Federation (in February 1992, the party 
had organised a series of meetings with Ukrainians from the Kuban'
region of Russia to encourage a potential separatist movement in the 
region).* 00
The party demanded quicker and more decisive Ukrainianisation of 
the state, and of the new Ukrainian Armed Forces in particular. The 
URP argued that too many servicemen had taken the Ukrainian shilling 
for economic reasons, and their loyalty could not be guaranteed in any 
future conflict with Russia. The party's commitment to ethnic 
nationalism was made clear by its slogan supporting 'the Ukrainian 
character of national statehood', that is priority treatment for Ukrainian 
language, culture and economic interests. The URP's economic policy 
was becoming increasingly national-protectionist. The party argued that 
the guiding principle of economic policy should be 'the priority of 
national industry' and condemned liberal centrists such as the then 
Economics Minister Volodymyr Lanovyi for granting excessive 
privileges to foreign investors.* 01 The party supported a complete 
economic break with Russia as the only way of guaranteeing Ukrainian 
independence.
The URP’s transformation into a 'party of respectable conservatism’ 
was now complete, and its efforts to consolidate nationalist forces to 
support the young Ukrainian state are described in Chapter 8.
The rest of this Chapter now concentrates on a thematic overview of 
the main policy and political issues surrounding the URP.
The URFs social and regional strength
The party's social base
The UHU-URP was the main nationalist party throughout this 
period, but it proved unable to transcend the geographical and social
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limits to Ukrainian nationalism's appeal that were described in Chapter 
1. Its appeal was largely confined to Kiev and Galicia.
The UHU-URP was a populist nationalist party, composed almost 
exclusively of ethnic Ukrainians, more than half of whom came from 
Galicia. Its rank-and-file membership was largely composed of workers 
and radical teachers. The UHU-URP was unable to make much impact 
on other social groups. Of the 381 delegates to the first URP congress in 
1990 who answered the mandate commission's questionnaire, an 
overwhelming 359 (94%) were ethnic Ukrainians (although several 
ethnic Ukrainian delegates from Eastern Ukraine spoke in Russian), 14 
were Russian, and four were from other nationalities. Sixty three were 
workers, and 94 were engineering-technical operatives (41% of the, total). 
17 were pensioners, 17 were unemployed, 2 worked in agriculture, and 
one was a housewife. Of those who might be classed as intelligentsia 
(27% of the total), 60 were teachers, 12 were doctors, 8 students, 7 
journalists or editors, 7 artists, 5 scientific workers, 3 workers 'in state 
and civil organisations', plus one writer and one architect. Two hundred 
and nine had higher education, 75 middle-specialised education, and 76 
only middle or incomplete education. Only 33 were w o m e n .  102
Unlike the Democratic Party of Ukraine, whose first congress was 
held in December 1990 (see Chapter 5), the UHU-URP had few supporters 
amongst the Ukrainian intelligentsia. On the other hand, the dominance 
of ex-dissidents was made clear when the Ukrainian National Party's 
Hryhorii Prykhod'ko began his address to the congress with the phrase 
'Dear fellow political prisoners!’ [spivkamernyky ] to loud applause.!03 
This pattern was confirmed at later gatherings. At the 1991 congress, 
96% of the delegates were Ukrainian (433 of the 450 who answered a 
questionnaire), and 4% Russian. Although 70% of delegates were now 
classed as 'intelligentsia' (297), most of these were teachers. The other
delegates were workers (27%), with a handful of pensioners (nine), 
students (two) and peasants (two). More than 61% of the delegates were 
over the age of 35. *^4
At the 1992 congress, 97% of delegates were Ukrainian. Only 48% 
were now classed as 'intelligentsia', 22% were workers, 19% peasants, 
and 7% pensioners.*105
As regards the party's mass membership, 46% were working class 
[robitnykiv ], and 28% white-collar [sluzhbovtsiv ]. Only 24% had higher 
education.*^ Only 5% were women.* ^
Regional support
The most detailed information concerning the party's regional 
support was made available at the time of the party's second congress in 
May 1991 when the party had 8,881 members. As shown in table 4.1 
below, the URP's membership was strongly concentrated in Galicia. Of 
the party’s 8,765 members based in Ukraine, 55% were from Galicia, and 
12% from elsewhere in Western Ukraine. Central Ukraine accounted for 
20% (6% in the Right Bank, 10% in Kiev d ty  and oblast, 4% in the Left 
Bank), but only 9% were from Eastern Ukraine, and a mere 4% from the 
South. The party's membership therefore was not as geographically 
widespread as that of the DPU (see Chapter 5). On the other hand, the 
size of the URP meant that they still had more members outside Galicia 
(3,933, and 2,894 outside of Western Ukraine as a whole) than any other 
party.
Table 4.1: The URP's membership as of Tune 1991.108
Oblast
i) Galicia 
L 'viv 
Ternopil' 
Ivano-Frankivs'k
ii) Volyn’-Polissia 
Rivne
Volyn'
iii) Other West 
Transcarpathia 
Chernivtsi
iv) Right Bank 
Kirovohrad 
Cherkasy 
Vinnytsia 
Zhytomyr 
Khmel’nyts'kyi
v) Kiev (dty & oblast)
vi) Left Bank 
Poltava 
Sumy 
Chernihiv
vii) East 
Kharkiv 
Donets'k
Membership
2,630
1,152
1,050
257
286
340
156
104
163
83
77
111
891
124
59
152
166
209
Luhans'k 82
Zaporizhzhia 142
Dnipropetrovs'k 214
viii) South
Mykolaiv 63
Kherson 135
Odesa 77
Crimea 42
Other (North, Leningrad, Moscow) 116 
Total: 8.881
A similar pattern was apparent in 1990, when 790 (34%) of the UHU's 
2,300 members were from L'viv oblast a l o n e , !  09 a n d  a further 270 (12%) 
were from Temopil').!!®
By 1991, the URP was well organised throughout Ukraine. The party 
had 258 regional organisations (154 in November 1990) throughout 
Ukraine's 27 oblasts (55 of these were in Galicia).!!! This meant that the 
URP's reach, uniquely among Ukrainian political parties, extended 
beyond oblast centres. The party had an organisation in almost every 
raion in Galicia, and in more than half of Ukraine's central raions, 
although its coverage of Eastern and Southern Ukraine was more patchy.
At the local level the URP (then the UHU) claimed the support of 427 
deputies in June 1991.! !2 Most (362) were elected in Galicia in March 
1990 where the opposition all but swept the board; 19 elsewhere in 
Western Ukraine; 37 in Central Ukraine, including 21 in Kiev d ty  and 
oblast; but only 9 in the East and 9 in the South! !3 (it should be borne in
mind that these figures refer to URP deputies. Most, but not all those 
who were elected as members of the UHU in 1990 transferred to the 
URP).
The UHU-URP's largest body of deputies was elected in L'viv oblast, 
where it had 23 deputies on the oblast council (out of 200), 20-22 on the 
town council (out of 150), and 210 in the oblast as a w h o l e .H ^
The URP helped form the 'Democratic Platform' faction in the 
Transcarpathian oblast co u n cil,!!^  and n  exercised considerable 
influence on the Temopil’, Ivano-Frankivs'k and Rivne councils (all in 
Western Ukraine). In L'viv, on the other hand, the URP was in 
opposition to Chomovil, who was leader of the council from 1990-92. 
However, the URP had few deputies outside of Western Ukraine (except 
for Kiev dty) and its deputies were rarely capable of disciplined action as 
a faction,! 16 despite the provision in the party's statute that they should 
always act as a group and coordinate their actions with the appropriate 
local branch of the URP.H?
Local party organisations produced a total of 29 papers (mainly 
samizdat ) with a total circulation of 259,700. Again, however, these 
were concentrated in Galicia. Eight of the URP's key papers were printed 
in Galicia, and no URP paper outside of Galicia and Kiev had a 
circulation of more than 10,000.H8 The dominance of the party's press by 
Galician radicals can be seen from the fact that they were always full of 
material on the OUN-UPA. Unlike the Democratic Party of Ukraine, the 
URP had no compunction about eulogising the UPA.H9
The preeminent role played by radical Galicians inside the party was 
also indicated by the fact that many of the URP’s members outside 
Galicia were actually bom in G a lic ia .  1 2 0  The three Galician oblast parties 
often held common sittings (although eventually the URP leadership 
ended this practice and condemned the Galician Assembly, the regular
joint assembly of the three Galician councils, arguing that this set an 
unhealthy precedent for regional separatism elsewhere in Ukraine). 121 
Members of the URP's Galician branches frequently travelled elsewhere 
in Ukraine to take part in public demonstrations, petition campaigns and 
the like. 122 in the 1989-91 period the CPU was able to attack the idea of 
Galician 'flying pickets' descending on Kiev or the Donbas to 
considerable propaganda effect The Galician branches of the URP were 
often twinned with weaker organisations in Eastern Ukraine to provide 
practical help and assistance. In 1991 the party helped to organise a series 
of exchanges of schoolchildren between Eastern Ukraine and Galicia to 
try  and help overcome misconceptions concerning 'Galician
extremism'.123
The effectiveness of the party's organisations elsewhere in Ukraine 
varied considerably. The Rivne party was prone to infiltration by 
extremists,124 as were the URP's organisations in Vinnytsia, Kherson, 
Mykolaiv and Odesa.125 Paradoxically, many of the URP's smaller 
branches in Eastern and Southern Ukraine were more easily dominated 
by a handful of ultra-radicals, resentful at the high local levels of 
Russification. 126 The URP’s Kharkiv branch, on the other hand, was 
larger and was led by one of the party's leading moderates Dior Kravtsiv. 
It therefore had relatively good relations even with Russophone groups 
such as the PDRU.127 in more remote areas, it was difficult even for a 
centralised party like the URP to control local party organisations, which 
often went their own way or fell under the control of particular 
individuals. 128 The Transcarpathian URP broke away from the rest of 
the party in April 1993.129 Even the URP's largest organisation in L'viv 
faced problems after 1991, as it was increasingly outflanked by more 
radical parties on its right.
Party organisation; neo-Bolshevik discipline
The URP as a nationalist Vanguard'
The URP soon obtained a reputation as a well-organised, but 
disciplinarian party, which ironically followed many of Lenin’s precepts 
on how to organise a political party. Although the irony of a nationalist 
party copying the methods of its communist opponents is obvious, the 
URP was able to develop a party organisation that was much more 
efficient than that of its rivals and consequently to exercise an influence 
out of proportion to its membership, much as the Bolsheviks 
themselves had done in 1917.
The original UHU had fallen between two stools. On the one hand, 
the UHU's Declaration of Principles had stated that the Union, 'not 
being a political party and not setting itself the aim of taking power' saw 
itself more as a proto-Popular Front, hoping to 'become the basis for 
uniting all democratic forces in the struggle for restructuring society, and 
for human and national rights’.* 30 It therefore functioned as a loose- 
knit broad church, describing itself as 'a federative union of self- 
governing human rights groups and organisations’, with the right of 
internal disagreement.
On the other hand, leading figures in the UHU already saw the 
Union as a vanguard organisation whose purpose was to radicalise other 
political organisations in a nationalist direction. To all intents and 
purposes the UHU was already attempting to function as an opposition 
political party, despite its public protestations to the contrary. 
Luk”ianenko in 1990 accepted that, 'the UHU has through the last two 
years played the role of a political p a r t y ',131 and even Chomovil
admitted that, 'the name "Helsinki" we considered from the very start to 
be temporary’...'a clearly tactical measure' to attract broad support to the 
UHU and allow it to function as a proto-Popular Front, particularly in 
order to combat the all-Union political parties that were beginning to 
spread outwards from Moscow to Ukraine. However, 'in practice, the 
authorities understood our true nature well and...began to call us an 
organised] political alternative to the CPSU, and even a party'.132 
Luk"ianenko later explained his thinking as follows;
The authority of a political party manifests itself not in ultra-radical 
political slogans, but in those slogans that the people consider realistic.
What people, on what basis?
It's clear that a party cannot orientate itself towards the backward part of 
the people. In order to be the leading force in society, the party should orientate 
itself towards the active part of the population, that part which is more quickly 
freeing itself from fear and regaining consciousness after the imperial and 
communist mist. The UHU is a dynamic organisation which has continually 
accelerated the development of the renewal of national consciousness and the 
civil activity of the people, whilst at the same time never getting ahead of 
them. The UHU's merit lies not in the fact that it well understands the 
inevitability of the disintegration of the empire and the arrival of an 
independent Ukrainian state, but in so far as it can contain itself and prepare 
others to [support] it s i d e a .  133
In other words, Luk"ianenko conceived of the UHU as a vanguard 
party, leading public opinion, but never wholly out of step with it. The 
Ukrainian public was not ready to swallow the idea of independence in 
1988. Luk"ianenko later admitted that 'if the UHU had gone to the 
people with its plans for independence in 1988, it would have remained
a tiny groupuscle like the UPDL'134 (the UPDL was the Ukrainian 
People's-Democratic League, another radical splinter group formed by 
defectors from the UHU in June 1989 that quickly disappeared almost 
without trace. See Chapter 6). The UHU did not begin openly to call for 
Ukraine's independence until after the formation of Rukh in September 
1989 (see Chapter 4).135
In the winter of 1989-90, as the Ukrainian elections of March 1990 
approached, the UHU's began to consider the possibility of openly 
organising themselves as a political party, but there were bitter 
arguments at the all-Ukrainian council of the UHU on 5 and 13 
November 1989 over what form the new party should take.*36
Luk"ianenko's position was that the UHU should 'abandon the form 
of human rights defence (the word "Helsinki") and change the federal 
principle of organisational construction [of the UHU] for a unitary 
o n e ’. *37 That is, the UHU should be reorganised into a disciplined 
political party. At the same time, however, Luk"ianenko argued that the 
Ukrainian elections must come before narrow party interests. He was 
opposed by Chomovil, who saw no need for neo-communist discipline 
within the future party, and preferred to concentrate on building the 
UHU’s internal strength.* 38 The dispute was further embittered by 
personal animosities resulting from Chornovil's hijacking of the UHU 
press-service to form his own Ukrainian Independent Publishing- 
Information Union in January 1990, and from the other UHU leaders' 
m istrust of Chornovil’s 'liberalism '. Chom ovil, however, was 
increasingly isolated amongst the UHU leadership. As early as 16 March 
1989, he had declared that he no longer considered himself to be a 
member of the UHU executive committee, and had called on UHU 
members to rally to his banner. 139
Chomovil was therefore squeezed out of the UHU leadership and 
Lukianenko’s line prevailed (after the March 1990 elections Chomovil 
formed his own independent power base as head of the new L'viv oblast 
council). Nevertheless, Chomovil was able to make a sharply critical 
speech to the first URP congress in 1990, accusing the party leadership of 
'creating a deeply centralised organisation of the Bolshevik-Fascist
type'.
The new party statute was certainly highly centralised. It gave the 
URP leadership a large amount of a u t o n o m y , !  41 which was further 
strengthened (in 1990-92 at least) by a culture of deference amongst the 
party’s largely working dass activists. The party leadership was able to 
reorganise, dissolve and reestablish local cells at will, and frequently 
intervened to change local leaderships when it deemed necessary. 142 a  
member of the central party leadership would always attend the AGMs 
of oblast party meetings to exercise general 'oversight' over the 
proceedings.143 Those who disagreed with the leadership line, such as 
KovaT's supporters in 1991, or Khmara's in 1992, were simply expelled 
(after 1991, via an 'Ethics Commission' of the party). Internal party 
factions were formally banned. Whenever sympathy for another 
organisation's political line became widespread amongst the party's 
membership, the leadership would simply forbid joint membership, as 
with the UNA in 1990 and KUN in 1993 (see Chapters 6 and 7). 144
Entry into the party was rigidly controlled, with the URP even 
adopting the Bolshevik system of 'candidate membership' as the first 
step towards entrance into full party membership. There was, however, 
considerable disagreement between Luk"ianenko and Khmara as to what 
size the party should be. For Luk"ianenko, a mass-based party was the 
only practical way to oppose the social power of the CPU, which had a 
cell in every village and every w o r k p l a c e .  145 Khmara, on the other
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hand, favoured a much smaller party with tighter control over the 
admission of former communists into the party. The dispute, however, 
remained largely academic, as the URP's membership stagnated at a 
maximum level of around 12,000 after 1992.
Party office and press
The URP was the best financed non-communist party in Ukraine. In 
1991-2 its party budget was 962,000 roubles, 306,000 roubles of which was 
financed by membership contributions and the rest from voluntary 
contributions, many from abroad.*46 The URP was therefore unique 
among non-communist parties in having a large and well-equipped 
central office in Kiev.
The party always had a strong central press which, although often 
journalistically weak, appeared regularly and in wide circulation. The 
party's first two attempts at publishing a national newspaper in 1990-91 
(Prapor antykomunizmu and Vyzvolennia '91 ) were short-lived. From 
February 1991, however, the party regularly published Samostiina 
Ukraina , ('Independent Ukraine', the same title as the nationalist 
pamphlet written by Mykola Mikhnovs'kyi in 1900).
The URP in parliament
Despite its reputation as a disciplined and centralised party, the URP 
had as many problems with controlling its parliamentary faction as other 
parties. Relations between the party bureaucracy and the party faction 
in the Supreme Council were often poor. The party's 11-man faction in 
the Supreme Council was dominated by ex-political prisoners, who were 
extremely reluctant to heed the advice of younger party m e m b e r s .  148
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Although they often met as a faction before crudal votes, they failed to 
exerdse voting disdpline. During the vote on the resignation of the 
Fokin government in July 1992, for example, URP leader Mykhailo 
Horyn' abstained, Oles' Shevchenko voted against, and Levko 
Horokhivs'kyi, Dior Derkach, Bohdan Rebryk, Bohdan Horyn’, and 
Yaroslav Kendz'ior voted in favour.149 jn any case, the URP deputies 
were not really a true parliamentary faction. Rather, they represented a 
radical pole of attraction, around which up to two dozen (out of 450) 
nationalist, but independent-minded deputies gathered on occasion 
(URP 'sympathisers' induded Ivan Makar, Larysa Skoryk and Hendrikh 
Altunian). After the party 's third congress in 1992, however, 
Horokhivs'kyi, the party's leader in the Supreme Coundl, was made 
deputy leader of the party, and this helped to achieve a better degree of 
coordination between the two wings of the party.
Links with other organisations
The party made two attempts to establish a youth wing. In 1990 it 
sponsored the creation of a nationalist youth organisation, SNUM, but 
this quickly fell under the control of extreme nationalists, split away 
from the URP, and had to be disowned by the party’s leadership (see 
Chapter 6 ). In 1991 the URP set up the Organisation of Young 
Republicans of Ukraine, led by Taras Batenko. It sought to be a 'youth 
organisation of a new type, deansed of pro-communist ideology and 
ultra-radicalism, with the aim of appealing to [the type of people who 
will provide] the most effective foundation for the affirmation of 
independence'. *50 Although it was not a paramilitary group like UNSO 
(see Chapter 6 ), it nevertheless organised its own sports section and 
youth 'emergency volunteer corps’. * 51
On the whole, however, the URP was wary about establishing sister 
organisations, and preferred the classic Trotskyist tactics of 'entryism'. 
That is, the URP sought to exercise indirect influence through 
positioning its members in strategic positions in other nationalist groups 
and attempting to radicalise them from within. Bohdan Horyn' 
described 'the UHU's task' as 'displacing the liberalism of certain 
informal organisations, and giving them a radical d i r e c t i o n ' . *52 XJHU 
members were active in Memorial, the Ukrainian Language Society and 
eventually Rukh (see Chapters 2 and 4 ). 153 w hen Rukh eventually 
held its founding congress in September 1989, the UHU’s secretary 
Mykhailo Horyn’ was elected to head the Rukh Secretariat (i.e. its 
bureaucracy), and seven UHU members became Rukh secretaries.!54 
The leadership of the UHU felt that a voice in such organisations was 
particularly vital after the leadership of such groups was effectively 
conceded to the establishment cultural intelligentsia in the winter of 
1988-9.
This strategy was often successful, but tended to cause resentment 
when the UHU was seen to be pushing its narrow party interests.
The UHU-URP also played a key role in establishing other nationalist 
organisations, such as the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers in 1990 and 
the Union of Officers of Ukraine in 1991 (see the section on Defence 
below). In 1991, when Ukrainian independence had not yet been 
achieved and when the URP was seeking to exert maximum pressure on 
national communists like Leonid Kravchuk to commit themselves to 
the national cause, the party was one of the main co-sponsors of the 
breakaway independent trade union organisation VOST (All-Ukrainian 
Organisation of Workers' Solidarity) along with more radical groups 
such as the UIA (see Chapter 6 ). The URP originally hoped that this
would function as an alliance between political activists and trade 
unionists akin to Solidarity in Poland. The party therefore seconded 
several of its leading members to VOST’s Consultative Council of 
political advisers (analogous to Jacek Kuron's Workers' Defence 
Committee in Poland), including deputy leader Stepan Khmara; Mariia 
Oliinyk, the leader of the URP in Donets’k; and two key URP 
sympathisers, the deputies Larysa Skoryk and Bohdan Ternopil'skyi (the 
latter joined the URP in 1992).* 55 However, VOST fell under the 
influence of the UIA, and became more of a vehicle for noisy public 
demonstration than a mass trade union. The URP therefore sought to 
distance itself from VOST after Ukrainian independence, as it came 
increasingly to argue that strikes were unpatriotic.
The URP also sought to broaden its influence through its regular 
practice of convening conferences of politicians and academics on key 
nationalist themes. These were often responsible for elaborating ideas 
that then became public policy. A path-breaking conference on the 
formation of Ukrainian Armed Forces was held in January 1991 (see 
below). A follow-up (on ’The Principles of National Security in an 
Independent State') was organised in October 1991, whilst on 22-3 
December 1990 the party organised a conference on 'Problems of 
Overcoming Economic Colonialism in U k r a i n e ' .  156
After independence: the URP liberalises its statute
In December 1991, however, the URP’s ruling Grand Council decided 
that the party would have to change profoundly if it was to successfully 
transform itself into a 'party of respectable c o n s e r v a t i s m ' . !  57 Before 
August 1991 the URP had had to function as a centralised and disciplined
organisation dedicated to the pursuit of independence, but now 
Luk"ianenko argued that this threatened to trap the URP in a ’bunker 
psychology’. The party's main task now was to assist the young 
Ukrainian state. Its statute should therefore become more liberal, and the 
party should attempt to recruit the intelligentsia who could help 
'construct rather than destroy', instead of the working class activists who 
had formed the party's backbone in the past, but who were only capable 
of flag-waiving and noisy public demonstration. The URP also hoped 
that its admittance to the Christian Democratic International in 
November 1991 would set the seal on the party's new-found 
respectability.^^
Deputy leader Oleh Pavlyshyn therefore proposed to replace the old 
territorial and workplace 'cell-based structure' of the party, which he 
admitted was copied from 'the experience of the Bolsheviks in 
organisational structures', with a more fluid system. The intelligentsia 
would be encouraged to act as party advisers or to become associate 
members of the party, and entry into the party was made easier by 
abolishing the need to secure two recommendations from existing party 
m em bers. 159 After the statute was duly liberalised at the party's third 
congress in 1992, there were some signs that the changes were having the 
desired effect. Leading intellectuals such as the deputy Bohdan 
Temopil'skyi and the journalist Viktor Teren' joined the party, and in 
June 1992 the party founded, with assistance from the Melnykite OUN in 
the diaspora, the theoretical journal Rozbudova derzhavy , ('Building 
the State'), to which many of the leading figures of the Kiev 
intelligentsia began to contribute.
A revolutionary or a parliamentary party?
Parliamentary politics
From the very beginning of its existence as the UHU, the URP’s 
primarily goal was the desire to achieve Ukrainian independence. 
Although the party's more moderate leadership continued to believe 
that this could be achieved through parliamentary methods (as 
Luk"ianenko himself had believed since as far back as 1958), many of the 
party's younger and more radical members were attracted by the extra- 
parliamentary 'National Congress' route to independence, popular in 
the Baltic States and in the Caucasus in the early 1990s, and amongst 
Ukraine's ultra-right groups before August 1991 (see Chapter 6 ). This 
approach rejected the legitimacy of all forms of Soviet rule and sought to 
restore the forms of national statehood that had existed in the non- 
Russian republics in 1917-21. In Ukraine this took the form of the 
campaign to restore the Ukrainian People's Republic of 1918.
Although the URP's leadership was prone to making ambiguous 
statements concerning the basic legitimacy of the Ukrainian SSR,160 on 
the whole they remained committed to parliamentary politics in 1990-91, 
if only to provide a tribune for the party's views. After winning 
deputies' seats in the 1990 elections, Luk"ianenko, Mykhailo Horyn', and 
V'iacheslav Chomovil (by then no longer a member of the URP) put 
themselves forward as symbolic candidates for the post of Chairman of 
the Supreme Council in May 1990 in order to make the maximum use of 
this unprecedented new opportunity to spread the national message 
(their speeches were carried on live T V ) .161 Luk”ianenko was quick to 
stress the achievements of parliamentary politics; - the URP was
officially registered on 5 November 1990, making it the first legal 
modern non-communist party in Ukraine,!62 formal freedom of the 
press had been established and Article 6  of the constitution of the 
Ukrainian SSR (guaranteeing the CPSU/CPU’s monopoly right to rule) 
had been abolished.!63 At the same time, however, although most of the 
party were prepared to follow LukHianenko when the parliamentary 
approach was seen to be bringing such results, the URP was also prepared 
to resort to extra-parliamentary methods, particularly during the general 
communist reaction throughout the USSR in the winter of 1990-91. In 
particular, any hint that the CPU leadership was prepared to contemplate 
signing a new Union Treaty with Moscow brought about URP-sponsored 
demonstrations (such as the mass rallies in Kiev to coincide with the 
opening of the second session of the Supreme Council on 30 September 
and 1 October 1990) and calls for an all-Ukrainian political s t r i k e .  *64 ^  
the freer political atmosphere after the Ukrainian elections in March 
1990, the URP's mobilisational ability was at its height. The party could 
regularly organise demonstrations in the thousands in both Kiev and 
L'viv. The party’s statute defined its 'main methods of activity1 
extremely broadly, from participation in elections to sponsoring strikes 
and campaigns of civil disobedience.!^^
This instrumental attitude was typified by Bohdan Horyn’, leader of 
the L’viv URP, who stated in February 1991 that 'the URP views the 
Supreme Council as an arena of struggle, and not for collaboration with
the imperial forces the party should not be afraid to declare that it is a
reactionary organ’.! 6 6  Basically the URP occupied the middle-ground 
between the far-right, who wanted to boycott all ’Soviet' elections and 
institutions, and the centre and centre-left, which was prepared to 
participate in both Ukrainian and all-Union institutions. The URP 
condemned the latter, but sought to work within the former. It was only
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after the August 1991 declaration of independence that the URP dropped 
its ambivalent attitude towards Ukrainian state institutions. Now it 
swung to the other extreme/ condemning extra-parliamentary action as 
'destabilising' and disloyal to the new regime, and dropping its previous 
association with VOST and other groups.
Cooperation with national communists
A related question concerned whether it was worthwhile trying to 
work with national communists within state institutions. All of the 
URP’s leading deputies, Luk"ianenko, the Horyn’ brothers and Oles’ 
Shevchenko, stood for cooperation with moderate elements in the CPU. 
Although the first URP programme had called for parties 'whose leading 
structures lay outside Ukraine’ to be banned, in practice the URP 
leadership knew that their party was too weak to obtain power on its 
own, and that the achievement of independence required cooperation 
with national communists. According to Bohdan Horyn’, the slogan of 
radical groups (see Chapter 6 ) for the 1990 elections, ’Councils without 
communists!' was a mistake, as many CPU members in the Supreme 
Council were already showing signs of embracing national communism. 
The URP must therefore work with them, and seek to broaden their split 
with their more reactionary colleagues.* 67 Luk"ianenko, in reply to a 
question in April 1991 as to whether he would prefer 'an independent 
Ukraine with a despotic [i.e. communist] order, or a Ukraine with a 
democratic order but within the USSR', replied 'without a doubt, only 
an independent' [Ukraine] .* 6 8  ^  March 1991, Luk'lanenko simply 
declared that "I am a colleague of K r a v c h u k " .  169 Like the Democratic 
Party of Ukraine, the URP leaders believed that nationalists could 
achieve their aims through proxy figures such as Kravchuk. However,
the leadership came under increasing challenge in 1990-1 as radical 
nationalists, including many in the URP, became increasingly 
disillusioned with the slow pace of constitutional change. 170
As far back as the first meeting of the URP’s new Grand Council (the 
party's leading organ between congresses, which met quarterly) on 3 June 
1990,171 Stepan Khmara had expressed his doubts concerning the 
commitment in the URP's statute to act in accordance with the 
constitution of the USSR (a necessary condition for the party's 
registration). Excessive legalism could only hamper the URP’s struggle, 
he argued. Khmara and Koval', who had links with the radical right, 
preferred the latter's strategy of treating all institutions of the Ukrainian 
SSR as part of a colonial administration, boycotting them and forming 
an alternative Citizens’ Assembly based on the 1917-21 Ukrainian 
People’s Republic (see Chapter 6 ). Moreover, they insisted that the 
CPSU/CPU should be treated as a criminal organisation, and that the 
URP should support mass strikes, civil disobedience and the creation of a 
rival 'Government of National Salvation' to achieve the resignation of 
the government and new elections to the Supreme Council (which 
rather contradicted the idea of total boycott). 172 Jh August 1990, Khmara 
attacked the opposition Narodna rada in the Supreme Council for its 
ineffective struggle against the CPU majority, and called instead for a 
policy 'of massive popular pressure on the apparat', and for the URP to 
agitate amongst the armed services and militia to undermine their 
loyalty to the state. 173 w hen the Supreme Council reassembled in 
October, Khmara tabled a bill, radical before its time, to nationalise the 
property of the CPSU and komsomol, (which was nevertheless only 
defeated by 192 votes to 130).
Koval’, meanwhile, announced that 'the beginning of the second 
session of the Supreme Council [in October 1990] has already shown that
"parliamentary” methods of struggle are obviously not enough'....’the 
fate of Ukraine will not be decided in the communist Supreme Council, 
but in the streets and the squares’....'the URP sees a positive perspective 
in paths to destabilisation, in paths to awakening the thirst for struggle 
amongst new sections of the population'. 1 74 Koval' was roundly 
censured for making similar calls at public rallies during the student 
hunger strikes of October 1990, which Luk"ianenko, considered to be 
dangerous demagogy at a time of a real risk of bloody confrontation with
th e  a u th o r it ie s . 1 ^ 5
As explained above, despite the pressure from their right, 
Luk''ianenko, Mykhailo Horyn' and Oles' Shevchenko cooperated 
actively in the Ukrainian parliament with Kravchuk, encouraged by the 
success of the second referendum question in March 1991 and by 
Kravchuk’s reluctance to sign Gorbachev's proposed new Union Treaty. 
They therefore considered themselves vindicated by the successful 
outcome to the attempted coup in August 1991, and by the CPU's 
wholesale (if belated) subsequent conversion to the national cause. 
Luk"ianenko now argued that the period between the Declaration of 
Independence on 24 August and its confirmation on 1 December had 
marked a decisive turning point in Ukrainian history. 'Since 24 August 
we have no [longer] had an occupation administration, but a Ukrainian 
state. If before the 24th we were prepared to attack it [the occupying 
administration] from out of the bunker, now we must raise ourselves 
onto the same level as the state, cooperate with her and defend her 
against external enemies and fifth columns'. 176
Therefore Luk"ianenko argued that the party must support the 
building of 'our state', changing from a 'party of destruction' to a 'party 
of construction’ by active participation in the new structures of power. 
The party must become 'a school for the preparation of state c a d re s '.1 7 7
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Hence, the URP supported Kravchuk's moves towards strengthening the 
institutions of Presidential rule in Spring 1992, including the system of 
local Presidential 'prefects' [predstavnyky ] introduced in March 1992, 
hoping that many of its members would be appointed to such p o s t s .  1^8
Khmara's anti-communist radicalism, on the other hand, now 
seemed illogical to the majority of URP members, and his hostility to the 
institutions of 'the Ukrainian SSR' absurd now that the Ukrainian SSR 
had supposedly been transformed into an independent Ukrainian state.
Ukrainian elections
In March 1989, the UHU had to face the question of whether to 
become an electoral party and participate in the all-Union elections 
called by Gorbachev. On 18 December 1988 the all-Ukrainian UHU 
council had called for the elections to be boycotted because of their all- 
Union nature and because they were based on an undemocratic franchise 
and nomination procedure. 1^9 Qn 19-24 February 1989, the UHU 
organised pre-election rallies in Kiev under the slogans 'Down with 
Shcherbyts'kyi!’ and 'State status for the Ukrainian language!', 
eventually broken up by the militia. However, under pressure both from 
the UHU's Eastern branches where the boycott call was having little 
effect and from the Western branches which felt confident that some 
seats in Galicia could be won, the UHU council reversed itself on 2 April 
and allowed local UHU branches to campaign for particular candidates, 
as they saw fit.
In L'viv for example the UHU supported Rostyslav Bratun, who was 
eventually elected in district No. 487 with 60% of the vote, whereas in 
the three okrugs where the UHU called for a boycott (Nos. 488 and 492, 
plus the L'viv national-territorial okrug) no candidate was elected on the
first round, with 60-94% of the vote being cast against the official 
candidates (a reasonable result in the conditions of the time).* 80 
Nevertheless, although some 50 or so of the 262 deputies elected from 
Ukraine to the all-Union Supreme Soviet were held to be sympathetic to 
the opposition, the elections demonstrated that the ability of the UHU 
and similar groups to reach and influence public opinion outside of 
Galicia was still fairly minimal, given continued CPU control of the 
mass media (see Chapter 2).
The March 1990 Ukrainian republican elections were less 
problematical for the UHU. Although the UHU conducted an internal 
debate over the winter of 1989-90 as to whether its first priority should be 
calling a congress to transform itself into a fully fledged political party, or 
devoting all its energies to the elections, few were prepared to argue that 
the UHU should not participate in what were after all Ukrainian 
elections. Ivan Makar and a handful of others continued to support the 
'National Congress' line and argue that such elections were essentially 
'imperial' and illegitimate, and that to participate in them would imply 
the de facto recognition of the occupying power, but they were in a 
distinct minority. Makar himself eventually ran for office and was 
elected as a deputy in L'viv oblast.
For rather different reasons, Chomovil was also highly critical of the 
UHU's campaign, which he regarded as amateurish. No common party 
manifesto was issued, and candidates were allowed to rim their own 
individual cam paigns.181 Luk"ianenko for example did not mention 
Ukrainian independence, but Khmara did. 182 The UHU's Mykhailo 
Horyn', on the other hand, was the initiator of the Democratic Bloc 
coalition formed on 18 November 1989,183 that eventually won 28% of 
the seats in the elections (125 out of 450). Twelve of these were members 
of the UHU,184 eleven of whom were elected in the three Galician
oblasts. Seven were former political prisoners, with almost 100 years of 
sentence between t h e m . *  85 Several scored impressive victories; - 
Luk'lanenko was elected on the first round with 54% of the vote, 
Mykhailo Horyn' with 70%, his brother Bohdan with 77%, Khmara with 
64%, Chornovil with 69%, Bohdan Rebryk with 71%, and Levko 
Horokhivs’kyi with 7 1 %. 186 The UHU formed the core of the 22 strong 
radical Nezalezhnist' (Independence) faction within the opposition 
group in the Supreme Council.187 The faction's platform issued on 12 
June 1990 called for Ukrainian independence 'on the basis of the 
Helsinki final act' and 'the organisation of the [Ukrainian] state, socio­
political, economic and cultural life in accordance with the national 
spirit and traditions of our people'.188
As mentioned above, the UHU-URP also elected 427 deputies at a 
local level.
However, the dispute as to whether elections held under the auspices 
of the Ukrainian SSR were legitimate resurfaced in March 1991, when 
the URP had to decide its attitude towards the referendum called by 
Gorbachev on the future of the USSR. Radicals within the URP 
leadership, in particular Roman Koval', were determined that the URP 
should follow the example of the rest of the ultra-right and boycott the 
referendum completely as the illegitimate act of an occupying power (see 
Chapters 6  and 7).*89 Several of the URP's deputies, on the other hand, 
in particular Oles’ Shevchenko, argued that the URP should not only 
participate, but also support the second question placed on the ballot by 
K r a v c h u k . ^90 On 3 0  January the URP Secretariat voted 5 to 2 against a 
boycott, whilst simultaneously arguing that the URP's propaganda 
should stress the illegitimacy of the e x e rc is e ,!  91 and in March even 
supported (by 7 votes to 3) the idea (which came to nothing) of 
Luk"ianenko joining the Supreme Council's committee to negotiate the
new Union Treaty.192 Under pressure from the URP's largest branch in 
L'viv, how ever,193 the URP Secretariat eventually decided on 1 March 
to call not for a boycott, but for a 'no' to both all-Ukrainian ballots, and a 
'yes' to the separate question on outright independence organised by the
three Galician c o u n c i l s .  194
The URP decided on Lukianenko's candidature in the Presidential 
elections due in December 1991 as far back as July 1991 of that y e a r . 195 
The rationale for doing so was firstly to raise the URP's profile, and 
secondly to oppose Chomovil, who seemed likely to be Rukh's official 
candidate. The URP's leadership considered Chornovil to be too 
stridently anti-communist and distrusted his commitment to a 
federalised Ukraine. In contrast to Chomovil, Lukianenko's campaign 
stressed the importance of maintaining the alliance with Kravchuk and 
the national communists that had brought about the Declaration of 
Independence and other subsequent state-building m e a s u r e s .  196 por the 
URP, the continuation of such measures was more important than 
either economic reform or de-communisation.
Lukianenko was supported by the Union of Ukrainian Students,! 97 
the all-Ukrainian Society of the Repressed,! 95 the Ukrainian Language 
Society Prosvita , the Ukrainian Youth Association, and prominent 
individuals such as Ivan Drach, Mykola Rudenko, Pavlo Movchan and 
Mykola Porovs'kyi, plus the Political Council of Rukh , and the Kiev 
branches of the Writers' Union of Ukraine and the UCDP. Together they 
formed an electoral coalition on 6  November entitled 'Ukraine, 
Lukianenko, Democracy’, and chaired by Mykhailo Horyn'.199 Table 3.2 
shows the vote obtained by Lukianenko on 1 December 1991. Not 
surprisingly, Lukianenko scored most strongly in Western Ukraine, 
except in L'viv where Chomovil still had special prestige as head of the 
local oblast council (the URP's strength in Western Ukraine was also
shown by the fact that 35,000 of the original 107,964 signatures in support 
of Luk'lanenko's candidature were collected in L'viv oblast alone). 200 In 
strongly nationalist Western Ukrainian towns such as Dubno in Rivne, 
he scored as high as 27.6%.201 He also scored 6.4% in Kiev dty, and 6.7% 
in his native Chemihiv.
Table 3.2: Support for Levko Luk"ianenko in the Presidential 
Elections of 1 December 1991.202
Oblast Support (%
i) Galicia
L’viv 4.7
Ternopil' 19.6
Ivano-Frankivs’k 11.8
ii) Volyn'-Polissia
Rivne 13.4
Volyn' 8.9
iii) Other West
Transcarpathia 5.0
Chernivtsi 4.4
iv) Right Bank
Kirovohrad 3.5
Cherkasy 2.0
Vinnytsia 3.3
Zhytomyr 3.3
Khmel'nyts'kyi 3.2
v) Kiev d ty  6.4
Kiev oblast 5.6
vi) Left Bank
Poltava 4.2
Sumy 3.9
Chernihiv 6.7
vii) East
Kharkiv 2.1
Donets'k 3.1
Luhans'k 2.8
Zaporizhzhia 3.1
Dnipropetrovs’k 2.5
viii) South
Mykolaiv 2.3
Kherson 2.2
Odesa 2.8
Crimea 1.9
Total: 4.5%
Nevertheless, the results showed the limits of the party’s nationalist 
appeal. Lukianenko admitted that his radical 'programme was a little 
before its time' and that the election of Kravchuk was natural in a post­
communist sodety.203 The URP was now well aware of the need to form 
a coalition of nationalist forces, and its efforts to do so are described in 
Chapter 8 .
Ideology: an ethnic or a civic state?
Whilst Luk"ianenko remained leader, the party remained at least 
formally committed to the civic conceptions of nationalism that it had 
inherited from the UHG and UHU.204 Moreover, the party repeatedly 
purged radical 'integral nationalists' such as Roman Koval' from its 
ranks. A close reading of the URP’s documents, however, and the 
observation of its practical political activity shows that the party was 
always statist, and bordered on the ethnidst. For example Luk"ianenko 
stated in 1990 that, 'the sodal philosophy of the UHU was that the fate of 
[every] separate citizen depends in large measure upon the fate of his 
n a tio n ’.^05 By the end of the period of study the URP had adopted a 
basically ethnidst programme emphasising 'the national character of 
Ukrainian statehood'.
The Dedaration of Prindples published by the founders of the UHU 
in 1988, despite stating that the UHU was the direct successor of the 
UHG, had already marked a shift of emphasis by concentrating on the 
struggle for national, rather than individual, rights. The Preamble of the 
Dedaration stated that 'the UHU considers it vital to define as the 
prindpal aim of its activity the defence of national rights, first and 
foremost the right of a nation to self-determination'.206 oieh Pavlyshyn, 
a founder member of the UHU and later deputy leader of the URP, 
admitted in January 1992 that 'the URP, and formerly the UHU, was 
always a party which stood for the liberation of Ukraine and against the 
totalitarian system, - though the latter always came second if we speak
frankly',207
The Declaration stated that 'the reestablishment of Ukrainian 
statehood, which exists today only on paper, would be the prindpal
lasting guarantee of the safeguarding of the economic, social, cultural, 
civic and political rights of the Ukrainian people as well as those 
national minorities living on the territory of Ukraine'.208 However, the 
Declaration's proposals for new Ukrainian citizenship laws were not so 
generous, arguing against 'the artificial intermixing of the population of 
the Union' [i.e. the USSR] and deriding the concept of 'Soviet Man'. Its 
criteria for citizenship were in essence ethnidst, stating that 'anyone can 
be a dtizen of Ukraine with compulsory and adequate knowledge of the 
state language of the republic [i.e. Ukrainian] and who lived on this or 
on o ther Ukrainian territory  before its inclusion into the 
USSR...Ukrainian emigrants...and all other persons, who always lived 
on the territory of the republic for no less than ten years and who 
recognise the state language and constitution of the republic'.209
The party programme adopted by the URP in 1990 firmly dedared 
itself in favour of complete Ukrainian independence, but avoided any 
reference to Dontsovite ideas of ethnic nationalism, choosing again to 
defer to the dvic traditions of the UHG-UHU. The new party dedared 
that its basic guiding prindples were taken from the UN's Dedaration of 
Human Rights.210 However, in a carefully-worded phrase, the URP 
defined as its basic prindple 'the absolute value of the life, freedom and 
specificity [samobutnist' ] of the individual and every nation', but 
nowhere defined which should take priority. The programme promised 
equality for every dtizen of Ukraine, regardless of national origin, and 
'national-cultural autonomy’ for all, but also spoke of the need for 'the 
cultivation of the aristocratic spirit, and the tutelage of self-respect and 
national pride'. There was also a call to ban those 'political organisations, 
whose leadership centres lie outside Ukraine’ (i.e. the CPU) .211
The offidal commitment to dvic nationalism was best represented by 
Yevhen Boltarovych, head of the party’s theoretical department in L'viv,
transferred to Kiev in 1 9 9 2 ,  who dedared that 'the most effective 
integrating factor [for a future Ukrainian state] will be "territorial 
patriotism", that is the awakening of the sense of solidarity between all 
inhabitants of Ukrainian lands regardless of social status, religious 
affiliation, ethnic origin and even national-cultural consdousness’.212 
This position was strongly opposed by the party’s younger radicals, 
who in 1 9 9 0 -9 1  began openly to argue in favour of the URP adopting 
Mikhnovs'kyi's slogan of 'Ukraine for the Ukrainians!' and basing the 
party’s ideology on the ideas of Dontsov. The radicals’ influence reached 
its peak at the spedal theoretical conference held by the party in February 
1 9 9 1  to settle the question of whether the URP should adopt 'democratic' 
or 'integral' nationalism as its offidal ideology. 213 Valentyna Paryzhak 
from L’viv, for example, stated that 'for all my respect for democracy and 
individual rights, we must give priority to the rights of the nation'. The 
URP 'should not be afraid....of taking the best elements’ of the OUN’s 
ideology. In fact, it was surprising 'how relevant to our time and our 
struggle are the thoughts and words of Stepan B a n d e r a ' ,2 1 4  Serhii 
Aibabin from Zaporizhzhia stressed that the URP should stress above all 
that they were 'UKRAINIAN nationalists’ who struggled 'for the 
interests of the Ukrainian nation above all', and called for a reversal of 
the tide of Russification in Eastern U k r a in e .2 1 5  Adam Kardash dedared 
that 'only nationalism can lead us to independence'.^! 6  Yurii Hureiv 
from Kiev argued that the URP should abandon parliamentary politics, 
and Koval’ called for the complete rejection of 'Soviets’ (i.e. 
parliamentary politics) as an alien Russian import into Ukrainian 
political l i f e .2 1 7  The conference also warmly greeted ultra-radicals from 
integral nationalist parties, such as Dmytro Korchyns'kyi and Zenovii 
Krasivs'kyi (see Chapters 6  and 7).218
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The speeches of other URP leaders showed that they were wary of 
dismissing the radicals' arguments out of hand. Nevertheless, after 
Luk"ianenko set the tone in his address, the 'integral nationalists' were 
largely defeated. Luk"ianenko attacked the 'Dontsovite integral 
nationalism....of some of our young men and members of SNUM' (the 
radical nationalist youth organisation, see Chapter 6 ), 'which is 
undemocratic in its content and revolutionary in its method'. Although 
he admitted that 'the ideology of national liberation cannot exist without 
hatred of the occupier and the regime established by them', Luk"ianenko 
stated that the URP's ideology should be based on 'the three elements of 
striving for national liberation, opposition to rightlessness and the 
creation of democracy', and called unequivocally for the URP to uphold 
the UHG-UHU's traditions of democratic nationalism and commitment 
to dvic rights.219 He was ably supported by others, who attacked the 
radicals' notion that '[integral] nationalism was simply the natural 
reaction of a people to its slavery'. It was an idea whose time had passed, 
and whose adoption by the URP would simply prevent it gathering 
support in Eastern Ukraine.^® Vasyl' Lisovyi, the journalist and head of 
the committee 'Helsinki-90'^^ (the organisation that had taken over the 
UHU’s responsibility for the defence of human rights in Ukraine after 
the UHU became the URP in 1990), proposed that the URP should look 
not to Dontsov for its ideological inspiration, but to the Ukrainian 
conservative philosopher of the 1920s (and sometime monarchist) 
V'iacheslav L y pyns'ky i.^2  The conference's offidal resolution stressed 
that 'democratic nationalism' was the official ideology of the URP, but 
left open the possibility of further discussion at the party's forthcoming
second congress.223
The integral nationalists' voice continued to be heard within the 
party, however, espedally as Roman Koval' was then both head of the
URP's theoretical department, and editor of the party papers Prapor 
antykomunizmu and Vyzvolennia '91 . A typical Koval remark was 
that Ukrainians had no grievances against those of its national 
minorities 'who did not declare their supremacy over Ukrainians', but 
this was unlikely to include the Russians, who are unable 'to consider 
themselves a minority beyond their ethnic lands, and moreover 
consider themselves the historical (and only) masters of these lands' [i.e. 
U kraine].224 The party's deputy leader Hrebeniuk meanwhile argued 
that the proposed Gorbachev referendum in March 1991 was analogous 
to the Germans, had they been victorious in World War Two, offering to 
decide Ukraine's fate by referendum forty years later.225
Although Koval' and Hrebeniuk were eventually removed from the 
party (on Koval”s later career, see Chapter 7), their arguments 
represented an important part of the party's mainstream. The URP's 
desire for an ethnically Ukrainian state was given added prominence 
after the declaration of independence in August 1991. During the long 
discussion that ran from September 1991 to February 1992 about which 
official symbols the new state should adopt (more moderate voices were 
wary of alienating Ukraine’s Russophone population),226 the URP 
insisted (with ultimate success) on the adoption of narrowly ethnic 
symbols; the blue and yellow flag, trident symbol (supposedly dating back 
to the era of Kievan Rus' )  and national hymn 'Ukraine has not yet died' 
popular in 1917-21. The party’s press even published the names of those 
'Russian chauvinist’ Deputies who had voted against their adoption.227 
In June 1992 the party opposed the official proposal that Ukrainian 
citizens should not have to mention their ethnic origin in the new 
Ukrainian passports.228 The URP continued to violently oppose a 
federal system of government for Ukraine, or any concessions to 
regional or separatist sentiment, especially in Crimea.229 The party
consistently pressed for a more rapid Ukrainianisation of the new state, 
for a more vigorous imposition of the 1989 Language Law, and for the 
new Ukrainian constitution to recognise the supremacy of the rights of 
ethnic Ukrainians on their own national territory .230 Lastly, the party 
was enthusiastically involved in the celebrations of the 50th anniversary 
of the founding of the UP A in Summer 1992, whom it viewed, as always, 
simply as 'national heroes'.2^
Defence and foreign policy
The URP tended to regard defence and foreign policy as its special 
preserve, and was able to exercise considerable influence in this area 
throughout 1991-2. It was the main proponent of the idea of building up 
Ukraine's Armed Forces even before the task began with the 
appointment of Defence Minister Konstantin Morozov in September
1991. The URP believed strongly in the nationalist axiom that Ukraine 
had lost her independence in 1917-21 'because her then leaders 
(Vynnychenko, Hrushevs'kyi), blinded by socialist ideals, did not defend 
the Ukrainian nation' militarily,2 ^2  and that therefore only sufficient 
military strength would guarantee Ukrainian independence in the face 
of inevitable Russian hostility. More generally, Luk"ianenko declared 
that 'a people which does not want to provide for its own army, will 
[have to] provide for a foreign one'.233
The UHU's Declaration of Principles in 1988 had included a demand 
for 'republican military formations', but had envisaged that these would 
still be a constituent part of the Soviet Armed Forces.2^  However, once 
radical groups such as the Ukrainian National Party (see Chapter 6 ) 
began to raise the issue of independent Ukrainian Armed Forces as early 
as Autumn 1989, the UHU soon followed suit, and the first URP
programme in April 1990 declared that the party supported 'the 
restoration of Ukrainian Armed Forces, as one of the main guarantees of 
the independence of the Ukrainian p eo p le ’.235 As a result of 
campaigning by the URP and others the Declaration of Sovereignty 
issued by the Supreme Council in July 1990 included the claim that 
Ukraine 'had the right to' form its own Armed Forces .236 in order to 
give substance to the Declaration, the URP then supported the campaign 
for Ukrainian conscripts to serve only on Ukrainian territory, and to this 
end assisted the formation of the Ukrainian Committee of Soldiers' 
Mothers in September 1990.237 The URP also played a key role in 
establishing the Union of Officers of Ukraine (UOU) at two congresses in 
July and November 1991, and later nudging it towards a nationalist
p la tfo rm .2 3 8
The URP, along with Rukh , organised a conference on "The External 
and Internal Security of Ukraine' on 2-3 February 1991,239 at which 
Luk"ianenko proposed that, instead of trying to create her own Armed 
Forces from scratch, as Armenia and Moldova had done, Ukraine should 
instead seek to take over the Soviet forces already stationed on her 
territory, and gradually Ukrainianise them by 'returning foreign officers 
to their homeland' and encouraging ethnic Ukrainian officers to return 
home from their stations in other Soviet republics and further 
abroad.240 Luk"ianenko also qualified Ukraine's commitment to future 
non-nuclear status by stating that 'she could not give them up earlier 
than the rest of the world achieved nuclear disarm am ent'. 
Luk”ianenko’s programme proved highly prescient, and was to be 
largely followed as Ukraine rushed to create her own Armed Forces after 
august 1991.
Once that campaign was underway, the URP exercised constant 
pressure on President Kravchuk and Konstantin Morozov to ensure that
Ukraine built up what it saw as adequate defences and reject all Russian 
attempts to frustrate the process. The party proposed that the country’s 
military doctrine should be based on a much clearer assessment of 
Ukraine's potential enemies, and that therefore the troop configuration 
inherited from the USSR, namely a concentration of men and 
equipment on Ukraine’s Western borders, should be changed to meet 
the requirements of ’all-round defence'. In particular, troops should be 
redeployed towards Ukraine's borders with Russia. This would require a 
total Armed Force of 500,000-520,000 men, as opposed to the 225,000- 
250,000 then planned by the Ukrainian governm en tal After the success 
of the campaign to persuade Soviet troops stationed on Ukrainian 
territory to take an oath of loyalty to Ukraine in early 1992, the URP then 
exerted further pressure to create an ethnically Ukrainian officer corps, 
and to weed out those who had only signed out of basically economic 
m otives.242 Too many officers were 'reactionaries', 'more or less 
oriented to Moscow’, who had brought too many of the habits of the old 
Soviet Armed Forces with them. To combat this, the URP proposed and 
then supported the creation of a 'Social-Psychological Service’ within the 
military, whose job would be to teach officers and men about the best 
'traditions of the Ukrainian people and Armed Forces’, and an enhanced 
role for the UOU, even its veto over appointments.243
As regards the division of Forces between Ukraine and Russia/The 
CIS, the URP's position was simple;.- 'everything that is situated on 
Ukrainian territory [at the time of the dissolution of the USSR] belongs 
to the Ukrainian people'.244 The URP called for the complete seizure of 
the Black Sea fleet, and denounced the August 1992 Yalta agreement 
establishing joint control over the fleet as 'Ukraine's Munich', and a 
Trojan Horse leading to the establishment of foreign military bases on 
Ukrainian territory.245 Luk"ianenko in fact calculated that Ukraine was
entitled to a proportionate share of 30.2% of the naval forces of the USSR 
(given her contribution to their construction, etc), and that therefore her 
demand for the Black Sea Fleet was a relatively modest claim.24**
As with the rest of the Ukrainian right, the URP’s position on 
nuclear arms progressively radicalised from 1990*93. As stated above, 
radicals such as Koval' had raised the issue of a nuclear Ukraine as early 
as 1990. Lukianenko's early doubts about nuclear disarmament soon 
grew into bitter criticism of the decision to transfer tactical nuclear 
weapons to Russia in 1992. Thereafter, the URP's position was that in 
order for Ukraine 'to sign any agreement on nuclear disarmament, it 
should be accompanied by the following conditions; firstly Ukraine must 
have effective guarantees from the nuclear states of the world, the UN 
Security Council and NATO concerning her national security and non­
interference in her internal affairs; secondly the developed countries 
must give Ukraine financial and technical help for the dismantling of 
nuclear warheads and their carriers. Such dismantling must take place 
on the territory of Ukraine. Thirdly, Ukrainian disarmament is possible 
only in parallel with the disarmament of other nuclear states'.2 4 2  Given 
that the fulfilment of even one of these conditions was highly 
problematical, the URP’s position amounted to a refusal to disarm. The 
new URP leader Mykhailo Horyn' was quite explicit that, in the face of 
'political and economic pressure on the part of our neighbours’ 
particularly from Russia, the non-nuclear commitments of 1990 were 
now outdated and Ukraine 'should conduct a [more] flexible policy to 
defend [her] independence and territorial integrity’.24®
The URP called for Ukraine’s departure from the CIS as early as 
January 1992,24^ and in its place proposed a Baltic-Black Sea zone of 
cooper a tio n .2®0 Such an alliance with other former non-Russian
republics of the USSR and with the states of the Visegrad 
Triangle/Quadrangle would serve both to cut Russia off from Europe 
and better serve to facilitate the development of long-term links with the 
EC. The CIS agreement was not worth the paper it was printed on, 
because 'it is impossible to believe in any agreement with Russia, 
because from the beginning of her existence to today she had been and 
remains an Empire, the basis of which is contempt for Ukrainian rights 
and interests, and intolerance of her freedom ’.251 Russian imperialists 
from the very beginning conceived of the CIS as some form of revived 
confederation or union, and the West was falling into the trap of seeing 
it in the same way. Only a sharp and decisive breakaway from Russia 
would serve to establish Ukraine as a truly independent national actor. 
The party therefore maintained a steady stream of attacks on the CIS, and 
on Russian imperialism in general.
Conclusion
The URP was the best organised nationalist party throughout this 
period. It exercised powerful influence through its ideological 
dominance of the right, although, unlike the DPU, it had only a handful 
of influential figures in the Supreme Council. The URP also played a key 
role in the early development of Rukh , was midwife to the birth of 
many nationalist organisations such as Prosvita and the Union of 
Officers of Ukraine, and was the main driving-force behind the creation 
of the Congress of National-Democratic Forces in August 1992, and the 
Anti-Communist Anti-Imperial Front in January 1993 (see Chapter 8 ). 
The party's rating in public opinion polls rose from 2% in January 1991 
to 4% in November 1991, and 7.7% in April 1992.252 The URP was the 
third largest party in Kiev in May 1992, with 7% support, behind the
Greens’ 10% and the SPU's 13%.^53 Although the momentum of the 
party's growth began to sag somewhat in late 1992, as the public as a 
whole became disillusioned with party politics and there were signs of a 
swing to the left, the URP had by then created the most effective 
structure of all the nationalist parties, and was well placed to be the 
leading party on the right in parliamentary elections due in 1994 or 1995.
4. RUKH - UKRAINFS POPULAR FRONT
Introduction
The first uncoordinated and unsuccessful attempts to form a 
Ukrainian Popular Front similar to those already operating in the Baltic 
republics were made by the UHU and others in the summer of 1988 (see 
Chapter 3). A ’Popular Front', it was felt, would help to coordinate the 
actions of Ukraine's fledgling opposition groups, and, by claiming to 
support Gorbachev's programme of perestroika, would be much more 
difficult for the conservative authorities in Kiev to suppress. The 
initiative failed, however, because Ukrainian society was not yet 
prepared to follow the initiative of radical groups like the UHU. 
Moreover, in Ukraine it was not yet possible to form a Baltic-style 
alliance between opposition activists and national communists, few of 
whom were yet visible in the CPU, which therefore forcibly crushed the 
attempts.
After the failure of the UHU's efforts, the initiative passed in the 
winter of 1988-89 to semi-official bodies, in particular to the ecological 
and Ukrainian language movement, and above all to the Kiev branch of 
the Writers’ Union of Ukraine (WUU).* Although the CPU remained 
far from enthusiastic about the prospect of a Ukrainian Popular Front 
and would place a succession of obstacles in its path, the authorities 
found it easier to tolerate the efforts of such semi-official groups than it 
did those of the UHU, which, although it helped in the background, was 
at this stage anxious not to alienate potential moderate supporters by 
adopting too high a profile.^ The WUU was also willing, initially at least, 
to accept a degree of party tutelage.
The Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika, or Rukh , that 
was finally established in September 1989 was therefore originally an 
extremely broad church, uniting reform communists, ’general 
democrats' and nationalists. However, as the general political climate in 
the USSR rapidly liberalised in 1989-90, Rukh was able to escape the 
CPU’s control, and by the time of of its second congress in October 1990, 
Rukh had fallen under the domination of its nationalist wing. This 
limited its growth and influence, especially after further arguments 
within the nationalist camp led to a formal split in the movement in
1992. Consequently, even at the peak of its support in mid-1990, Rukh 
found it difficult to expand its appeal beyond the nationalist heartlands 
in Western and Central Ukraine, and as it began to slide in 1992, its 
implosion and the rise of extreme nationalism within its ranks 
demonstrated the fragility of the Ukrainian commitment to civic 
nationalism.
First steps
The first, stillborn, attempts to establish a Ukrainian Popular Front 
were made in the Summer of 1988, when separate initiative groups 
appeared in L’viv, Kiev, Vinnytsia, Khmel’nyts'kyi and elsewhere.^ The 
largest group was the L'viv based 'Democratic Front in Support of 
Perestroika', formed after mass demonstrations in L'viv in June and July 
1988 (the first mass unofficial rallies of the modem period).^ Although 
reportedly up to 10,000 to 20,000 attended,5 the demonstrators were 
unable to challenge the communist party's monopoly on power in the 
manner of the Baltic Popular Fronts. Firstly, national communists who 
might have made common cause with the opposition were still thin on 
the ground, despite the sympathy of some, such as Bohdan Kotyk, head
of the L'viv d ty  CPU.6 Potential national communists in Galicia were 
still subject to Kiev’s orders in any case. Secondly, the various informal 
groups which organised the demonstrations, such as the UHU, 
Tovarystvo leva , the Ukrainian Language Society and Memorial , were 
still too small, amorphous and lacking in influence. They were still 
perceived as too radical by the majority of the population (and certainly 
by the authorities). Coercion was therefore the logical outcome of the 
demonstrations, which had subsided by the autumn.
A similar fate befell the other groups, attempting to organise on less 
favourable territory. In Kiev a meeting in June 1988 had called for the 
creation of a 'Popular Union in Support of Perestroika '7  The initiative 
was supported by Kiev's tiny informal dissident groups, such as the 
Ukrainian Culturological Club and the student group Hromada , but 
without official protection such groups were even less able to make 
contact with mass public opinion than in L'viv.
Therefore an alternative approach began to be canvassed. The idea of 
intelligentsia leadership for a would-be Popular Front was first raised at a 
meeting of 150 or so writers in the Kiev Writers' Union building on 30 
October 1988,® chaired by Pavlo Movchan and Viktor T eren.9 An 
initiative group was then formed under the poet Ivan Drach,^® and later 
enlarged by the addition of representatives from similar groups set up at 
the Institute of Literature (such as Mykola Zhulyns’kyi and Vitalii 
D onchyk),H  and the Institute of Philosophy (headed by Myroslav 
P o p o v y c h ) . ! ^  Several of the key figures in the initiative group, such as 
the poet Dmytro Pavlychko,*® then hijacked a 10,000 strong 
demonstration ostensibly concerning ecological issues in Kiev on 13 
November, and went public with their demands for the creation of a 
Popular Front.l^
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However, right from the very start there were arguments concerning 
the extent of party tutelage over the embryo Popular Front, and in 
particular over whether the leading role in the initiative group should 
be played by the party groups in the various institutes, or should 
encompass most of the leading figures in the Kiev intelligentsia.
The CPU, however, particularly the Ideology Secretaries Yurii 
Yel'chenko and Leonid Kravchuk, was in two minds. Its first instinct 
may have been to attempt to strangle the Popular Front at birth 
(Shcherbyts’kyi of course was still First Secretary of the CPU). Kravchuk 
issued a warning at the 31 January 1989 plenum of the WUU against 
party members joining the initiative group, and many members of the 
intelligentsia were successfully warned off, such as the writer Borys 
Oliinyk (later a leading Ukrainian socialist).^ On the other hand, more 
realistic voices recognised that something had to be done to release the 
pressure building up from below, and that it would be preferable if any 
Popular Front was formed on the party’s own terms. The publication of 
the Popular Front's draft programme was therefore delayed until 
February 1989, while the party attempted to make its impact felt. 16
The version finally published in the main intelligentsia paper 
Literaturna Ukraina on 16 February 1989 conformed to most of the 
party's demands. The Popular Front was to be called 'The Popular 
Movement [Rukh ] of Ukraine for Perestroika'; and it explicitly 
recognised both the CPU's constitutional leading role, and the socialist 
character of Ukrainian society. Rukh , as the organisation was soon 
known, would not seek to usurp the role of the party, but would act as a 
'unifying link between the programme of perestroika [in Ukrainian, 
perebudova ] proposed by the Party and the initiative of the broad mass 
of the people'.*? Rukh would campaign for 'humanity, peace and 
progress', for a rule of law and for individual rights. In the crucial area of
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the national question, the programme confined itself to some safe 
remarks concerning the desirability of republican sovereignty.
Rukh's cautious approach was not only dictated by the heavy hand of 
the CPU. Rukh's founders were also aware of the need to create as 
broadly based a coalition as possible to counterbalance the influence of 
party conservatives. Ukrainian nationalists were always likely to provide 
the bedrock of the movement's membership, but Rukh also hoped to 
attract into its ranks CPU moderates, 'general democrats' (that is liberals 
and centrists) and if possible Russian-speaking Ukrainians or Russian 
radicals from Eastern and Southern Ukraine.
Moreover, the CPU-controlled mass media had in any case launched 
a campaign of defamation against Rukh before it was barely even off the 
ground, led by party papers such as Pravda Ukrainy and Radians'ka 
Ukraina , but also including the TV and radio. 18 Rukh's leaders, 
mindful of the historical weaknesses of the Ukrainian national 
movement (see Chapter 1), were extremely concerned at the effect of 
such propaganda on the population of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. 
The dominant figures in R ukh 's  original leadership were also 
overwhelmingly from the shestydesiatnyky generation, and hoped that 
civic or territorial nationalism would help bridge the gap with Eastern 
Ukraine. Hence, they were prepared to tread carefully, and to downplay 
the national message.
However, there were still several paths that Rukh could take. In its 
early stages, it was still entirely possible that Rukh would be little more 
than a talking-shop under the direct supervision of the CPU. In March 
1989, a round-table meeting was organised between CPU leaders and 
Rukh representatives, at which Rukh came under immense pressure to 
submit to the party's direction and confine itself largely to a cultural 
programme. That it did not do so was largely due to the resistance of
Ivan Drach.19 Instead, Drach and others deliberately sought to broaden 
the base of Rukh , and head off the danger of its being swallowed by the 
CPU, by the creation of an independent Coordinating Council at the end 
of March 1989. In order to maximise Rukh's outreach to all sections of 
Ukrainian society, the Council was headed by the moderate and urbane 
philosopher, Myroslav Popovych. It was Popovych who presented 
Rukh's case in a series of TV debates with Leonid Kravchuk in the 
summer of 1989. The other members of the Coordinating Council were 
mostly leading literati ; - Drach, Pavlychko, Donchyk, Les’ Taniuk, 
V'iacheslav Briukhovets'kyi, Serhii Hrechaniuk, Leonid Shulman and 
Anatolii Shevchenko.^®
A series of regional conferences was organised, at which Rukh , 
whilst remaining in general loyal to the party, was able to express its 
differences, and gradually edge away from the party's tutelage. The 
regional branches of Rukh also began to support a thriving samizdat 
press (such as Vil'ne slovo , or 'The Free Word' in Kiev, and Viche , an 
old Ukrainian term for 'People's Assembly' in L'viv), which could 
usually take more risks than the movement's official spokesmen. At the 
conference of the Kiev branch of Rukh on 1 July 1989, for example, 
Pavlychko spoke of
two conceptions of perestroika. One ..allows [different] peoples to be reborn, 
to raise from under the boot their sovereignty, language and culture, and to go over 
to a republican economy and real popular self-rule. The other conception is 
Pharisiacal, our official-republican conception, which by various means tries to 
preserve the command-administrative system, to nourish dissatisfaction with 
the changes brought about by perestroika, to frighten people with invented 
rumours of nationalism amongst the .. intelligentsia, and paint the leaders of 
Rukh , without doubt honest and brave citizens of the republic, as adventurists 
bent on the seizure of power.^ 1
Ivan Drach meanwhile bemoaned the absence of 'a Ukrainian 
Brazauskas', prepared to forge an alliance between reform communists 
and Rukh .22 At the same time however Pavlychko was calling only for 
'an economically, politically and culturally sovereign Ukraine within 
the ranks of the USSR’,23 whilst Popovych insisted that R ukh  
concentrate on building a general 'democratic movement, that includes 
all possible political trends' rather than a narrowly nationalist 
m ovem en t.24 Rukh , he argued, should seek to build a Ukrainian 
national revival on the basis of prior democratisation, not the other way 
round.
This approach initially helped to promote the growth of Rukh in 
regions other than Western Ukraine, but so long as Shcherbyts'kyi 
remained in power as head of the CPU, it was still harassed at every turn. 
Apart from the set-piece TV confrontations in the summer, it was still 
denied access to the mass media. Its programme and opinions circulated 
mainly in samizdat (although here the intelligentsia weekly Literaturna 
Ukrai'na , and increasingly the Kiev daily Vechirnii Kyiv under 
reformist editor Vitalii Karpenko were notable exceptions). 25 The right 
to public demonstration was also strictly curtailed, and there was little 
prospect of Rukh being allowed to participate in the upcoming 
republican elections in March 1990.
The movement’s prospects only began to improve after September 
1989, when R u kh 's  founding congress was finally held, and 
Shcherbyts'kyi at last resigned. On the other hand, with its new found 
freedom of action Rukh would increasingly become a more narrowly 
nationalist, rather than 'general democratic' movement.
The first Rukh congress, September 1989
On 8-10 September 1989, the founding congress of Rukh was finally 
held in the Hall of Culture at Kiev’s Polytechnic Institute. An official 
building had been secured, but many were still discouraged from 
attending, the authorities prevented large-scale demonstrations, and the 
proceedings were not broadcast on TV.26
By then the organisation claimed around 280,000 members, 
represented by 1,109 delegates. Some idea of the sociological and political 
profile of Rukh can be gained from the following information supplied 
by the congress' mandate commission.27 Nine hundred and forty four 
(89% of those who replied to the commission's questionnaire) of the 
delegates were Ukrainian, and 77 (7%, as opposed to 22% of the 
population of Ukraine as a whole) were Russian. The largest number of 
delegates was from Galicia -318 or 29%. 133 (12%) were from Volyn'- 
Polissia, 39 (4%) were from Transcarpathia and Chemivtsi, 133 (12%) 
were from Right Bank Ukraine, 199 (18%) from Kiev d ty  and oblast' ,  68 
(6%) from the Left Bank, 132 (12%) from Eastern Ukraine, and 79 (7%) 
from the South (8 delegates from the Baltic republics are excluded from 
the calculations).
This was a much broader geographical spread than would be the case 
in later years. Rukh's then broad church was also indicated by the fact 
that 252 (23%) of the delegates were still members of the CPU or the 
Komsomol.
The congress was dominated by the cultural intelligentsia. Eight 
hundred (72%) delegates had some form of completed higher education. 
28 had doctoral degrees, and 96 had graduate degrees. One hundred and 
thirty of the delegates were described as educational workers (i.e. mainly 
teachers), 104 were cultural workers, 42 were journalists, 48 were medical 
practitioners, 25 were lawyers, 5 were actors, 5 were students, 3 were 
bookkeepers and 2 were architects (a total of 38% of those who indicated
a profession). A further 329 (34%) were ’engineers’ (the most common 
Soviet technical or managerial qualification). Only 109 were labourers 
(11%), and a mere 16 (2%) were agricultural workers. Few of these were 
from the workers’ movement in Eastern Ukraine, whose representatives 
attended only as observers.
The congress was also dominated by the shestydesiatnyky . The 
average age of the delegates was 42. There was, however, also a 
substantial youth element, as 167 of the delegates were under the age of 
30. The fact that even opposition politics in Ukraine was largely a male 
preserve was indicated by the fact that only 98 women attended the 
congress.
The congress formalised Rukh's existence as a ’general democratic’ 
movement, but the preoccupation of many delegates with the national 
question was evident.^® Formally the movement remained under the 
tutelage of the CPU. The new programme adopted at the congress stated 
that Rukh 'conducts its activity according to the principles of 
hum anism , democracy, glasnost, pluralism , social justice and 
internationalism [emphasis added], proceeding from the interests of all 
citizens of the republic, regardless of nationality'.^ The programme also 
pledged to follow the course laid down at all recent gatherings of the 
CPSU. The importance of national revival was heavily emphasised, but 
Rukh defined its main goal as the rather less controversial 'construction 
of a humane and democratic society in Ukraine'. No mention was made 
of Ukrainian independence. Rather it was declared that Rukh supported 
'the transformation of the Ukrainian SSR into a democratic state under 
the rule of law', although the sections on the economy and culture 
strongly emphasised the importance of creating true republican 
sovereignty.
The programme was, above all, predicated on the need to defend 
individual rights and to construct a civil society in Ukraine, while the 
section on 'The National Question' stressed territorial rather than ethnic 
concepts of citizenship. Moreover, the programme stated that 'while 
advocating respect for national dignity and rejecting national nihilism, 
Rukh * considers the propaganda of racial and national exclusivity and 
chauvinistic and nationalistic views to be incompatible with its 
principles'.
Some speakers of course sounded a more radical note, especially 
Levko Luk’lanenko, leader of the UHU. His speech, which was the only 
main speech not to be published in Literaturna Ukraina , called on Rukh 
to help 'abolish the empire as the greatest evil of life to d a y '.3 0
The dominant moderate tone, however, was due to centrists such as 
Popovych and the economist and USSR deputy Volodymyr Cherniak, 
who had a key say in drawing up the programme.31 They supported 
such a general line as necessary in itself, while others, such as the 
chairman of the preparation committee for the congress, Volodymyr 
Y avorivs'kyi,32 and Ivan Drach, elected at the congress as Rukh's first 
leader, had only deemphasised the national question because of massive 
pressure from the CPU. Once the hegemony of the CPU began to decline, 
they would come increasingly to the fore.
The priorities of Rukh's rank and file could be seen from a poll of 
delegates' priorities which showed that 73% thought that Rukh 'should 
support the development of the Ukrainian culture and language', while 
49% thought that Rukh should promote 'economic sovereignty within 
the framework of the USSR'. Only 46% mentioned the 'solving of 
pressing economic problem s '.33 a  simultaneous poll of the general 
population, however, showed that economic problems were most often 
mentioned (by 44%), compared to only 12% mentioning language and
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culture. The potential long term conflict between Rukh's priorities and 
public opinion was not yet fully apparent, however, and more (37%) 
evaluated Rukh positively, than negatively (2 5 %).34
A key organisational problem for Rukh  was the absurdly 
cumbersome leadership structure created at the congress. Ivan Drach was 
elected leader, but he was to share power with a bicameral Grand 
Council, consisting of a 81 strong Council of Representatives under 
Volodymyr Yavorivs'kyi and a 93 strong Council of Collegia under 
Volodymyr Cherniak (the 'Collegia' were basically four sub-committees 
on Politics, Society and Economics, Culture and Ecology); an 
administrative Secretariat under the UHU’s Mykhailo Horyn'; a Council 
of Deputies and a Council of Nationalities under the ethnic Armenian 
army colonel Vilen Martyrosian. As might be expected, the above 
structures were to prove slow, unwieldy and a recipe for factional 
conflict, while real power tended to pass to the Secretariat.
Between congresses, 1989-90
The first congress and the subsequent, and (hardly coincidental) final 
demise of Shcherbyts'kyi gave a considerable boost to Rukh and its 
organisational and communication abilities. Rukh's view of the limits 
of the politically possible was also rapidly radicalised by the collapse of 
communism in East-Central Europe in late 1989. R ukh 's  front 
organisation, the Democratic Bloc, succeeded in winning 25% of the seats 
in the March 1990 Ukrainian elections. However, the aftermath of the 
elections, and the growth of political pluralism in Ukraine presented 
Rukh with problems that it was less able to manage.
Kravchuk had failed to deliver on his promise to allow Rukh to be 
officially registered in time to participate in the March 1990 elections
(Rukh was officially registered in February, after the deadline for 
candidate registration had already passed). Hence Rukh and the other 
small opposition organisations formed the Democratic Bloc in Kiev on 
18 November 1989 instead.35 The Bloc was a useful way of 
circumventing the refusal to register Rukh , and a necessary device to 
promote non-communist candidates, but, despite publishing a largely 
negative common platform,36 it was too amorphous to exercise any real 
collective authority over the candidates it endorsed, most of whom 
campaigned on their own individual programmes. Some candidates 
even ran against one another. For example in the Pechers’k region of 
Kiev, Popovych was opposed by the UHU's Oles’ Serhiienko, resulting 
in the loss of the seat to the CPU.
Nevertheless Rukh /the Democratic Bloc demonstrated considerable 
mobilisational ability during the election campaign, the high spot of 
which was the giant human chain organised from Kiev to L'viv to 
celebrate the 71st anniversary of the temporary reunification of Western 
and East-Central Ukraine in 1919 on 21 January 1990.37 The event was 
designed to celebrate Rukh's commitment to dvic nationalism, by 
symbolically linking Galida with Central Ukraine. At this point, Rukh 
was still well aware of the dangers of assodating itself too dosely with 
the self-limiting myths and symbols of Galician nationalism. Rukh 
therefore also invested considerable effort in the celebrations of the 500th 
anniversary of the first Ukrainian Cossack settlements throughout 1990, 
culminating in the 'Days of Cossack Glory' festival in August 1990. 
Whereas the appeal of the OUN-UPA myth was confined to Western 
Ukraine, the historical centres of Ukrainian Cossackdom had been in 
Central and Eastern Ukraine. The late seventeenth century 'Hetmanate' 
state had been based on Left Bank Ukraine (Chernihiv, Poltava and 
Sumy), and the Cossacks’ Sich headquarters at Zaporizhzhia. Therefore,
Rukh's purpose in emphasising the Cossack heritage was twofold; it 
hopefully provided a historical myth that Eastern Ukrainians could 
share with Western Ukrainians, and moreover, 'the celebration of the 
Cossack past contradicted the Russian imperial vision of the area 
[Eastern and Southern Ukraine] as primarily the creation of Catherine n
and Prince Grigorii Potemkin the restoration of the memory of the
Cossack past had in effect claimed these southern lands for the emerging 
Ukrainian p o l i t y ' . ^  By 1 9 9 1  Ukraine's national communists had 
realised the effectiveness of this approach, and were making similar use 
of the Cossack myth. By then, however, Rukh was more firmly under 
the control of the nationalists, and its choice of political symbols less 
sensitive.
Although the elections had many faults, not least the continuing 
CPU monopoly of the mass media, the 2 5 %  or so the vote won by the 
Democratic Bloc was probably a fair reflection of Rukh's strength at the 
time.39 The Bloc won 4 3  out of 4 6  seats in Galicia, 11 out of 1 9  in Volyn’- 
Polissia, a surprisingly low 1 out of 1 7  in Transcarpathia and Chemivtsi, 
1 2  out of 8 5  in the largely rural Right Bank; 1 7  out of 21 in Kiev city and 2  
out of 1 7  in Kiev oblast' , 6  out of 4 2  on the Left Bank, 2 8  out of 1 5 0  in 
Eastern Ukraine (1 1  of these were in Kharkiv), and 2  out of 6 4  in the 
South (a further 3 6  non-communist deputies were elected in Eastern 
Ukraine, but preferred to keep their distance from Rukh and remain 
non-party).^®
The Democratic Bloc claimed 1 1 5 -3 3  members, the uncertainty being a 
result of continued defections from the CPU and the amorphous nature 
of political loyalties in general.^1 The Bloc's deputies named themselves 
the Narodna rada (People’s Council), adopted a formal statute,42 and 
elected Ihor Yukhnovs'kyi as leader. His deputies were Luk"ianenko of 
the UHU/URP; Dmytro Pavlychko, eventually of the DPU; Oleksandr
Yemets' of the Democratic Platform /PDRU; and Les* Taniuk was 
Secretary.43 The Narodna rada , however, did not constitute a Rukh 
faction as such. It often held common sittings, but the decisions of such 
meetings were only recommendatory. In practice, the Narodna rada 
soon subdivided into four more or less formalised mini-factions (the 
radicals led by the URP, the DPU, the PDRU and the non-party), and a 
variety of other cross-cutting loyalties.44
The broader problem for Rukh was the question of how it was to 
cope with the political pluralism that was rapidly beginning to develop. 
A first option, that of turning Rukh into a formal political party, was 
rejected at the Grand Council meeting in Khust, Transcarpathia in 
March 1990 (see Chapter 5). A majority on the Grand Council felt that 
this would narrow Rukh's political base unnecessarily, and were also 
aware of the public distrust of political parties that was already 
apparent.45 This decision speeded up the formation of both the URP and 
DPU (see Chapters 3 and 5).
The second option was to restructure Rukh as an umbrella or 
coordinating movement to which all political parties would be 
responsible. Two problems arose with this strategy, which was the one 
adopted. Firstly, now that Rukh was increasingly free of the oversight of 
the CPU, as the latter's formal hegemony began to dissolve in 1990 (see 
Chapter 2), it became an increasingly openly nationalist organisation, 
alienating the new parties of the centre-left. Secondly the main parties of 
the nationalist right, the URP and DPU were also unwilling to submit to 
the authority of Rukh , and preferred to further their own narrow party 
interests.
Particularly at a local level, and in Galicia above all, Rukh 
underwent rapid radicalisation in 1989-90.46 This was the result of the 
growing influence of the UHU/URP (see Chapter 3), and of the higher
rate of political mobilisation in Galida and to a lesser extent Kiev. The 
publicity given to nationalist deputies in the Supreme Council, and the 
achievement of passing the Declaration of Ukrainian Sovereignty in July 
1990 served to radicalise that minority of the population which had 
supported the Democratic Bloc in March 1990. Leaders such as Drach 
began openly to talk of their desire for full independence,4? and Rukh 
expressed outright opposition to proposals for a renegotiated Union 
Treaty between Moscow and the republics that Gorbachev began to float 
in mid-1990. Rukh now openly embraced narrowly ethnic myths and 
symbols, such as the blue and yellow flag from 1917-21,48 and its press 
began to fill up with articles eulogising the OUN-UPA.
Rukh now had a very active press. At a central level, it published 
Visnyk Rukhu 0Rukh  News’)/ Ohliadach (’The Observer’), and 
Ekspres-novyny ('Express News'), but the all-important planned daily 
paper Narodna hazeta ('The People's Paper') had yet to get off the 
ground. At a local level, Rukh organisations produced approximately 50 
publications of variable q u a li ty ,4^ often little more than samizdat. 
Nearly all devoted a high proportion of their pages to reviving ethnic 
myths and symbols, and to filling in the 'blank spots' in Ukrainian 
history. In Galicia especially, increasing attention was paid to reviving 
the memory of the OUN-UPA. A festival to commemorate the UP A was 
held in Volyn’ in September 1990.
The increasing predominance of Galician radicalism led to increasing 
tensions with Eastern and Southern Ukraine, however. The Kharkiv 
Rukh organisation for example effectively split in two as Russian 
speakers led by elements in the PDRU such as Vladimir Griniov^O 
sought to disassociate themselves from Rukh's growing nationalism.51 
At the same time centrist liberals, such as Popovych, began to drift away 
from Rukh as the nationalist influence grew.52
Centre-left parties such as the SDPU and PDRU therefore rejected 
Rukh's overtures. The SDPU condemned Rukh's ’anti-democratic 
ideology and political practice, that is national ultra-radicalism'^^ at its 
party conference on 24-5 November 1990. The PDRU meanwhile stressed 
the 'priority of general human values over class or national values', and 
kept their distance from Rukh .54 Ironically however both the URP and 
the DPU also failed to become associate members of Rukh , despite the 
changes made to Rukh's structure at its second congress that were 
designed to encourage them to do so, and sought to promote their 
narrow party interests instead (see Chapters 3 and 5).
Second congress
The second congress of Rukh , held in Kiev on 2 5 - 8  October 1990, 
showed how far the movement had been radicalised by the events since 
its first c o n g r e s s .5 5  The congress’ radical mood also reflected a reaction 
against the turn to the right that had been manifest in official circles in 
both Moscow and Kiev since the late summer of 1990.
The movement now claimed the support of 630,000 members (a 
considerable increase on the 280,000 at the time of the first congress), 
2,125 of whom were present as delegates to the co n g re s s .5 6 The 
composition of the delegates reflected the growing dominance in Rukh 
of more nationalist elements. Almost 95% of delegates were now 
Ukrainian, and only 4% R u s s ia n ,57 compared to 89% and 7% 
respectively a year earlier. More than half (57%) the delegates were now 
from the nationalist strongholds of Galicia and Kiev dty, compared to 
47% in 1989.58 Only 1.5% of delegates still belonged to the CPU or 
Komsomol (compared to 23% in 1989), whereas 13% now belonged to the 
URP, 6% to the DPU, and 25% to the Ukrainian Language Society. Even
ultra-radical groups such as the DSU (4 representatives, or 0.2%) and the 
Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (9 representatives) were present 
(see Chapter 7).59 Fifteen veterans of the UP A were also in attendance.****
The congress was once again dominated by middle-aged male 
members of the intelligentsia. 72% had higher education or above. In 
terms of profession, 30% of delegates were from the cultural 
intelligentsia,***1 and 53% from the technical intelligentsia.**^ Pensioners 
represented 6%, 3% were workers, 3% were from the village 
intelligentsia, 1.4% were unemployed, and 0.6% were in the Armed 
Forces.**^ The average age of delegates was again 42. The foothold on 
power gained by Rukh /  the Democratic Bloc in the March 1990 elections 
was demonstrated by the fact that 418 of the delegates were now people's 
deputies at one level or another (5 USSR deputies, 18 Ukrainian, 117 
oblast, and 323 raion or dty deputies).***
Ivan Drach's keynote speech to the congress was uncompromisingly 
radical in tone, reflecting the fact that the URP's Mykhailo Horyn' was 
under pressure to challenge him for the leadership. Drach claimed that 
the CPU was preparing a 'Peking variant' against the Ukrainian people 
(i.e. the use of force as in Tianamen square), which Rukh should resist 
through 'extra-parliamentary action’, civil disobedience and the like.**5 
The only long-term defence against the CPU was 'the full sovereignty of 
the Ukrainian people, and a completely independent Ukrainian state'. 
Drach used his usual colourful language to full effect. The after-effects of 
Chomobyl' were like a 'Mengelian' experiment on Ukraine's future 
generations. The Ukrainians, he argued, were the true inheritors of the 
traditions of Kievan Rus' , and were the real 'elder brothers’ to the 
'Great Russians’.**** However, Drach still went to some length to 
formally reject ethnic nationalism, stressing that all Ukrainian citizens
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should share in a future Ukrainian state, and emphasising his solidarity 
with Russian patriots.
While many delegates, such as people's deputy Serhii Holovatyi,67 
echoed Drach's sentiment that Rukh should emulate the methods of 
Gandhi and Martin Luther King and use only peaceful and democratic 
means of struggle, the URP's Mykhailo Horyn' placed more emphasis on 
the achievements of extra-parliamentary methods, such as the 1989 
miners' strikes, the October 1990 student hunger strikes and mass 
demonstrations such as the one which concluded the students' strikes 
on 17 October. By themselves he declared 'parliamentary methods for 
achieving democratic laws are not enough’.^ ® Extra-parliamentary 
action, he declared, was necessary both to bolster the position of the 
Narodna rada minority in the Supreme Council and to 'raise the 
consciousness' of the people.
The prevailing radical mood resulted in several key changes to 
Rukh's programme and statute. The words 'for perestroika ' were 
dropped from the movement’s title. Moreover, the programme stated 
that 'today Rukh has naturally transformed itself [pereris z ] from a 
movement for perestroika into a movement for the state independence 
of Ukraine, and become a real force in opposition to the CPSU and to the 
totalitarian state-party system '.69 The main aim of Rukh was now 
explicitly 'attaining Ukrainian sovereignty in accordance with the 
principles of the Declaration of Ukrainian State Sovereignty on 16 July 
1990', and the full 'state independence of U k ra in e '.F u rth e rm o re , 
membership in Rukh was now banned to those who belonged to 
organisations whose 'leading organs were located outside the Ukrainian 
SSR’ (obviously such a move was directed against members of the CPSU, 
but it left the door open for possible future reconciliation with a truly 
independent CPU). The congress in fact called on communist party
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members to chose between 'Ukraine or the CPSU!’ and desert the 
party.^1
Post-congress activity
Rukh also changed its statute to encourage the newly formed 
Ukrainian political parties to become collective members of the 
movement. A new Political Council was created under the URP’s 
Mykhailo Horyn', on which the leaders of all parties and organisations 
who became associate members of Rukh would have a seat as of right 
(and also on the Grand Cotm dl).^ The congress also passed an appeal to 
all political parties in Ukraine to join a political coalition entitled 
'Democratic U kraine'.^
In the siege mentality created by Gorbachev’s embrace of CPSU 
conservatives in the winter of 1990-1 and the Baltic killings in January, 
the Political Council was able to announce the formation of just such a 
broad-based coalition on 30 January 1991.^4 Only the extreme right (the 
UIA) and the CPU did not sign. Crucially the Political Council was able to 
persuade centrist groups like the PDRU, both Social Democratic parties 
and the Greens to join up.^5 However, the crisis atmosphere, and the 
unity it produced, did not last long. New divisions were exposed in the 
run-up to the referendum called by Gorbachev on the future of the 
Union on 17 March 1991. Rukh established a committee entitled 
'Referendum - [for a] Sovereign Ukraine', but a common front of all the 
opposition parties was now impossible to hold. Nationalists argued with 
centrists who still favoured some kind of Union, and extreme and 
moderate nationalists argued over whether to boycott the referendum.
The argument within Rukh was now mainly between nationalists. 
Many Rukh radicals sympathised with call from the ultra-right (and
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many in the URP) to boycott the referendum altogether, but they were 
defeated at a special session of Rukh's Coordinating Council on 2-3 
February, by 117 votes to 847 & Rukh therefore campaigned against 
Gorbachev’s question (’Do you consider it necessary to preserve the 
USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which 
human rights and the freedoms of all nationalities will be fully 
guarantied?'), but in favour of the second republican question added by 
Leonid Kravchuk ('Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union 
of Soviet Sovereign States on the basis of the Declaration of State 
Sovereignty of Ukraine?')/? Mykhailo Horyn' however supported the 
URP’s position (two 'nos'), and was increasingly accused of abusing his 
position to promote the narrow party interests of the URP, which saw 
even the second ballot as a betrayal of their demand for full 
independence.?®
On 17 March, the Ukrainian electorate gave 70.5% support to 
Gorbachev's question, but 80.2% supported the Ukrainian question. 
Analysis of the voting shows that Rukh's influence on the electorate 
had not advanced much on the position obtained in March 1990. Table 
4.1 seeks to show the level of support for Rukh in two ways. Column 2 
shows the vote against the Gorbachev question, and Column 3 shows 
the common vote for both questions as a measure of the vote for the 
status quo (that is, in opposition to Rukh's call for a 'no' and a 'yes').
Table 4.1. The Referendum of 17 March 1991 .?9
Oblast Rukh support (%) Status quo (%)
i) Galicia 
L’viv 71 10
Ternopil’
Ivano-Frankivs’k
77
78
13
12
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ii) Volyn'-Polissia
Rivne 43 47
Volyn’ 43 47
iii) Other West
Transcarpathia 36 54
Chernivtsi 36 54
iv) Right Bank
Kirovohrad 16 73
Cherkasy 21 67
Vinnytsia 18 72
Zhytomyr 17 72
Khmel’nyts’kyi 21 67
v) Kiev d ty  53 37
Kiev oblast 31 59
vi) Left Bank
Poltava 20 69
Sumy 20 68
Chernihiv 15 75
vii) East
Kharkiv 22 62
Donets’k 14 72
Luhans'k 17 76
Zaporizhzhia 19 68
Dnipropetrovs'k 21 64
viii) South
Mykolaiv 14 73
Kherson 18 70
Odesa 16 68
Crimea 12 *
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* Figures for Crimea were unavailable.
In the aftermath of the referendum, Rukh found it increasingly 
difficult to persuade all political parties to campaign under its umbrella. 
Centrist parties such as the PDRU now favoured a loose Confederation 
of Independent States to replace the USSR (as in fact occurred in 
December 1991), and had been amongst the prime movers behind the 
’Democratic Congress’, formed with like-minded parties from other 
republics in Kharkiv on 26-7 January 1991 to promote such a goal.®® 
They therefore increasingly kept their distance from nationalist leaders 
such as Ivan Drach and Mykhailo Horyn'. The nationalist camp also had 
its problems in relation to Rukh . The relative weight of delegates from 
Eastern Ukraine at the original congress of the DPU in December 1990 
(see Chapter 5), and the desire of the DPUs leaders to maintain a broader 
church than the URP had prevented the DPU becoming an associate 
member of Rukh at an all-Ukrainian level (although cooperation at the 
oblast' level was considerable). The URP on the other hand still 
considered Rukh too moderate, and at the time was internally divided 
over whether to cooperate with national communists like Kravchuk (see 
Chapter 3), or to adopt the UIA’s tactics of boycotting all the institutions 
of the Ukrainian SSR. Formally therefore, the URP too maintained its 
independence from Rukh , but in practice continued its entryist tactics of 
trying to radicalise Rukh from within. However, the URP’s very success 
in this regard (243 out of the 2,125 delegates [11%] to Rukh's second 
congress had been members of the URP),®1 only served to alienate more 
moderate elements from Rukh .
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Independence and the December 1991 polls
A degree of unity was restored by the attempted coup in August 1991. 
Nationalist forces closed ranks in the face of the threat to their 
achievements to date, and then made use of the communists' disarray in 
the wake of the coup's collapse to force the national communists into 
supporting a historic declaration of Ukrainian independence on 24 
August.
After a meeting with Kravchuk at 11 a.m. on Monday 19 August (the 
first day of the coup) the main non-communist parties unanimously 
condemned the coup, and on 20 August formed a coalition entitled 
'Independent Democratic Ukraine' to resist the j u n t a .8 2  There were 
already, however, important differences of emphasis between the parties. 
The PDRU for example confined itself to -general appeals for calm. 8 3 
Rukh's call for a general strike was published in Vechirnii Kyiv on the 
20th,'84 and by the 22nd Rukh was calling for the special Supreme 
Council session on the 24th to declare Ukraine's secession from the 
USSR.85 The unity showed by Rukh was then instrumental in forcing 
the CPU's national communists to cut their ties with Moscow, vote for 
independence (the vote was 346 to 1) and the declaration to establish 
Ukrainian Armed Forces on the 24th, and accept the decision to ban the 
CPU on the 30th. However the unity briefly reestablished in August was 
the product of extreme circumstances, and was rapidly lost as political 
attention turned to the two simultaneous election campaigns in the 
Autumn of 1991.
The Declaration of Independence had to be ratified by referendum on 
1 December 1991, and elections for the first Ukrainian executive 
President (already planned before the attempted coup) were to be held on 
the same day. Although Rukh could unanimously campaign for the
former goal, it could not reach agreement on whom to support for 
President, either internally or with other political parties. When Rukh's 
Grand Council met to discuss the issue on 1 September 1991, it split 
between those such as Drach and Yevhen Proniuk (leader of the all- 
Ukrainian Society for the Repressed, i.e. ex-political prisoners) who 
supported the URFs Lukianenko because of his impeccable nationalist 
credentials, and lower-ranking leaders and the younger generation, such 
as the leader of the October 1990 student hunger strikes Oles' Donii, who 
preferred Vlacheslav Chomovil because of his populist appeal and his 
more outspoken anti-communism.®® Lukianenko argued that the 
building of a strong nation-state must take precedence over de- 
communisation and economic reform, Chomovil the opposite.
The Grand Council eventually supported Chomovil as R ukh's  
official candidate, swayed most by the argument that the younger and 
more energetic Chomovil would gamer more votes, but Lukianenko 
and a third Rukh candidate Ihor Yukhnovs'kyi refused to stand down 
in his. favour (Lukianenko was supported by Rukh's smaller Political 
Council). The best promise the three could make was to withdraw in 
favour of the best placed Rukh candidate in any second round (necessary 
if no candidate received received more than 50% of the votes on the first 
round). This promise, however, did nothing to prevent the three 
campaigning against each other before 1 December. The Grand Council 
also endorsed a disastrous decision allowing local branches of Rukh to 
campaign for any candidate of their choosing.® ? The Donets'k branch of 
Rukh ended up supporting Kravchuk.®® Not surprisingly therefore 
Rukh's campaign was wracked by disunity, and produced much bad 
blood. i
The final number of candidates was six. Leonid Kravchuk®^ was the 
only national communist candidate (Agriculture Minister Oleksandr
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Tkachenko withdrew in Kravchuk's favour).90 Leopol'd Taburians'kyi 
was the candidate of the centrist People's Party of Ukraine.91 The Deputy 
Chairman of the Supreme Council, Vladimir Griniov put himself 
forward as the candidate of Ukraine’s Russophone population.92 He was 
supported by elements in the PDRU, including in his native Kharkiv, 
the leftist United Social Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Kadets , and 
several of the Donbas strike committees.
Of Rukh's three candidates, Chomovil was also supported by the 
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine and the Association of Democratic 
Councils;93 Luk’lanenko by Prosvita , the Union of Ukrainian Students, 
the all-Ukrainian Society of the Repressed, and the Kiev branch of the 
Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (the Christian and Peasant 
Democratic Parties were divided between supporters of Chomovil and 
Luk"ianenko);94 and Yukhnovs'kyi by the PDRU and the Kiev DPU.95 
As the urbane Yukhnovs'kyi found it difficult to promote his 
message beyond the ranks of the big d ty  intelligentsia, the Rukh vote 
was basically divided between Chomovil and Luk”ianenko (with 
arguably Griniov siphoning off some liberal-minded Russophone 
voters). The total vote for the Rukh troika is shown in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2. Support for the three Rukh candidates in the Ukrainian 
Presidential election on 1 December 1991.96
Oblast Chomovil Luk''ianenko Yukhnovs'kyi Total
i) Galicia
L 'viv 75.9 4.8 4.4 85.1
Ternopil’ 57.4 19.6 3.2 80.2
Ivano-Frankivs'k 67.1 11.6 3.3 82.0
ii) Volyn’-Polissia
Rivne 25.5 13.4 3.6 42.5
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Volyn' 31.4 8.9 3.2 43.5
iii) Other West
Transcarpathia 27.6 5.0 2.8 35.4
Chernivtsi 42.7 4.4 2.0 49.1
iv) Right Bank
Kirovohrad 13.5 3.5 1.1 18.1
Cherkasy 25.0 2.0 1.0 28.0
Vinnytsia 18.2 3.2 1.6 23.0
Zhytomyr 14.0 3.3 1.0 18.3
Khmel'nyts'kyi 15.4 3.2 1.6 20.2
v) Kiev dty 26.7 6.4 3.5 36.6
Kiev oblast 21.2 5.6 1.5 28.3
vi) Left Bank 
Poltava 13.6 4.2 1.3 19.1
Sumy 14.7 3.9 1.8 20.4
Chernihiv 123 6.7 0.9 19.9
vii) East 
Kharkiv 19.7 2.1 1.0 22.8
Donets'k 9.7 3.1 0.9 13.7
Luhans'k 9.9 2.0 0.7 12.6
Zaporizhzhia 13.0 3.0 1.3 17.3
Dnipropetrovs'k 18.1 2.5 1.2 21.8
viii) South 
Mykolaiv 15.1 2.3 0.7 18.1
Kherson 18.1 2.2 1.0 21.3
Odesa 12.8 2.8 1.1 16.7
Crimea 5.0 1.9 0.9 7.8
Sevastopol* 10.9 1.8 0.9 13.6
Total 23.3 4.5 1.7 29.5
In total, the Rukh trio received 9,393,654 votes, or 29.5% of the total 
(turnout was 84.2%). The centrist Taburians’kyi received a mere 0.6%, 
while the maverick Griniov polled 4.2%, performing even better in 
Russophone areas such as his native Kharkiv (10.9%) and Donets'k 
(11.0%). Kravchuk, however, was a strong winner, receiving 61.6% of the 
total vote. The results largely confirmed the pattern of Rukh support 
established in March 1990 and March 1991, and the likely level of 
maximum support for the nationalist parties in any future 
parliamentary elections. The Rukh trio swept the board in Galicia and 
received strong support elsewhere in Western Ukraine. They scored 
better than average in Kiev and other Central Ukrainian cities (for 
example 30.7% in Sumy dty  as against 20.4% for the oblast as a whole, 
and elsewhere 47.9% in Rivne city as opposed to 42.5%, and 24.3% in 
Dnipropetrovs'k d ty  as opposed to 21.8%),97 and improved sharply in 
Chemivtsi, but otherwise remained weak in Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine, especially in the Donbas and in Crimea. Rukh could make 
little impact on the countryside outside of Western Ukraine. Opinion 
poll evidence showed that support for the Rukh trio, as for 
independence as a whole, was most pronounced among the 
intelligentsia and students (those with higher education were 39% more 
likely to support Chomovil than those with incomplete or only middle 
education),98 ethnic Ukrainians (in one poll Ukrainians split 35%, 10% 
and 2% between Kravchuk, Chomovil, and Griniov; but Russians 25%, 
3% and 6%)99 and amongst Uniate Catholic and Autocephalous 
Orthodox believers.
Table 4.3 shows that support for independence in the simultaneous 
referendum on 1 December 1991 was relatively high and uniform
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throughout Ukraine on the basic 'Yes’ figures shown in Column 2, but if 
allowance is made for differential turnout by calculating the percentage 
voting 'Yes' as a percentage of the total electorate (Column 3) rather than 
as a percentage of those who voted, a similar pattern of differential 
support to that in the March 1990 and March 1991 votes is more clearly 
exposed.
Table 4.3. Results of the referendum on Ukrainian independence on 1 
December 1991.100
Oblast 'Yes', as % of turnout* 'Yes' as % of electorate
i) Galicia
L 'viv 97.4 92.8
Ternopil’ 98.7 95.8
Ivano-Frankivs’k 98.4 94.2
ii) Volyn’-Polissia
Rivne 96.8 89.2
Volyn1 96.3 89.8
iii) Other West
Transcarpathia 92.6 76.8
Chernivtsi 92.8 81.3
iv) Right Bank
Kirovohrad 93.9 82.7
Cherkasy 96.0 86.6
Vinnytsia 95.4 87.2
Zhytomyr 95.1 86.1
Khmel’nyts’kyi 96.3 90.0
v) Kiev dty 92.9 74.6
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Kiev oblast 95.5 84.0
vi) Left Bank
Poltava 94.9 87.2
Sumy 92.6 81.9
Chernihiv 93.7 85.1
vii) East
Kharkiv 86.3 65.3
Donets'k 83.9 64.4
Luhans'k 83.9 67.6
Zaporizhzhia 90.7 73.1
Dnipropetrovs'k 90.4 73.9
viii) South
Mykolaiv 89.4 75.1
Kherson 90.1 75.1
Odesa 85.4 64.0
Crimea 54.2 36.6
Sevastopol' 57.0 36.4
Total 90.3 76.0
The generally high levels of support for independence were due to 
the fact that both Rukh and the national communists were campaigning 
for independence. No significant force, not even the Socialist Party of 
Ukraine, opposed independence. Again, however, the regional pattern 
was clear, with support for independence dropping significantly in 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Rural areas everywhere showed higher 
turnouts, indicating the continuing social power of collective farm 
chairmen, whilst urban apathy reduced turnouts in Eastern Ukraine and 
even in Kiev.
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After independence: Government or Opposition?
Rukh was profoundly affected by the internal tensions generated by 
the campaign, and by the fact that they and the national communists had 
campaigned on the same side in the referendum. Two opposing camps 
quickly developed within the movement, and began a struggle for 
Rukh's soul in the run-up to the movement's third congress scheduled 
for 28 February-1 March 1992.
For a majority of Rukh's leadership, particularly the nationalist URP 
and DPU, the outcome of the campaign was dear enough. The national 
communists were to be praised for having adopted their agenda. 
Independence had been secured, and all patriotic forces should now 
unite around the new President, particularly given residual dangers of 
Russian revanchism and separatism within Ukraine. The real 
opposition in Ukraine was now the Socialist Party. The ardent 
nationalist and Deputy Leader of Rukh , Mykola Porovs'kyi,101 for 
example, argued that Rukh must now 'go over to constructive work, 
and assist the state-building activity of the President, Supreme Council 
and government’ and promote Rukh's nationalist ideology as the new 
ideology of the state;102 Rukh's leader, Ivan Drach, declared even more 
bluntly that 'he who supports Ukrainian statehood must support the 
President’.103
As Drach was now taking something of a back-seat in politics, 
however, the nationalist argument was put most forcefully by the URP's 
Mykhailo Horyn', head of the Rukh Secretariat, as he campaigned to 
succeed Drach as leader. He strongly urged Rukh to support the 
President, and sought to protect the interests of the nationalist parties by 
reviving the plan for collective membership in Rukh .104 Now that
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Rukh itself was more nationalist, he hoped that both the URP and DFU 
would be happier to join it as associate members. Moreover, a pro- 
Presidential Rukh could be the vehicle through which the URP and 
DPU could achieve their new-found ambition of becoming ’parties of the 
state' and entering government (see Chapters 3 and 5). Rukh's support 
would also be a more attractive proposition to President Kravchuk, than 
that of the URP alone. This position was endorsed by other leading 
figures in Rukh , such as the DPU's Dmytro Pavlychko.105
On 5 February 1992 the URP's Grand Council endorsed the idea of 
collective membership in Rukh in principle,* 06 followed by the DPU's 
Kiev organisation on 1 February and the party's National Council on 8 
February (which recommended oblast' organisations to become 
collective members of Rukh ).*07
These developments were encouraged by Kravchuk. In February he 
expressed the hope that Rukh 'can become the organisation that unites 
around itself all progressive democratic forces',* 08 and on 21 February 
organised a round-table with Rukh and all the political parties, which 
led to the creation of a permanent consultative council between the 
President and the par ties. 109 Immediately after the meeting, Kravchuk 
announced the creation of a Duma , or Presidential advisory council, on 
which Rukh members were prominent. Of the D um a's  four 
committees, one (on 'humanitarian politics') was headed by the literary 
critic and Rukh sympathiser Mykola Zhulyns'kyi, and another (on 
'scientific-technical politics') by one of Rukh's Presidential candidates, 
Ihor Yukhnovs'kyi. Other leading Rukh members included Ivan Drach, 
Oleksandr Lavrynovych and the economist Volodymyr Cherniak.* *0 
After Kravchuk announced the formation of a system of regional 
Presidential Prefects in March 1992, Rukh , URP and DPU leaders also 
hoped that many of their members would gain such positions.
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Not surprisingly therefore most of the Rukh leadership responded to 
Kravchuk's bait by endorsing Horyn”s proposals, despite heated 
argument, at a meeting of the Rukh Grand Council on 25 January,!!! 
and at a special meeting with leaders of the URP, DPU, Union of 
Ukrainian Students and Prosvita at the Kiev Writers' Union building 
on 1 F e b r u a r y . ! ! ^ Finally, after the de facto dissolution of the Narodna 
rada faction in the Supreme Council after the December 19?1 elections, 
Mykhailo Horyn’ announced the formation of a Rukh (nationalist) 
faction of 41 Deputies in February 1992 under his l e a d e r s h i p . ! ! 3
Whilst a majority of Rukh's leaders' were prepared to ally with 
Kravchuk, V'iacheslav Chomovil continued to campaign for a 
completely different set of priorities. He was furious with Rukh's 
fractious campaign, which had prevented him from running Kravchuk 
closer. He was especially angry with the URP and DPU for not submitting 
to Rukh's collective discipline. Moreover, he did not regard 1 December 
as a complete victory for Rukh's programme, as he argued that true 
Ukrainian independence could not be achieved until the national 
communists had been dislodged from power. For Chomovil, the 
national revolution and the anti-communist revolution were 
inextricably bound together. He therefore argued both that Rukh had to 
remain in opposition, and that it must become a more effective and 
professional organisation in order to better challenge the national 
communists in the future.! !*
According to Chomovil, it was premature and dangerous for the 
nationalists to disable the forces of opposition by allying with the 
national communists. Without an opposition, Ukraine would simply 
relapse into authoritarian rule. Moreover, if Rukh supported the 
President, only a handful of small and fractious parties would be left in
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ineffective opposition. According to Chomovil, 'without basing itself on 
Rukh , any new political opposition.in the republic is im p o s s ib le '.*  *5 
The political parties were too weak themselves to perform such a role, 
and were likely to remain so as Ukrainian society remained 
undifferentiated (see Chapter 2). Only Rukh could function as a broad 
civic movement capable of mobilising Ukrainians on a mass scale. In 
order to do so, however, it had to become a US-style mass campaigning 
party, with a streamlined and professionalised internal structure, free of 
the debilitating influence of the fractious parties. Mykhailo Horyn"s 
proposal for Rukh to function as an umbrella movement for the 
existing parties would simply institutionalise previous patterns of 
anarchic internal dissent.* *6 Therefore Chornovil demanded that all 
political parties (i.e. the URP and DPU) should be purged from Rukh's 
ranks, although by February he had reduced this demand to a call simply 
for the removal of representatives of the political parties from Rukh's 
leadership positions.
Chomovil received strong support for his line from the grass-roots 
membership of Rukh ,  in what he described as a 'revolt from b e l o w ' . *  *7 
Rukh's leaders might benefit from Kravchuk's patronage, but to most 
members of Rukh in the regions, the same old regime remained in 
charge at their level, and Rukh was in danger of selling its soul to the 
national communists (a sarcastic banner at the third Rukh congress read 
'Greetings to the [Rukh ] nomenklatura from the lower ranks!').**® The 
oblast conferences held in the run-up to the third Rukh congress 
showed that this position was gaining g ro u n d .*  *9
The near total incompatibility of Chomovil and Horyn”s views, and 
the simultaneous struggle between the two men to succeed Ivan Drach 
as Rukh leader, seemed to indicate that Rukh was facing the same fate 
as Poland’s Solidarity or Czechoslovakia's Civic Union as it approached
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its third congress. That is, its early history as a common front for all 
opposition forces was giving way to strong internal centrifugal forces. An 
indication of the passions aroused was Drach's intemperate attack on 
Chomovil at Rukh's Grand Council meeting on 25 January 1992, when 
he accused him of trying to usurp the position of Ukraine's 
democratically elected President. Chomovil, according to Drach, 'could 
not wait [another] five years, and is trying to force new elections. In my 
opinion this is intolerable. Ukraine is being threatened by the position of 
Russia, and war between Ukraine and Russia would [bring] a 
contemporary apocalypse’.1 2 0
The third congress: Rukh splits in all but name
The third Rukh congress, having been delayed by the Autumn 
election campaign, was finally held in Kiev on 28 February - 1 March 
1992.121 The information provided concerning the 864 delegates in 
attendance largely confirmed the social and political profile of Rukh 
established at the second congress in October 1990. Over half the 
delegates were from Galicia. 74% were urban dwellers; but only 14% were 
classified as workers, and a mere 4% 'peasants' [selianyn ]. The rest were, 
as before, mainly representatives of the cultural intelligentsia, such as 
teachers, doctors and academics (34%), and the 'scientific-technical 
intelligentsia' (20%). Students and serving members of the Armed 
Forces accounted for 1% each. Rukh's foothold in the corridors of power 
was demonstrated by the fact that 5% now classed themselves as workers 
in state administration (and 25 People's Deputies were in attendance). 
The rest were 'various’. The average age of the delegates was 35. 
Although over 500 delegates classed themselves as 'non-party', 91 were
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members of the URP and 108 of the DPU (the PDRU, UCDP, UPDP and 
Greens all had less than ten delegates). 122
The first day of the congress was carefully stage-managed by, and 
reserved for, the official leadership. Mykhailo Horyn"s pro-Presidential 
line therefore predominated. President Kravchuk himself attended and, 
having flattered Rukh for 'having done most' to achieve Ukrainian 
independence, made an explicit appeal to Rukh to define its central 
future task as assisting him 'in building Ukrainian statehood'. He 
finished by declaring that 'the idea of national consolidation can be the 
idea that unites the President and Rukh J'123 He was followed by 
Mykhailo Horyn', who declared that Kravchuk had adopted Rukh's 
programme, to which therefore it was impossible to remain in 
opposition.
However, the extent of the leadership's lack of communication with 
the movement's grass-roots was revealed on the second day (Saturday 29 
February) when the regional heads had their say (16 out of 25 leaders of 
Rukh's oblast' organisations had reportedly consulted with Chomovil 
at his hotel on the Friday n ig h t).!24 Almost to a man they supported 
Chomovil, and expressed a groundswell of popular discontent against 
the fractious activity of the parties, and their leaders' perceived pursuit 
of privilege. Chomovil was also supported by People's Deputies Les1 
Taniuk, Ivan Zaiets’ and Serhii Holovatyi.
As defeat stared them in the face, the '1 February group' circulated a 
petition stating that they, 'the best representatives of the working and 
scientific-technical intelligentsia....could not take part in the election of 
[Rukh's ] leading organs, when the further activity of Rukh at a time 
most critical for the independence of Ukraine will be in the role of an 
opposition, which will narrow her social base and make it more 
complicated for democratic political organisations to take part [in her
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activity]', and calling for a rival assembly at the Kiev Writers’ Union 
building the next morning.*25 When Ivan Drach read out this 
statement, his supporters having conveniently disconnected the TV 
cameras, the congress threatened to collapse in mayhem.
After pressure from diaspora representatives (Rukh's main 
paym asters), however, a compromise emerged from backstage 
negotiations, and, after a two hour break, a new leadership troika of 
Drach, Chomovil and Horyn' was presented to the largely relieved 
delegates. Chomovil, who would have been elected undisputed leader in 
an open election, accepted a certain dilution of his preeminence as the 
price of keeping the rebels in the fold, but he was clearly first among 
equals. His demand that Rukh's leading organs should be departidsed 
was accepted, the congress' main dedaration stated that ’Rukh will be in 
opposition to the executive power and the President, if their actions 
contradict the programme of Rukh ',126 and two-thirds of Rukh's new 
leadership was appointed by Chomovil, as opposed to only one third for 
Drach and Horyn' to g e th e r.*  27 Moreover, Rukh's Political Council, 
hitherto Mykhailo Horyn"s power-base, was disbanded.
The congress' resolutions confirmed Rukh's increasingly radical 
position on the national question, while still paying lip-service to dvic 
nationalism. The congress stressed that 'the independence of Ukraine, 
nothwithstanding its formal recognition by the states of the world, to 
date remains more declarative than real', and called for Ukraine's 
departure from the CIS. *28 it also demanded the dissolution of the 
Crimean Supreme Soviet and the imposition of direct Presidential rule 
on the p e n in s u la ,*29 and strongly condemned separatism in general.
Rukh remained divided on the question of the OUN-UPA. Larysa 
Skoryk provoked uproar by accusing Chomovil of an insuffidently 
reverent attitude towards the OUN-UPA, claiming that he had referred
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to them as 'historical tatters [motlokh ]', - a claim vehemently denied by 
C h o m o v il. 130 At the other end of the spectrum Oleksandr 
Burakovs'kyi, head of Rukh's Council of Nationalities, in his speech 
attacked not only extreme right groups such as the UNA, but also the 
DPU, accusing it of becoming 'a mono-national party' which had 
abandoned its original commitment to democracy as a primary value to 
become a 'national-democratic' party instead.131
Chomovil's Rukh
In the aftermath of the congress, however, Rukh came increasingly 
under the sole control of Chomovil, especially after he resigned from his 
position as leader of L'viv council in March to take full-time control of 
the central Rukh bureaucracy in K i e v . ^32 Drach took little part in the 
Rukh leadership after the congress, and Horyn' was forced out after his 
election as leader of the URP in May 1992. However, Chomovil's 
ambitions to turn Rukh into an efficient campaigning organisation 
remained largely on paper, and Rukh continued to experience problems 
with internal divisions and the growth of extreme nationalism within 
its ranks.
Chomovil’s dominance of the movement was strengthened by the 
formal withdrawal of the URP and DPU from its ranks, although this 
deprived the organisation of many of its hardest-working and most 
prestigious members. The URP condemned Chomovil's plans to turn 
Rukh into yet 'another political party’, and called on those who were 
still committed to the idea of Rukh as an umbrella organisation for all 
political parties to rally around the URP.133 The DPU meanwhile 
disassociated itself from Chomovil’s so-called 'constructive opposition' 
which it claimed would simply lead to confrontation with President
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Kravchuk and internal destabilisation at a time when the need for 
national unity was paramount. * 34 The departure of the URP and DPU to 
organise the rival Congress of National-Democratic Forces, however, 
allowed Chomovil to exercise complete control over the Rukh  
bureaucracy by the summer of 1992. By then, many of Horyn' and 
Drach's nominees to the leadership, such as Mykola Porovs'kyi, had 
ceased to take an active part in the movement's leadership, in any case. 
The bureaucracy was now run by Oleksandr Lavrynovych, an ally of 
Chomovil's.
Chomovil used his new-found preeminence to attempt to reactivate 
Rukh as a campaigning organisation. His attempts to force the 
resignation of the government and the Supreme Council, and organise a 
public 'trial' of the CPSU/CPU for its crimes are described in Chapter 8 . 
Chom ovil was increasingly critical of President Kravchuk’s 
'constitutional monarchism', and attacked the draft Ukrainian 
constitution published in July as potentially authoritarian (Chomovil 
was a member of the committee on the constitu tion).^35 Moreover, 
Rukh now argued that only a special Constitutional Assembly would 
have the authority to pass a new constitution, instead of the discredited 
Supreme Council.
Therefore Rukh was far from enthusiastic about the formation of the 
pro-Presidential Congress of National-Democratic Forces (CNDF), whom 
it accused of trying 'to create an alternative Rukh or a party of power, 
which will become a political support for the authoritarian system of 
p o w e r'.136 Rukh sent Lavrynovych to the CNDFs first meeting on 2 
August 1992, but only as an observer.137 j n  the summer of 1992, Rukh 
and the CNDF drifted further and further apart, as Chomovil could not 
comprehend its support for Kravchuk at a time when the President was 
failing to seize a golden opportunity to make real radical reforms.
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Consequently, when the Supreme Council reassembled in September 
1992, the two groups formed separate factions. The 'Rukh' faction 
established by Mykhailo Horyn' and Mykola Porovs'kyi in February 1992 
became the CNDF faction, which claimed 40-50 members, whilst a new 
Chomovil-led Rukh faction also claimed the support of 50 Deputies. * 38 
Rukh was, however, subject to the same radicalisation process as the 
rest of the Ukrainian political spectrum in 1992. Rukh's Council of 
Nationalities continued to meet, and called for a strengthened law 
protecting ethnic minorities' rights, and for state support for minority 
national-cultural societies, but it tended to work very much on its 
ow n. 139 Chomovil did not dissent from the CNDF's insistence on the 
need for rapid Ukrainianisation of the new state, and in particular its 
Armed Forces. He also stressed 'the necessity of strengthening 
propaganda and enlightenment work, especially in the Southern and 
Eastern oblasts of Ukraine' and also 'amongst the Ukrainian population 
of the states of the former USSR, especially in ethnically Ukrainian 
lands '.*^  He had also dropped his support for a federal Ukraine since 
the election campaign . 141 In June Chomovil visited the Kuban' in 
South-West Russia (the region to which the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks 
were expelled after the destruction of their headquarters by Catherine 
II),142 the Rukh leadership issued an appeal to support Ukrainians 
in Prydnistrov"ia (the rebel Dnister republic in M oldova).143
Radicalisation was most evident in L'viv, however, which still had 
the largest share of Rukh's total membership (of 50,000 reregistered 
members in November 1992, 20,000-30,000 were in L 'v iv ) .1 4 4  in the early 
summer of 1992, L'viv’s fringe nationalist groups (see Chapter 7) and 
supporters of the former 1970s dissident, and radical nationalist 
Valentyn M o r o z , !  45 organised a 'Nationalist Bloc' against the more 
moderate leadership of Yurii Kliuchkovs'kyi, Rukh chairman in
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L'viv. 1^6 ^  \ f ay 1 9 9 2  the L'viv radicals organised a conference attended 
by other nationalists such as Stepan Khmara and members of the U N A , 
which openly called on Rukh to reorient itself towards 'the nationalist 
conception and moral bases of the OUN' and even to declare itself the 
'spiritual successor and continuation of the O UN'.147
On 27 September 1992, a meeting of the regional heads of L'viv Rukh 
passed a motion of no-confidence in K h u c h k o v s ' k y i , 1 4 8  and expressed 
support for Moroz, who was openly calling for a 'noble reinvigoration of 
Rukh ’ [shliakhetno ozdorovyty Rukh ] through a return to the integral 
nationalism of the 1930s OUN. He claimed that the 'democratic 
resources of the Ukrainian revival are [now] depleted. Thus ends the 
first, general-democratic, stage. The next stage must be nationalist', as he 
argued that a historical progression through the 'formula; communist- 
democrat-nationalist' was inevitable. Moroz urged Ukraine to throw off 
the colonial burden of both Russia and the 'pro-Russian' West, and 
assert its national interests at home and on the world stage. Ukrainians 
were threatened with becoming a 'national minority' in their own land. 
'In the draft constitution' claimed Moroz, 'all rights [are granted] to them 
[i.e. the national minorities], and not for us - the ruling nation. Power is 
not [yet] in our own h a n d s ' . 1^9 His supporters claimed that Ukraine was 
becoming 'a banana republic', rejected the 'penetration into the national 
economic structure of foreign elements', and called for the spiritual 
cleansing of the irredeemably compromised and corrupt local and 
national administration, claiming that 'the conclusion from the parallel 
with Weimar is that only nationalism can save Ukraine from 
communist-fascist d i c t a t o r s h i p ' .  150
The conflict between Kliuchkovs'kyi and Moroz’s radical nationalists 
came to a head at the L’viv oblast' conference of Rukh on 24 October 
1992, from which Moroz had prudently absented h im s e lf .151 His
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supporters were unsure of obtaining a majority, and therefore recruited 
50 or so thugs from the neo-fascist Social-National Party of Ukraine (see 
Chapter 7), who stormed the building, breaking doors and windows and 
taking over the platform. After several minutes of chaos, the visiting 
Chomovil suspended the conference. Moroz's supporters, however, 
who numbered around half the delegates (but who controlled a minority 
of the L'viv regions) remained, declaring themselves the legal 
representatives of Rukh in L'viv, and electing Moroz as one of three co­
leaders, along with Dior Baranovs'kyi and Iziaslav Kokodyniako. * 52 The 
radicals also gained control of the L'viv Rukh newspaper Viche .153 
Rival assemblies were then held by Kliuchkovs’kyi on 7 N o v e m b e r , 154 
and by the Moroz group on 28 November. The latter issued a manifesto, 
calling for 'the equality of Ukraine amongst all the nations of the world', 
'mighty armed forces' and 'the education of nationally conscious 
individuals boundlessly dedicated to Ukraine, for whom the nation is 
above all'. Despite recognising 'the rights of national minorities', the 
manifesto argued that 'the [ethnic] Ukrainian nation is the primary state- 
building agent on its own ethnic t e r r i t o r y ' . 155
Not surprisingly, Chomovil was ultimately compelled to deny the 
Moroz group entry to the fourth national Rukh congress in December 
1992, but the affair had wider ramifications. Firstly, with a membership 
of 20,000-30,000, the L'viv branch of Rukh was not only the backbone of 
Rukh itself, but was also one of the largest political organisations in the 
country. Nothwithstanding Rukh's split in L’viv, Moroz's supporters 
had therefore secured the first mass base for an extreme ethnic 
nationalist movement. Secondly, the events were given wide publicity 
throughout Ukraine, and could not but help provoke an anti-nationalist 
backlash in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, especially at a time of 
growing economic collapse and disillusion with the new state. Thirdly,
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Moroz had helped to demonstrate that Chomovil's optimistic 
expectation that he would inherit a Rukh as powerful as at its peak in 
1990-91 was misguided. Moroz's supporters would make common cause 
with the other anti-Chomovil elements in Rukh (see below).
Fourth congress
The fourth Rukh congress was held in Kiev on 4-6 December 
1992.156 Rukh's statute stipulated that congresses should be held yearly, 
but the fourth congress was brought forward both to confirm 
Chomovil’s ascendancy, and to turn Rukh into a political party before 
the June 1992 Law on Citizens' Associations (see Chapter 2) came into 
affect on 1 January 1993. Rukh had to become a political party if it was to 
participate in future legislative elections, and the move was given extra 
logic as Rukh was now a smaller, but more homogeneous movement 
under Chomovil’s leadership (L'viv notwithstanding).
The decision to turn Rukh into a political party (Rukh received its 
registration on 2 F e b ru a ry ),!  57 however, caused a further split at the 
congress. On the 6 th a rival assembly was organised by 116 of the 474 
delegates, mainly those from Galicia, Chernivtsi, Kharkiv, Poltava, 
Mykolaiv and the C r i m e a .  158 The splitters appeared to be supporters of 
the CNDF and a more nationalistic line for Rukh . The proposition that 
'the realisation of the principles of Ukrainian nationalism' should be 
'the ideological basis' of the new ersatz Rukh , was greeted with loud 
applause. The splitters later organised a rival 'All Ukrainian Popular 
Movement of Ukraine' led by the CNDF stalwarts Mykola Porovs’kyi 
and Larysa Skoryk as a spoiling tactic at a congress in Kharkiv on 20 
February 1993,159 possibly to form a future alliance with Moroz's L'viv 
'Rukh' . In order to spike Chomovil’s guns, and spread confusion
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amongst the general public, the new Rukh rapidly received official 
registration on 26 February 1993.160
Chomovil meanwhile had slimmed down the organisation of Rukh 
proper, and re-registered a membership of 60,000 (which made Rukh in 
practice the largest political party in Ukraine). In addition to 60,000 card- 
carrying members, Rukh  now claimed amongst one million 
'sympathisers' (who were required to do no more than sign a statement 
of sympathy with Rukh's aims and values) and 100,000 collective 
associate members, belonging to the Union of Ukrainian W o m e n ,! 61 
Memorial ,162 the Association of Farmers and others. 163
The new Rukh programme approved at the congress, drawn up by 
Cherniak, Holovatyi, Kostenko, Oleksandr Savchenko, Taniuk, Zaiets' 
and others was entitled 'A Conception of State-building in Ukraine’, and 
largely confirmed Rukh's differences with the CNDF. Both were clearly 
nationalist programmes, but Rukh continued to give greater priority to 
individual and civic rights, and was more openly hostile towards the 
residual influence of the national communists. Rukh's programme 
stressed the primacy of fundamental individual rights, arguing that 'the 
state can only receive its legitimacy from civil society. The state cannot 
stand above dvil society, or even on the same level. The state must 
serve society.' Furthermore, the new programme stated that 'Rukh 
views Ukraine as a national state [formed] from the multi-national 
nature of Ukrainian society', because 'for historical, ethnic, economic, 
political and social-pyschological reasons Ukrainian society is not 
h o m o g e n e o u s ’. 164 Therefore the programme was surprisingly mild on 
the question of Ukrainianisation of language and culture, and also 
advocated inter-confessional tolerance.
On the other hand, the congress' slogan had been 'Ukraine in 
Danger!', and the programme was more uncompromising in its sections
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on internal and external security. Despite the fact that Chornovil had 
flirted with the idea of a federalised Ukraine before beginning his 
election campaign in Autumn 1991, Rukh now strongly emphasised the 
importance of maintaining a unitary system to prevent the growth of 
separatist forces, particularly in the Crimea. In terms of external security, 
Rukh supported President Kravchuk's rapid build-up of military 
strength, although the nuclear question was largely sidestepped 
(Chomovil himself was strongly against 'one-sided disarmament') .165 
Although the importance of maintaining 'mutually beneficial economic 
ties' with Russia was stressed, the new programme declared that 'Russia 
still has not finally made her choice between a democratic or 
imperialistic course of future development. Russia has not once and for 
all given up territorial pretensions on Ukraine. Moreover, internal 
processes in Russia are threatening her with dissolution, and she is 
embroiled in conflicts on her borders in the Caucasus and in Central 
Asia. Because of this Russia is in practice a continual source of instability 
and possible external threat'.*&>
Therefore, Rukh proposed immediate Ukrainian withdrawal from 
the CIS, and supported instead the idea of a Baltic-Black Sea alliance first 
proposed by the URP and UNA..
In January 1993, the attempt by Eastern Ukrainian deputies to force 
Kravchuk to sign the CIS charter, and to lift the ban on the CPU, plus 
their attempt to impeach Defence Minister Morozov, at the same time as 
a growing threat of a revanchist nationalist movement replacing Yel'tsin 
in Moscow, caused Rukh to revive its slogan of 'Ukraine in Danger!' 
and bury its differences with the CNDF and others by joining a common 
'Anti-Imperial, Anti-Communist Front’ (see Chapter 8 ), but the 
fundamental differences between Chomovil and the CNDF that surfaced
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in 1992 meant that the alliance was unlikely to be anything other than 
tactical and short-term.
Conclusion
From 1989-91 Rukh was the main nationalist umbrella organisation 
in Ukraine. However, the historical weaknesses of the Ukrainian 
nationalist movement prevented it from becoming a hegemonic 
political force, and also debilitated it from within, through a succession 
of internal splits. Rukh's commitment to civic nationalism was a vital 
factor in moderating the nationalist movement throughout 1989-92, but 
by 1992 Rukh was unable to keep all leading nationalists to such 
moderate positions, resulting in the formation of the CNDF in August 
1992. Nor was Rukh able to contain the growth of ethnic nationalist 
groups on its right flank.
In 1988-90, Rukh's original leaders had kept it to moderate positions 
in order to try and expand its appeal in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, 
but in 1990-92 the movement fell under the control of more nationalist 
leaders, such as Ivan Drach and Mykhailo Horyn'. V'iacheslav 
Chomovil took over the Rukh leadership in March 1992 with a slightly 
less nationalist programme, and attempted to reforge links with centrist 
parties (see Chapter 8 ). However, his victory came by appealing to the 
Rukh rank and file, most of whom were Ukrainians from Galicia and 
Central Ukraine. Rukh has therefore had to continue to compete with 
the parties to its right, leading to further radicalisation in Rukh's  
programme in 1992. Rukh in 1993 remained a large and significant 
political force, but it was now only one nationalist group amongst many.
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5. THE PARTY OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA;
THE DEMOCRATS
Introduction
The second main nationalist party to emerge in Ukraine in the early 
1990s was the Democratic Party of Ukraine (DPU), which held its 
founding congress in December 1990. It was always poorly organised in 
comparison with the URP, but its importance lay in its position as the 
preeminent party of the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia. It included in 
its ranks many cultural figures who had been prominent leaders of the 
broader national movement in 1988-90, and who therefore gave the 
party high public visibility and a sense of intellectual gravitas. One of the 
DPU's founders, the poet Dmytro Pavlychko, even went so far as to 
describe the party as 'the brain of our nation' in June 1991.1
The programme of the DPU was largely therefore the typical 
programme of a revival nationalism led by a local intelligentsia, 
concentrating initially on issues of national cultural and linguistic 
rebirth, and after August 1991 on aiding and abetting the process of 
building a Ukrainian nation-state. The party therefore helped to chart 
the course for the new ship of state, and to develop an ideology of 
Ukrainian national interest, as well as reviving ethnic myths and 
symbols from the past to help promote national revival in the present.
The DPU was therefore the main political representative of the new 
Ukrainian intelligentsia, whose development was described in Chapter 
1. The new intelligentsia was less socially marginalised (and therefore 
radicalised) than its nineteenth century counterpart, and had been 
strongly influenced by the legalistic and humanistic traditions of 1960s 
dissent. Initially at least (in 1990) the DPU therefore tended to support
civic rather than ethnic conceptions of nationalism. The DPU, like Rukh 
and to a lesser extent the URP, deliberately sought to overcome the 
legacy of ’Eastern exceptionalism' by emphasising its adherence to 
general European and international standards of human rights, and by 
explicitly rejecting Dmytro Dontsov’s Ukrainian version of integral 
nationalism. However, the Ukrainian intelligentsia's commitment to 
civic nationalism was always likely to be qualified in the long run by its 
desire to improve the dismal status of Ukrainian language and culture, 
and its own status as a social group. The DPU therefore moved to the 
right in 1990-2 to espouse positions little different from those of the URP, 
and by the time of its second congress in December 1992 was committed 
to the principle of 'the Ukrainian character of the state'.
The party's roots
The roots of the DPU were in the 1960s shestydesiatnyky movement 
for Ukrainian cultural and national rebirth, rather than in the camps 
(see Chapter 3). The DPU's first leader from 1990-2, Yurii Badz’o, had 
been a high-profile dissident, but was also a typical representative of the 
shestydesiatnyky generation. He worked in the Institute of Literature 
from 1961 until 1964, when his sympathy for the more radical elements 
in the shestydesiatnyky  cost him his job.2 His main dissident 
publication, the 1,400-page Prava zhyty (’The Right to Live') written in 
the late 1970s, concentrated on issues of linguistic and educational 
R u ssifica tio n ,3 although at the time he described himself as a 
'Eurocommunist'. His successor, Volodymyr Yavorivs'kyi, was a writer.
The party therefore drew its strength from the Ukrainian cultural 
establishment, restive in the 1960s, and again beginning to stir in 1988-90
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after the enforced slumbers of the 1970s and early 1980s. 65% of the 
delegates to the inaugural DPU congress in December 1990 had at least 
higher education,4 as did 80% of the delegates to the first all-Ukrainian 
conference of the DPU in April 1992.5 The party was characterised as a 
’party of philologists’ whose ’so-called party cell number one'6 was to be 
found in the building of the Kiev Writers’ Union. Its higher ranks were 
indeed dominated by Ukrainian literati, such as the poets Ivan Drach 
and Dmytro Pavlychko, academics such as the historian Voleslav 
Heichenko and artists such as Halyna Yablons'ka and Diana Petrynenko; 
while the party's lower levels consisted ’preponderantly of engineering 
technical workers and the scientific intelligentsia’/  teachers and the like. 
Its strongest local organisations tended to be in university towns (see 
below).
Such people had provided both the leadership and the rank and file 
for the various ’informed’ movements that sprang up in 1988-90 in 
Ukraine and which were the direct antecedents of the DPU. According to 
Badz’o, ’the procedure was simple: the leader of the [local] organisation 
of Rukh or the [Ukrainian] Language Society would simply sign the 
[DPU’s] Manifesto, therefore automatically becoming the organiser for 
the creation of party cells in the oblast, and later, also almost 
automatically, becoming the leader of the oblast council of the p a r ty ’.5
Chapter 4 described how the cultural intelligentsia provided the 
initial leadership for such organisations. After the failure of the first 
attempt to form a Ukrainian Popular Front in the summer of 1989 under 
the leadership of the UHU and other ’informal’ organisations, the 
initiative passed to leading members of the Kiev branch of the Writers’ 
Union of Ukraine (WUU), such as Ivan Drach, Viktor Teren and Pavlo 
M o v c h a n . 9  Members of the WUU predominated on the organising 
committee for Rukh and amongst the Rukh leadership elected at the
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movement's first congress in September 1989. Drach became leader. 
Another writer, Volodymyr Yavorivs'kyi, headed the Kiev Rukh 
organisation.
The cultural intelligentsia also dominated the Taras Shevchenko 
Ukrainian Language Society (ULS) which held its founding congress in 
February 1989. The first leader of the ULS was Dmytro Pavlychko. Yurii 
Badz'o also worked for the ULS from November 1989. By the summer of 
1989 Pavlychko claimed 70,000 members for the Society.^® Together with 
local cells of Rukh the ULS was the main organisational outlet for the 
frustrations of the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia in this period (for 
the moment confined to the campaign for national cultural and 
linguistic renaissance).
From Rukh to the Democratic Party
The first successful Rukh congress in September 1989 marked the 
end of the first stage of the organisation's existence, when it had 
functioned as a necessary umbrella under whose protection the first 
shoots of political pluralism had begun to develop. Thereafter there were 
a number of possible directions in which Rukh could have evolved. 
Drach and Pavlychko wanted Rukh to become a political party, to which 
Rukh's still high levels of popularity could simply be transferred. Rukh 
/The Democratic Bloc had won 25% of the seats in the March 1990 
elections, and with the imminent abolition of Article 6  of the USSR 
constitution, they argued that the time was right to create a broad-based 
party capable of challenging the communist party's continuing 
hegemony.
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On 8  March 1990, between the two rounds of the republican elections, 
Drach's group published a declaration To the members of Rukh and to 
all citizens of Ukraine’, signed by Drach, Pavlychko, Yavorivs'kyi, Pavlo 
Kyslyi, Vitalii Donchyk and others.** It called for an 'immediate 
extraordinary congress of Rukh , at which to elaborate a [new] conception 
of Rukh and its activity as a political party '. *2 Drach and Pavlychko, 
supported by Levko Lukianenko and Mykhailo Horyn’ from the UHU, 
who had also signed the declaration, then pushed this line at the fourth 
session of the Grand Council of Rukh , held in Khust in Transcarpathia 
in late March 1990. They were however defeated by those who preferred 
to see Rukh develop as a coordinating organisation for all political 
parties that might emerge in Ukraine, and by those who did not yet wish 
to challenge the power of the CPU outright.
Drach and Pavlychko therefore published a 'Declaration of 
Conscience’ announcing their intention to leave the communist party 
and to go it alone in forming a new political party. An initiative group 
was founded on 14 May, headed by Pavlychko, with Badz'o and Vitalii 
Donchyk as his deputies. The draft Manifesto for the new party was 
published in Literaturna Ukraina on 31 May 1990.* 3
The May manifesto was based on a project for a 'Ukrainian Party of 
Democratic Socialism and State Independence' that Badz'o had been 
working on since as long ago as March-April 1989.*^ Badz’o's 1989 draft 
had sought to rehabilitate the ideals of Ukrainian Social Democrats such 
as Vynnychenko, before their corruption by the Bolsheviks and 'real 
existing socialism', whilst stressing the Ukrainian people's 'historical 
will to life and to freedom ’.*3 Badz'o's draft was therefore strongly 
reminiscent of Ivan Dziuba's 'loyal petitions’ in the 1960s (see Chapter 
3), and was far removed from the strident anti-Marxism of the OUN or
226
UHU. Many of the DPU’s leaders were too close to the existing political 
establishment to be sharply critical of it.
The May 1990 manifesto was notable for its long intellectual critique 
of Marxism-Leninism, but again the criticism was phrased from within 
the general socialist tradition. The manifesto attacked the CPSU as 'a 
ruling class' overseeing a form of 'feudal socialism1, but its signatories 
nevertheless proclaimed that the new party 'adheres to the world social- 
democratic movement and continues the traditions of Ukrainian social 
democracy'. Moreover, it would 'strive to ensure that Ukrainian society, 
on its path to economic and political freedom, does not repeat the 
experience of primary capitalist accumulation with its acute social 
antagonisms and unchecked private-ownership egoism’ (although the 
manifesto also declared earlier that 'the categories of "capitalism" and 
"socialism" are outdated and have lost their historical content').* 6  The
manifesto called for full Ukrainian state independence, as 'a nation's
\
liberty, like that of an individual, is an absolute value and does not 
require explanation or justification'. There would be a transitional 
period to full independence, but there was no possibility of 'any middle- 
road in this conflict. Half-freedom is an unstable condition'. 17 
Moreover, 'the idea of a "new union agreement" on federal principles is 
speculation and highly dangerous for the national freedom of the 
USSR's peoples'.
The draft manifesto was signed by 8 6  leading members of Ukrainian 
society, representing a broad cross-section of support, on which the DPU 
had the opportunity to establish itself as the preeminent opposition 
party. The long delay to December 1990 in holding the party's first 
congress, however, meant that many initial supporters drifted away, 
such as Oleksandr Lavrynovych, later in charge of the Rukh
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bureaucracy; Serhii Holovatyi, a leading non-party opposition deputy; 
and Leopol'd Taburians'kyi, founder of the tiny People's Party of 
Ukraine, and Presidential candidate in December 1991 (he received 0.6% 
of the votes).
Through the summer of 1990 the debate about the DPU's ideology 
and programme continued to progress in the context of rapidly 
radicalising public opinion, particularly in Literaturna Ukratna and in 
the samizdat journal Holos ('Voice'). The editor of Holos , for example, 
Volodymyr Solopenko, in describing 'our tasks', called for 'privatisation 
and a decisive crossover to market economic relations’.!** By September 
1990 Holos announced that the DPU’s basic aim should be 'the creation 
of a sovereign Ukrainian state with a market economy (on the basis of 
neo-conservative economic th e o r ie s )'.!  9 As Ukrainian public opinion 
became increasingly anti-communist in the afterm ath of the 
disappointments surrounding the 27th CPSU and CPU congresses, the 
growing liberal faction in the would-be party was increasingly reluctant 
to contemplate any mention of 'socialism' or even 'social democracy' in 
the party’s p ro g ra m m e d  However, the party's leadership, dominated by 
ex-Eurocommunists such as Badz'o and long-time CPU stalwarts like 
Pavlychko, resisted such demands.
In June three organising committees were set up. The first, to draw 
up the party's programme, was chaired by the self-styled neo­
conservative, Oleksandr Lavrynovych. The second, empowered to draw 
up the party's statute, was led by the historian and (after November 1990) 
head of the Kiev DPU, Voleslav Heichenko. The third, to organise the 
congress itself, was led firstly by Vitalii Donchyk, and then Badz'o from 
November.
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The DPU's leaders assembled in the town of Terebovlia in Temopil' 
oblast on 22 September 1990 to formally declare the party's existence (the 
local council had been dominated by the party's supporters since the 
March 1990 elections and had printed the DPU's paper Volia since July 
1990). Thereafter a series of oblast congresses were held in the run up to 
the party's inaugural national congress. In Ivano-Frankivs'k for example 
the congress was held on 17 November, with the local party already 
claiming 300 members.22 jn Kiev the congress on 24 November was 
reportedly a virtual who’s who of the capital’s cultural intelligentsia .23 
In Kharkiv on 8  December Volodymyr Shcherbyna, people's deputy of 
Ukraine and Professor of physics and mathematics at Kharkiv university 
was elected as head of the local DPU. In Kirovohrad on 2 December the 
editor of the local evening paper, Serhii Zaporozhana, was elected 
leader.24 The L'viv DPU held its congress on 8  December, attended by 92 
delegates representing 2 1 2  members.25
Still, the DPU’s founding congress did not take place until 15-16 
December 1990 in Kiev, a full nine months after the original intention to 
form the party had been announced. This was an extraordinary delay and 
one that severely undermined the party's 'launch effect'. Although its 
leaders remained well-known and popular, in the interim crucial 
momentum had been lost, and the political ground that the party 
wanted to occupy was already partly occupied by the centrist Social 
Democratic Party of Ukraine that held its founding congress in May 1990, 
and the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine whose first congress had 
been on 1-2 December 1990 (see Chapter 2). The URP had already 
established itself as the main nationalist party (the DPU was in fact the 
twelfth new political party to be formed in Ukraine in 1990). Moreover, 
the drawn-out process was characteristic of the DPU's leaders' general 
lack of enthusiasm for basic organisational work. In Vitalii Donchyk's
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words, 'the party was not created in [people's] heads, or on paper, rather 
it emerged of its own accord'.?^
Inaugural congress
The first DPU congress was eventually attended by 523 delegates 
representing 2,753 members of the party. The delegates included 188 
'experts in economy’, 152 workers in science, culture and education, 6 6  
industrial workers, and 6  unemployed.?? One delegate openly boasted 
that 'the main support for the DPU to date has been the scientific and
working [tvorcha ] intelligentsia'.?^
The party had by then also established a faction of 23 deputies in the 
Supreme Council,?9 led by Dmytro Pavlychko, who claimed an 
additional 19 'sympathisers'^^ (in practice Pavlychko's deputy, Stepan 
Volkovets’kyi, did much of the organisational work, as Pavlychko was 
so often preoccupied with his duties as chairman of the Supreme 
Coundl's committee on Foreign Affairs). Unlike the 11 deputies who 
were elected as members of the UHU in March 1990, however, the DPU 
faction was formed long after the elections by previously independent 
deputies who transferred their allegiance to the DPU. Pavlychko and 
Volkovets'kyi therefore had to give their colleagues a relatively long 
leash.
Despite its long gestation period, the party was still unsure about 
several crucial aspects of its identity. The dispute between liberals and 
social democrats continued to simmer away. At the congress, the 
economist and USSR deputy Volodymyr Cherniak called on the DPU to 
help create a ’class of businessmen’l l ,  while the Holos editor 
Volodymyr Solopenko criticised the new party for paying insufficient
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attention to socio-economic problems and for underemphasising 
individual as opposed to national rights.32 Badz'o in his speech 
admitted that 'we must assert and defend economic freedom - more 
concretely, the interests of business. But we [must] not absolutise and 
idealise private property interests, or identify it with private property 
egoism!'33
Although the congress supported a nationalist platform of outright 
state independence, there were doubts both amongst the intelligentsia 
and amongst delegates from Eastern and Southern Ukraine concerning 
the wisdom of reviving the right wing traditions of Ukrainian integral 
nationalism. Pavlychko declared that the DPU should struggle against 
not only 'the dictatorship of one-party Bolshevism’ and the USSR as 'the 
combination of an Asiatic feudal monarchy with a European fascist 
regime', but also against 'nationalism based on the Nietzscheanism of 
Dontsov'. Extremist parties such as the UIA and SNUM (and the CPU) 
were deliberately not invited to the Congress. However, Pavlychko also 
declared that 'Democracy - is above all the self-determination of the 
nation’, and 'there is no conflict between the rights of individuals and 
the rights of a people [narod ]'.34 Badz'o moreover declared that 'the 
centre [of the Soviet empire] - is not some mythical supranational 
bureaucracy, as some try to picture it. In its origins, national-cultural 
basis and orientations, [in terms of] its physical superiority - it is a 
Russian centre, a second tier of Russian statehood (above the RSFSR)'.^^
However delegates from Eastern and Southern Ukraine opposed 
attempts to rehabilitate the wartime OUN-UPA, resulting in a 
compromise suggestion by Ivan Drach to hold a special academic 
conference on the subject.36 Although the DPU was a nationalist party, it 
sought to act as a bridge between Eastern and Western Ukraine and
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avoid confinement in a Galician ghetto, and was therefore concerned to 
tread more cautiously on these issues than the URP.
Paradoxically, most difficulty was experienced over the new party’s 
attitude to Rukh . Rukh had by then (in October 1990) held its second 
congress, which had been perceived by many as marking a decisive shift 
away from its original 'general democratic' direction towards more 
exclusively nationalist concerns. Although Badz'o himself was in favour 
of the party becoming a collective member of Rukh he had warned 
the second Rukh congress about the dangers of 'ideological intolerance 
and the psychology of hatred’ and simplistic opposition politics.^ The 
party decided to keep its distance from Rukh at this stage, and declined 
Badz'o's proposal.
The DPU programme passed at the congress gave a clearer 
commitment to the supremacy of liberal and humanist values than 
many of the speeches at the congress. It declared that 'our system of 
priorities is: the individual - the family - the nation - the state'.39 it 
placed heavy emphasis on the importance of a rule of law and 
exclusively parliamentary methods of struggle, and stated that the 
'state's power is not a mechanism for the political rule of one class over 
another' .40 No mention was made of the political rule of one ethnic 
group over another, but the programme promised that all would be 
equal citizens of a future independent Ukrainian state. Such a state 
should have its own Armed Forces, although w ithout nuclear 
weapons.41
The influence of the party’s intelligentsia constituency was obvious 
in many areas of the programme. The party stressed the importance of 
the revival of education and the arts, with the former to 'operate on the
basis of the harmonious unity of general human and national values',^ 2  
and increased state support for academia, research and culture.
The economic section of the programme was again somewhat 
cautious, calling for the 'state's role in regulating economic processes to 
gradually [postupovo ] decline' and for equality between all forms of 
property. There should be 'a guarantee of the social defence of the 
population', with indexation of incomes.43
The party's statute was more liberal than that of the URP.^4 Entry 
into the party was made relatively easy, and Article 2.4 of the statute 
declared that only primary organisations could expel members, who in 
any case had the right to protest to an appeal committee, whereas the 
leadership of the more rigidly centralised URP had the (frequently used) 
right to expel members (see Chapter 3). According to Article 3.1 (again 
unlike the URP which banned factions within the party), the DPU 
guarantied minorities, defined as l/5 th  of any assembly, the right to be 
heard and publish their opinion. The DPU’s hostility to the idea of a 
centralised and disciplined party, however, also meant that party 
congresses were to be held only every two years (Article 7.1) - an obvious 
encumbrance for a new party trying to establish its position and profile. 
The party also burdened itself with an unwieldy National Council of 83 
members, necessitating the later creation of an Inner Council of seven, 
plus six regional representatives.
Badz'o was elected leader, receiving 413 votes for and 74 against. His 
only opponent was Volodymyr Yavorivs'kyi, who received 63 for and 
424 against, after Dmytro Pavlychko withdrew his candidature claiming 
the pressures of parliamentary business .45
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Party membership
The DPU was officially registered as a political party at the Ukrainian 
Ministry of Justice on 28 June 1991, having passed the membership 
threshold of 3,000 to do so (it actually had 3,015 members). The party was 
proud that its membership profile was broader than that of both the URP 
(concentrated in Western Ukraine) and the PDRU (concentrated in 
Eastern Ukraine). It therefore claimed, somewhat disingenuously, to be 
the most 'all-Ukrainian' of the parties. 34% of the DPU's members were 
from Galicia, 5% from Volyn’-Polissia, 6 % from Transcarpathia and 
Chemivtsi, 30% from Central Ukraine (17% from the Right Bank, 8 % 
from Kiev city and oblast' , and 5% from the Left Bank), 18% from 
Eastern Ukraine, and 7% from Southern Ukraine and Crimea (see Table 
5.1 below). Such percentages should not disguise the fact that the DPU's 
overall membership remained disappointingly low. The DPU’s most 
active local organisations were in Galicia, Kiev and Chernivtsi, but the 
party also had strong organisations in Donets’k, Dnipropetrovs’k and 
Cherkasy.46
Table 5.1. Membership of the DPU at the time of the party's 
registration on 28 Tune 1991.47
Oblast Membership
i) Galicia
L 'viv 254
Ternopil' 356
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Ivano-Frankivs'k 403
ii) Volyn'-Polissia
Rivne 74
Volyn1 72
iii) Other West
Transcarpathia 106
Chernivtsi 84
iv) Right Bank
Kirovohrad 59
Cherkasy 2 1 2
Vinnytsia 115
Zhytomyr 37
Khmel’nyts’kyi 73
v) Kiev (dty & oblast) 250
vi) Left Bank
Poltava 94
Sumy 28
Chernihiv 24
vii) East
Kharkiv 181
Donets'k 137
Luhans’k 25
Zaporizhzhia 68
Dnipropetrovs’k 145
viii) South
Mykolaiv 50
Kherson 85
Odesa 61
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Crimea 12
Total: (& 10 People's Deputies) 3.015
Some idea of the party's social profile can be gleaned from the 
analysis of the 203 delegates who attended the DPU's first all-Ukrainian 
party conference on 12 April 1992. One hundred and eighty six were 
Ukrainians (91.6%), plus 11 Russians and 6  others.48 Fifteen were below 
30,106 aged 30-50, 59 from 50-60, and 23 over 60. One hundred and sixty 
two had at least higher education. As regards occupation, nearly all were 
from the intelligentsia; 32 were engineers or technicians, 29 were 
teachers, 24 were scientists or researchers (naukovtsi ), 22 were 
university lecturers, 12 were doctors, 9 were white-collar workers 
(sluzhbovtsi), 6  were journalists, 5 were artists, 4 were factory directors, 2 
each were lawyers, writers, and actors, while there was also one architect, 
farmer and vet. The rest were made up of 16 workers, 3 pensioners and 2 
peasants (not all the delegates declared their occupation).
Party organisation
The party could not be described as well-organised. It suffered from 
several major problems: the weakness of the resource base at its disposal; 
the lack of communication and coordination between the party 
leadership and both the local oblast organisations and the party's faction 
in the Supreme Council: certain defects in the party's statute; and 
consequent to all the above, the party’s problems in organising collective 
action.
The party’s resource base was weak. Although the party had a small 
head office in Kiev, its only patron was the WUU and it lacked 
significant diaspora support (unlike the URP), although Badz’o tried to 
cultivate contacts with the O U N -z .49  The DPU's main source of funds 
was from membership dues, but the central party leadership was 
constantly complaining about the oblast organisations' poor record in 
forwarding dues to the centre, and as the Ukrainian economy succumbed 
to serious inflation in 1992, the flow almost dried up. In summer 1992, 
the central office had a mere 1 0 ,0 0 0  coupons in the kitty (then around 
$30).50 Despite Badz'o's repeated attempts to found a central party paper, 
the party's only organ in 1990-92 remained Volia , printed in Temopil' 
through its supporters on the local council in Terebovlians'kyi raion. 
Volia's circulation, however, fell from an original 50,000 to 5,000 by 
stimmer 1991. It appeared only irregularly, and not at all after autumn 
1991. It was not until December 1992 that the first issue of the long- 
planned national party paper Demokrat appeared, with a circulation of 
25,000.
The party’s capacity to print and distribute its various appeals and 
declarations was limited by its lack of resources. Before the March 1991 
referendum, for example, it was able to print 4 appeals, but only in runs 
of 10,000 copies each, and this was counted a s u c c e s s T h e  party's 
appeals and statements, however, regularly appeared in the press. In this 
respect, the DPU was blessed by its intelligentsia leadership, many of 
whom had independent access to the mass media, although as Badz'o 
constantly complained, many of the party's representatives and deputies 
’"forget" to mention their party allegiance when speaking at sessions, 
meetings, on TV, or printing articles in the p ress ’.5 2
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In general the party's central leadership found it difficult to exercise 
control over the other branches of the party. At a local level, many 
branches led only a formal existence, or operated as independent 
fiefdoms that rarely communicated with the centre (unlike the highly 
centralised URP). According to Badz'o again, 'some of the local leaders of 
the regional councils of the DPU simply "forget" about the party'.53 Too 
often, local party organisations 'confine their work to the oblast centre, 
or at best, a few regional centres'.54 Unlike local branches of the URP, too 
little effort was made to broaden the party's influence at a local level by 
expanding contacts with local youth groups, strike committees, etc.5 5 
The attempt by the party leadership in May 1991 to encourage the 
creation of local 'information-enlightenment groups' to promote the 
party's message, was largely stillbom.56
At its worst, many local branches did not even 'act like separate 
political subjects'.^? Badz'o cited the Zhytomyr, Khmel’nyts'kyi, 
Chemihiv and Sumy organisations as areas where the party's existence 
was purely formal (in 1991), with local leaders such as Sviatoslav 
Vasyl'chuk in Zhytomyr effectively spending all their time in other 
political organisations such as Rukh .58 Despite constant campaigns to 
expand the party's membership, by the time of the party's second 
congress in December 1992, the leadership had to settle for congratulating 
themselves that they had actually managed to maintain the party's 
membership constant at around 3 ,0 0 0 .5 9
As stated above, 23 deputies in the Ukrainian parliament belonged to 
the DPU (plus a further 16 ’sympathisers'), but relations between the 
deputies' faction and the rest of the party were often problematical. As 
Badz'o complained, 'our deputies are not people who were elected from 
political parties on a multi-party basis, but deputies who becam e 
members of parties, after the elections. They don’t necessarily work in
the party’s m echan ism s.'^  Therefore their sense of responsibility to the 
party was too often subordinated to their individual interests as deputies. 
Moreover Badz'o was not himself a deputy, the leader of the DPU's 
faction in the Supreme Council, Dmytro Pavlychko, was too often busy 
on other business, and his deputy Stepan Volkovets'kyi was unable to 
organise any effective whipping system.
Nevertheless, powerful figures from the DPU were a significant force 
on many Supreme Council committees, particularly on the Foreign 
Affairs Committee (chaired by Pavlychko); the Chomobyl' Committee 
(chaired by Volodymyr Yavorivs'kyi, with Volodymyr Shovkoshtnyi, a 
DPU 'sympathiser', as his deputy); and the Science and Education 
Committee (chaired by Pavlo Kyslyi after Ihor Yukhnovs'kyi became 
Deputy Prime Minister in October 1992, with the DPU's Stepan Pavliuk 
also a member). The DPU's Mykhailo Svaika was also deputy head of the 
Economic Reform Committee, headed by another DPU 'sympathiser', 
and the party's unsuccessful Presidential candidate in 1991, Volodymyr 
Pylypchuk; while Dmytro Zakharuk was Secretary to the Committee on 
Planning, the State Budget, Finance and Prices. Three out of 27 members 
of the Supreme Council Presidium therefore belonged to the DPU (four 
if Pylypchuk is included).
The DPU also had its representatives in local and national 
government. Stepan Volkovets’kyi, for example, was head of Ivano- 
Frankivs'k oblast council; Anatolyi Pohribnyi,61 a member of the party’s 
National Council, was deputy minister of Education in the national 
government. Pohribnyi, also a leading figure in the ULS, was regarded by 
many as the power behind the throne in the department (the minister 
was Petro Talanchuk), and the driving force behind plans to 
Ukrainianise education. Many DPU figures were appointed as provincial 
prefects (predstavnyky ) by President Kravchuk after the system was
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established in March 1992, such as Professor Roman Hrom"iak, former 
local head of the DPU, in Ternopil’; Vitalii Donchyk, former head of the 
Kiev DPU, as deputy prefect in Kiev; and Anatolii Zdorovyi as deputy 
prefect in Kharkiv.
The party often claimed (after the elections in March 1990) to have 
more deputies at all levels than all other parties, including the URP, 
especially in G a l id a .6 2  However, estimates of 500 deputies or more could 
not be substantiated because of poor communication with local party
cells.63
The party's leading figures, such as Pavlychko and Drach, were very 
much a. law unto themselves, as were the DPU's representatives in 
parliament or government as a whole. For example, only 13 of the DPU’s 
23 deputies joined the Rukh faction formed by Mykhailo Horyn’ in 
February 1992 (later the Congress of National-Democratic Forces
faction).64
The DPU also suffered from certain weaknesses in its party statute. 
The decision to hold congresses only every two years was clearly a 
mistake, depriving the party of vital opportunities for publicity in the 
crudal 1990-2 period of party formation and consolidation. It also led to a 
lack of communication and coordination between the party's national 
leadership and the party rank-and-file, demonstrated by the disputes 
over the OUN issue at the 1990 congress, and over merger with the URP 
at the 1992 congress. On the other hand, the license given to local party 
organisations and the DPU faction in parliament simply reflected the 
party's political culture, and the impossibility of imposing discipline on 
its leading figures. Most of the DPU’s members were happier arguing 
about abstract issues than in mundane organisation. The party statute 
stated dearly that every 'deputy group coordinates its activity with the
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party council of the equivalent l e v e l ’,65 but in practice the principle was 
impossible to implement.
Hence, although the DPU found itself gradually placing more 
emphasis on central authority, its leading structures were always 
uncoordinated and inefficient in comparison to those of the URP. The 
meetings of the party's National Council tended to lack discipline and 
focus, and. therefore increasing responsibility tended to devolve to the 
party Presidium and Inner Council (Mala rada ) of 1 3 .6 6  But even the 
Inner Council was never possessed of sufficient leadership or material 
resources to impose itself on the rest of the party in the manner of the 
URP's Secretariat. Dissatisfaction with the party’s performance in this 
respect, and Badz'o's increasing sense of frustration, was one key reason 
for the election of Volodymyr Yavorivs'kyi as party leader to replace 
Badz'o at the party’s second congress in December 1992.
. These factors were reflected in the party’s opinion poll performance. 
It tended to outscore all other parties (apart from the Green Party), 
because of the high public profile of its leaders, but its rating began to 
slide in 1992, and the party found it difficult to translate vague feelings of 
public sympathy into more tangible forms of support for the party.
In September 1 9 9 1 ,  for example, a more than respectable 18%  
considered themselves 'well-informed' about the DPU, second only in 
public recognition to the G r e e n s .6 7  in December 1 9 9 1  3 3 %  of the 
population rated the DPU positively, 14%  negatively (plus 19%  net), and 
5 2 %  offered no opinion, a rating above that of the URP (plus 13%  net), 
and in line with that of the PDRU (plus 22%  net), but behind that of the 
GPU (plus 30%  n e t ) .6 8  The percentage intending to vote for the DPU in 
multi-party elections rose from 6%  in January 1 9 9 1  to 9%  in November 
1 9 9 1 ,  before slipping back to 4 .3%  in April 1 9 9 2 .6 9  The DPU’s leaders
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were therefore aware that this was by Ukrainian standards an impressive 
but fragile level of support, and by 1992 were increasingly susceptible to 
the argument that the DPU needed to ally with the organisational 
solidity of the URP to make the best of its ratings.
Post-congress activity: the DPU moves to the right
Although the DPU was clearly a nationalist party, at its first congress 
in December 1990, Badz’o had defined the DPU’s ’vocation as 
performing the role of a [political] centre, the role of balancing the 
turbulent political primitives to the right and left’.^ O In 1990 and early 
1991 therefore, there were calls, particularly from the Kiev DPU, to 
cooperate with, and even eventually unite with, the centrist Party of 
Democratic Revival of Ukraine (PDRU) which saw itself in a similar 
fashion. The PDRU had made overtures at the DPU congress, and 
Pavlychko had urged for ’union within a year at the most’ to create ’a 
mass party of opposition to the CPU’ as early as December 1990.^1
The DPU’s Presidium discussed the issue on 27 March 1991, and the 
full National Council on 13 April and 14 May 1991. Some representatives 
stressed the logic of a merger with the PDRU, given the importance of 
'attracting the technical intelligentsia’ who 'were afraid of the 
B an d erite s '.^2  Pavlychko in particular pressed the issue. The 
predominant feeling however was against the PDRU, as the party 
contained 'as many chauvinists as democrats', and too many 'general 
democrats - without nationality'.^ According to Badz’o, the PDRU (and 
the Social Democrats) were dominated by 'people of a cosmopolitan 
direction, that is either indifferent or even alien (chuzhy ) to the idea of a 
Ukrainian national revival and Ukrainian statehood. Such people are 
very common in the PDRU, there is even an openly anti-Ukrainian
mood amongst some. Therefore unity with such people was
i m p o s s i b l e ' . 74 Moreover, the PDRU's liberals 'favour the idea of the 
complete bargain basement sale of the main part of Ukrainian industry 
to foreign capital'. According to Badz'o, 'the Kharkiv PDRU' [led by 
Vladimir Griniov] supports 'the sovereignty of the individual over the 
sovereignty of any collective. That is, once again the right of the 
individual against the right of the nation. Our position is different: the 
right of a nation is an organic part of the rights of an 
individual....because there is no [such thing as a] individual without or 
transcending nationality’.75
At the meeting of the National Council on 18 May 1991 Vitalii 
Donchyk proposed a compromise whereby the decision would be 
devolved to the DPU's local organisations, and this was accepted with 
only four votes against.76 Thereafter the DPU and PDRU continued to 
cooperate in certain areas, where both parties were dominated by the 
liberal intelligentsia, particularly in Kiev where many members of the 
DPU campaigned for the PDRU's candidate, Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi, in the 
1991 presidential elections. In some areas of Eastern Ukrainian, the DPU 
had some Russian-speaking members who preferred to cooperate with 
the PDRU, as in Donets'k where the DPU had some cells in mining 
towns, Dnipropetrovs'k and Zaporizhzhia.77 The L'viv DPU and PDRU 
even created a common coordinating council for their w ork.78 But on 
the whole, the DPU’s increasing preoccupation with the national 
question in 1991-2 inevitably brought the party's mainstream closer to 
the URP. The DPU therefore kept its distance from the centrist New  
Ukraine coalition founded by the PDRU and others in January 1992. 
Although the then head of the Kiev DPU, the historian Voleslav 
Heichenko, attended as an observer, Badz’o immediately made clear that
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the DPU had not joined as collective member,79 a line endorsed by the 
National Council on 8  February 1992.80
Instead, the DPU converged towards the URP in 1991-2 by adopting a 
much more clearly nationalist line. In the rim up to the March 1991 
referendum on the future of the Union, the DPU strongly opposed 
Gorbachev's question, but supported both the republican and Galician 
ballots, whereas most members of the URP opposed the second question 
as it stopped short of full in d e p e n d e n c e .8 1  Although the DPU had doubts 
about the wording of the republican question the majority on the party’s 
Presidium supported it on pragmatic grounds, as it encouraged the 
convergence of Kravchuk's national communists with the nationalists, 
and its defeat would have meant a significant step backwards away from 
s o v e r e i g n t y . 8 2  The DPU's Ivan Yushchuk was deputised to organise the 
coalition 'Referendum for a Sovereign U k r a in e ' ,8 3  which included the 
DPU and Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party, but also the centrist 
PDRU, Social Democrats, and Liberal Democrats. Its declaration, issued 
in January 1991,84 indicated the parties' preference for a 
'Commonwealth of Independent States' along the lines of the project 
drawn up by Ukrainian a c a d e m ic s .8 5  i n  the aftermath of the referendum 
the DPU denounced the confused results, but argued that they could not 
be used to justify any new Union T r e a ty .8 6
By April 1991 the DPU was sounding a more radical note. It called for 
the 1990 Declaration of Ukrainian Sovereignty to be given constitutional 
status, for Ukraine to refuse to recognise the validity of the USSR 
constitution on Ukrainian territory, for the banning of parties with 'a 
extra-republican structure’ (i.e. the communist party), and for an all- 
Ukrainian political strike in the event of the Ukrainian government 
signing Gorbachev’s proposed new Union Treaty.87 in August 1991, the 
DPU paper Volia published sharp criticisms of the proposed Treaty.8 8
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The DPU’s leaders increasingly believed that full independence was 
achievable, but were wary of running too far ahead of public opinion, 
particularly in Eastern Ukraine.®^ In private however Badz'o was 
insisting that 'we must always emphasise that a Commonwealth is only 
a form for the transition to full independence'.^ On the Monday 
morning of the attempted August 1991 coup (the 19th), the DPU was the 
first party to seize the moment and called for the Supreme Council to 
'denounce the Union Treaty of 1922, and announce the full state 
independence of Ukraine'.91
The DPU, however, was aware that the opposition was still too weak 
to achieve this goal on its own and therefore keenly supported Leonid 
Kravchuk's national communist group, both before and after the 
attempted August coup. According to Badz'o in April 1991,. the 
opposition 'must not lump together Kravchuk and the Kravchukites 
with Hurenko [the hard-line First Secretary of the CPU], but search for a 
split between them and widen it'.92 Whereas the radical wing of the 
URP at this time doubted Kravchuk's motives, the DPU enthusiastically 
greeted the emergence of national communism as the best way of 
breaking the deadlock with Moscow, and securing independence, or at 
least full sovereignty, for Ukraine. In April 1991, Badz’o was prepared to 
admit that 'for the tasks that now stand before Ukraine, Kravchuk is best 
suited. Although of course the [necessary] basis for this - is his departure 
from the CPU1.93
Ironically, the DPU found it more difficult to cooperate with the rest 
of the opposition. Various attempts to organise the opposition in a 
common front before August 1991 floundered (see Chapter 8 ). Similar 
difficulties were experienced in the run-up to Ukraine’s first ever 
presidential elections on 1 December 1991. The DPU, despite issuing a 
call for a common opposition candidate in September 1991,94 was unable
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to coordinate its activities with the other opposition parties. In August 
1991, the DPU's National Council discussed the issue of whom the party 
should support.95 Unlike the URP, which remained determined to 
nominate Luk"ianenko for President, the DPU was not confident 
enough of its own organisational capacity to nominate a candidate from 
their own ranks. Nevertheless, the party felt obliged to raise its profile by 
supporting a candidate. It was too early to openly declare for Kravchuk, 
especially after his equivocation during the attempted coup. On the other 
hand many DPU members were more or less openly supportive of his 
state-building efforts, and it was difficult to raise their enthusiasm for a 
campaign against him.
As regards the opposition candidates, the DPU National Council 
denounced the L'viv oblast DPU for prem aturely supporting 
V'iacheslav Chornovil, whom the DPU’s leaders had long condemned 
for his support for a federal Ukraine. Badz’o argued in favour of 
supporting the liberal academic Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi, the head of the 
opposition Narodna rada faction in the Supreme Council, but a majority 
on the National Council supported the formally non-party economist 
Volodymyr Pylypchuk, a decision confirmed on 1 September. Pylypchuk 
however failed to excite the party’s intelligentsia supporters, and ran a 
lacklustre campaign. The DPU only managed to collect 79,710 of the 
100,000 signatures necessary to place his name on the final ballo t.^  The 
Kiev DPU simply supported Y u k h n o v s 'k y i .9 7  The campaign therefore 
ably demonstrated the weakness of the DPU as an organisation, and 
encouraged the DPU's leaders to. seek closer ties with the more 
disciplined URP.
Nationalism and ideology
As discussed in Chapter 1 , one way of judging any Ukrainian party's 
attitude to ethnic nationalism is by its attitude towards the OUN-UPA. In 
this respect the DPU has been an excellent weather-vane for the 
Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia as a whole, mirroring the gradual 
radicalisation of its attitudes over the early 1990s.
The issue had been a thorny one at the December 1990 congress, but 
on the whole the DPU was careful to avoid the unreserved endorsement 
of the UPA that was characteristic of the URP. Badz'o in his congress 
speech had accepted that 'the activity of the OUN and UPA, - 
[represented] a social and national liberation movement, that wrote an 
important page in the history of the Ukrainian people. But we would be 
poor readers of our experience if we did not also observe in its activity an 
undemocratic ideology and political practice’. ^  In other words, Badz'o 
supported a carefully constructed compromise between those 
emphasising the importance of reviving the myth of the OUN-UPA to 
help consolidate the incipient national revival, and those delegates, 
primarily from Eastern and Southern Ukraine, who considered that 
associating the new national movement with such a controversial 
historical tradition would only serve to help confine its appeal to Galicia.
Such sensitivity did not last long, however. By August 1991, 
however, the DPU’s newspaper Volia was devoting half of its pages to 
favourable portrayal of the OUN-UPA, and blaming their poor historical 
image in Eastern Ukraine on ’lying Soviet propaganda aimed at dulling 
the consciousness of the peoples of the USSR and coarse defamation of 
fighters for freedom','^ 9 although the party's revised programme in 1992 
still avoided making any direct statement on the i s s u e d  ^ 0
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In sharp contrast to the party's founding congress, the DPU's second 
congress in December 1992 demanded that 'the UPA be recognised as a 
military organisation, and its members given all the rights of veterans of 
the second world w a r ' . ! 0 !  Dmytro Pavlychko, who had skilfully swum 
with the times, described the 1940s as an era, 'when the UPA, the 
military organisation of the Ukrainian people, which appeared as [the 
result of the latter’s] protest against Hitler’s occupation, conducted a just 
struggle both against Stalinist enslavement and once again for national
f r e e d o m '. !  0 2
The DPU, however, continued to formally reject Dontsovite 
nationalism. In Badz’o’s words in September 1991, 'the DPU was bom in 
and is based on three ideas: the state independence of Ukraine, a 
democratic Ukraine and a democratic path to an independent democratic 
U k r a i n e ' . !  03 The bases of the party's ideology were 'humanism, 
democracy, patriotism and rationalism'.! 04 The party believed in 
'Ukrainian patriotism' but 'we understand by Ukrainian patriotism not 
only patriotism for Ukrainians, but also for Ukrainian citizens of any 
other n a t i o n a l i t y ' . !  05 Moreover, the DPU supported the creation of a 
'civil society....whose characteristics are the sovereignty of the people 
with respect to power, the inalienability of rights and the inviolability of 
the i n d i v i d u a l ' . ! 06 in this respect, the DPU remained true to its origins 
in the legalistic and humanistic traditions of the shestydesiatnyky 
generation. The party’s programme emphasised the importance of 
general human rights, and the harmonious balance of the rights of the 
individual and the nation or state. The draft programme for the party's 
December 1992 congress emphasised that the DPU’s guiding principle 
was the idea 'of UKRAINIAN NATIONAL-STATE PATRIOTISM, 
which is based on the common interests of all citizens of our state, 
regardless of their ethnic o r i g i n ' . ! 07
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However, the party was also* prone to making such statements as ’the 
secure freedom of the individual is not possible without the freedom of 
national independence and the self-development of the people’.* ^  The 
draft programme for the December 1992 congress stated that 'Ukraine is 
the ethnic territory of the Ukrainian people [narod ], and the declaration 
of die state independence of Ukraine on 24 August 1991 was an act of the 
self-realisation of the Ukrainian people. Therefore we are against any 
attem pt to in terp ret the Ukrainian state as the anational 
[ponadnatsional'ne ] territorial creation of those peoples who live in 
it. 109 The party was of course overwhelmingly Ukrainian in its 
composition (see above). As with the URP, the DPU in day to day politics 
supported many of the principles of an ethnically Ukrainian state. The 
party talked a great deal about the rights of Eastern Ukrainians, but was 
reluctant to give them what they wanted.
The DPU took an uncompromising line against minority separatism 
within Ukraine and against proposals for a federal constitution. As 
separatist sentiment began to grow in the aftermath of Ukraine's 
Declaration of Independence in August 1991, the DPU issued an appeal 
to the Presidium of the Supreme Council and the General Procurator of 
Ukraine, condemning 'separatists...who play on the low levels of 
political consciousness of a section of the population. Their activity is de 
facto a continuation of the putsch’, and calling for the use of forceful 
'legal sanctions against those who threaten the territorial unity of our 
fatherland'. 110 The DPU was particularly eager to condemn separatist 
movements in Transcarpathia and in the Crimea (Badz’o was from 
Transcarpathia). It considered that demands for Transcarpathian 
autonomy had 'no historical, ethnic or political grounds'. The local 
population was simply part of the Ukrainian ethnie . Any contrary
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sentiment was simply the result of 'inter-state anti-Ukrainian intrigue1. 
Similarly, demands for a Crimean republic were solely the result of the 
'pretensions of Russian politicians' and 'the games of the [local] 
administrative power’. m  To combat the rising separatist movement in 
Eastern Ukraine, the DFU, along with Prosvita (the renamed Ukrainian 
Language Society), founded a nationalist Ukrainian-language paper 
entitled Nashe slovo in Donets'k in July 1992.* 12
Foreign and defence policy
The DPU also took a strongly nationalist line in questions of foreign 
policy, a stance that could not but have helped to alienate Ukraine’s 
substantial Russian-language population. Although necessarily 
circumspect before August 1991, when the party had in any case tended 
to concentrate on the single issue of independence, in 1991-2 the DPU, 
like the URP, became an increasingly forceful advocate of an aggressive 
pursuit of Ukrainian national interests as it saw them. Although the 
DPU was now a strong supporter of President Kravchuk, it constantly 
chided him whenever he failed to oppose Russian pretensions.
The DPU almost immediately condemned the December 1991 Minsk 
agreement setting up the CIS. The party’s National Council declared that 
'the formation of a so-called Commonwealth...will only support and 
even strengthen the inertia of the imperial attitude towards Ukraine on 
the part of certain leadership circles in Russia, and will leave the 
Ukrainian people at the mercy of their age-old encroachment pn our 
f r e e d o m ' . !  13 According to Badz'o the agreement was a 'trap', perhaps a 
necessary 'transitional form’ towards the full destruction of the Empire, 
but one that risked perpetuating Ukraine’s longstanding 'slave 
psychology' towards its larger neighbour, and distracting the West's
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attention from Ukraine’s drive towards full independence.* *4 As early 
as January 1992, in the aftermath of growing confrontation between 
Ukraine and Russia over the issue of the Black Sea fleet, the DPU 
declared that 'the history of the CIS is short, but it already gives sufficient 
grounds to conclude that in Russia the tendency to view the 
Commonwealth as the road towards a unitary state is already victorious. 
If Ukraine remains in such a union, it will threaten her sovereignty and 
i n d e p e n d e n c e ’ . * *5 Consequently the National Council called for 
Ukraine's departure from the CIS.
The DPU supported all moves towards the creation of national 
Armed Forces, and towards military disentanglement from the CIS. 
Although the party’s draft programme in early 1992 (drawn up by 
Badz'o) still insisted that the DPU stood 'for the non-nuclear and non­
block status of Ukraine’,* * 6  by the time of its second congress in 
December 1992 the draft party programme declared that 'in the present 
circumstances we consider Ukrainian neutrality to be mistaken. Instead 
we propose a system of collective security with [other] Central and East 
European nations’.**^
.The perceived threat from Russia also led the DPU to rethink its 
position on nuclear weapons. It had been radical groups such as the 
UNA who had first questioned Ukraine's non-nuclear status in autumn 
1991, but the adoption of similar positions by the more respectable URP 
and DPU by the summer of 1992 considerably aided the permeation of 
such thoughts into official circles. Many state officials were openly 
calling for Ukraine to retain a nuclear capacity in some respect by the end 
of 1992.
The DPU’s original 1990 programme had echoed Ukraine’s July 1990 
Declaration of Sovereignty by declaring that the party supported 'the
creation in Ukraine of a non-nuclear zone, and also the banning of the 
manufacture, preservation and transport of weapons of mass destruction 
on her territory'.! 18 At the time it was thought impossible to reconcile 
Moscow to the idea of Ukrainian independence without such a 
declaration. This position was still maintained when the party's 
National Council discussed a new draft programme on 8  . February 
1992.11^ However, doubts concerning the wisdom of transferring tactical 
nuclear weapons to Russia at a time of growing tension with Ukraine's 
powerful neighbour, and over the neglect of realpolitik in giving up 
such valuable assets for no tangible return, led the April 1992 DPU 
conference! 20 to demand that 'the question of Ukraine's nuclear 
disarm am ent should depend on effective control over such 
disarmament and on international guarantees of the inviolability of 
Ukraine's sovereignty, [and that] in the interests of the independence of 
Ukraine [she should] temporarily suspend her transformation into non­
nuclear status'.!21 The documents prepared for the party's December 
1992 congress called for 'the destruction of atomic weapons throughout 
the world and the acquisition by Ukraine of non-nuclear status only as 
part of the process of general European and global nuclear 
d i s a r m a m e n t ’, ! 22 and insisted that Ukraine’s 'signing of the nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty should depend on guarantees for the security of 
Ukraine from the nuclear states of the W e s t ' . 123 The above statements 
contained several mutually incompatible positions, but demonstrated 
the depth of the party's unease.
The party's leaders also maintained a steady stream of anti-Russian 
rhetoric, constantly condemning Russian interference in Ukrainian 
affairs, and her supposed desire to resurrect some form of imperial 
dominion over Ukraine. Badz'o for example criticised nineteenth 
century Ukrainian thinkers such as Mykhailo Drahomanov, who
saw Ukraine's future in some kind of union with Russia. They hoped that 
Ukrainian traditions, Ukrainian society would influence Russia, lesson the 
authoritarianism in the Russian tradition and harmonise the relations between 
us as neighbours. History has shown that this is impossible. The inertia of 
Russia's imperialistic attitude towards Ukraine is still powerful. The formation 
of Ukrainian statehood, and the assertion of independence from Russia in all 
spheres of life is therefore our only guarantee of d e m o c r a c y .  124
The DPU's first all-Ukrainian conference on 12 April 1992 declared 
that under cover of the CIS, 'tendencies to revive the empire are not 
only preserved but are actually strengthening themselves. Russia is 
imposing constant economic, political and propaganda pressure on 
Ukraine, complicating for us the process of creating a democratic order 
and independent s t a t e ' .  125 Although the DPU rarely used the more 
virulent anti-Russian language of the URP or of more extreme groups, it 
shared their thesis of innate Russian imperialism and authoritarianism 
in a milder form.
By December 1992, the DPU considered that a key priority for the 
'foreign policy of Ukraine should be the defence of the rights of 
Ukrainians who live in other states, support for their national revival, 
and securing their close links with U k r a i n e ' .  1 2 6
Second congress
The build-up to the DPU's second congress in December 1992 was 
marked by the DPU leadership placing increasing stress on the 
importance of joint action with the URP in defence of the state-building 
process in Ukraine. The meeting of the DPU’s National Council on 13
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September 1992 called on all political parties to participate more actively 
in this p r o c e s s , 127 and declared its support for President Kravchuk and, 
with some qualifications, for the proposed new constitution, about 
which others had serious r e s e r v a t i o n s . !  28 Moreover, the Council 
’welcome[d] the formation of the coalition between the DPU and URP 
and the Congress of National-Democratic Forces, which opposes the 
politics of destructive radicalism with the position of positive 
participation in the building of an independent democratic state and
civil society'. 129
The congress was finally held in Kiev on 12-13 December 1992.130 
The National Council had twice postponed the congress, in February and 
September 1992, and the April 1992 party conference had been held in its 
place, and such a long delay had serious consequences both for the 
party's public visibility and organisational cohesion. The party's 
membership had stagnated at around 3,000, and many more moderate 
DPU party cells had dissolved themselves into Chornovil's Rukh as a 
result of the decision to departidse Rukh taken at the third Rukh 
congress in February-March 1992 (see Chapter 4).131
The congress confirmed the DPU's development in a more 
nationalist direction over the period 1990-92 (although at the same time 
formally reaffirming the party's commitment to civic nationalism). 
Dmytro Pavlychko's remarks on the UPA were referred to above. 
Pavlychko spoke of how the Ukrainian people were no longer like 'a 
paralytic at the crossroads', but were now 'masters in their own 
h o u s e ' .  132 The new government of Leonid Kuchma and President 
Kravchuk, and espedally Defence Minister Morozov should receive 
every Ukrainian’s support for their efforts in building a Ukrainian 
nation-state. 133 Badz'o went further, asserting that 'amongst our
political leaders in Ukraine today, [Kravchuk] is the one individual who 
can live up to the demands of history in every r e s p e c t ' .  134
The DPU nevertheless asserted that state-building should only 
proceed on the basis of the ’priority of the rights of the individual. The 
rights of the family, nation and state follow on from this one basic 
righ t'. 135 Badz'o, by . contrast, attempted to balance the rights of 
individuals and nations as follows; -
as Ukrainian patriots, we resolutely support and will continue to support the 
complete state independence of Ukraine, the all-round rebirth and development 
of the Ukrainian nation, and oppose cosmopolitan speculation on the idea of 
individual rights. As democrats, we insist not only upon equality of civil rights 
for all the nationalities of Ukraine, but also reject Ukrainian chauvinism, and 
view critically the non-democratic strains in the Ukrainian national-liberation 
movement of both the past and present. As patriots, we strive for the 
consolidation of the nation in the naine of her state independence. However, as 
democrats we clearly state that the consolidation of the nation is possible only on 
the basis of democracy and in the name of a humanistic order.... At the same time 
the Ukrainian state is both a supra-national territorial creation, and the logical 
consequence of the historical self-determination of the Ukrainian e t h n o s . 1 3 6
The sub-text behind this balancing act was the attempt by the DPU’s 
leadership to force an early merger with the URP. In order to do so, the 
DPU had committed itself in the summer of 1992 to the Congress of 
National-Democratic Forces' (CNDF) programme which stressed 'the 
national character of Ukrainian statehood' (see Chapter 8 ). The congress 
now 'declared its intent [to seek] an organisational union of the URP and 
DPU on the basis of a common programme and s t a t u t e ' . ^^7 Badz'o,
having stated that ’the URP and DPU are not identical, but in the present 
circumstances, it would be an extravagance to make [serious] differences 
out of our distinctions', called for a union on the basis of ’national- 
democratic principles’, to create a ’National-Democratic Party of 
Ukraine', which he hoped would attract like-minded elements from 
’Rukh ,... the UPDP, Christian Democrats, Greens and [even] the PDRU 
and social democrats' to its ranks.138
However, it was apparent that not all the DPU’s membership shared 
the leadership's enthusiasm for moving to the right and seeking union 
with the URP. The Kiev DPU, which contained many of the party’s best- 
known moderates, declared before the congress that 'in the event of the 
immediate union of the two parties, the Kiev organisation of the DPU 
will remain as part of the [original] DPU'.* 39 At the congress Badz’o 
publicly attacked the Kiev DPU for their 'opposition to the national- 
democratic direction of our party', their preference for general liberalism, 
and willingness to entertain notions of a federalised U k r a i n e .  140 He also 
criticised local branches of the DPU, who 'without an appropriate 
decision from higher party organs, were prepared to enter coalitions with 
any other party organisation, instead of entering into a coalition with the 
CNDF . 1 4 1
In other words, it was doubtful whether the DPU could deliver its 
organisation and membership base, which were of limited extent in any 
case, into any deal with the URP. What it could offer, however, was the 
prestige of its leading members, and the party's strength in the Supreme 
Council.
Badz'o was replaced as leader by Volodymyr Yavorivs’kyi, another 
writer and Badz’o's unsuccessful opponent in 1990. Although Ivan 
Drach expressed his doubts at the departure of the hard-working Badz'o, 
the congress supported Yavorivs'kyi 'almost u n a n i m o u s l y ’,142 jn the
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hope that he would raise the party's profile in the Supreme Council and 
the country at large, and forge stronger links between the party 
organisation and the party in Parliament. Yavorivs'kyi was a strong- 
willed individual, however, who was unlikely to accept second place to 
the URP's Mykhailo Horyn' in any union between the two parties.
Conclusion
The proposed alliance between the URP and DPU was in theory 
ideally suited to both. The URP had a well-organised party machine 
outside of parliament, while the DPU had a prestigious leadership and a 
higher profile in the Supreme Council. However, mergers between two 
parties do not always conserve the strengths of both. The main impetus 
towards union was the recognition by the DPU's leadership of their own 
organisational effectiveness, but its grandees would undoubtedly seek to 
preserve their freedom of action in any new party in the same way as 
they had done in the DPU, and this was likely to clash with the more 
centralised traditions of the URP. Nevertheless, the DPU continued to 
hope that the prestige of its leaders would bring it public support, and 
prevent the party being smothered by the URP.
The fortunes of the DPU were emblematic of those of the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia as a whole, whose crucial importance in the Ukrainian 
national movement as a whole was described in Chapter 1. The party 
rode its popularity in 1990, but was unable to significantly expand its 
influence outside of Galicia and Central Ukraine in 1990-2. In terms of 
organisation and membership, the party trod water between its two 
congresses in December 1990 and December 1992. Many of the party's 
leading individuals were able to exercise powerful influence in official 
circles in 1991-92. Many DPU figures, such as Drach and Pavlychko, had
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close and friendly relations with Kravchuk. However, the DPU was 
unable to institutionalise such influence, and it was in a poor position to 
oppose any back-sliding by the national communists in their 
commitment to the national cause.
Most significantly perhaps, the DPU, even more than the UHU, was 
nominally committed to the ideas of dvic nationalism, but the above 
analysis has demonstrated how its actual political practice was based on 
the idea of an ethnically Ukrainian state, and how the party moved 
sharply to the right in 1990-92.
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6 . THE STREET PARTY:
THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Introduction
Over the period 1988-92 public opinion amongst the nationalist core 
constituency in Galicia and Kiev grew increasingly more radical and 
impatient (although, as has repeatedly been stressed, this was far from 
representative of Ukraine as a whole). This had two effects. One, as 
described in the last three chapters, was to pull Rukh  and the 
mainstream nationalist parties in a more radical direction. The other 
was to open up a political space to their right. The existence of the 
Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA), an openly authoritarian group 
and the most successful organisation on the extreme right, was therefore 
testimony to the impatience of many Ukrainian nationalists with the 
civic nationalism originally espoused by Rukh , the URP and DPU. A 
host of other, smaller, ethnicist parties were also formed in this period, 
and are described in Chapter 7.
The UNA was formed on 8  September 1991 as the result of a name- 
change by the Ukrainian Interparty Assembly (UIA) established in Kiev 
on 1 July 1990 as a coalition of various small ultra-right parties. 
Throughout 1990-92 the UIA-UNA was the most significant political 
force to the right of the URP, and also tended to be the most prominent 
(or most noisy) in public demonstrations. Although the ultra-right as a 
whole in Ukraine has proved extremely quarrelsome and fissiparous, 
the UIA-UNA has remained its best organised, most durable and most 
influential component. It has strongly opposed the democratic and civic 
version of nationalism originally propagated by Rukh , but has also 
rejected the 'romantic nationalism’ of the 1930s OUN as obsessed with
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history, irrelevant to modern conditions, and likely to appeal only to 
Galida. Instead the UIA-UNA has attempted to forge an ideology based 
on a mixture of ethnic nationalism and statist-corporatist concepts, with 
a strong paramilitary emphasis to attract its main target group, 
disaffected youth throughout Ukraine.
The history of the UIA-UNA can be divided into three phases. The 
original rationale for the creation of the UIA was to coordinate the 
efforts of all those ultra-radical groups to the right of the UHU. Most had 
split from the UHU-URP over firstly, the UHU’s refusal to campaign for 
full Ukrainian independence until September 1989, and secondly the 
UHU's decision to participate in the Ukrainian republican elections of 
March 1990. The UIA therefore represented those who considered that 
'the Ukrainian SSR is not a Ukrainian state. It was created by the 
communist party of a country hostile to the Ukrainian People’s Republic 
[the short-lived independent Ukrainian state of 1918], - the RSFSR'.* Its 
members sought to copy the tactics of the radical citizens' committees in 
Estonia and boycott the structures of the official state, whilst at the same 
time recreating the old legitimate government of the Ukrainian People’s 
Republic to replace the Soviet 'occupying power'.
Following the election of Yurii Shukhevych (the son of the wartime 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army commander Roman Shukhevych) as leader 
of the UIA in December 1990, the UIA entered a second phase after it 
openly embraced the integral nationalist ideology of Dmytro Dontsov,^ 
and began to cooperate with the 6migr£ OUN-r. However, the UIA 
eventually turned its back on the £migr£s, whom it regarded as 
manipulative and out of touch, and entered a third phase in its existence 
after September 1991 as it began to develop a brand of Ukrainian 
nationalism that it deemed more appropriate to modem conditions.
The founder members of the UIA
The first session of the UIA, held on 1 July 1 9 9 0  to coincide with the 
anniversary of the 1 9 4 1  declaration of Ukrainian independence by OUN 
leaders in L'viv, was attended by most of the ultra-right groups then in 
existence. The most significant were the Ukrainian National Party, the 
Ukrainian People’s Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Peasants' 
Democratic Party, and the nationalist faction of the Union of 
Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM)3 (the Ukrainian Peasants' 
Democratic Party will be considered in Chapter 7 , as its L’viv branch only 
participated in the UIA's opening session out of curiosity). All of these 
were ultimately to fall by the wayside except SNUM. The UIA-UNA 
therefore came to be dominated by the representatives of radical youth 
who ran SNUM. The history of the other parties is worth describing, 
however, in order to give the flavour of the times. Even in 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 ,  
many radicals were impatient with the dvic nationalism then espoused 
by the UHU and others.
Ukrainian National Party
The Ukrainian National Party (UNP), led by the former political 
prisoner Hryhorii Prykhod'ko, was in fact the first non-communist 
political party to be established in Ukraine in the modern era. 
Prykhod’ko, an electririan by trade, had been held in the camps for 1 5  
years. Upon his release in July 1 9 8 8  he joined the UHU in L'viv, but 
found it too cautious on the basic issue of Ukrainian independence, and 
left in May 1 9 8 9  along with like-minded radicals such as Ivan Makar and 
Vasyl' Sichko (Makar later became a radical deputy and Sichko founded 
the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front - see Chapter 7) A
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The UNP's founding congress was held in L’viv on 21 October 1989. 
As the party still had to operate underground, the meeting had to be held 
in a private apartment. The UNP's original programme argued that 
in so far as the Ukrainian SSR [UkSSR] and its government were created by 
the decision of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party and because of the 
exile of the legal government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the laws and 
agreements of the government of the UkSSR with the governments of other 
nations are legally void. Therefore the UNP does not recognise it and considers 
the UkSSR not a republican, but a colonial administration in Ukraine.®
The UNP were therefore the first to suggest copying the tactics of the 
Citizens’ Congress committees in Estonia and elsewhere and organise a 
campaign for the rebirth of the Ukrainian People's Republic (in 
Ukrainian, UNR). It proposed the organisation of committees to register 
’citizens of the UNR', which would then create a system of 'dual power’ 
in the republic to challenge and usurp the existing authorities.
The UNP’s programme also called for ’the rebirth of the UNR within 
her ethnic borders', and, most controversially, argued that 'the best 
defence [of democracy] is private arms'.® Prykhod’ko later defended the 
latter statement by saying that he did not envisage armed revolutionary 
struggle. Rather, as with the US Second Amendment, the right to bear 
arms was a means of strengthening civil society against the stated
Prykhod’ko also explicitly rejected the dvic concept of Ukraine as a 
multi-national sodety, and denounced the use of the term 'the peoples 
of Ukraine'.® There was only one Russian people, and only one 
Ukrainian; and each had its own homeland where the other should 
neither live nor interfere.
The party saw itself as an elite group rather than a parliamentary 
party, for whom Targe numbers were not necessary’.^ Members were 
expected to engage constantly in 'patriotic activity', and leading former
communists were theoretically excluded from membership. The party's 
statute was much criticised for the authoritarian powers given to 
Prykhod'ko.10
The UNP published a party newsletter (Visnyk UNP ), and two 
journals (Klych natsii , and Ukrai'ns'tyi chas ). The radical L'viv 
historian Yaroslav Dashkevych wrote frequently for Ukrains'kyi chas . 
As the most radical party in late 1989 to early 1990, the UNP was 
instrumental in organising a theoretical conference on how to obtain 
Ukrainian statehood in January 1990 along with the UHU and UPDL (see 
below). In the climate of the time, the conference had to be held in 
Iurmala in Latvia. It was also one of the prime movers behind the 
creation of the Committee for the Creation of Ukrainian Armed Forces 
in L'viv in February 1990 (which did much to popularise the idea of 
independent Ukrainian Armed Forces), the Committee of Soldiers' 
Mothers in April 1990, and Ultimately of the UIA in July 1990. It also set 
up a youth wing called Sich (named after the headquarters of the 
seventeenth century Ukrainian Cossack state).**
Although the UNP was in many respects a path-breaking ultra-right 
party, which led to initial material support from the Emigre OUN-r, it s 
membership remained low (never more than 100-150) and it was soon 
overtaken by other groups in importance. Prykhod'ko's idiosyncratic 
behaviour soon led to the withdrawal of OUN-r support.*2 it also 
alienated itself from moderate nationalists by its harsh criticism of their 
involvement in the parliamentary p r o c e s s .  *3
The UNP lost its leading position in the UIA in December 1990 (see 
below), and its radical wing, led by Levko Franchuk of the L'viv UNP, 
defected to form the Ukrainian National Patriotic Liberation Front in 
April 1 9 9 1 .* ^  At their first meeting (zbir ) on 26-7 October 1991, 
Franchuk’s tiny group refused even to recognise the legitimacy of
263
Kravchuk as Ukraine's ’so-called President'.^  Franchuk's group also 
had links with the ultra-right Nationalist Bloc set up in L’viv in 1992 
(see Chapter 7).
Prykhod'ko meanwhile partially revived the fortunes of the UNP by 
keeping intact the small group of L'viv intelligentsia around 
Ukrains'kyi chas , and by issuing a new manifesto in September 1991, 
declaring that, after the 24 August 1991 Declaration of Ukrainian 
Independence, the UNP could emerge from the underground, 'legalise 
its activity’ and campaign for a 'Yes' vote in the 1 December 
referendum . 16 As regards the Presidential election, it advised a vote 
against the allegedly pro-Russian Griniov, but did not make any positive 
recommendations.
The UNP remained fiercely nationalist, and against the Ukrainian 
government's 'Robin Hood style of social p o l i t i c s ' . i n  the face of an 
'economic war by Russia against Ukraine' and the threat of Ukraine's 
exploitation by foreign multinationals 'like a third world country', 
Ukraine faced 'a stark choice: either to legalise 'shadow' capital or [face a] 
revolution of the lumpen, or the economic and financial dependence of 
Ukraine either on Russia or the West'.*** In other words, Ukraine must 
build its national self-defence through the creation of its own capitalist 
class. Prykhod'ko attempted to define the UNP as a national-Thatcherite 
party, arguing against the paternalistic approach of all other parties that 
the only guarantee of a strong state is strong and self-reliant
individuals.^
This programme had much in common with that of the Kiev 
intelligentsia-based UPDP (see below), and the two parties merged to 
form the Ukrainian National-Conservative Party (UNCP) in Summer 
1992,^0 which then participated as an observer at the Congress of 
National Democratic Forces in August 1992 (see Chapter 8 ). The UNCP
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was registered as a legal party in October 1992, under the leadership of 
Viktor Rodionov, and retained a modicum of influence as an 
intellectual pressure g r o u p .2 1
Ukrainian People’s Democratic Party (UPDP)
The UPDP's roots were in the tiny informal 'cultural discussion' 
groups that sprang up amongst the Kiev intelligentsia and in student 
circles in 1987-88. At the time, it was impossible to engage in open public 
dissent. Therefore the groups that began to form in this period, such as 
in Kiev the Ukrainian Culturological Club,22 and the student Hromada 
(meaning 'Community' or 'Society', and named after the intelligentsia 
groups of the nineteenth century);23 and in L’viv Tovarystvo leva (the 
'Lion Society', named after the symbol of the city),24 confined 
themselves in theory to cultural affairs, although behind closed doors 
heated discussion would take place.
Other small groups active at this time were Ukrainian branches of all- 
Union political organisations, notably the Democratic Union established 
in May 1 9 8 8  in Moscow. Its Ukrainian offshoot, the Ukrainian 
Democratic Union, was set up in Autumn 1 9 8 8 ,  but renamed itself the 
Ukrainian People’s Democratic League (UPDL) in February 1 9 8 9  to make 
clear it was not an artificial import from R u s s ia .2 5  its activists were a 
peculiar mixture of nationalists and liberals, who joined the UHU as 
collective members (with pretensions to be its 'Christian Democratic' 
intellectual vanguard) until the congress that turned the UHU into a 
political party (the URP) in April 1 9 9 0 .2 6  The UPDL fortnightly journal 
Nezalezhnist' (Independence) that began publication in September 1 9 8 9  
was the first regular opposition publication in Ukraine.
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The UPDL emphasised anti-communism as much as Ukrainian 
nationalism, and quarrelled with the UHU in the run-up to the 1990 
Ukrainian elections, when they campaigned under the slogan ’Councils 
without communists!' After the ’league' left the UHU, it transformed 
itself into the Ukrainian People's Democratic Party (UPDP) at a congress 
on 16-17 June 1990, attended by 36 delegates supposedly representing 347 
m em bers.2^ The UPDP's twin slogans: 'A free individual in a free land 
and a free state' and the 'four Ds' derzhavnist' , demokratiia , dobrobut , 
diikhovnist' ,28 (statehood, democracy, prosperity and spirituality) 
demonstrated the new party's attempt to balance individual and 
national rights.
The party’s extremely long programme was also marked by a peculiar 
mixture of liberalism and radicalism .29 On the one hand, the party, like 
the UHU, claimed to base its philosophy on the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, and laid out a detailed plan, advanced for its time, for 
the creation of a market economy. On the other hand, it argued, like the 
UNP, that the Soviet Ukrainian government was illegitimate, and 
should be replaced by a revived Ukrainian People's Republic elected by 
citizens' committees. In fact it claimed to have been the originator of the 
idea.30 To this end, both 'parliamentary and extraparliamentary means' 
were permissible.81
The UPDP was therefore the other key founder member of the UIA in 
July 1990. However, it soon found itself disillusioned with the ULA's 
narrow social and ideological base and was outflanked by the ULA's 
younger ultra-radicals. After dissociating itself from a motion concerning 
the possible use of force at the UIA’s first session,82 the UPDP formally 
walked out at the fourth session in March 1991.83 More precisely, the 
UPDP split, as its more radical members chose to stay within the ranks of 
the UIA.
Consequently, at the UPDP’s second congress in Kiev on 29-30 June 
1991, the party appeared a spent force, with only 600 members, down 
from its peak of 1,811 members in December 1990.34 Nezalezhnist' no 
longer appeared regularly, and the party had little organisational 
discipline over its membership.
In retrospect, it seems that the ranks of the party were artificially 
swollen in 1988-90, when it was one of the few available fora for dissent, 
but by 1991 it had reverted to its original status as a discussion club for a 
handful of intellectuals. In that status, however, in had reasonable 
prospects of survival in its new union with the UNP (see above).
Youth Groups35
In effect then, despite the initial prominence of the UNP and UPDP 
in the UIA, the latter soon fell under the control of the extremist youth 
group SNUM, and then its offshoot the Ukrainian Nationalist Union. 
The latter were then in turn the main driving force behind the UIA’s 
radicalisation as the Ukrainian National Assembly in 1991-2.
As early as July 1988, certain members of the UHU, such as Ivan 
Makar, had proposed the idea of creating a youth affiliate, along the lines 
of the inter-war Union of Ukrainian Youth, which still survived 
amongst the Ukrainian diaspora. However, although UHU activists, 
such as Ihor Derkach, were prominent in making the initial steps 
towards the creation of a youth organisation to rival the Komsomol, the 
organisation that was eventually established at an all-Ukrainian congress 
in Ivano-Frankivs'k on 26-7 May 1990 called itself the Union of 
Independent Ukrainian Youth (in Ukrainian, SNUM) to emphasise its 
distance both from the organisations of the diaspora and from domestic 
party politics.36
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The first SNUM congress gathered 220 delegates from 19 oblasts in the 
republic, representing 1,200 members.^ 7  Thirty eight of the delegates 
were students, 53 from middle schools; 190 were Ukrainian, only two 
were Russian. Even at this stage, SNUM was beset by arguments between 
Derkach's leading group, who were supporters of democratic 
nationalism, and radical supporters of Dontsovite 'integral nationalism' 
such as Oleh Vitovych and the leader of the Kiev group Dmytro 
Korchyns'kyi. However, SNUM’s ideology as a whole was already quite 
radical, due to the influx of extremist youths over whom the 
organisation's would-be patron, the UHU, had little control.38 SNUM's 
programme stated that 'the highest and strongest human community is 
the nation'. The nation is distinguished by its 'spirit', which is 'the 
conscious feeling of belonging to past, present and future generations’. 
Moreover, SNUM declared that 'the attitude of the individual to his 
nation is the main test of his morality and e t h ic s ' .39 SNUM's rather 
authoritarian statute also demanded members' full-time commitment to 
the organisation. 'Through constant explanation the leadership must 
maintain the members of SNUM in conscious obedience, discipline and 
execution of [their] tasks’.^ ® SNUM issued the journal Napriam in 
L’viv, edited by Volodymyr Yavors'kyi, who had been expelled from the 
L'viv URP (see Chapter 3) for his support for ethnic nationalism.
By May 1990 Vitovych, Korchyns'kyi and Viktor Mel’nyk had 
organised a nationalist faction in SNUM, which formally split from 
Derkach's moderates, and changed its name to the Ukrainian Nationalist 
Union (UNU) at its founding congress on 3-4 November 1990 (it should 
be pointed out that in the Ukrainian context, the word 'nationalist' has 
long been synonymous with chauvinist. Hence the open use of the word 
is designed to shock).
According to Korchyns'kyi, ’our aim is not [just] independence 
(which is only a little thing), our aim - is building a great nation , which 
will not adapt itself to circumstance, but will dictate its own terms to the 
world' .41 The only route to national survival 'is by abandoning [mere] 
restoration, and beginning intensive nation-building, abandoning the 
position of defence and going onto the attack’.42 As Kievan Rus' , 
'Ukraine was the centre for the birth of European civilisation ....a 
historical base for the long-lasting and protracted creation of European 
cu ltu re ’,43 and Ukraine must be restored again to a position of 
dominance over Europe. This aim would best be secured by the creation 
of 'a nuclear Ukraine within, her ethnic borders’, that is including 
ethnically Ukrainian territories in the RSFSR and elsew here.44 The 
UNU adopted a party symbol deliberately evocative of the Nazi swastika 
and its members took to wearing paramilitary uniforms.
Although the UNU only had a hard-core of 100 or so members in 
1990-2, they were extremely well-organised and active, as is so often the 
case with ultra-radical youth groups. The UNU had two regular and 
well-produced publications (initially funded by the emigre OUN-r); 
Zamkova hora in Kiev (its masthead slogan is '[we want] everything 
and immediately!’) and Natsionalist' in L'viv (published by the Club of 
Supporters of Dmytro Dontsov, set up in December 1990, and basically 
also an UNU group. Its slogan is 'Ukraine above all!'). As will be shown 
below, the UNU were in effective control of the UIA by the summer of 
1991, - hence the dropping of the word 'interparty' when the UIA 
changed its name to the Ukrainian National Assembly in September 
1991.
SNUM, meanwhile, remained under the control of Derkach, now a 
deputy in the Ukrainian parliament. After the August 1991 Declaration 
of Ukrainian Independence, the organisation renamed itself the Union
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of Ukrainian Youth, which claimed 800 members, and published the 
journal Nash klych
The first two sessions of the UIA
The first meeting of the UIA was held in Kiev on 30 June-1 July 1990. 
In its political declaration, the UIA argued that 'the control over the 
Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR by colonial forces and the 
impossibility of achieving a Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine 
through our deputy patriots [i.e. the moderate nationalists in the 
People's Council] leads [to the conclusion that] the parliamentary 
method of struggle is insufficient’. ^  Therefore, the UIA adopted the 
UNP/UPDP's idea of promoting the revival of the 1918 Ukrainian 
People's Republic through a network of local committees that would 
register its would-be citizens. When 50% of the adult population was 
signed up, a National Congress of these committees would be held, and 
Ukrainian independence declared. By the time of the Assembly's second 
session on 6-7 October 1990, the head of the ULA's Executive Committee, 
Anatolii Lupynis, was claiming that the committees were 'already a real 
alternative to the organs of power, the prototype models for a future 
state’.47 The second session also passed a resolution declaring that such 
committees could become the basis of a 'committee of national 
emergency' if necessary.48
Such statements were of course sheer hyperbole. The success of the 
signature collection campaign on the other hand is hard to gauge, as the 
UIA's figures were obviously inflated for propaganda purposes. 
Nevertheless, the Kiev political scientist Oleksa Haran' accepted a figure 
of 729,000 by 27 September 1990. More than half of these, however, were 
collected in L'viv oblast alone (450,000). In Kiev city and oblast 140,000
signed, and in Ternopil’ 40,000. No other oblast managed more than
2,000.49 Later claims were as high as 2.5 million,50 or 2.2 million in 
January-February 1 9 9 1 ,5 1  and 2.8 million by April 1 9 9 1 .5 2  Clearly the idea 
was attractive to many in Galicia and to some in Kiev, but had no impact 
elsewhere in Ukraine. Only 28 people from only nine oblasts attended 
the regular council for the committees in Kiev on 2 March 1 9 9 1 .5 5  
Moreover, even Korchyns'kyi admitted that many who signed did not 
understand the implications of what was in v o l v e d .5 4  The leader of the 
URP, Levko Luk"ianenko, did however praise the propaganda value of 
the campaign.5 5
The UIA was also able to find common ground with the URP on 
issues such as the creation of Ukrainian Armed Forces. Both were active 
in the Committee for the Revival of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 
which held a conference in Kiev in February 1991 on 'ways towards the 
creation of the Armed Forces of U k r a i n e \ 5 6  The ULA's radical 'extra- 
parliamentary and n o n - p a r l ia m e n t a r y '5 7  methods, however, alienated 
potential support on the moderate right, as did the fact that the UIA 
seemed more concerned with abusing the URP and other nationalist 
parties than the communists. By trying to win over the URP’s radicals to 
its side, the UIA was bound to attract the hostility of the URP.
The UIA flirts with the emigre OUN-r
At the third session of the UIA on 22-3 December 1990, Prykhod'ko 
made a series of idiosyncratic demands; to devolve all the ULA's work 
onto the citizens' committees and devote all of the organisation’s 
energies to their activities, and to exclude all former communists from 
leading positions in the UIA. The UIA was already evolving into a de 
facto party of the ultra-right, however, and most of its members wished
to adopt a more flexible strategy.58 Prykhod’ko was consequently 
replaced as head by Yurii Shukhevych. Because his father had been one 
of the wartime leaders of the UP A, Yurii had suffered two long spells as a 
political prisoner from 1945-68 and 1973-89. During his second 
imprisonment, he lost his sight. He was consequently a man of radical, 
and old-fashioned, views, who was arguably out of touch with events in 
post-war U kraine^  (even in 1968-72 he had not been allowed back to 
Ukraine, but had been forced to work as an electrician in the North 
Caucasus).
Shukhevych wished to build the UIA in the image of the wartime 
OUN, at least in its mythologised variant. Shukhevych accepted the 
myth nurtured by the post-war OUN-r in exile that the OUN had always 
been a Dontsovite party since its foundation in 1929, and that it had kept 
the faith uninterrupted into the modem era. In fact, the true history of 
the OUN is rather more complex, as outlined in Chapter 1. Dontsov was 
never formally a member, and the party had split in both 1940 and 1953, 
creating three rivals to its inheritance (the militant OUN-r, the more 
moderate OUN-s, and the openly social democratic OUN-z).
Nevertheless, all £migr£ Ukrainian parties were now keen to rebuild 
their influence inside Ukraine, particularly the OUN-r, now under the 
leadership of Slava Stets’ko, widow of Yaroslav Stets’ko, one of the 
wartime leaders of the OUN. The OUN-r had first attempted to work 
through the idiosyncratic Prykhod'ko, but his UNP had failed to live up 
to its early promise. Then the OUN-r had attempted to radicalise the 
URP, but the latter had formerly repudiated ’integral nationalism' at its 
theoretical conference in Kiev in February 1991 (see Chapter 3) .60 Now 
the OUN-r targetted the UIA.
Slava Stes'ko attended the fifth UIA session in L'viv on 29 June 1991, 
when the UIA adopted OUN-r slogans such as 'a united Ukraine under a
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black and red flag [the colours of the OUN] from the Sian (a river in 
Poland) to the Caucasus'.*61 Stets’ko was also president of the Anti- 
Bolshevik Bloc of Nations formed under OUN-r influence in the 1940s, 
and which reconstituted itself on 'occupied territory' at a conference in 
Kiev on 1 June 1991. Korchyns'kyi, Shukhevych and Mel'nyk attended 
for the UIA, along with like-minded radicals from the Baltic and the 
Caucasus, and the UIA maintained strong links with the organisation .62 
Korchynsk'yi's speech singled out Russian imperialism rather then 
communism per se as the main enemy of the Ukrainian people. Russian 
imperialism 'may change its form, it may go under the red flag or under 
the tricolour, it may use the ideology of Marxism or stand under the 
White Guard ideology of Orthodoxy. But its essence, and therefore its 
name, does not change’. The RSFSR itself was an empire, and therefore 
'the activity of our organisation must be transferred onto the territory of 
the opponent'. 'Real independence' for the suppressed nations of the 
USSR was impossible he declared, 'until Russia has returned to her 
borders at the time of Ivan in’.63
The UIA also copied traditional OUN-r tactics of trying to expand its 
influence in trade unions, and through youth organisations like Sich .64 
The UIA was one of the guiding forces behind the creation of The All- 
Ukrainian Organisation of Workers’ Solidarity (in Ukrainian, VOST) on 
21-3 June 1991 (see also Chapter 3). VOST even shared the UIA's offices 
in Kiev, and the conference's proceedings were published by the UIA.65 
The UIA's Anatolii Lupynis was a member of VOST's consultative 
council, along with other radicals such as Larysa Skoryk and Stepan 
Khmara. VOST, claiming to represent 1-3 million workers, attacked the 
official trade unions as 'schools of amorality, impudence, the suffocation 
and degradation of the individual' and passed a resolution prepared by 
Lupynis condemning the activity of the current Ukrainian Supreme
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Council as ’dangerous for Ukraine' VOST remained officially non- 
party, ’not subordinate to any civic organisation, political party or state 
institution'^? but always tended to support ultra-radical positions. As 
VOST always found it difficult to displace the old official trade unions, 
with their established organisations and monopoly control of welfare 
functions, it tended to remain a semi-political organisation, always 
prominent in public demonstrations. The UIA and (VOST) repeatedly 
called for strikes in 1990 and 1991; such as on the opening of the second 
phase of the 28th congress of the CPU on 13 December 1990, and against 
the March 1991 referendum, but it had little opportunity to mobilise a 
now largely apathetic general public. The miners' strikes in March 1991 
were not of its doing, although the UIA tried to propagandise amongst 
the participants. The working dass as a whole still remained immune to 
far right propaganda. The UIA's manipulative attitude towards the 
radical trade unions was revealed after the August 1991 dedaration of 
independence, when the UIA sharply reversed itself, and began to 
condemn 'unnecessary and disruptive' strike action. In September 1992, 
the UNSO occupied the offices of the Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions, and demanded that its leaders be prosecuted for actions 
injurious to Ukrainian independence.
Throughout 1991, the UIA maintained its uncompromising stance 
against the institutions of the Ukrainian SSR as an 'occupying power'. It 
called for a boycott of all the questions in the March 1991 referendum on 
the future of the Union. I ts  executive committee dedared that it was 
immoral to pose such a question and for 'one generation in a state of 
subjugation to pledge the destiny of the coming generation'.^ The UIA 
condemned Gorbachev’s proposed Union Treaty and 'any other
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agreements between the imperial centre and the organs of colonial 
administration' in U k r a in e .6 9
This ultra-radical stance meant frequent arrests for both leaders and 
members of the UIA. On 26 March 1991 Petro Kahui, the head of the UIA 
executive committee, was arrested, as was Lupynis on 6 July 1991.^0 The 
UIA also had poor relations with other nationalist groups, quarrelling 
frequently with the URP and Rukh , particularly after the prospects for 
an UIA-URP alliance declined after the defeat of Stepan Khmara's 
radicals at the second URP congress in June 1991 (see Chapter 3). 
According to the UIA's Oleh Vitovych, the 'moderate democrats' in the 
Ukrainian parliament disgraced themselves not only by participating in 
the structures of the Ukrainian SSR, but also by ignoring Bandera’s 
dictum that 'with the Muscovites [;moskaly ] there can be no common 
language' and by seeking to build bridges with 'Moscow-democrats'. 'We 
shall throw these people in the litter. They are not [true] Ukrainians'.
Vitovych also quoted Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. ' "I call you not to peace, 
but to war". We also are calling for war, but only because for us it is 
sacred. The war started by our ancestors has not finished for us even 
today. It will continue in every possible form and method, as long as one 
of us is liv ing 'll
Such ultra-radicalism was above all due to the increasing dominance 
within the UIA of the UNU, especially after the restraining influence of 
the UPDP, most of whose members were moderate members of the Kiev 
intelligentsia, was lost when most of its members walked out of the 
UIA's fourth session in March 1991. Shukhevych largely left 
organisation up to the UNU activists. Unlike Rukh ? which 'cared about 
mass [membership], but didn't care about quality', Shukhevych praised 
the UNU as a tightly knit elite, around whom the people 'would group 
in the near fu ture '.^  According to Mel’nyk, leadership of the UIA fell to
the UNU by default, as none of the other member organisations were 
sufficiently active or sufficiently num erous.^
For Mel'nyk, 'the [UIA] is not a party. It is an anti-party organisation. 
Parties must base themselves on concrete social layers and represent 
their interests. But these simply don't exist'. It was therefore logical for 
both the UIA and UNU to remain elite organisations (the UNU's 
membership was ’in the 100s’). The difference between the UNU and the 
UIA was that the UNU 'pushes things forward,... attempts to overcome 
inertia. The UNU performs the work that others are afraid to do. There 
are some things which the state should do... but where they limit 
themselves. The UNU is the catalyst for events. [Whereas] the UIA is 
w i d e r ’.74 The UNU in other words was a vanguard group leading the 
UIA. .But the UIA was worth preserving for its potentially broader 
appeal.
After the coup: The Ukrainian Interparty Assembly 
becomes the Ukrainian National Assembly
The declaration of Ukrainian independence by the Supreme Council 
on 24 August 1991 rendered the UIA's strategy of campaigning for the 
revival of the Ukrainian People's Republic redundant. It was also 
apparent that the organisation's leaders were already rethinking their 
relationship with the OUN-r, as they were unwilling to function as their 
puppets in Ukraine.
Shukhevych, speaking at the sixth session of the UIA in Kiev on 8 
September 1991 said that 'on 24 August this year the Supreme Soviet [sic] 
of the Ukrainian SSR pronounced the Act on independence. It is possible 
to have different attitudes to this, but in essence there is just this - the 
Act is passed and is the juridicial basis for our statehood. This may please
some, and displease others, but we are facing an accomplished fact, and
we shall proceed from its basis '75 The September session of the UIA
therefore resolved to turn itself into a better structured organisation, 
renamed itself the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA), resolved to 
take part in the forthcoming presidential elections, and nominated 
Shukhevych as its candidate.
The session's political resolution, which was to be the basis of the 
UNA's election programme, stated that 'the cardinal question of today is 
not the conflict of democracy and communism, but the struggle [borotba ] 
between nations - the struggle of Russia for domination, and of the non- 
Russians for lib e ra tion '.^  Moreover, according to Korchyns'kyi, 'we, the 
UNA, [as] Ukrainian nationalists have already said that the real enemy is 
not some mythical imperial centre, not the command-administrative 
system, but Russia, and Russian c h a u v in i s m ' .7 7
The Ukrainian people, however, were not well-placed to resist the 
inevitable revival of Russian imperialism. After centuries of Russian 
rule the Ukrainians were just 'a mass...without any sense of general 
national priorities, without national feeling, without even general 
national culture'. The UNA therefore looked to the new Ukrainian state. 
Whether it was rim by national communists or not, it was now a 
Ukrainian state, and 'the state is an instrument for forming the nation'. 
Moreover, given the weakness of civil society, it was the only effective 
instrum ent a v a i l a b l e .78 According to the UNA, Ukraine stood at a 
crossroads. It could either become 'a market, a raw material appendix, an 
object of exploitation and a field for the activity of external economic and 
political influences' or 'be the central state of the region, that is to hold 
in its hands Euro-Asian communications, to be the guarantor of stability 
in the region and determine the directions of its own development’. 
This would require nothing less than a strong army, a great leap forward
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towards the technological level of the West, and ’the defence of the 
internal economic and state structure from outside influence’. At the 
same time, there must be a powerful system of social defence to ensure 
that 'the Ukrainian people live better than [all other] peoples of the 
region'. The UNA's slogan was to be 'Order, Strength, P ro s p e r ity '.^
The new party programme stressed that 'as Ukraine enters the 
world's economic infrastructure and the international division of 
labour, there is a danger that her economy may be subordinated totally to 
the interests of [other] strong states'. It is therefore necessary to 'support 
and defend the Ukrainian businessman [pidpryemets' ] until the time 
when he can overcome foreign business in competitive struggle'. In 
general, 'there must be the formation of a force that is capable of 
containing class contradictions and party ambitions...that will represent 
the interests of all the Ukrainian nation, that can defend the worker 
from excessive exploitation, and also the businessman from the worker 
and secure him victory in the struggle with foreign capital. Such a force 
can only be Ukrainian nationalism', which must be represented by a 
hierarchical organisation, such as the UNA, as the 'matrix for the future 
national hierarchy itself'.^O
To this end, the UNA's statute envisaged a powerful leader 'who 
carries out the general leadership of the Assembly, creates temporary 
structures of the UNA and dissolves them, takes political decisions and 
summons sessions of the UNA’. He also appoints the Executive 
Committee. The leadership was relatively unconstrained by the congress 
(zbir ) of the UNA, which need only assemble every two years, or the 
sessions of the UNA, held only every six months.*** In practice, 
however, given Shukhevych's disability, real power in the UNA rested 
with Mel'nyk and Korchyns'kyi.
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The UNA therefore was developing an ideology of statism or fascist 
corporatism. This tended to take it a long way from the traditional anti­
communism and 'Galician romanticism' of the OUN-r. In fact, it was 
pushing the UNA into a position of support for Kravchuk's national 
communists and their efforts to build the young Ukrainian state. 
According to Mel'nyk, 'the choice of independence made by the 
population of Ukraine was not the result of the so-called 'democratic 
forces'...but was the result of the turn towards independence of the 
higher [levels] of power'. 'The state must be led only by those who are 
capable of doing so’.82 in other words, the democrats were self-seeking, 
verbose and inexperienced, only the national communists were capable 
of building a strong state. According to the UNA’s official military 
programme/the communist party was de facto the only political force in 
the country, which still cemented the administrative and economic 
structures and created the possibility of governing through them. 
Whether for good or for evil [zhubu ] -that is already another affair.’ 
Therefore, 'the maintenance in power of the national communists in 
the person of Kravchuk and co., with their experience in the state may be 
the "lesser evil" for U k r a i n e ' . ^  Only Kravchuk, the UNA believed, 
could provide the smack of firm government. The UNA therefore 
instructed its members to vote for Kravchuk on 1 December 1991, after 
Shukhevych had failed to obtain the 100,000 signatures necessary to 
support his candidacy.
The UNA's support for the national communists meant a final break 
between the UNA and the OUN-r, which cut off support and shifted its 
attention to the DSU (see Chapter 7). The UNA continued to be well- 
organised and well-funded, however, leading to persistent rumours of 
covert support from the newly established Ukrainian Ministry of 
Defence. In 1992 the UNA-UNU was unique amongst nationalist parties
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in having three newspapers which appeared regularly; - Zamkova hora 
('Fortified Heights') with a circulation of 10,000; Natsionalist also with 
10,000; and Ukrains'ki obrii ('Ukrainian Horizons') with 999. A further 
publication, Holos natsiX (’The Voice of the Nation') began to appear in 
late 1992.
The UNA now accused the OUN-r of being trapped in the ideology of 
a different era, and of failing to take account of the changes in Ukraine 
since the 1 9 4 0 s .8 4  The OUN-r was 'mechanically transferring onto 
Ukrainian soil Western rules of political life'. Consequently, the UNA 
refused to attend the Conference of Ukrainian Nationalists organised by 
the OUN-r in Kiev in March 1992 (see Chapter 7).
Nationalism and the corporate state
The basic premise in the UNA’s political philosophy was the need to 
restore order and national might. In the UNA's standard formulation of 
the question, 'Ukraine's problem lies in whether a social force can be 
created capable of standing against social chaos, uniting all links of the 
state mechanism and getting the motor of the economy in motion. The 
question for the future is this: who will bring such order? This will 
either be one of [our] internal forces, or the function of restoring order 
will be left to some external cause. [But] this would be their order, and 
order for their benefit' .85
The UNA of course represented such an internal force and was 
capable of leading Ukraine to greatness through her own efforts, whereas 
'the majority of our so-called political parties are subordinate to, and aim 
to serve foreign states and transnational institutions'^^ and interests (an 
obvious swipe at the OUN-r). Other parties, such as the PDRU would sell 
out Ukraine to Western or Russian interests, whereas Ukraine must
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defend her own security in opposition to both. Iii Mel’nyk's words, 
'Military, physical expansion [of Russia] -that's the worst variant. But we 
also have to face economic expansion from the likes of Japan. There is 
also spiritual expansion from America'.^?
In order to resist external domination, a strong and united nation had 
to be reborn. 'In Ukraine a nation is intensively forming itself, but there 
are many potential 'centres of national "crystallisation". There will be 
competition between them for the right to form, and determine the 
future face of, the nation'.®** In order to overcome the potential anarchy 
of such competition, there must be an authoritarian and statist domestic 
order. 'Freedom is a wonderful thing. But no freedom can exist...when it 
is not supported by some kind of order. Today in the world only strength 
is respected. All questions, problems, contradictions can only be resolved 
from a position of s t r e n g th ' .® 9  For the UNA, true freedom was the 
unconstrained might of the strong nation, not that of individuals using 
their license to undermine national cohesion and strength.
Such a nation could only be created by a national elite, forming a 
powerful nation-state in its own image. Given that the Ukrainian ethnos 
was now weakened and disunited by centuries of Russification, and 
decades of totalitarian rule, it was impossible 'for the Ukrainian ethnos 
to become a strong political nation in the near future without her 
general organisation from above'.90 In a time of economic and social 
chaos, Ukraine was facing 'the ruination of old views of the world, 
morals, and the old store of understanding. There is a search for new 
values and new orientations'.91 In other words, the time was right for a 
Nietzschean 'revaluation of values', to be led by the new national elite. 
The twenty first century would then be the century of nationalism, and 
above all of Ukrainian nationalism. As stated above, the UNA was 
increasingly prepared to accept that the elite of what they termed the new
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Natsiokratiia would, apart eventually from themselves, in practice have 
to be the national communists, and the UNA’s support for them grew 
more steadfast through 1992.
Most of the above could have been lifted straight from the work of 
Dontsov, and the UNU/ UNA's literature was full of reprints of his 
works. The UNA echoed his attack on the weak-mindedness of the 
Ukrainian elite, and its 'provincial' mentality, and the need for national 
salvation through the Nietzschean transformation of the individual 
into the embodiment of the national 'spirit' or 'will', and the leadership 
of the nation to redemption by an elite of such men (whereas the URP 
preferred the traditional conservative nationalist philosopher, 
V'iacheslav Lypyns'kyi. See Chapter 3).
The UNU liked to argue that 'the Ukrainian revolution has two 
phases: the first is national-democratic (the establishment of the 
Ukrainian Weimar republic, the sale and dispersal of everything into 
small pieces), and the second - is the decisive entry of nationalism onto 
the scene in organised forms (the rapid formation of the nation and 
preparing the possibility for its spiritual take-off). We are people of the 
second wave’. The second phase would be characterised by the 
emergence of hierarchy out of chaos. In order to lead this process, he 
who 'calls himself a nationalist, must be he best in every respect: in 
educating others, in a fight, in his profession, in his action’, and 'must 
stand out from the crowd through his dignity, nobility, and intellect 
wherever he may find himself, at work, at home, on the barricades or in 
prison. Above all, he must never be similar to the common herd'. Such 
an individual moreover m ust devote himself wholesale to the 
nationalist movement. The individual 'realises himself through the 
organisation. The organisation will defend you. Your state - is the
organisation '.^
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Ethnic politics
However the UNA's ideology was closer to fascism than Nazism, and 
placed little overt emphasis on racial theory. Unlike the DSU, the UNA 
(and the UNSO paramilitaries, see below) was open to non-ethnic 
Ukrainians. Indeed UNSO had fought beside Russian Cossacks in 
Moldova in 1992. Both organisations were prepared to accept anybody for 
whom the building of a strong state was the first priority, although of 
course in practice the UNA's membership was overwhelmingly 
Ukrainian. However, although the UNA claimed not to be as 
preocuppied with traditional ethnic politics as the DSU or OUN-r (see 
Chapter 7), the UNA's definition of the national interests of the new 
Ukrainian state was clearly ethnidst.
The UNA believed that one of the key duties of a strong state was the 
defence of the interest of Ukrainians living beyond Ukraine. 'He who 
does not pursue an active politics beyond the boundaries of the state, will 
become subject to the active politics of his n e i g h b o u r s ' . ^  Accordingly, 
the UNA’s press was full of news concerning the interests of Ukrainians 
abroad (under the heading Sobornist' , meaning 'unity' or 'ingathering'), 
and condemning the 'separatism' of non-Ukrainian minorities at home 
(a section simply called 'Fifth Column' in Zamkova hora ). In Spring 
1992, the UNA set up a Kuban ' fund to help the many largely 
denationalised Ukrainians who still lived t h e r e .9 4  They were also one of 
the prime movers behind the formation of the Union of Officers of the 
U kra in ian . Diaspora, called ’Return to the M otherland’ ( "Za  
povernennia na bat'kivshchynu" ) in Kiev on 19 July 1992.95 (At the 
time the campaign to persuade ex-Soviet servicemen left on Ukrainian 
territory to take the oath of loyalty, to the new Ukrainian Army had
proved remarkably successful, and nationalists were beginning to argue 
that many non-Ukrainians had only signed up for economic reasons, 
and should be replaced with ethnic Ukrainians officers stranded 
elsewhere in the former Soviet Union).
The UNSO was active in the Crimea, and in the 'Dnister republic' 
(see below). The UNA regarded Kravchuk’s comments in June 1992 that 
hinted at possible future Ukrainian support for the Dnistran rebels as a 
victory for their months of campaigning on behalf of ’fellow Ukrainians' 
in the breakaway region (28% of the area's population was Ukrainian in 
1989, but highly Russified) .96 The UNA took a characteristically extreme 
attitude towards Crimean separatism, issuing a terse official statement 
after Bagrov’s short-lived declaration of Crimean independence in May 
1992 to the effect that 'The Crimea will either be Ukrainian or 
depopulated1 (bezliudnym ).97 The UNA regarded the test of Ukrainian 
will in the Crimea as Ukraine's T h e rm o p y la e .'^
Foreign and defence policy
The UNA put much of its energies into developing a military and 
defence doctrine, which it came to regard as its special province. It was 
often the first to express a developing philosophy of realpolitik and an 
aggressive defence of national interests, when others were still afraid to 
do so. The UNA was fond of declaring that liberals and others 'do not 
understand that the enemy is not interested whether the people of a 
given country conduct themselves well or badly. He simply follows his 
own interests',99 as Ukraine must follow hers. The UNA criticised the 
Ukrainian government for having been seduced by doctrines of 
'minimum sufficiency', and for remaining hamstrung by the unrealistic 
commitments made in the July 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty
concerning Ukraine's neutral and non-nuclear status.100 Ukraine's 
national communist leaders had also not fully overcome the habit of 
servility to Russia, and an obsessive concern with Moscow affairs.
The UNA, on the other hand (the UNA was even more outspoken 
than the URP), saw itself as expressing the inner thoughts of many in the 
state apparatus who remained constrained by the above commitments 
from developing a clear philosophy of the Ukrainian national interest.
According to Shukhevych at the press conference in autumn 1991 
that launched his campaign for the presidency, 'the question of borders, 
and the question of atomic weapons, must be decided by Ukraine. No 
encroachment by Moscow on the territory of Ukraine should force us to 
renounce nuclear arms. The democrats, who today express the concept of 
a nuclear-free Ukraine, are acting against her interests, against her 
security'.101 In other words, 'given the territorial pretensions of Russia', 
'we need a guarantee that Ukraine will be strong...and for this, she must 
have an army with nuclear arms'. 102
According to the UNA's 'military doctrine' 'every one of Ukraine's 
neighbours has territorial pretensions (historical or political) against 
her'. Russia of course was the most serious threat, but because 'Ukraine 
was not in the condition to raise similar forces [to Russia], the basis of 
her Armed Forces therefore must be nuclear weapons. They are the only 
guarantee of the defense preparedness of Ukraine'. According to the 
UNA, nuclear weapons would provide the necessary short-term defence 
until Ukraine successfully developed its own self-sufficient military- 
industrial c o m p le x .  103
Ukraine should also develop her-defence against Russia by 'the 
creation of a buffer zone between Ukraine and Russia in terms of 
autonomous or state structures in the Kuban' and the Don’; 'by 
supporting national liberation movements on the territory of the
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present-day Russian Federation'; and through ’the creation of an anti- 
Russian defensive alliance, above all of the countries of the Baltic, 
Caucasus and Central Asia’.lO4
All of these subjects were taboo when first raised by the UNA, but all 
came under official consideration in 1992. The UNA therefore had a 
significant influence on Ukrainian defence and foreign policy thinking, 
contributing to the radicalisation of Ukrainian positions in 1991-2 and to 
the attempt to construct an anti-Russian realpolitik.
Domestic politics
In internal affairs, the UNA supported the creation of other aspects of 
national statehood, especially the formation of a national Orthodox 
Church. The UNA and UNSO were strong supporters of Metropolitan 
Filaret's defection to join the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church, and form a united national Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev 
Patriarchy) in June 1992 (see below). UNA and UNSO paramilitaries 
often appeared at official Church functions, and were allegedly 
responsible for a series of attacks on those priests who remained loyal to 
Moscow.
The UNA's economic policy combined both populism and a 
corporatist emphasis on the need for state support in the creation of an 
effective national economy. The political resolution of the eighth session 
of the UNA in June 1992 condemned 'unconsidered privatisation' and 
an open door for foreign i n v e s t m e n t .  105 The UNA's rhetoric concerning 
'socially just privatisation’ and condemning price increases had much 
in common with that of the Socialist Party of Ukraine. At the same 
time, however, the UNA clearly hoped that economic hardship would 
provide it with a pool of recruits. The UNA's leadership constantly
refered to a ’Weimar scenario', hoping that Ukraine would pass through 
a similar period of declining order and prosperity, so that the UNA 
benefited from the consequent radicalisation of public opinion.
Support
The UNA was officially registered in May 1 9 9 2 , and announced its 
intention of participating in all future elections. It expected to gain 5-7%  
of the vote. 1 0 6  Opinion polls in 1 9 9 1  showed that the majority of the 
public was simply ignorant of its activities. In September 1 9 9 1 , only 2%  of 
the public considered themselves ’well-informed’ concerning the UNA, 
whereas 1 5 %  ’knew something’ about t h e m . 1 0 7  However, its 
controversial antics, especially those of the UNSO, rapidly gained it a 
higher profile in 1 9 9 1 -2 , and a notorious reputation, helping to polarise 
opinion about them. In December 1 9 9 1 ,1 1 .6 %  evaluated them positively, 
1 2 .4 %  negatively, whilst 76%  offered no opinion or found it difficult to
r e p ly .^ 0 8
The UNA claimed a membership of 16,000 when it was registered, 
and 14,000 in February 1 9 9 3 .*09 Such claims were likely to be based on 
the nominal membership figures of all of the UNA’s supposed 
constituent parties, however, many of whom had fallen by the wayside. 
Five thousand of the UNA's claimed membership in February 1993 were 
in Western Ukraine, and 950 in L'viv alone. However, the UNA’s 
membership was less geographically concentrated than that of other 
nationalist parties, and the UNA had local organisations in 14 of 
Ukraine's oblasts.**0 The UNA’s leaders claimed more success in 
attracting members outside of Western Ukraine than the more 
traditionalist DSU, and in building a modern nationalist movement 
capable of expanding its appeal beyond OUN veterans and Galician
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extremists to disaffected and radical youth in the rest of turban Ukraine 
(particularly through its paramilitary branch, the UNSO - see below). The 
UNA’s key leaders, such as Oleh Vitovych and Dmytro Korchyns’kyi, 
had after all begun their political careers in the youth group SNUM.
The Ukrainian Peoples' Self-Defence Forces (UNSO)
The UNA attracted most notoriety through the creation of its 
paramilitary wing, the Ukrainian Peoples’ Self-Defence Forces (in 
Ukrainian UNSO). According to Mel'nyk, 'UNSO is a completely anti­
party organisation. It is an organisation of social order, created because 
peoples saw the need for self-defence, because in Ukraine everything is 
falling apart, everything, - state and military structures'.* ** Its main 
purpose was to undertake the actions that the nationalists felt that the 
state was too cautious to perform itself (dealing with separatists, mafiosi 
of pro-Moscow priests) or to provide the state with additional manpower 
when it did take its responsibilities seriously.
The initiative to form UNSO came after August 1991, when it was felt 
that the young Ukrainian state lacked the means to defend itself 
(Ukraine had yet to create her own Armed Forces), given that Yel'tsin's 
press spokesman had already caused a storm by announcing the 
possibility of Russian territorial pretensions on Ukraine, and separatist 
movements in the Crimea, Donbas and Transcarpathia were 
strengthening in response to Ukrainian in d e p e n d e n c e .*  *2 Moreover, it 
was feared that the authorities would not yet be able to control the 
internal security and economic situation. Posters circulated by the UNA 
in Kiev in autumn 1991 stated that recruits who were 'physically healthy 
individuals, without needless psychological complexes, who wish to take 
part in acts directed towards the defence of national interests in
288
Prydnistrov’iia, the Crimea and other regions can realise their dreams in 
the ranks of UNSO'.H^ By May 1992, the UNA was claiming a total 
membership for UNSO of 5,000, more than half of whom were non- 
party individuals. Most were youths, but the UNSO also included some 
ex-officers and policeman in its ranks.! 1^ The L'viv branch of UNSO 
even issued an appeal to women aged 17-30 'with nationalistic views' to 
join their ranks in January 1993.115
UNSO based itself on the traditions of the Free Cossack movement 
active in Ukraine during 1917-21, and the UNS (Ukrainian Peoples' Self- 
Defence) militia active in Western Ukraine in 1941-4.116 its uniform and 
insignia were similarly evocative of the UNS and the UPA. UNSO's 
programme stated that its main tasks were to 'the defence of military and 
state objects; the struggle with sabotage and diversions; the direction of 
reconnaissance and the organisation of a partisan movement of an 
aggressive type; the support of law and order, assistance of the police; and 
helping the population in extraordinary circumstances, in times of 
industrial catastrophes and natural disasters'.! 17 UNSO attempted to 
function legitimately. It even demanded 'the political and financial 
support of the leadership of the state in connection with securing formal 
neutrality',! 1® but the organisation was refused official registration by 
the Ministry of Justice in May 1992.119
UNSO’s practical activities were various. Most notoriously, it claimed 
to have sent 200 of its members to join the fighting in the 'Dnister 
republic' in Spring 1992. Ukraine's stated policy at the time was one of 
neutrality, if not de facto support for the Moldovan authorities, and 
Kiev had closed the border with Moldova in March 1992 to prevent the 
transit of volunteers to the fighting. There were therefore calls to 
prosecute UNSO for taking part in the hostilities.120 UNSO also made 
several trips to the Crimea, including one in Spring 1992 with then URP
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deputy leader Stepan Khmara, where UNSO members ’confronted’ 
activists of the separatist Republican Movement of the Crimea.
Perhaps most surprisingly, UNSO paramilitaries (in uniform) 
provided a guard for Metropolitan Filaret during his public appearances, 
especially after he agreed to break ranks with the Russian Orthodox 
hierarchy and form the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kievan Patriarchy) 
in alliance with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in June 
1992. UNSO members attempted to storm the Kiev Pechers'k monastery, 
the stronghold of those bishops who refused to go along with Filaret’s 
union, in the same m o n t h .  1 2 *
UNSO has also tried to perform a 'Guardian Angel' function by 
patrolling areas of high crime. Its members have assisted Ukraine's hard- 
pressed customs officials in attempting to ensure that Ukraine's best 
produce was not spirited away over its borders, and in combating local 
'mafiosi' and 'speculators'.
It is difficult to assess the popularity of all the above actions, but it can 
be said that UNSO enjoyed a measure of tacit support beyond ultra­
nationalist circles. The fact that the organisation was not suppressed in 
1991-2 shows remarkable official toleration. In 1992 Ukraine was far from 
disintegrating into the open chaos and warlordism characteristic of the 
former Yugoslavia, but the appearance of an open paramilitary 
organisation was obviously deeply worrying, indicating the potential for 
inter-ethnic conflict if the economic and/or security situation were to 
dramatically worsen.
Conclusion
The 'Weimar scenario' so often dted by the leaders of the UNA and 
UNSO remained in early 1993 a distinct possibility (the UNA’s leaders
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also liked to compare themselves with Le Pen's National Front in 
France, and even with the Klu Klux Klan).^22 It would be rash to predict 
which of Ukraine's many ultra-nationalist political groups would benefit 
from a radicalisation of nationalist public opinion, but as of autumn 
1992, the UNA was best placed to do so.
In 1990-92, however, the UNA's main practical importance was to 
break the taboo on key subjects, such as the retention by Ukraine of the 
nuclear weapons left on her territory by the collapse of the former 
Union, or the protection of the interests of Ukrainians living in the 
Russian federation. Such issues then slowly percolated into official 
circles, if necessary via more respectable parties like the URP. The UNA, 
because of its controversial public image, did not have the same personal 
contacts with government circles as the DPU or URP, but its importance 
lay in the ideas that it raised.. Moreover, the UNA chose its issues 
carefully, campaigning as the nationalist conscience of Ukraine, rather 
than being diverted into marginal issues like many of the smaller 
nationalist groups, or speaking the language of the past, like the OUN. 
The UNA was 'against ukase [decrees] that cannot be put into a c t io n ! ,!  23 
and was cautious of discrediting itself by running too far ahead of the 
current climate of nationalist opinion.
According to Korchyns'kyi in May 1992, 'Kravchuk is a mirror. He 
simply reflects the existing situation. In a year [when we have gathered] 
sufficient strength, Kravchuk will be a nationalist'.124 In 1990-92, 
Kravchuk did indeed swing to the right, as nationalist forces made the 
running. On the other hand, the UNA's extreme political message was 
never likely to have much appeal to Russian-speaking groups in Eastern 
and Southern Ukraine, despite the UNA’s care to avoid an openly 
ethnidst programme. Rather, the UNA's antics, and especially those of 
the paramilitary UNSO, only served to help confirm the propagandist
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stereotype in Eastern and Southern Ukraine that all Ukrainian 
nationalists were Nazis, and were a factor in encouraging the rise of 
Russophone political groups in Eastern Ukraine from the summer of 
1992.
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7. SMALLER GROUPS:
ETHNIC NATIONALISTS AND OTHERS
Introduction
Chapter 1 explained both how radical ethnic nationalism enjoyed 
considerable popular support in Galicia in.the inter-war period, and how 
difficult it had been to transplant Gaiician nationalism to the rest of 
Ukraine, in the 1940s after Galicia was absorbed into the Soviet Union. 
Although after 1945 Galicia shared in many of the post-war social 
changes that affected the rest of Ukraine, it remained a largely 
agricultural region, whose radical traditions marked it off from the rest 
of Ukraine. It was therefore only to be expected that ethnic nationalism 
was bound to revive to an extent in Galicia, as national traditions were 
'rediscovered' from the late 1980s onwards, after initial expectations 
concerning Ukrainian statehood were disappointed, and after the 
economic situation sharply worsened, in the early 1990s. After an initial 
period of euphoria in 1988-90, many Galicians became frustrated with the 
slow pace of constitutional change and with Kiev's cautious approach to 
Ukrainianising the new state, and consequently shifted their support to 
organisations of the far right. As was to be expected, however, such 
groups found little support elsewhere in Ukraine.
The first organisation to embrace the far-right nationalism of the 
1930s OUN was the tiny Ukrainian National Party founded in 1989 (see 
Chapter 6). It was then followed by the (Organisation for) Ukrainian 
Statehood and Independence (known by its Ukrainian acronym of DSU) 
founded by radical members of the UHU in 1990, and a variety of openly 
neo-nazi groups such as the Social-National Party of Ukraine and the 
Ukrainian National-Radical Party. Other parties, notably the Ukrainian
Conservative Republican Party (formed as the result of a split from the 
URP in 1992); the Ukrainian Peasants' Democratic Party; and the 
Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party although in theory much closer to 
the political mainstream, also upheld many of the traditions of the 
OUN. Although political satellites of the URP, they also had one foot in 
the ultra-nationalist camp. Finally, the various £migr£ branches of the 
OUN itself began to revive their activity in Ukraine in the early 1990s, 
with the most radical and most active, the OUN-r, forming the Congress 
of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) as a front organisation for its activities 
in 1992.
All such parties tended to remain small, and largely confined to 
Galicia, but they exercised considerable influence in dragging more 
moderate nationalists to the right. Moreover, by confirming Eastern 
Ukrainians' traditional preconceptions of radical Galician nationalism, 
they helped to widen the split between Western and Eastern Ukraine.
The DSU
The DSU was established by former members of the UHU in April 
1990, who had become disillusioned by the latter's failure to declare itself 
in favour of outright Ukrainian independence in 1988-9, and was later 
periodically reinforced by radical nationalists defecting from the URP 
(such as Roman Koval', Serhii Zhyzhko, Volodymyr Yavors’kyi and the 
DSU's first leader Ivan Kandyba, who had all been leading figures in the 
UHU-URP). The UHU's leaders had argued in 1988-89 that Ukrainian 
public opinion was not yet prepared to accept the demand for full 
independence, and that the UHU had to preserve its influence on the 
public by not rushing too far ahead of them.1 By rejecting such an 
approach, the DSU demonstrated its preference for ideological purity
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over political pragmatism. Moreover, the potential size of the 
organisation was deliberately limited by denying membership to non- 
Ukrainians or those in any way connected with the CPSU.2 Also, 
whereas the UHU-URP based itself (at least on paper) on the civic 
traditions of the shestydesiatnyky' and the UHG (see Chapter 3), the DSU 
harked back to the ethnic nationalist traditions of the OUN and the 
underground Ukrainian National Front of the 1960s. The DSU was 
therefore largely confined to Galicia and its membership middle-aged, 
unlike the UNA which was more successful in building a more modem 
ultra-nationalist movement with more appeal to radical youth 
throughout Ukraine.
The DSU's founding congress in L'viv on 7-8 April 1990 was attended 
by 180 delegates representing 30Q members.® Significantly, 75% of the 
delegates were from L'viv oblast.^ The DSU has never grown 
significantly in size since. At the time of its second congress (zbir ) in 
December 1991, the organisation still only claimed 650 members,® 
although by then it claimed to be active in 22 of 25 Ukraine’s oblasts.® 
The DSU's first leader Ivan Kandyba admitted, however, that the DSU's 
main organisations were in Western Ukraine (L'viv, Ivano-Frankivs’k 
and Rivne), although it also had strongholds in Zaporizhzhia and in the 
Donbas.'7 At the DSU’s third congress in December 1992 the DSU's main 
ideologist and new deputy leader Roman Koval' admitted that 
membership was stagnant,® (in fact it had fallen to 530) whilst the 
congress was attended by delegates from only 16 oblasts (plus delegates 
from the historically ethnically Ukrainian lands of the Kuban' and 
Voronezh in Russia).^ According to Kandyba, the DSU's membership 
did not include 'many intelligentsia. Our main membership consists of 
relatively unskilled white-collar workers [sluzhbovtsi ] of a middle 
intellectual level, no more'.*® The DSU's membership was also mainly
middle-aged, but the organisation made a conscious, if unsuccessful, 
attempt to attract radical youth by lowering its membership age from 18 
to 16 in January 1992.11
The DSU elected as its first leader Ivan Kandyba. Kandyba was a long­
standing nationalist dissident who had been sentenced to 15 years with 
Levko LukHianenko as one of the original members of the UWPU in 
1961 (see Chapter 3), and had also been one of the founder members of 
the UHG in 1976 before being imprisoned again in 1981-88.1 ^  However, 
Kandyba, although accorded respect for his 22 years in the camps, was not 
a dynamic leader, and at the DSU's third congress in December 1992 he 
was replaced by Volodymyr Shlemko, one of a dozen or so ultra-radical, 
bu t independent-m inded, members of the Ukrainian Supreme 
Council.1^
The DSU's main publications were Neskorena Natsiia ('The Nation 
Unsubdued'), edited in Kiev by Roman Koval' with a circulation of
11,000, and from 1992 the former journal of the radical youth movement 
SNUM in L’viv, Napriam ('Direction') edited by Volodymyr Yavors'kyi 
with a circulation of 3,000.
Before August 1991 the DSU was in effect an underground party that, 
like the UNP and UIA, refused to participate in what it saw as the 
'illegitimate' institutions of the Ukrainian SSR. It was even somewhat 
reluctant to participate in Ukraine's first presidential elections in 
Autumn 1991, although KovaT’s paper Neskorena Natsiia (not formally 
the organ of the DSU until December 1991) endorsed the UNA’s 
candidate  Yurii Shukhevych.1 * Like other u ltra-nationalist 
organisations, however, it soon became a strong supporter of 'our' state. 
The DSU applied for, and received, official registration in March 1 9 9 3 .1^
In theory therefore, the DSU should have shared much common 
ground with its stablemates of the ultra-right. However, proposals to
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establish a common front of all ultra-right parties always seemed to 
flounder on minor policy differences and personality clashes. The DSU 
distrusted its main rival, the UIA-UNA, because of the latter's 
'adventurism', its insufficiently reverent attitude towards the OUN, its 
willingness to cooperate with former communists, and its failure to 
restrict membership to Ukrainians only. The former deputy leader of the 
URP, Stepan Khmara, proposed cooperation with his Ukrainian 
Conservative Republican Party (see below), at the third congress of the 
DSU in December 1992,16 but personal differences again made this an 
unlikely prospect. For a time the DSU was linked with the £migr£ OUN- 
r, but even this relationship soon collapsed. This failure to cooperate and 
consolidate was symptomatic of the ultra-right as a whole, which 
remained fractious and ill-disciplined.
An ethnic super-state
The DSU's programme called for 'the building by democratic means 
of a Ukrainian state within [her] ethnographic b o r d e r s ’. ! ?  iVan Kandyba 
later clarified this as meaning that ethnic Ukrainian territory in Poland 
and Slovakia (Lemko Ukraine), Belarus' (Brest) and Russia (the Kuban', 
Strarodub, Vorenezh and Taganrog) should be permitted to peacefully 
reunite with Ukraine,!® probably by r e f e r e n d u m .!  9  The DSU usually 
stressed that this is a long-term ambition that the young Ukrainian state 
was in practice still too weak to achieve. In the short-term therefore, the 
organisation has confined itself to sending literature and 'cultural 
agitators' to such regions, but it hopes to take advantage of what is sees as 
the inevitable development of centrifugal tendencies within the Russian 
Federation to eventually add such territory to a Ukrainian super-state, 
united 'from the Carpathians to the Caucasus'.?®
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The DSU has also called for ethnic Ukrainians to receive priority 
treatment within the Ukrainian state. At its first congress in 1990, the 
DSU demanded that 'only Russians study the Russian language in 
Ukraine, and that for other citizens it should be one of [many] foreign 
languages'^ (a position later supported by the ULS). According to the 
DSU's official statement of its political philosophy in 1991, 'we 
understand the nation as an ethnos....an ethnos which has power 
over...national minorities. The meaning of "nation" and the state are for 
us indivisible'.^^ Most bluntly, 'nationalism as we understand it is about 
the defence of the Ukrainian ethnos’.23 The DSU in fact frequently 
attacked the dvic nationalism of those such as the DPU's Dmytro 
Pavlychko, 'who want to build in Ukraine not a Ukrainian state, but a 
"state of [all] the peoples of Ukraine"'.24 instead the DSU sought to 
revive Mikhnovs'kyi's slogan of 'Ukraine for the Ukrainiansf’25 (see 
Chapter 1). The DSU castigated the shestydesiatnyky for having 
abandoned what they saw as the ideology of the OUN. According to 
Koval’, 'the level of national consciousness amongst the dissidents/ 
human rights activists of the 1960s to 1980s was not high. A large 
proportion of them was more [concerned with] defending the rights of 
Soviet individuals than with defending the rights of the Ukrainian 
people’.26 Hence they were now ill-equiped to lead a national revival. 
Koval’ agreed with Mikhnovsk’yi and Dontsov’s diagnosis that the 
biggest obstade to Ukrainian independence was always the feeble­
mindedness and 'cosmopolitan' preference for 'universal' over national 
values amongst the native Ukrainian intelligentsia.27
Their biggest mistake was to try to incorporate the 11.4 million 
Russian minority, a massive potential fifth column, into a civic 
Ukrainian state, by promising that Russians would live better in Ukraine 
than in Russia itself. Instead, 'active U krainianisation and
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discrimination in favour of Ukrainians [protektsionists'ka stosovno 
UkraXntsiv ] will create a political climate not only favourable towards a 
Ukrainian renaissance, but will also create an atmosphere of social 
discomfort for Russians, which will contribute to their gradual removal 
to beyond the borders of Ukraine’,28 (a line similar to that of radical 
Estonian nationalists). Anatol' Shcherbatiuk provoked calls for his 
prosecution at the third DSU congress in December 1992 be declaring that 
the only thing to do with 'our internal enemies' was 'to get a gun and 
start shooting'.^
Moreover, the Russians were the natural enemies of Ukrainian 
statehood, because of their imperial mentality. According to Koval', 'the 
history of Russia - is the history of raiding, wars, plunder, Anschluss, 
occupation, intervention, blockade, and unceremonial interference in 
the affairs of other nations and peoples’. ^  The Russian people could not 
blame imperialism on the Tsars or on communism, rather it was in 
their blood; - 'the Russian people themselves are the creators of the 
Russian empire'.31 ’It is not worthwhile to talk about the differences 
between the national politics of Russian democrats, monarchists and 
communists. They have one single policy - imperial and chauvinistic 
[velukoderzhavna ]'.32 Not only should Russians be opposed per se as 
natural imperialists, but an explicitly anti-Russian Ukrainian orientation 
would provide the 'image of an enemy’ around which to consolidate an 
otherwise weak nation. About this, the DSU was quite explicit; - 'a 
nation needs the image of an enemy, an object to beat upon. A people is 
used to having someone to blame for its misfortunes'.33 According to 
Koval’, speaking in 1992, 'only that politics which has a clear image of 
the enemy is effective. When the CPSU existed it was easier to organise 
people against it, but now nobody says to the people that our enemy is
Russia'.34
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Anti-semitism also often bubbled fairly close to the surface in the 
DSU's publications and actions. Even if it remained something of a taboo 
subject as late as 1992, the DSU knew how to speak in the right code, 
sparking a discussion concerning the need to rehabilitate the word 'yid' 
in 1992,^5 and often leading protests against the supposed victimisation 
of Ivan Demjanjuk by Israel.36
The only way to build a true Ukrainian nation-state was to 
consolidate it around a 'national idea', a simple ethnic conception of 
citizenship which all could comprehend. Only an undifferentiated 
ethnie could build a strong nation-state. It should make no concessions 
to national minorities. According to Koval’ again, 'it's absurd for 
national minorities to dictate to us what our national flag and national 
symbols should be. Russians like Charadeev, Griniov and Rugoslav 
[Russian deputies in the Ukrainian Supreme Council] are trying to ban 
us from having our own national symbols, like Arabs getting up in the 
French parliament and saying that the Tricolour should have only two
colours!'37
As in Dontsov's conception of nationalism and that of the original 
OUN (see Chapter 1), all other values should be subordinated to that of 
the nation. 'A nation is always built by force',33 and 'an organisation, 
which bases itself on democracy will never lead a nation to f r e e d o m ' .39 
Democracy divides the people during the crucial period of nation- 
building, when there should instead be order, hierarchy and discipline. 
Whereas 'modern Ukraine in both politics and the state - is a classic 
example of the rule of the w e a k ,'4 0  the DSU proposed instead a vulgar 
Nietzschean mixture of a hierarchically ordered society, a cult of 
heroism, and an ideology of national might, in which 'the rights of the 
state took priority over the rights of the in d iv id u a l'.^ !  In January 1992 
therefore Koval' summarised the DSU's values as 'traditionalism,
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idealism, national interests, the unity of all Ukrainian lands, militarism, 
hierarchy, order, the supremacy of the state, responsibility before the 
nation, anti-communism and anti-liberalism' .42
National defence
To this end, the DSU placed great emphasis on the importance of 
building up national defence, and was one of the first groups to call for 
the retention of nuclear weapons by Ukraine. Koval' had argued in the 
build-up to the first URP congress in 1990 that Ukraine should become a 
nuclear state, only to be overruled by Oles' Shevchenko.43 Kandyba, 
addressing the third Rukh congress on 28 February 1992, had caused a 
stir by calling for a halt to Ukraine's 'unilateral disarm am ent'.^ The 
DSU's Anatol’ Shcherbatiuk argued in March 1992 that 'only atomic 
weapons will allow the proud and unobstructed development of 
Ukraine in the future*, and 'allow Ukraine to live amongst the world 
hierarchy of aggressive nations '.^  For Koval’, disarmament while 
Russia, 'our historical and actual enemy', remains a nuclear power, 
would simply ensure that Ukraine remains a colony'.46
If the DSU had not existed, a similar organisation would have taken 
its place. There was always a political space for an ethnidst Galidan party 
following in the footsteps of the OUN, However, the DSU's influence 
seemed likely to diminish once the real OUN returned to active 
Ukrainian political life in 1992.
The OUN and Ukrainian Politics
From 1989 at least, the various factions of the OUN in exile (see 
Chapter 1) began to try to exerdse a degree of more direct influence back
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in Ukraine. The more moderate OUN-m largely preferred to work with 
the URP, while the better-funded and better organised OUN-r sought out 
more radical partners. To assist its rehabilitation in Ukraine the OUN-r 
sought to present itself as a reformed organisation with a new-found 
commitment to democracy, but its tactics remained manipulative and its 
declarations dissimulative.
Its initial approach was to work through front organisations, and to 
attempt to radicalise existing nationalist organisations in the direction of 
Banderite nationalism (see Chapter 1). The first tactic brought 
disappointing results, as the OUN-r's chosen targets (the UNP and UIA) 
were happy to receive material assistance, but unwilling to become the 
puppets of the £migr£s, whilst the URP, the main target of the second 
tactic, had largely checked the rising tide of radicalism within its ranks by 
the time of its second congress in June 1991 (see Chapter 3). Therefore the 
OUN-r’s leaders, by then permanently resident again in Ukraine, 
changed tack in 1992 and sponsored the formation of the Congress of 
Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) as a front organisation for the revival of 
the OUN-r in Ukraine.
The OUN-r was also the leading force behind the Anti-Bolshevik 
Bloc of Nations formed in 1943, and renamed the Assembly of the Bloc 
of European and Asian Nations for Independence and Freedom at a 
conference in Toronto in November 1992,47 which was also active in 
Ukraine.
The OUN-r's early partners
The OUN-r had first looked to the Ukrainian National Party as the 
organisation closest to its own heart, but the idiosyncratic behaviour of 
its leader Hryhorii Prykhod’ko soon ruptured ties (see Chapter 6 ). 
Similarly, the UIA-UNA was unwilling to be manipulated by the OUN-
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r, and increasingly saw its nationalism as old-fashioned in any case (see 
Chapter 6 ). The all-Ukrainian Brotherhood of Veterans of the OUN- 
UPA, established in L’viv in April 1991 and led by Mykhailo 
Z e le n c h u k ,4 8  not surprisingly took a more reverent attitude towards the 
£migr£s, but the OUN-r still sought a more overtly political organisation 
through which to exercise influence. Its next target was therefore the 
DSU.
The DSU's literature had always reprinted much OUN material, and 
sought to portray the nationalists of the 1940s in an idealised heroic 
light.49 Moreover, the DSU’s leaders stressed both their ideological 
closeness to the OUN-r, and their opposition to the moderation and 
democratisation of its ideology after the splits of 1943 and 1954.50 The 
original leadership of the DSU included several veterans of the OUN- 
UPA, such as Petro Duzhyi, editor of the journal Ideia i chyn , (’Idea and 
Action') and Zenovii Krasivs’kyi (reportedly the leading representatives 
of the OUN-r in Ukraine in.the absence of its leader Slava Stets'ko).51 
The DSU and its supporters were also prone to criticise the dvic ideas of 
'democratic nationalists' such as Dmytro Pavlyckho of the DPU, and 
Mykhailo Horyn’ of the URP, preferring instead an idealised version of a 
truly 'Dontsovite' OUN.52 Hence they seemed natural allies for the 
OUN-r.
The links were more or less formalised around the time of the DSU’s 
second congress in December 1991, when both sides spoke warmly of the 
prospects for future cooperation. There was even talk of possible union 
between the two organisations.53 However, the OUN-r became 
disillusioned with the DSU's low intellectual level, and the leadership of 
the aged Kandyba; whilst the DSU mistrusted the OUN-r's attempt to 
paint itself in more moderate colours in order to facilitate its return to 
mainstream Ukrainian politics, and its basically instrumental attitude to
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the DSU. Therefore, the Conference of Ukrainian Nationalists that was 
held in Kiev in March 1992 under OUN-r sponsorship, which seemed at 
the time to mark a high-point in the development of cooperation 
between the DSU and OUN-r, in fact was used the first stage of the OUN- 
r's rebirth in Ukraine as a more or less independent organisation. By the 
time of the DSU's third congress in December 1992, the DSU was 
attacking the OUN-r for 'causing splits in the nationalist movement', 
and for 'looking on us like younger brothers'.^
Conference of Ukrainian Nationalists
The March 1992 Conference then marked a key change of tactics by 
the OUN-r. In the light of Ukrainian independence and the referendum 
of December 1991, the organisation had to rethink its traditional 
abstentionist and anti-communist tactics. The OUN-r therefore sought to 
attract more mainstream nationalists, such as the radical deputies Stepan 
Khmara, Larysa Skoryk and Les’ Taniuk, to its March 1992 Conference in 
order to legitimise its rebirth amongst more moderate opinion. All in 
all, 600 delegates attended.55 Although the conference used the still 
largely taboo word 'nationalist', it nevertheless called for 'all healthy 
national forces in Ukraine to unite in one nationalist block on the basis 
of a common platform'.56 Moreover, the conference declared that 
'democracy and multi-party [politics] are the basis of the Ukrainian state 
order', and stated that 'we shall always support the [state] power in 
Ukraine, if that power acts in the spirit of the interests of U k r a i n e ' . 5 7 
Slava Stets’ko, attempting to dissociate the OUN-r from narrow ethnic 
nationalism in her speech, declared that 'the OUN struggles against 
Russian imperialism and not against the state of the Russian people on 
their own ethnic territory', stressed the OUN’s 'anti-racism', and called
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for 'a common front’ of all Ukraine's ethnic minorities in the building 
of a Ukrainian s ta te d
At the same time, however, she declared that 'the liberal-democratic 
state is not the last word in history', and called for a 'new elite of the 
spirit', and called for a nationalism of national unity to transcend the 
egoism of the individual, and the selfishness of social classes.59 The 
influence of the OUN-r's radicalism was also clear in the call for 
'Ukrainian nationalism [to become] the official ideology of the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces', for the Union of Officers of Ukraine to 
become 'the nucleus of nationalism within the Armed Forces', and for a 
sober consideration of national interests to replace Ukraine's ill- 
considered rush to non-nuclear s t a t u s .6 0  Despite the attempt to present a 
respectable front, many delegates, such as Yevhen Smyrnov, made 
comments such as our 'internal enemy number one is those supporters 
of human rights and liberal democracy who are oriented towards 
Washington and Tel-Aviv'.^l Many of the OUN-r's former supporters 
were in any case critical of the decision to emerge, albeit partially, from 
the underground, as they were convinced that the traditional method of 
organisation would soon prove necessary again in the event of what 
they regarded as the inevitable coming conflict with Russia.
The conference announced the formation of a permanent Secretariat, 
whose task would be to coordinate the revival of nationalist forces in 
Ukraine. Therefore, throughout 1992, a series of rolling regional 
'Conferences of Ukrainian Nationalists' were held, mainly in Western 
U k r a i n e , 62 leading to a founding congress of the Conference of 
Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) in Kiev on 17-18 October 1992, attended by 
delegates from 23 of Ukraine's oblasts.63 KUN was officially registered as 
an all-Ukrainian organisation in January 1993, with Slava Stets'ko as its 
C h a i r w o m a n .64 On 30-31 January 1993 the split between the DSU and
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OUN-r was formalised, when Kandyba and others organised a Congress 
for the 'Relegalisation of the OUN' in L'viv, which was formally 
disowned by Stets'ko.65
There were good reasons for expecting KUN to become perhaps the 
largest single organisation of the ultra-right, and main rival to the UNA. 
It was well-funded in the diaspora, and from 1992 was able to distribute 
its newspaper Shliakh peremohy (’The Road to Victory') in Ukraine. As 
other ultra-right organisations fractured or declined in influence, KUN 
hoped to mop up their supporters and use its organisational strength to 
become the hegemonic party on the far right. Only the UNA seemed to 
have put down strong enough roots to survive as a significant 
independent force outside the orbit of KUN.
Peasant Democrats
The Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party (UPDP) was formed in June 
1990, but is more difficult to classify than other right wing parties. It has 
sought, without conspicuous success, to build a social base in the 
Ukrainian countryside, but it has also been active in wider politics, 
where, under the influence of the party's radical leader the writer Serhii 
P la c h y n d a ,6 6  it has adopted a position somewhat to the right of the URP.
The UPDP, however, failed to live up to its early promise. Ukrainian 
nationalism has traditionally looked to the village, and much of its 
support in the early part of the twentieth century had come from the 
smallholder farmers (kurkuly ), prominent in both West Ukraine (until 
the 1940s) and Central Ukraine (until collectivisation and the Great 
Famine in 1932/3). The UPDP in fact sought to project a traditionalist 
image by naming its paper Zemlia i volia (’Land and Liberty') after the 
nineteenth populist organisation. In 1991, 32% of the Ukrainian
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population was still classified as r u r a l .6 7  Therefore there were good 
grounds to expect good prospects for a rural nationalist party in Ukraine. 
Moreover, the movement to revive the Ukrainian village had quite 
broad backing in 1 9 9 0 .  The 'Appeal to the Peasants, Workers and 
Intelligentsia of Ukraine', published in March 1 9 9 0  by the initiative 
group to form a 'Peasants' Party', was signed by 2 1  prominent 
individuals, 1 9  of whom were still members of the communist p a r t y .6 8  
The party’s draft statute committed it to the principles of 'democratic
socialism’. ^
However, on 4  April 1 9 9 0  the group split, as the radicals who wished 
to restore 'traditional Ukrainian village life' were opposed by the 
representatives of the all-powerful collective farm chairmen and heads 
of agro-industry who wished to defend their social and economic 
domination of the countryside by building an organisation based on the 
existing rural communist structures. The majority therefore formed the 
Peasants’ Union of Ukraine in September 1 9 9 0 .^ 0  This in turn was the 
basis of the Peasants’ Party of Ukraine, established in January 1 9 9 2  under 
the sponsorship of establishment individuals such as the then Minister 
of Agriculture Oleksandr T k a c h e n k o .^ l  The Peasants' Party claimed a 
nominal membership of 1 .6  million, and cells in 3 4 0  raions in Ukraine,
(largely a hangover from the official rural organisations of the pre- 
perestroika era).72 Not surprisingly, its programme tended to stress 
continued state support for agriculture and the maintenance of the 
collective farm system.
The radical minority, meanwhile, called in early 1 9 9 0  on 'all honest 
individuals, dedicated to the national rebirth of town and village, 
workers in education and culture’ to join their r a n k s .^3 The founding 
conference of the UPDP was then held on 9  June 1 9 9 0  in K ie v .^ 4  The 
party declared its aims to be 'ending the plunder of the Ukrainian
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village’/ 'the rebirth of the culture and ethnos of the Ukrainian village’, 
and a reversal of its long-term spiritual, national and demographic 
decline.^ The party declared that it was ’above all a party of farmers', but 
admitted that the collective farm system, although 'the product of 
totalitarian socialism' which 'had brought enormous material and 
spiritual ruin on the village', had nevertheless 'become convenient for 
the majority of Ukrainian peasants’ and the party therefore stopped 
short of calling for its dissolution.^
Herein lay the party's problem. As one of its leading members 
admitted, the Ukrainian peasantry was like 'an internal colony' of the 
Soviet system, politically passive and difficult to m o b i l i s e d  Apart from 
radical peasants in Galicia therefore, the party's social base was limited to 
nationally conscious collective farm chairmen or members of the village 
intelligentsia, plus radical students at agricultural academies and first 
generation urban dwellers who retained their rural roots. These, 
however, were few and far between, and the party could never rival the 
Peasant's Party in size. The UPDP remained geographically confined to 
Galicia. At the party's founding conference, 3 2  of the delegates were from 
L’viv, 4 8  from Kiev, and 7  from Ivano-Frankivs'k. No other oblast' 
provided more than two d e l e g a t e s .78 initially optimistic claims for the 
party's membership; - 1 0 ,0 0 0  in June 1 9 9 0 ,7 9  and 3 0 ,0 0 0  in August 1 9 9 0 ;8 0  
were scaled down to 3 ,2 5 6  at the time of the party’s official registration in 
January 1 9 9 1 . Of these, 73%  were from Galicia ( 1 ,3 0 7  were from L'viv 
oblast' , 8 3 1  from Ivano-Frankivs'k, and 2 3 7  from Ternopil').®^ In 
February 1 9 9 2 ,  Plachynda claimed that the party had increased its 
membership to 5 ,0 0 0 ,  but accepted that it remained confined to Galicia, 
Kiev and a few central oblasts such as Cherkasy and K ir o v o h r a d .8 2  The 
party had little or no presence in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. The
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special deputy leader posts created to represent the two regions remained 
empty after the party’s first congress in 1990.
Even the above figures might be treated with some scepticism, as at 
the time of the conference of the L'viv branch of the UPDP in March 
1992, the local party only claimed 502 members, not 1,307.83 The same 
conference provided some information confirming the social base of the 
UPDP. Of the 151 delegates, 51 were heads of collective farms, 18 worked 
in local agricultural administration, and 27 were members of the 
agricultural firm Provesirt' , in whose premises the conference was 
held.84 The UPDP was often derided therefore, even in Galicia, for being 
a ’party of collective farm chairmen’.
The UPDP initially supported the founding of the Association of 
Ukrainian Farmers in February 1991,85 although the Association in turn 
formed a rival Farmers' Party in February 1 9 9 3 .8 8  Although this was 
unlikely to help expand the party’s social base in the short-term (there 
were reportedly only 78 registered farmers' businesses in Ukraine at the 
time,87 and still only 14,600 in February 1993),88 the UPDP had great 
hopes that land privatisation in Ukraine would eventually create a class 
of supporters. It lobbied strongly in the Supreme Council to radicalise the 
Land Law passed in January 1992 (which stopped short of wholeheartedly 
embracing the principle of the private ownership of land), and its 
pressure was a key factor leading to the more radical decree of January 
1993 transferring the ownership of small land plots to their current 
users89 (the UPDP has one deputy in the Ukrainian parliament, Dmytro 
Chobit from L’viv).
The political significance of the UPDP's failure to build political 
support for nationalism in the Ukrainian countryside outside Galicia 
was immense. It demonstrated yet again the relatively narrow social and 
regional base of the Ukrainian national movement. It was unable to
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make much headway in Eastern and Southern Ukraine for ethnic and 
historical reasons. Moreover, the countryside, still home to 32% of the 
Ukrainian* population, was also largely impervious to the nationalist 
message because of the continued social dominance of the collective 
farm system. Unlike many Central European states, Ukraine was unable 
to build a strong agrarian nationalist party. In Hungary and Romania 
such parties had dominated the inter-war period and in many cases been 
revived after 1989, but the collective farm system had much deeper roots 
in Ukraine, having been established a generation earlier (apart, as 
always, from in Galicia).
Ideology
Without a firm social base in the countryside, the political autonomy 
of the UPDP’s leaders was increased, and their growing radicalisation 
was apparent throughout 1990-93. Plachynda himself, after early 
moderation, was something of a loose cannon in the Ukrainian national 
movement as a whole, often being the first to express previously taboo 
thoughts.
Two of Plachynda’s deputies, Hryhorii Kryvoruchko and M. 
Starushko, caused a storm by attending the first session of the ultra- 
radical UIA in Summer 1990 (see Chapter 6 ) and declaring that the UPDP 
were ’not a parliamentary party'. Although their views were repudiated, 
and the UPDP still contained a countervailing moderate faction led by 
Volodymyr Shcherbyna, the original head of the party in L’viv, that 
favoured cooperation with the CPU, the party swung rapidly to the right 
after its founding congress. The party in July 1990 called for the 
nationalisation of all Soviet property in Ukraine and for the USSR to be 
replaced by a ’confederation of 100 states '.^  In December 1990 Dmytro 
Chobit introduced, without success, a bill before the Ukrainian
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parliament to nationalise all Soviet enterprises on Ukrainian territory. 
At the UPDP's second congress on 2 February 1991, the party resolutely 
opposed Gorbachev’s proposed Union Treaty, and could not even agree 
to support the project for a Confederative Union of Free States published 
by leading Ukrainian academics in Literaturna Ukra'ina on 24 January
1991. Instead, many delegates supported the proposed Galician 
referendum on outright independence for Ukraine.^* During the 
autumn 1991 presidential campaign, the UPDP was similarly split 
between moderate and radical nationalists, dividing its support between 
Levko Luk”ianenko and V”iacheslav Chornovil.92
Plachynda himself grew progressively more radical. In 1990, he 
declared that 'democratic nationalism is the ideology of the UPDP’.93 By 
dem ocratic nationalism , however, Plachynda understood 'the 
opposition to Great-power chauvinism', as demonstrated by the OUN 
and UP A. Therefore, 'the time of Bandera was [in fact] a national- 
liberation struggle, and Stepan Bandera was a national hero of 
U k r a i n e ' .94 According to Plachynda in June 1992, Ukraine needed 'an 
element of aristocratic rule, because, unless we stabilise our internal 
situation by aristocratic methods, we shall again become a colony, not 
only of Russia, but also of world c a p i t a l ' .95 By 1992 Plachynda was 
prepared to state openly that only radical nationalism was capable of 
defending Ukraine against Great Russian chauvinism, 'the most 
powerful enemy of the Ukrainian nation'. Although Plachynda stated 
that, 'Democracy, Autocracy and Nationalism are the three foundations 
[kyty ] of statehood’, he went on to argue that 'without autocracy there 
cannot be democracy. Because democracy without autocracy means 
anarchy, chaos, the destruction of society, or at least its degradation....At 
the same time, democracy without nationalism is Pharisaism, political 
intrigue, d e m a g o g y ' .96 in other words, Plachynda believed that
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democracy was a disposable luxury during the critical early stages of 
building a a nation-state.
At a round-table of political leaders (also broadcast on Ukrainian TV) 
with President Kravchuk in February 1992 largely devoted to the 
exchange of pleasantries, Plachynda stood out by declaring that 'we must 
scrap the Alma-Ata decision [by which control of 'strategic' nuclear 
weapons was a matter for the newly-created CIS] and end the transfer of 
nuclear arms to Russia. We must not delude ourselves here by playing 
with [the ideas of] internationalism and a non-nuclear state. It's 
impossible to believe in Russia. In Russia, as is obvious, there are 
chauvinistic black forces prepared for anything, including a nuclear 
attack on Ukraine. We must have a deterrent, which to them, is tactical 
nuclear weapons’. ^
At the founding assembly of the Congress of National-Democratic 
Forces in August 1992, Plachynda declared to huge applause that 'we 
should not support trans-national [pozanatsionaVnu , that is civic] 
democracy, that can become the hidden agent of chauvinism'. In other 
words, talk of minority rights was simply a means to prevent ethnic 
Ukrainians from obtaining their rights. In Plachynda's words, the 
majority of 'Russians support chauvinism, even fascism. Therefore 
Russians will only rid themselves of this chauvinistic complex, as the 
Germans freed themselves from fascism, - through war, suffering and 
b lood '.98 M0St controversially, at the fourth congress of Rukh in 
December 1992, he called for Ukraine to sell its nuclear weapons to 
Saddam Hussein and Colonel Gaddafi. Such controversial statements 
have nevertheless served to maintain Plachynda's high political profile.
The UPDP's third congress in March 1993 confirmed the general 
pattern described above. Although the party tried to remain a broad 
church, it was dominated by Plachynda, and continued to find it difficult
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to expand beyond Galicia (the party now claimed a total membership of 
over 4,000).99
Christian Democrats
The Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Party (UCDP), first established as 
the Ukrainian Christian-Democratic Front (UCDF) in November 1988, 
played an important role in 1988-90 by acting as the radical conscience of 
the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), and through mobilising Greek 
Catholic opinion in the 1987-89 relegalisation campaign. However, 
internal disagreements resulted in the party's split into three factions in 
1992, with the Kiev faction in effect dominated by Russian Orthodox 
believers. The better organised URP joined the Christian Democratic 
International in 1991 as the main representative of Ukrainian Christian 
conservatism, and the UCDP’s influence therefore went into sharp 
decline. The history of the UCDP's unfulfilled promise is however 
instructive, and provides further evidence of the limited appeal of 
Ukrainian nationalism. In Central and Eastern Europe the backbone of 
many nationalist movements has been a strong peasants' party, such as 
the Smallholders' Party in Hungary or Rural Solidarity in Poland, or a 
Christian nationalist party such as the Christian Democrats in Lithuania; 
but Ukrainian nationalists were unable to build either as a significant 
political force.
The UCDF was formed on 1 November 1988, (the anniversary of the 
creation of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918) by father and 
son Petro and Vasyl' Sichko,100 both former dissidents and founder 
members'of the UHU.101 Vasyl' Sichko claimed in 1991 that the UCDF 
had had 365 members at the time, but this seems exaggerated. 102 Like the 
UPDL and DSU, the UCDF was formed as a result of the impatience of
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the UHU's more radical members with the cautious line taken by the 
UHU on* the national question in 1988-89.103 As Vasyl' Sichko later 
explained; from the beginning 'we stood on truly principled anti­
communist positions. Because politics must be principled, if it is to be 
r e s p e c t e d ' .  104 As well as stressing the incompatibility of Christian and 
communist values, the UCDF moved more quickly than the UHU to 
support full Ukrainian i n d e p e n d e n c e . !  05 The Front also stressed the 
importance of reviving ethnically Ukrainian myths and symbols, and 
emphasised the specifically national aspects of religious revival. It was 
one. of the main supporters for the campaign to revive the two 
traditional national Ukrainian churches (the Greek Catholic and 
Autocephalous Orthodox) 'which were a moral and spiritual defence for 
millions of U k r a in ia n s ' .106 The early period of the UCDF's existence was 
therefore basically clandestine. The Front's first conference on 13 January 
1989 had to be held in a private apartment in L’viv.
In practice the UCDF was an almost exclusively Galician organisation, 
and its membership almost exclusively Greek Catholics, as admitted by 
Mykola Boika in October 1 9 9 0 .1 0 7  Moreover, according to Vasyl’ Sichko, 
'only Christians can be members of our party. We can admit former 
communists into the party, but only of course through their confession 
of C h r i s t ' , 1 0 8  As the main political expression of Galician Greek 
Catholicism, however, the UCDF rose to public prominence during the 
massive campaigns to relegalise the Greek Catholic church in 1 9 8 7 -8 9 .1 0 9  
By 2 1 - 2 2  April 1 9 9 0 , when the UCDF held its first public congress, and 
formally turned itself into the UCDP, the party's profile was well- 
established. The largest group amongst the 1 8 8  delegates came from 
Ivano-Frankivs'k, followed by L'viv, Temopil' and Kiev (although there 
were also representatives from Odesa and Vinnytsia).H0
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The UCDF/P also sought to embed itself in Galidan life by sponsoring 
a range of sister organisations, including the Scout organisation Plast 
(for ages 7 to 16, Plast had existed in Galida until 1940, and was revived 
in 1989); the Christian Union of Ukrainian Youth (for ages 16 to 30) set 
up in September 1989; and the Ukrainian Christian Party of Women, 
established in November 1991 and led by Ol'ha Horyn', wife of the URP 
leader Mykhailo Horyn'.*** The UCDP was offidally registered on 14 
November 1991, and daimed 7,000 m e m b e r s .*  * 2
In the long-tem, however, the UCDP’s mono-confessional nature 
and the ultra-radicalism of its leaders placed a cap on its potential 
growth. The party's nationalist agenda concerning the rehabilitation of 
the QUN and UPA prevented it from gaining much support amongst 
Orthodox believers in Ukraine outside of G a lic ia .*  *3 The party boycotted 
both the 1989 and 1990 elections (although one People's Deputy, Zinovii 
Duma from Ivano-Frankivs'k, was a supporter of the party). At the 
UCDP's second congress in April 1992, Sichko sponsored a new 
programme and a series of resolutions highly critical of Ukraine's 
national communist leadership, and opposing presidential rule, at a 
time when most Ukrainian nationalists were strongly supportive of 
President Kravchuk. 1 *4 Sichko also alienated the party's potential 
supporters amongst the Ukrainian intelligentsia, by adopting Dontsov’s 
argument that they were irredeemably corrupted by sodal democratic 
i d e a s *  15 (the party’s membership, however, consisted predominantly of 
the intelligentsia or the Galidan peasantry. Of the 900 members of the 
Kiev branch of the UCDP in 1992, only three were dassed as workers).****
Sichko in any case largely wrote off Eastern Ukrainians as potential 
Christian democrats, as they were too 'm a te r ia lis t ' .*  * ^
Most damaging of all to the UCDP, however, was the unpredictable 
and autocratic behaviour of Vasyl' Sichko. In Autumn 1991, he
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quarrelled with the L'viv branch of the UCDP, and expelled its leaders. 
However, this meant that many of the party's leading branches (those 
from L'viv oblast, Ivano-Frankivs’k city, Ternopil' raion, and Kiev 
oblast and dty) refused to attend the second party congress called by 
Sichko in his stronghold of Ivano-Frankivs'k in April 1992.118 Sichko's 
congress was attended by 488 delegates supposedly representing 5,500 of 
the party's members, but his opponents claimed this was simply because 
the congress' mandate commission was prepared to admit almost
anybody.H9
Sichko’s opponents were not a unified force, however. The Western 
Ukrainian rebels opposed him from a nationalist position, whereas 
those from Kiev and elsewhere had strong links with with the Orthodox 
Church and Russian Christian democrats. Two 'alternative' Christian 
democrat congresses were therefore held in June 1992. The first, in L'viv 
on the 19th June, was supported by the Galician rebels, and by the 
UCDP's one deputy, Zinovii Duma, and elected the former OUN 
member and political prisoner, Mykhailo Viter as its head. It was 
attended almost entirely by Greek Catholic ethnic Ukrainians. 120 The 
Viter group adopted a similarly nationalist programme to that of 
Sichko’s UCDP, and left the door open to possible future reunion, 
presumably once Sichko had departed from the stage.
On the 20th June 117 delegates from 11 oblasts in Central and Eastern 
Ukraine claiming to represent 6,000 members met in K i e v ,121 elected 
Viktor Zhuravs'kyi, a candidate of philosophical science, leader, and 
renamed themselves the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine (thereby 
emphasising their multi-ethnic nature).!22 The Kiev congress was 
dominated by Russophone and Orthodox Christian democrats, nearly all 
of whom were representatives of the intelligentsia (85% had higher 
education, and only 8 % were workers and a mere 2 % peasants),!23 and
was attended by Russian Christian democrat activists from Russia and 
Moldova, including V. Savitskiy, co-leader of the Christian Democratic 
Party of Russia.
In the long-term, it seemed that the split between the two Western 
Ukrainian groups and Zhuravs'kyi's Kiev group would prove more 
serious, as it reflected the ongoing conflict amongst Ukraine's warring 
faiths. Zhurakivs'kyi's Kiev party was basically Russophone and anti­
nationalist. The split in Western Ukraine seemed to be mainly a matter 
of personality. Support from the Greek Catholic hierarchy in Galicia for 
the idea of a party of Christian values remained strong, but the split was 
likely to be prolonged in the short-term as Sichko's group was officially 
recognised by the state, whilst Viter's group had more grass roots support 
in Galicia.
Only Sichko's UCDP joined the Congress of National-Democratic 
Forces in August 1992, where Sichko ironically admitted that the 
nationalist movement was plagued by a plethora of small parties, 'whose 
basic programmatical principles are almost identical', and whose 
'differences lie more or less in individual p e r s o n a l i t i e s ' ,1 2 4
Stepan Khmara's Conservative Republican Party
The events leading up to the departure of the URP's charismatic 
populist deputy leader, Stepan Khmara, from the party in May 1992 were 
described in Chapter 3. He then founded his own party in June 1992, the 
Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (UCRP). On the one hand this 
new split was further evidence for the extreme fissiparousness of the 
Ukrainian far right, but on the other hand the UCRP did represent a 
genuine right-radical tradition that had been part of the UHU since its 
inception in 1988, and Khmara remained a popular figure well-skilled in
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the art of self-publicity. Moreover, the UCRP represented those ultra- 
nationalists who were also anti-communist. His party therefore appeared 
to have better prospects than most.
The founding 'conference' of Khmara’s party was held in Kiev on 6-7 
June 1992, attended by 243 delegates from 22 o b l a s t s . *  25 n q direct 
information was provided about the new party’s membership; but it had 
been estimated (see Chapter 3) that about 5-10% of the URP's then 12,000 
members were supporters of Khmara. Khmara's supporters in fact 
claimed that the third URP congress had been unconstitutional, and that 
they were the true keepers of the faith as established at the founding 
URP congress in 1990. Therefore the congress declared that 'with the aim 
of distancing ourselves from the revisionists, we add to the name of our 
party the term "conservative", [and] confirm our new name - Ukrainian 
Conservative Republican Party. We consider henceforth that the UCRP 
is the rightful successor to the URP in all matters of legal, political and 
property i n h e r i t a n c e ’, *  26 a claim of course rejected by the URP, and 
without any juridicial force w h a t s o e v e r .  *  27
Not surprisingly, given Khmara’s past record, the UCRP sought to 
distinguish itself from the URP in three main areas;, its attitude to 
President Kravchuk and the existing authorities, questions of economic 
reform, and over relations with Russia.
As regards the first, Khmara remained virulently anti-communist. In 
April 1992 he had stated that 'I identify the Marxist philosophy and 
ideology with the philosophy of Satan’. Since independence, communist 
'bureaucrats have only changed from one seat to the other, but always 
remained in p o w e r ' .  *28 in his speech to the UCRP conference, he 
attacked 'old communist cadres who [remained] at all levels of state 
power - like a huge state mafia, which is the main internal threat to the 
Ukrainian s ta te ' .  129 This mafia was corrupting the privatisation process
and 'had proved itself incapable of defending Ukraine's state interests. 
Therefore, unlike the URP, which had become ’a marionette of the state- 
mafia communist nomenklatura ’,130 the UCRP would remain in 
resolute opposition to President Kravchuk and his national 
communists, who were 'supported by the most reactionary communist 
f o r c e s ' .131 So long as they remained in power, 'a truly independent state 
cannot exist’.* 32 The conference's resolutions even threatened to 
organise a campaign for Kravchuk's impeachment. The new party’s 
statute forbade even former rank-and-file communist party members 
from joining the party.
The UCRP strongly condemned the 'predatory privatisation of the 
communist party-state mafia',133 and called instead for state property to 
be distributed free to workforces, and for all Ukrainian citizens to have 
an ’equal start' in the privatisation process. The new party also called for 
key avenues of nomenklatura self-enrichment to be blocked off, 
including the establishment of parallel private businesses to state 
enterprises and so-called 'spontaneous privatisation’. Deputies should be 
banned from engaging in commercial activity (several of these populist 
themes were taken up by the new government of Leonid Kuchma after 
October 1992). Khmara’s slogans condemning price rises, the 
impoverishment of the people and the growth of crime often echoed 
that of the populist Socialist Party of Ukraine.
Khmara's anti-Russian rhetoric at the conference was sufficiently 
extreme to cause a walkout by approximately 40 of the delegates. 
Khmara's proposed programme contained the following passage:
The politics of Ukraine should be steadfastly directed towards the 
disintegration of the empire - the Russian Federation. Only after its 
disintegration will such a mortal danger to Ukraine disappear. The held of
struggle should be taken onto Russian territory; - the most favourable moment for 
this has arrived and it should not be wasted. Then Russia will no longer [be able 
to make] imperialist encroachments against Ukraine - and such a policy will 
weaken to a maximum extent the 'fifth column' within Ukraine...
The opportune moment has [also] arrived to cut off Russia at last from the 
Black Sea. Here our interests coincide with those of our neighbours, first of all 
with Turkey.
Ukraine should become the organiser of an anti-Russian anti-imperialist 
front of the former republics of the USSR.^
Such an aggressively anti-Russian position, with its implied support 
for Ukrainian separatism in the South-West of the Russian Federation 
(in the Kuban’, Voronezh and Taganrog) was opposed by Mariia Oliinyk, 
former head of the Donets'k URP. Although a majority of delegates 
agreed with her, Khmara made the issue one of confidence in his 
leadership. The passage therefore remained, and 40 or so of Oliinyk's 
Eastern Ukrainian supporters left the h a l l .  135 Oliinyk later formed a 
rival organisation in Donets'k, entitled Soborna Ukraina (’Unified 
Ukraine'), which eventually became the local branch of KUN. 136 Such a 
split, however, at the founding conference of a party which had itself 
only split from the URP in May 1992, was hardly an auspicious start for 
the UCRP.
The conference's declarations committed the new party to much that 
was by now part of the standard nationalist programme. The UCRP 
called for departure from the CIS, the Ukrainianisation of the Armed 
Forces, and Ukrainian control over the nuclear weapons on its territory. 
Organisations which engaged in 'anti-Ukrainian, anti-state activity' 
should be b a n n e d .1 3 7  First of all, this meant separatist organisations. The 
UCRP called for the 'so-called Supreme Soviet of the Crimea’ to be
dissolved, and its leader Nikolai Bagrov to be arrested, and it made 
repeated similar appeals through the winter of 1992-93 as more and more 
Russophone organisations began to appear in Eastern Ukraine.* 38 
Unlike those nationalists who were prepared to work'with the national 
communists, however, the UCRP called for all 'former heads of the 
leading structures of the CPSU-CPU and komsomol to be deprived of 
their deputies' mandates, and to leave the structures of executive power, 
leading positions in the economy and in political and social 
organisations’.'*$9
The national communists could not be trusted because of their 
criminal past; and because of their tendency to compromise on the 
ethnic character of the Ukrainian state. On this issue, Khmara remained 
as explicit as always. Myths and symbols, particularly those of the OUN- 
UPA, 'should not be celebrated only in Western Ukraine, [but should 
have] an all-Ukrainian character'.*40 The desire to compromise with 
Eastern Ukrainians would simply perpetuate the low level of national 
consciousness in Ukraine, according to Khmara.
A final indication of the UCRP's radicalism could be seen in the fact 
that the conference reserved for itself the right to use all methods, 'not 
excluding armed struggle' in the event of a Russian revanchist threat 
against Ukraine, with only 17 delegates voting a g a in s t .* ^ *  Moreover, in 
the first issue of the UCRP paper Klych , ('The Call'), published in 
February 1993, Khmara declared that 'in general I am a supporter of 
republicanism, of a parliamentary form for the state. However, in a 
transition period a positive role could be played by an authoritarian
regime in such circumstances we must rely on strong i n d i v i d u a l s ' . * ^
Khmara's uncompromising stand won him few friends, even on the 
right. He had burnt his bridges with the URP, and therefore the UCRP 
took no part in the establishment of the Congress of National
321
Democratic Forces in August 1992. Khmara often spoke warmly of the 
OUN-r, and his overtures to the DSU at their third congress in December 
1992 have already been mentioned above. However, the increasing 
estrangement between the OUN-r and the DSU was also likely to make 
the prospect of dose ties less attractive from the UCRP's point of view. 
Khmara continued to use his position as a deputy to act as a radical 
tribune (he was parliamentary spokesman /  adviser for both the radical 
trade union organisation VOST and the Union of Officers of Ukraine), 
and he could still pull big crowds, but his political isolation seemed 
complete when he refused to join the Anti-Communist Anti-Imperial 
Front of Ukraine (ACAIF) set up in January 1993 (see Chapter 8 ), even 
though groups such as the UNA and UNSO attended its first s e s s io n .1 4 3  
Khmara's argument that there was just as much danger to Ukrainian 
statehood from the traitorous acts of President Kravchuk, as from 
Russophone deputies in the Supreme Council or from separatist 
organisations in the Donbas, gathered little support at a time when all 
nationalist political forces, even Chornovil's Rukh , wished to close 
ranks in support of the President.
Minor parties
As well as the parties listed above, a number of smaller ultra-right 
groups existed in Ukraine (mainly in Galida), often with barely a 
hundred members. None appeared to be important in themselves, but 
their existence did shed some light on the nature of nationalist politics 
in Ukraine in the period. In Galicia, espedally in L'viv, the radicalisation 
of public opinion over the period 1988-93, the growing economic crisis 
after 1990, and the general disillusion with Ukraine’s seemingly 
atomised and ineffective political parties after August 1991, meant that it
proved extremely difficult for the mainstream parties to hang on to then- 
more radical and impatient members. They tended to create a string of 
ultra-radical parties with maximalist political programmes, explicitly 
renouncing civic nationalism as the 'ideology of the weak', and 
wholeheartedly embracing a mythologised version of Dontsovite 
extremism. Although none was ever capable of an organisational 
challenge to the established parties, they certainly contributed to the 
radicalisation of the ideological atmosphere in L'viv in the Summer of
1992. Many were founder members of the Valentyn Moroz's Nationalist 
Bloc that took over the L'viv branch of Rukh in the run-up to the 
fourth Rukh congress in December 1992 (see Chapter 4).
One such party was the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), 
founded in December 1991. Its name was deliberately evocative of the 
NSDAP, as was its party symbol, a Ukrainian trident, reminiscent of a 
Nazi swastika. The party's programme was explicitly ethnidst, dedaring 
that
the democrats and partocrats are building a Ukraine where Russians can live 
better than in Russia, whilst Ukrainians remain second class titizens. They are 
continuing to deceive us with the ideas of human rights. We [however] will not 
pay any attention to fashionable cosmopolitan breezes from across the ocean. The 
nation is the basis on which all European states are formed. This principle is the 
root of all their achievements. The nation - is the root of the state! On this there
can be no compromised^
The SNPU called for a complete purge of the corrupt state, and its 
replacement by a new order that was both 'forbidding and omnipotent'. 
Most of the SNPU's claimed 300 members were radical youths, 
previously active in organisations such as Plast and SNUM, such as the 
party’s leader Yaroslav Andrushkiv. Members of the SNPU were
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reportedly prominent amongst the nationalist thugs who disrupted the 
L’viv Rukh congress on-24 October 1992 (see Chapter 4 ) .* 4 5
The Ukrainian National-Radical Party (UNRP), founded in late 1990 
by Mykhailo Stosiuk, (it was originally called the All-World Ukrainian 
Radical Party) occupied very similar ground.*46 its slogan was 
'Independence or death', and its programme called for the unity 'of all 
the world's nationally conscious Ukrainians in one monolithic party', 
and for an 'independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus'. 
It also favoured a hierarchically ordered society after the Japanese model, 
led by Nietzschean 'new men'. The party did not rule out revolutionary 
struggle to achieve such e n d s . * 47 The UNRP modelled its statute after 
what it saw as the military discipline of the OUN. Its supposed 500 
members were required to wear uniform and unquestioningly carry out 
the orders of the party leadership. Little was heard of the UNRP after 
1992, but Stosiuk continued to edit the nationalist journal Derzhavnist' 
('Statehood') that he founded in 1991, and which provided a mouthpiece 
for various extreme right groupings, as well as reprinting the works of 
Dontsov, Mikhnovs'kyi and others.
In March 1992, a Union of Monarchists of Ukraine appeared in 
L ' v i v , *48 on May 27-8 1993 an All-Ukrainian Forum of Monarchists
was held, also in L 'v iv ,*  49 but the patent absurdity of their cause 
confined the union to the fringe of Ukrainian politics. A N ational- 
Socialist Party of Ukraine, apparently separate from the SNPU was 
reportedly created in Poltava in October 1992. Its platform called for 
strengthening Ukrainian statehood and resolute support for an 
emergent business class on the basis of a nationalist dictatorship.*^
Conclusion
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None of the above-mentioned parties was, in 1990-2, as powerful as 
the mainstream nationalist parties or the UNA. The ultra-right, 
although gradually growing in importance throughout the period, 
remained organisationally weak and fractious, and its influence was 
largely confined to Kiev and Galicia. However, the early appearance and 
large number of such parties indicated that not all Ukrainian nationalists 
were happy with the moderate civic nationalism espoused by the likes of 
Rukh and the DPU. The fact that they existed as competitors to the right 
also helped to pull the more mainstream parties in a more radical 
direction.
Finally, as with the UNA, the ultra-right believed with much 
justification that there was a strong possibility of public opinion 
swinging strongly in their direction in the event of serious confrontation 
with Russia and/or further deterioration in the internal economic and 
security situation, if only in Galicia and Kiev. No single group had yet 
managed to combine the strong organisation, charismatic leadership and 
populist ideology characteristic of successful parties of the far right, but 
the potential for such a group dearly existed. However, it is noteworthy 
that there was little evidence of any of the above groups successfully 
expanding their appeal even to ethnically Ukrainian industrial workers, 
despite the immense economic problems faced by Ukraine in the early 
1990s. Large-scale unemployment, however, yet to appear in 1992, might 
provide a potential pool of recruits.
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8 . NATIONALIST SPLITS AND COALITIONS
%
Introduction
As argued in Chapter 2, all Ukraine's political parties (not just the 
nationalists) faced many major handicaps after the unexpectedly sudden 
achievement of independence in August 1991. Therefore the period 
1992-3 was marked by a process of political consolidation and coalition 
formation as the political parties attempted to overcome their 
weaknesses by combining together. In the nationalist camp two separate 
coalitions were formed, after the serious split amongst nationalists in 
early 1992.
This final chapter seeks to describe the processes by which the two 
groups were formed. One, the Rukh -led Congress of Democratic Forces 
of Ukraine (CDFU) was established by Viacheslav Chomovil in late July 
1992, while the more nationalist Congress of National-Democratic Forces 
(CNDF) was set up by the URP and DPU in August 1992. The CDFU also 
organised the ’New Parliament for a New Ukraine' campaign in the 
autumn of 1992. In January 1993, the two coalitions attempted to resolve 
their differences through the creation of the Anti-Communist Anti- 
Imperial Front (ACAIF), but the attempt seemed unlikely to have lasting 
success.*
Of the two coalitions, the CNDF was more cohesive. Chapters 3 ,5  and 
7 described the process by which the main nationalist parties, the DPU, 
URP and their satellites, were radicalised in 1990-92 and ended up 
occupying much the same political positions in mid-1992. Chomovil's 
CDFU attempted less successfully to build bridges with the main centrist 
parties. Although both exercised considerable influence on the 
government and President,2 the division of the nationalist camp into
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two in fact came at a most inopportune time. In early and mid-1992 
leftist and regional lobbies had yet to organise themselves, and the 
nationalists had a golden opportunity to press their agenda on 
Kravchuk. They were able to pull him a long way in their direction, but 
not as far as would have been possible if unity had been maintained. As 
leftist and regional groups began to organise in late 1992, there was a 
growing realisation that crucial momentum had been lost, but by the 
time the attempt was made to restore unity in January 1993 too much 
bad blood had been split, and it seemed likely that the nationalists would 
be less well placed to stop Kravchuk backsliding from his commitment 
to their agenda.
The Congress of National-Democratic Forces (CNDF)
Convergence between the URP and DPU
The roots of the CNDF went back a long way. As described in 
Chapters 3 and 5, the two main nationalist parties, the URP and DPU, 
had moved progressively closer together in 1990-92. The original 
rationale for differentiating the DPU from the URP (formed before the 
DPU in April 1990) had concerned the parties’ different social bases, 
tactics and ideologies. Although many of the URP’s leadership were 
from the intelligentsia, its rank and file membership was largely 
working class (see Chapter 3). For many in the DPU this fact was 
connected with the URP's rabble-rousing style, and its repeated flirtation 
(before August 1991) with extra-parliamentary action. In particular, 
cooperation with the URP was difficult so long as Stepan Khmara 
remained deputy leader of the URP. His ultra-radicalism, including his 
repeated calls to boycott the Supreme Council and his cooperation with 
far right groups, was unacceptable to the DPU 3 A final factor was the
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URP’s commitment to a neo-conservative economic policy, whereas the 
DPU remained broadly social-democratic.
By the time of the URP's third congress in May 1992, however, all of 
these problems had disappeared, whilst other factors were encouraging 
closer cooperation between the two parties. After August 1991 the URP 
had declared its intention to become a 'party of Ukrainian statehood' and 
of 'respectable conservatism'. The URP's Ideological Conference in 
February 1992 had supported the leadership’s intention to attract more 
intelligenty into the party, and Khmara and his supporters had been 
forced out of the URP at the May congress. Moreover, the URP had 
begun to adopt a more protectionist and corporatist economic policy, 
moving some, but not all, of the way towards bridging the gap with the 
DPU on economic policy (see Chapter 3).
The DPU meanwhile attempted to pay greater attention to economic 
issues, as the economic crisis worsened still further in 1992, and shake off 
its reputation as the 'party of philologists'. One of the party’s Deputies, 
the economist Mykhailo Shviaka, was commissioned to draw up a new 
party programme in January 1992,4 that reflected the party's cautious 
approach to privatisation, stress on the need to protect the national 
economy from foreign competition, and desire to cushion the blow of 
reform with maximum social protection. As the economic crisis 
deepened in 1992, it became increasingly dear that such polides reflected 
more closely the instincts of the two parties' nationalist constituency 
(and those of the public as a whole),5 than the URP’s theoretical 
commitment to liberal capitalism, that owed as much to anti­
communism as to positive desire. The URP itself realised as much in 
1992, leading to a dilution of its neo-conservatism. Despite the 
leadership's expressed desire to attract more intelligenty into the party, 
the backbone of its membership remained working dass nationalists,
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who were more likely to be animated by criticism of the then 
government's price reform, than by the uncertain long-term prospect of 
their enrichment under capitalism.®
The DPU also moved closer to the URP in 1991-2 by abandoning the 
idea of union with the PDRU and adopting a much more clearly 
nationalist line, as described in Chapter 5. Union between the two was 
also encouraged by both parties' perceptions of their own relative 
weakness. The referendum campaign in March 1991, according to the 
DPU’s assessment, 'demonstrated that the democratic forces in Ukraine 
are not yet sufficiently well-grounded and [tactically] m obile '/ while 
Lukianenko would later admit that 'we are not prepared for elections. 
The URP has not got sufficient candidates in all [450] constituencies’.® 
Moreover, support even for the united opposition had stagnated at 
around 25-33% of the electorate in 1990-91 (see Chapters 1 and 2 ). 
Therefore the leadership of both parties realised that they had to 
cooperate not only with each other, but also with Leonid Kravchuk's 
national communist group. The DPU, and URP leaders such as 
Lukianenko, Shevchenko and the Horyn' brothers, enthusiastically 
greeted the emergence of national communism as the best way of 
breaking the deadlock with Moscow, and securing independence (or at 
least full sovereignty) for Ukraine.
Badz'o, Pavlychko and others therefore tried to organise the 
opposition in a common front in order better to support Kravchuk, but 
the attempt proved premature. At two meetings on 2 April and 10 June 
1991 the DPU had supported the idea of a coalition entitled 'Independent 
Democratic Ukraine' to be formed on the basis of the Ukrainian section 
of the all-party and all-Union Democratic Congress formed in Kharkiv 
in January 1991/ The proposal however eventually floundered on 
Lukianenko's insistence (supported by Ivan Drach, who feared a
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possible rival to Rukh ) on preserving the URP's distinctive face, and on 
his.w orry that such a move would precipitate a split with Stepan 
Khmara and the radical wing of the URP. 10 The latter still distrusted 
Kravchuk's motives, and preferred the ultra-right's tactics of 
underground struggle and the boycott of the institutions of the 
Ukrainian SSR. Luk"ianenko also declared that he 'saw no need to create 
yet another supra-party organisation. We are in favour of cooperation, 
but against the creation of [unnecessary] structures'.! 1
Similar difficulties were experienced during Ukraine's first ever 
presidential elections on 1 December 1991. The URP and DPU, despite 
the latter issuing a call for a common opposition candidate in September 
1991,12 were unable to coordinate their activities. Moreover, the DPU’s 
lack of discipline over its own members was clearly demonstrated by the 
manner in which the party divided its support between different 
candidates, and failed even to collect the 100,000 signatures necessary for 
its candidate to proceed to the final ballot. The URP ran a stronger 
campaign, but Lukianenko still only received a disappointing 4.5% of 
the vote. The campaign therefore ably demonstrated the weakness of 
both parties (especially the DPU) when they acted separately, whilst at the 
same time creating a strong desire amongst them to support, and indeed 
participate in, the process of building the new Ukrainian nation-state.
The third Rukh congress and after
Such cooperation was evident in the run-up to the third Rukh 
congress in February-March 1992. The two parties formed a joint faction 
of 40 Deputies in the Supreme Council, originally entitled 
'Independence and Democracy',13 and negotiated on joint tactics for the 
congress (see Chapter 4).14 The two aimed, by becoming collective 
members of Rukh at last and securing the election of the URP's
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Mykhailo Horyn' as Rukh's leader, to take over control of Rukh and 
then align it more clearly in support of President Kravchuk. In return, 
the parties’ leaders expected to be drawn into the embrace of 
government.
Chapter 4 has described how the attempt failed, and V"iacheslav 
Chornovil came to dominate Rukh instead. If the URP and DPU were at 
first inclined to remain in Rukh  and fight their corner against 
Chornovil, it quickly became clear that Chornovil was more dominant 
than they expected, and consequently both parties withdrew from Rukh 
and began organising another vehicle for their a m b i t io n s .* 5
Badz'o had called for ever closer cooperation between the DPU and 
the URP at the latter's third congress in May 1992, and later in the same 
month the leading nationalist deputy Mykola Porovs’kyi called for the 
formation of a ’Ukrainian National Democratic Party' to be based on the 
URP, DPU and like-minded elements within Rukh Porovs'kyi proposed 
that its programme would include the defence of Kravchuk, ’strong 
Presidential power’ and the post-August 1991 state, whilst emphasising 
state-building and 'the strengthening of people's social conscience' over 
the establishment of a market economy.* 6
On 1 July 1992 the URP and DPU announced the formation of a 
coalition between the two parties. Their joint declaration called for; 
departure from the CIS, a unitary, anti-separatist state, 'the priority of 
national industry', and the 'national character of Ukrainian statehood’ 
(although at the DPU’s insistence a phrase was added defining 
'Ukrainian patriotism as the ideology and feeling of people regardless of 
their ethnic origin’). The joint declaration's definition of 'social justice 
as the possibility for the self-realisation of the individual in society, and 
the effective defence of those groups of the population who cannot fend 
for themselves’ [nepratsezdatni ] was closer to the economic thinking of
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the URP than to that of the still broadly social-democratic DPU. The 
possibility of eventual union between the two parties was discussed at 
the DPU's second congress in December 1992 (see Chapter 5), and in the 
run-up to the URP's fourth congress in May 1993.18
On 8 July a broader meeting of like-minded parties and organisations 
was held; including the URP, DPU, UPDP, all-Ukrainian Society for the 
Repressed, Union of Ukrainian Students, Union of Ukrainian Youth 
and Union of Officers of Ukraine, plus Ivan Drach and Viktor Burlakov 
from Rukh . It resulted in a common programme calling for the creation 
of a 'law-based democratic state and civil society', 'the national character 
of Ukrainian statehood and the national self-determination of Ukraine 
with the wide participation of all national minorities', 'a unitary state 
structure for Ukraine', and 'the creation of a "society of property owners" 
by the means of just privatisation and destatification, dynamic economic 
reform and the priority of national industry'.1^ Those present also called 
for a series of regional conferences of a 'Congress of National-Democratic 
Forces' to be held,20 followed by an all-Ukrainian congress on 2 August 
1992. On 16 July Pavlo Movchan overruled the pro-Chornovil forces in 
Prosvita (the renamed Ukrainian Language Society), and added his 
signature to the declaration.21 Initially, there was some hope that 
Chornovil's Rukh would join the proposed CNDF,22 but Chornovil 
had no desire to repeat the arguments of the third Rukh congress, and 
on the eve of the 2 August meeting accused the CNDF of attempting 'to 
form an alternative Rukh or "party of power", which could become the 
political support for an authoritarian system.'23 Chornovil sent Rukh's 
deputy leader, Oleksandr Lavrynovych, to attend the CNDF congress as 
an observer, but he declined to formally join its structures.
The divergence between the two groups was clearly exposed on 7 July, 
when the URP leader, Mykhailo Horyn', formally abstained in the
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Supreme Council in the vote of censure against the government 
organised by Chornovil and his supporters (see below), which Horyn’ 
described as 'premature'.24 The URP and DPU instead supported an 
alternative motion requiring Kravchuk to 'reexamine' the composition 
of the government before parliament reassembled in September. At a 
press conference on 8 July, Horyn' then presented the URP-DPU 
proposals for a 'government of technocrats' to be led by Academician 
Pavlovs'kyi or by the rector of Vinnytsia polytechnic and national 
deputy Borys Mokin.25 Leading members of the CNDF had already 
received state posts. Luk"ianenko, for example, was appointed 
ambassador to Canada, the DPU's Vitalii Donchyk the President's deputy 
prefect in Kiev,26 and leading members of the CNDF such as Larysa 
Skoryk were appointed to the President's advisory Duma ('Council'), 
established in February 199227 (although abolished that October when 
Kravchuk was forced to cede many of his powers to the new Kuchma 
government).
The CNDF congress
On 2 August, the CNDF Congress was held in K ie v ,28 attended by 60 
deputies of the Supreme Council and 500 delegates representing 18 
political parties and organisations, plus others who attended as 
observers. The 18 included all the main groups of the moderate right, 
apart from Rukh . The political parties present were the URP and DPU, 
Plachynda's UPDP, Sichko’s UCDP, and the Ukrainian National- 
Conservative Party (see Chapter 6); and the main civic organisations 
were the All-Ukrainian Society of the Repressed led by Yevhen Proniuk, 
Pavlo Movchan's Prosvita , the Union of Ukrainian Students, Mykola 
Porovs'kyi’s 'Crimea with Ukraine' organisation, the Committee for the 
Defence of Ukrainian Orthodoxy (led by Vasyl' Chervonyi and the URP's
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Oles' Shevchenko) the 'Independence' Union of Ukrainian Journalists, 
the Andrii Sheptyts'kyi Ukrainian Greek Catholic Union, the Ukrainian 
Association for the Defence of Historical Heritage, the Organisation of 
Soldiers’ Mothers,29 the Rukh Women's Organisation (represented by 
Larysa Skoryk), the 'OUN-Rukh 'organisation from Moscow, the 
Kharkiy CNDF, and the Ukrainian Youth Association. 30 The URP's 
Mykhailo Horyn', acting Chairman of the Congress, compared the 
gathering to the formation of the broad-based coalition by the OUN in 
1944 (the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council) .31
Like Rukh , Memorial and the Ukrainian Greens attended only as 
observers, as did the Union of Officers of Ukraine. The ultra-right were 
not invited. The Organisation of the Crimean Tatar National Movement 
promised to join at a later date. A permanent Council of the CNDF was 
elected, consisting of three representatives from each of the Congress’ 
constituent groups (all of whom had an equal voice). In practice, 
however, the URP was the dominant force in the CNDF as the party’s 
representatives and allies dominated the delegations from Prosvita 
(Pavlo Movchan), 'Crimea with Ukraine' (Mykola Porovs’kyi), the all- 
Ukrainian Society for the Repressed (Yevhen Proniuk) the Rukh 
Women’s Organisation (Larysa Skoryk), and the Committee in Defence 
of Ukrainian Orthodoxy (the URP deputy Oles' Shevchenko); and 
Mykhailo Horyn’ was the CNDF’s chairman. Many of the CNDF’s 
constituent organisations had supported Luk"ianenko's election 
campaign in Autumn 1991 (see Chapter 3), and the agenda for the 
Congress was set at the meeting of the URP's Grand Council the day 
before.32
The Congress adopted as its slogan 'Ukraine in Danger!’ The 
programme adopted echoed the main themes of the 1 July declaration, 
whilst the organisation's statute described the CNDF as 'a union of
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political parties and civil organisations of national-democratic 
orientation, formed for the purpose of taking strong measures for the 
building and strengthening of a Ukrainian state, securing national 
independence and dem ocracy '.^  The Congress' main declaration 
attacked 'anarchic radicalism', and declared instead that during the 
period 'of building [our] own independent state’ it was necessary 'to 
strengthen presidential power'.34 ^  Mykhailo Horyn"s words, 'as 
regards the President, neither the URP nor I wish to place him above 
criticism. But to fear the loss of the glory of opposition, and not to 
support the President when he deserves and needs it, just because he is 
the President, would in such times be [dangerously] frivolous’. 'Despite 
all his imperfections and errors, the President remains the guarantee of 
stability in the country.35
The Congress’ declarations also called for 'the securing of the 
principle of unitary Ukrainian statehood and the strengthening of the 
Ukrainian nation on her ethnic territory; support for Ukrainians who 
live in the [other] states of the CIS in their striving for national revival; 
and the satisfaction of the cultural needs of all national minorities'.^ in 
foreign and defence policy, the Congress called for an immediate and 
total severance of links with the CIS, the creation of powerful national 
Armed Forces, and the removal of all 'foreign forces and foreign bases 
from her territory' (i.e. the CNDF was opposed to the Yalta agreement of 
August 1992 which established joint Ukrainian-Russian control over the 
Black Sea Fleet for three years). Surprisingly however, little was said 
directly on the nuclear weapons issue.
In the economic sphere, the Congress called for 'the removal of any 
discrimination against national industry in comparison with foreign 
industry', and 'the reexamination of the 1992 privatisation programme’ 
which was supposedly too favourable to foreign investors, and the
creation of 'equal starting possibilities', in other words a populist 
programme whereby shares would be given away free to the general 
public or workforces, rather than falling into the hands of the 
nomenklatura .37 The Congress still, however, professed that it saw this 
as the best route to achieving a 'society of property-owners'. In other 
words, the programme owed most to the URP's mixture of neo­
liberalism and protectionism.
Many at the Congress were sharply critical of Chornovil and Rukh 's 
activity after the de facto split at the third Rukh congress in February- 
March 1992. Badz'o, for example accused him of practising 'yesterday’s 
politics - the position of frontal assault on power', which could only 
'lead in the end to the political destabilisation of society, which will 
complicate the process of reform and state creation’. ^  Larysa Skoryk's 
attack on Chornovil and his ally Serhii Holovatyi was even more 
intemperate. Skoryk was also explicit in asserting that the CNDF should 
abandon their former allies in Rukh to make common cause with the 
national communists, quoting V ’iacheslav Lypyns'kyi to the effect that 
the Ukrainian intelligentsia alone would always be too weak to build a 
Ukrainian state with its own strength, and should therefore 
enthusiastically embrace the contribution of the national communist 
defectors from the old order (see Chapter 1)39
The most radical note was sounded, as was by now traditional, by 
Serhii Plachynda, leader of the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party. His 
demand that 'Ukrainian nationalism [i.e. ethnic nationalism] should 
become the ideology of the state' was met by loud applause, but was for 
the time being ignored by the Congress' leadership.^
The CNDF continued to press the Ukrainian leadership to take 
decisive state-building measures, particularly through its Supreme 
Council faction of 43 led by Mykola Porovs’kyi and Mykhailo
Holubets'.^l During the governmental crisis of September-October 1992 
it directed most of its effort towards support for Defence Minister 
Konstantin Morozov and Security Services Minister Yevhen Marchuk. 
According to the CNDF, 'success in [other] spheres does not compensate 
for losses from the insufficient tempo and quality in the formation of 
state structures (an army, security service, forces of law and order, 
customs, a financial-monetary and banking system)'.42 The organisation 
praised Morozov, Kravchuk and Marchuk for their efforts to date, but 
urged them on to greater efforts.
The CNDF continued to rail against Ukraine's enemies at both home 
and abroad, calling for separatists within Ukraine to be prosecuted and 
for a special commission 'to take effective measures’ against the danger 
of 'the activation of chauvinistic pro-imperial forces’.43 Abroad, Yel'tsin 
was to be supported because of the dark forces that lay in wait to succeed 
him .44 in February 1993, the CNDF grasped the nuclear nettle, and 
declared that 'taking into account the fact that our neighbours, Russia in 
particular, continually make territorial claims on Ukraine, we have to 
regard nuclear weapons as a means of strategic deterrence and demand 
that Ukraine exercise full control over these weapons’. In other words 
the CNDF rejected 'the unilateral disarmament of Ukraine that will 
leave the country hostage to the aggressive policy of other states’.45 By 
the time Ukraine's draft Military Doctrine was debated for a second time 
in April 1993, 162 Deputies were prepared to sign a declaration 
supporting such a position.46
R ukh , the Congress of Democratic Forces of Ukraine 
(CDFU) and a *New Parliament for a New Ukraine*
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Chapter 4 described how V ’iacheslav Chornovil had emerged 
victorious from the third Rukh congress in February-March 1992, on a 
platform of combining nationalism and anti-communism. Unlike the 
CNDF therefore, he was unwilling to support Kravchuk’s national 
communists. In particular, he used his new-found preeminence within 
Rukh to adopt a much more aggressive line against the government of 
then Prime Minister Vitol'd Fokin and against the national communists 
in general. Fokin was taking many of the aggressive state-building and 
security measures demanded by the CNDF, but was not promoting 
domestic or economic reforms.
Rukh's campaign against Fokin^? culminated in a formal vote of no- 
confidence in the Supreme Council on 7 July 1992, the last day of the 
summer parliamentary session. Fokin survived by 139 votes to 135,48 
but a second vote instructing President Kravchuk to ’reexamine the 
government's composition’ by the time parliament began its next sitting 
in September was carried by 238 votes to 81.
Chornovil therefore began a dual-track campaign. On 31 July he 
organised a loose coordinating council of sympathetic political parties 
and organisations under the label Congress of Democratic Forces of 
Ukraine (CDFU). The CDFU consisted mainly of centrist and centre-right 
political parties, hence the choice of the term 'Democratic Forces', rather 
than 'National-Democratic Forces'49 (although many parties were 
members of both the CNDF and CDFU). The CDFU remained a much 
looser body than the CNDF. Although a Coordinating Council was 
created with 2/3 delegates from each member organisation, the latter 
insisted that it should remain a campaigning organisation only and 
should not usurp the parties’ 'executive functions'.^ The main purpose 
of the CDFU therefore was the creation of a committee entitled 'A New 
Parliament for a New Ukraine', whose sole aim was to campaign for the
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collection of the three million signatures necessary under Ukrainian law 
to force the pre-term dissolution of the Supreme Council. As Rukh had 
lost many leaders and members to the CNDF, who now refused to 
cooperate with the campaign (as did the ultra-right, which was now 
emphasising the importance of stability and strong national communist 
government) Chornovil was forced to bring the centrist New Ukraine 
movement onto his committee. The Committee's founding statement 
asked rhetorically, ’Can the legislative body of one state wield power in 
another? Strangely enough it can. Our parliament today represents a 
non-existent state, the Ukrainian SSR’.^l
At the same time, Rukh made its own proposals, either for a new 
government (two of the ministerial candidates put forward by Rukh in 
July, Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi and Viktor P y n z e n y k ,5 2  duly became Vice- 
Premiers in the new Kuchma government of October 1 9 9 2 ) ,  or for 
President Kravchuk himself to head a ’government of national accord’ 
(a proposal Kravchuk was extremely unlikely to embrace so long as the 
Ukrainian economy remained plagued by severe stagflation). When the 
Supreme Council reassembled in September 1 9 9 2 , Rukh and the CDFU 
pressed successfully for Fokin’s resignation,53 and claimed much of the 
credit for forcing the creation of the Kuchma government in October 
1 9 9 2 ,  in which the influence of the national communists was at least 
somewhat diluted.
In the new government, apart from the above-mentioned Ihor 
Yukhnovs'kyi (First Deputy Premier) and Viktor Pynzenyk (Deputy 
Premier and Minister for Economic Reform); Rukh was also represented 
by Mykola Zhulyns'kyi (Deputy Premier with responsibility for Social 
Issues, a literary critic and long-standing Rukh sympathiser), Ivan Herts 
(Minister for Foreign Economic Relations and a member of Rukh's
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Parliam entary faction), and Yurii Kostenko (Minister for the 
Environment).
The formation of the new government took the wind out of the sails 
of the Rukh-New Ukraine petition campaign, although in the end it 
managed to collect 1,175,068 signatures (3% of the available electorate). 
As might be expected, a majority of these (702,000 or 60% of the total) of 
these were collected in Galicia (238,000 in Temopil', 209,000 in Ivano- 
Frankivs’k, and 255,000 in L'viv), compared to a paltry 1,600 (0.1% of the 
total) in Crimea and 3,600 (0.3%) in M y k o la iv .5 4  Proposals for a second 
attempt were soon abandoned, as they were unlikely to be successful 
much before new elections were due in March 1995 in any c a s e .5 5
Rukh also began to call for a 'Nuremberg-2'; in other words a grand 
public trial of the communist party and all its misdeeds. Chornovil 
would have preferred a state sponsored trial along the lines of the 
investigation of the CPSU then being undertaken by the Russian 
Supreme Court, but, as the former was impossible to organise, a civil 
process was a useful second resort, as the main intention was simply to 
nip any potential neo-communist revival in the bud by publicising the 
party's past c r im e s .5 6  In practice, however, the initiative meant little 
more than the publication of anti-communist material in Rukh's press 
(in this area, it has to be said that despite the generally pro-Kravchuk line 
of the CNDF, the ex-political prisoners of the URP were more prepared 
to take part in Rukh's anti-communist campaign than the former CPU 
stalwarts who dominated the DPU's leadership)57
Anti-Communist Anti-Imperial Front (ACAIF)
Despite the divergences between Rukh and the CNDF in 1992, the 
political crisis of January 1993 revealed that both were, in the last analysis
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nationalist groupings to whom the interests of the Ukrainian state were 
paramount. The crisis was the result of the confluence of three forces: 
growing calls to rehabilitate the CPU in Ukraine, following the decision 
by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in November 1992 to 
partially lift Yel'tsin's ban on the communist party (by January, 243 
Deputies had signed a petition to the Chairman of the Supreme Council, 
Ivan Pliushch, calling on him to permit a debate on the banning of the 
CPU);58 the attempt by 150 Eastern Ukrainian Deputies to force the 
opening of a special session of the Supreme Council before the Minsk 
CIS summit on 22 January 1993, and commit President Kravchuk to sign 
the proposed CIS Charter;59 and growing opposition to the economic 
reforms of the* Kuchma government. For many nationalists, this 
simultaneous pressure on three fronts amounted to the creation of a 
powerful fifth column within Ukraine, and produced a strong desire to 
close ranks behind President Kravchuk. The political tension was further 
exacerbated by the crisis in Moscow, uncertainty over the future of 
President Yel’tsin, and concern over who might succeed him; and by the 
violent arguments concerning elections to the new Ukrainian Supreme 
Court. Those nominated were mainly former CPU stalwarts, including 
Al’bert Korneev, the only man to vote against Ukrainian independence 
in August 1991, and hence the ACAIF feared that the Supreme Court was 
being packed in preparation for a ruling on the restoration of the CPU 
and to ensure that the new constitution represented the interests of the 
former nomenklatura .60
This new-found solidarity was first apparent at a round-table of 
political parties and organisations called by Kravchuk in the run-up to 
the Minsk summit. The nationalists closed ranks and demanded that 
Kravchuk should 'not sign the Statute and should withdraw from the 
CIS'. This line was supported by Chornovil for Rukh , Mykhailo Horyn’
for the CNDF, Ivan Drach representing the Ukratna society, Pavlo 
Movchan representing Prosvita (the Ukrainian Language Society), 
Stepan Khmara for the UCRP and others.*^ Centrist groups on the other 
hand (Volodymyr Filenko for New Ukraine , Valerii Khmel'ko for the 
PDRU, Oleksandr Stoian for the Federation of Ukrainian Trade Unions, 
and Volodymyr Pylypchuk, Chairman of the Supreme Council 
Committee on Economic Reform) proposed that 'Ukraine should use 
certain advantages of its participation in the CIS'; while the Left 
(Oleksandr Moroz for the SPU, Serhii Dovhan for the PPU, and M. 
Petrun for the Ukrainian Society of War Veterans) declared that Ukraine 
should 'sign the Statute and stay in the CIS by all means'.
In the tense build-up to the summit, the URP was the first to 
announce the creation of 16 regional branches of an 'Anti-Imperial Anti- 
Communist Front' on 16 January 1993, an initiative also supported by 
Mykola Porovs'kyi, now Deputy Chairman of the CNDF.62 After a 
spectacular volte-face by Chornovil, who declared that in such a 
situation of crisis Rukh would now support President Kravchuk and 
participate in the new coalition,163 a common front of all Ukrainian 
nationalist parties from the UNA to Rukh was established at the 
'Forum' of the 'Anti-Communist Anti-Imperial Front (ACAIF) in Kiev 
on 21 February 1993, attended by 4,000 delegates from 30 political parties 
and organisations.^^ Ivan Drach was persuaded out of his semi- 
retirement to head the ACAIFs Coordinating Council.
The limits to such a common front, however, were immediately 
apparent. New Ukraine , the PDRU and other centrist groups, however, 
kept their distance from the ACAIF, arguing that the threat of a 
communist revanche in Ukraine was exaggerated, and that the creation 
of the ACAIF would only serve to widen the gap between Western and 
Eastern Ukraine (although the New Ukraine organisations in Odesa,
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Chernihiv, Donets'k and Kiev joined their local A C A I F ) . 65 Stepan 
Khmara's UCRP, rather more idiosyncratically, also refused to join, 
arguing that nationalists should not be uniting behind the President, 
when Kravchuk himself was in fact the main threat to Ukraine's 
independence.^^ Chornovil, meanwhile, objected to the presence of the 
UNA and UNSO.67
However, so long as the atmosphere of political crisis continued, 
Rukh and the CNDF at least were forced to work more closely together. 
A joint meeting of the two in March 1993 resulted in pledges to 
cooperate together in the face of the mounting danger from Russia, and 
evidence of growing public disillusion with all political forces,68 and 
both supported a declaration by the Coordinating Council of the ACAIF 
in March calling on President Kravchuk to 'prevent the destabilisation 
of the situation in the whole Russian Federation....from spreading to 
Ukraine' by taking 'urgent measures to strengthen the state borders of 
Ukraine', and after 'suspending the plenary sessions [of the Supreme 
Council], considering the growing confrontation in Parliament', 'set up 
an Anti-crisis Committee under the President involving representatives 
of state administrations, deputies' factions, political parties and 
associations'.69 Interestingly, Rukh had now persuaded the CNDF to 
support its call, however unrealistic, for the dissolution of the Supreme 
Council. The CNDFs opposition to new elections had previously been 
predicated on the national communists’ loyalty to the new state, and it 
was therefore prepared to signal to the national communists the 
conditionality of their support, in so far as many former CPU Deputies 
now appeared to be backsliding on several crucial issues.
Conclusion
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The ACAIF was unlikely to prove a permanent organisation, but it 
did demonstrate the potential for the consolidation of Ukraine’s 
nationalist forces, especially under the threat of serious conflict with 
Russia. In the absence of such conflict, however, it seemed that the split 
between the CNDF and Chornovil's Rukh was likely to prove 
permanent. The split seriously weakened the nationalist camp at an 
inopportune moment. Chapters 2 and 4 demonstrated the cap on the 
level of public support reached for the nationalists in 1990-91 (around 25- 
33% of the population, mainly in Western and Central Ukraine), hence 
the split was extremely ill-timed at a time when leftist and Eastern 
Ukrainian groups were beginning to gain in strength.
9. CONCLUSION
The achievements of Rukh and the nationalist political parties in 
1988-92 were considerable. They helped to push the national 
communists into a declaration of independence and to separate from the 
USSR without bloodshed. Thereafter considerable progress was made 
towards the consolidation of a nation-state with its own political 
institutions and Armed Forces.
However, these successes were not obtained by transcending the 
historical and regional weaknesses of the Ukrainian national movement 
outlined in Chapter 1, or the organisational problems of the political 
parties described in Chapter 2. As in other post-communist states, 
Ukrainian political parties continued to struggle to influence the 
political process. In many respects, moreover, parties were relatively 
weaker in Ukraine than elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
Although nationalist parties had by 1990-91 created a strong base in 
Western Ukraine (especially in Galicia), and amongst the intelligentsia 
in Kiev and other main urban centres in Central Ukraine, Chapters 1 
and 2 described the geographical and social limits of the nationalists' 
influence. The detailed analysis of individual parties in Chapters 3-7 
then confirmed this picture. Nationalism had little or no appeal in 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine (the most populous areas of Ukraine), 
and outside oblast centres and university towns in Central Ukraine 
(Right and Left Bank). As argued in Chapter 1, this reflected the sharp 
regional differences in Ukraine bequeathed by history, and the fact that 
the main support group for Ukrainian nationalism, the new cultural 
intelligentsia, was both small in numbers and geographically 
concentrated.
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Outside of Galicia, where an entire nationalist civil society existed, 
Kiev and a handful of large Central Ukrainian towns, the mainstay of 
the nationalist movement tended to be teachers and white collar 
workers, who were not capable of challenging the social dominance of 
local ex-communist elites in the same manner as the Kiev intelligentsia. 
Throughout this broad swathe of Ukrainian territory, the old guard 
remained in place.
Apart from in Galicia, and to a lesser extent in Volyn'-Polissia, the 
nationalist parties had virtually no impact on the countryside. Chapter 7 
described the difficulties of forming a rural nationalist party in Ukraine 
(the UPDP). Unlike many Central European countries, where the 
experience of collectivisation was much shorter, there is only a limited 
base for rural nationalism in Ukraine. Chapter 7 also discussed the 
difficulties faced by nationalists in trying to establish a Christian 
nationalist party in Ukraine. Unlike Catholic Lithuania or Poland, deep 
inter-confessional differences exist within Ukraine, and the most 
religious region of the country, Galicia, is strongly atypical and of a 
different faith, Uniate Catholicism, to the country's Orthodox majority.
Chapter 4 demonstrated that Rukh and the nationalist parties could 
not command more than 25-33% of the national vote even at the peak of 
their popularity in the elections and referenda of 1990-1. Moreover, 
Chapters 3-7 demonstrated how all nationalist parties, even the URP and 
DPU, remained small, even after independence, and failed to expand 
their support significantly in 1991-2. Most suffered from stagnant or 
falling membership. The work as a whole has shown how frequent 
squabbles and splits within this nationalist bloc were throughout this 
period. Chapter 6 described how even the UNA, which sought to 
transcend the traditionally limited appeal of Galician nationalism by 
organising amongst radical youth and adopting a populist programme to
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attract unskilled workers disoriented by growing economic chaos, had 
only partial success, unlike similar xenophobic populists elsewhere in 
Europe (such as Meciar in Slovakia or Milosevic in Serbia). Finally, 
Chapter 8 described how attempts to reestablish unity within the 
nationalist camp in 1992 had only partial success.
It has to be pointed out therefore, that independence was due as 
much to the extraordinary process of imperial collapse in Gorbachev's 
USSR and to the role played by Kravchuk's national communist group 
as to the internal strengths of the national movement.* In this respect, 
Ukraine occupied the middle ground between the Baltic republics where 
the nationalist opposition was sufficiently powerful to take power on its 
own, and the Central Asian republics where local national communists 
easily dominated relatively weak oppositions.
From early 1991 Ukrainian politics was dominated by the interplay 
between three roughly equal groups; traditional communists, national 
communists and the nationalists. The centre group - Kravchuk’s 
national communists - governed by maintaining alliances with one or 
both of the other groups. Kravchuk had one foot in both camps, that of 
the nationalists and the former apparatchiki . After independence and 
the formal dissolution of the CPU, the nationalists attempted to 
persuade Kravchuk to forge a closer alliance with them and cut his ties 
with the old guard, but Kravchuk was too aware of the nationalists' 
limited strength, and their lack of progress in 1991-2 in extending their 
support, especially after the implosion of Rukh in March 1992. 
Therefore, although he moved sharply to the right in 1992, Kravchuk 
never fully embraced the nationalists' cause. The creation of the CNDF 
in August 1992 represented the second attempt by pro-Presidential 
nationalists to persuade Kravchuk to jump ship, but it remained too
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amorphous a structure to rival the resources of the ex-communist 'party 
of power'.
Therefore, because of the self-limiting nature of the nationalists' 
support, the defence of Ukrainian statehood continued to depend on the 
national communist group. In fact, Kravchuk's delicate balancing act 
between nationalists and the old guard, Russophone groups in Eastern 
Ukraine and a revivalist left wing became even more difficult after the 
summer of 1992, as the latter grew in strength; reducing the likelihood 
that the national communists would risk an alliance with the 
nationalists alone. This left the nationalists dangerously dependent on 
the national communists, whose commitment to the national cause had 
yet to be tested in a serious confrontation with Russia, or amidst a make- 
or-break economic crisis at home and/or the head-on collision between 
Western and Eastern Ukraine that economic collapse made increasingly 
likely. In a comparative perspective, the Soviet Union's imperial 
economy was centralised to an extraordinarily high degree, which made 
the economic costs of escape that much higher than in other cases of de­
colonisation, thus making the Ukrainian nationalists' task even harder.
The work has also demonstrated how the nationalist parties were 
unable significantly to expand the appeal of nationalism into Eastern and 
Southern Ukraine in 1990-92. Most Eastern and Southern Ukrainians 
voted for independence for pragmatic economic reasons in 1991, and 
therefore Ukraine’s subsequent economic collapse risked placing severe 
strain on their relatively tenuous loyalty to the state.
Nevertheless, the nationalist parties took their chances well in the 
political vacuum that developed in 1990-91, and were instrumental in 
forcing the CPU to split and give birth to the national communist group 
which led Ukraine to independence. From August 1991 until mid-1992 
the conditions remained favourable for nationalist parties to set the
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political agenda, as Ukraine's new leaders concentrated on building the 
institutions of a nation-state and charting an independent foreign and 
defence policy.
Thereafter Russophone and neo-socialist groups began to catch up on 
their late start and become politically organised. After a period of relative 
political quiescence in 1990-92, growing economic difficulties, the 
severance of ties with Russia and the rise of ethnic nationalism in 
Western Ukraine prompted Eastern and Southern Ukrainians to find 
their feet again and create their own political organisations (see Chapter 
2).2 The nationalists' failure to achieve a hegemonic position in 1990-92 
bade ill for the prospects of future stability if relations with Ukraine’s 
near 40% Russophone population were to become a serious problem, 
especially as the radicalisation of the nationalist camp in 1990-92 had 
further increased the distance between the two groups.
Because the Ukrainian national movement was well-aware of its 
minority position at the time it was first organising itself in 1988-9, it was 
widely realised that a commitment to dvic nationalism was necessary to 
broaden its appeal outside of Western Ukraine. This lesson had in fact 
been learned at an earlier period, by some sections of the OUN in 1943, by 
the shestydesiatnyky  movement of the 1960s, and the Helsinki 
movement of the 1970s. Therefore the discontinuity between the late 
1980s and the militant Ukrainian nationalism of the 1930s and early 
1940s was partly an illusion. Moreover, if the OUN and UP A had been 
largely peasant organisations confined to Western Ukraine, the national- 
dissident movement of the 1960s and 1970s was more broadly-based 
geographically, spreading to Kiev and other urban centres in Central 
Ukraine, whilst its leadership mainly came from the new intelligentsia 
that, paradoxically, was a product of Soviet socio-economic
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development. The same was true of Rukh and the nationalist parties 
that began to appear in 1988-90. This early phase of the modern 
Ukrainian nationalist movement therefore was characterised by 
moderation, and a surprising degree of success in uniting Ukraine's 
disparate regions and ethnic groups.
However, the intelligentsia's commitment to civic nationalism began 
to fray at the edges with the general radicalisation of the nationalist 
mood in 1990-92. Many nationalists became frustrated with their failure 
to win outright control of the state, and with the slow pace of 
Ukrainianisation. Many felt that so much damage had been done to the 
Ukrainian language and culture in the Soviet period, that only 
accelerated and forcible Ukrainianisation would ensure the survival of 
the Ukrainians as an ethnic group.
Chapter 4 described how Rukh , which began its life as a 'general 
democratic' movement in 1989, adopted a specifically nationalist 
programme in 1990. Even though the fourth Rukh congress in 
December 1992 reaffirmed the movement’s commitment to civic 
nationalism, its  programme was noticeably more radical, and Rukh’s 
relatively moderate leaders were loosing ground to Valentyn Moroz’s 
radical 'Nationalist Bloc' in the nationalist stronghold of L’viv. 
Moreover, Rukh lost many of its leading members in the summer of 
1992 to the CNDF. The CNDF continued to pay lip-service to the civic 
principles inherited from the 1960s, but its guiding principle was 'the 
national character of Ukrainian statehood’, and a growing sense of 
frustration with the national communists' failure to Ukrainianise the 
state.
The same sense of frustration animated both the main parties on the 
right, the URP and DPU. Chapters 3 and 5 described the progressive 
radicalisation of both parties over 1990-92. When the two parties were
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founded in 1990, the URP's roots in the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, and 
the DPU’s intelligentsia leadership and desire to function as an all- 
Ukrainian party were powerful forces for moderation. However, by 1992 
both parties stood on a common platform of a strong, unitary national 
state, with a foreign and defence policy committed to the aggressive 
defence of national interests. The two parties were still prepared to 
accommodate ethnic minorities in the Ukrainian state, but were equally 
clear that the interests of the indigenous ethnic Ukrainian population 
should always be the first priority of the state. The DPU was always less 
of an ethnidst party than the URP, but its organisational weaknesses 
tended to force it to accept the URP’s lead. The URP consequently tended 
to dominate the CNDF.
Moreover, the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the mainstream 
nationalist parties were unable to prevent the growth of ultra-radical 
parties in 1990-92 as disillusion with the established parties grew. The 
main such ultra-nationalist organisation was the UNA, described in 
Chapter 6, while its smaller rivals were covered in Chapter 7. Such 
groups contributed little to expanding overall levels of nationalist 
support, largely in fact having the opposite effect, but were able to slowly 
expand their influence within the nationalist camp at the expense of the 
more moderate parties.
As argued in Chapter 1, a key reason why civic nationalism failed to 
take root throughout Ukraine was that the new Ukrainian intelligentsia 
remained both relatively thin on the ground and unevenly distributed 
throughout Ukraine. The new intelligentsia was not a Western style 
middle-class, socially dominant because of property ownership and the 
control of business and the professions. Its control over its own 
constituency was limited to the force of moral example and cultural
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prestige. Moreover, this constituency was relatively small, as in most of 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine, and throughout rural society (Galicia 
excepted) traditional ex-communist elites continued to dominate. 
Moreover, the conditions identified in Chapter 1 as encouraging the 
development of ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe had not been fully 
transcended by the process of socio-economic change in Soviet Ukraine. 
It remained distinctly possible that inter-ethnic tension within Ukraine 
could dramatically increase as the economic situation deteriorated, in the 
event of a serious conflict between Ukraine and Russia, or if the national 
communists began to backtrack on their commitment to the national 
cause.
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T o ta l i t a r ia n is m  , (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 
especially Chapter 6.
2 On the rise of Eastern Ukrainian parties, see Andrew Wilson, The 
Growing Challenge to Kiev From the Donbas Challenges Kiev', R F E /R L  
R esearch  R e p o rt , Vol. 2, No. 33, 20 August 1993.
ABSTRACT for the PhD submission
Modern Ukrainian Nationalism:
Nationalist Political Parties in Ukraine 1988-1992 
by Andrew Wilson
1. Civic and Ethnic Nationalism. Political Parties, the Intelligentsia and the State, 
The opening chapter considers the theoretical distinction between the ideal- 
types of civic and ethnic nationalism, and the argument that the latter is more 
common in Eastern Europe. The history of the Ukrainian nationalist 
movement in the twentieth century is then analyzed. Social and political 
changes in Ukraine since the 1940s are then examined with a view to 
considering whether the conditions that fostered ethnic nationalism in the 
1940s have been transcended. This was found to be only partially the case. 
Therefore, the oft-stated commitment of modern Ukrainian nationalists to civic 
nationalism is likely to prove precarious. The historical factors limiting the 
appeal of Ukrainian nationalism throughout the twentieth century are found 
still to exist.
2. The Development of Party Politics in Ukraine. 1988-1992. Different stages in the
development of political pluralism in Ukraine are distinguished. The 
nationalist movement is therefore placed in a broader context. The difficulties 
in establishing strong political parties and a civil society in post-communist 
Ukraine are examined.
3. The Prisoners' Party. From the Ukrainian Helsinki Union. 1988-1990 to the 
Ukrainian Republican Party. 1990-1992. The main nationalist party. Its roots in
the dissident movements of the 1960s and 1970s are examined, then a brief 
history of the period 1988-92 is provided, demonstrating how the party became 
in practice an ethnicist party. Key themes in the party's history are examined, 
such as commitment to parliamentary politics, attitude to ethnic minorities, 
defence and foreign policy. The same themes are then picked up in later 
chapters.
4. Rukh - Ukraine's Popular Front. When first formed in 1989, Rukh was a broad- 
based movement, uniting nationalists, liberals, 'general democrats', and reform 
communists; but over 1990-1 it gradually fell under the control of the nationalist 
element. In 1992 Rukh was weakened by repeated splits and by the rise of 
extreme nationalism within its ranks.
5. The Party of the Intelligentsia. The Democrats. If the Republican party was led by
former dissidents and political prisoners, the Democratic Party was led by 
prominent members of the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia. They, more than 
any other group, were nominally commited to civic nationalism. However, 
Chapter 5 demonstrates how they swung sharply to the right in 1990-2 to adopt 
political positions little different to those of the Republicans. By 1992, the two 
parties were contemplating merger.
6. The Street Party. The Ukrainian National Assembly. The revival of open ethnic 
nationalism was also demonstrated by the formation of the Ukrainian Inter- 
Party Assembly in 1990 (which became the UNA in 1991) encompassing all 
political parties to the right of the Republicans. The UNA's ideology and tactics 
are examined, as is the paramilitary movement it founded in 1991. The 
prospects for a radicalisation of public opinion leading to a sharp rise in the 
fortunes of the UNA are analyzed.
7. Smaller Groups, Ethnic Nationalists and Others. Further evidence for the rise of 
ethnic nationalism is provided by the study of ultra-right fringe parties. Most 
such parties remain small and their influence is mainly confined to Western 
Ukraine. However, their existence demonstrates the impatience of many 
nationalists with the politics of compromise, and their creation provided more 
mainstream parties with competition, helping to shift the latter to the right.
8. Nationalist Splits and Coalitions. Given the weaknesses described in Chapter 2, 
the nationalist parties have made various attempts to combine their strength. 
However, the nationalist camp split in 1992 and two rival coalitions were 
formed.
9. Conclusions. The main findings of the thesis are firstly, that, despite a strong 
revival in the late 1980s, the Ukrainian nationalist movement was unable to 
win majority support in Ukraine. Secondly, partly in response to this failure, 
and because many of the conditions identified by Kohn and others as likely to 
foster the development of ethnic nationalism still hold true, most nationalist 
political parties swung sharply to the right in 1990-2. This bade ill for the future, 
as it promised to encourage sharp polarisation in Ukrainian society.
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